Decision criteria do not shift: Commentary on Mueller and Weidemann (2008)

The effects of base rates and payoffs on the shapes of rating receiver operating characteristic curves are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of signal detection theory (SDT), in particular the notion of a shifting decision criterion. Mueller and Weidemann (2008) propose that these unexpected phenomena are not due to problems with the decision- criterion construct but are instead due to two compounded effects: instability of the decision criterion across trials, and even greater instability in the flanking criteria that determine which confidence rating will be reported. There are several problems with the authors’ decision-noise hypothesis. First, even if their hypothesis about decision noise were taken for granted, the key feature of the ratings data that rejects the SDT model would remain a mystery. Second, the same violations of SDT that are exhibited in the ratings paradigm are also exhibited in the yes-no detection task when response time is substituted for confidence as a basis for analysis. Finally, the decision-noise hypothesis predicts that sensitivity will increase when one source of this variation-the response on a previous trial-is controlled for. This prediction was consistently violated in both the yes-no and ratings conditions of Mueller and Weidemann’s experiment. In an Addendum, we respond to Weidemann and Mueller’s (2008) reply to this Comment.     

Reaching a Decision: A Reply to Oaksford

In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is the psychological process of reaching decision: externalisation methods provide a means of exploring this process and of assessing the value of Bayesian approaches.     

Questions of criteria: Reply to Peterzell (1997)

In a reply to our report on hemispheric differences in processing band-pass filtered letters (Christman, Kitterle, & Niebauer, 1997), Peterzell (1997) argues that our results are not attributable to hemispheric asymmetries in spatial frequency processing. Rather, Peterzell argues that factors such as response criteria and stimulus visibility can account for our results. We argue that our results are attributable (at least in part) to hemispheric asymmetries in spatial frequency processing, while at the same time we acknowledge the potential influence of other factors in the determination of hemispheric differences.     

Lexical Decision Paradigms do not Differentiate between Fearful and Non-fearful Individuals

Thirty-two spider-fearful, 33 blood/injury/injection fearful, and 28 non-fearful individuals (N = 93) participated in dual-task study. Participants were presented with blood, spider, neutral, positive and pseudo-word stimuli while having to also verbally identify numbers as either even or odd. Blood-fearful individuals responded slower than spider and non-fearful individuals. However, there was no interaction of group membership with stimuli type. This study replicates the results of two previous studies that have used a lexical decision task in an effort to differentiate between fearful and non-fearful individuals and found no significant differences between these two groups on this task. These results suggest that the lexical decision task in general may not be sensitive enough to elicit processing differences in non-clinical samples.     

To do or not to do: desirability and consistency mediate judgements of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.     

The development of perceptual averaging: learning what to do,not just how to do it

The mature visual system condenses complex scenes into simple summary statistics (e.g., average size, location, orientation, etc.). However, children, often perform poorly on perceptual averaging tasks. Children's difficulties are typically thought to represent the suboptimal implementation of an adult‐like strategy. This paper examines another possibility: that children actually make decisions in a qualitatively different way to adults (optimal implementation of a non‐ideal strategy). Ninety children (6–7, 8–9, 10–11 years) and 30 adults were asked to locate the middle of randomly generated dot‐clouds. Nine plausible decision strategies were formulated, and each was fitted to observers' trial‐by‐trial response data (Reverse Correlation). When the number of visual elements was low (N < 6), children used a qualitatively different decision strategy from adults: appearing to “join up the dots” and locate the gravitational center of the enclosing shape. Given denser displays, both children and adults used an ideal strategy of arithmetically averaging individual points. Accounting for this difference in decision strategy explained 29% of children's lower precision. These findings suggest that children are not simply suboptimal at performing adult‐like computations, but may at times use sensible, but qualitatively different strategies to make perceptual judgments. Learning which strategy is best in which circumstance might be an important driving factor of perceptual development.     

Different task success criteria affect expectancies of success but do not improve golf putting performance

This study examined how providing different criteria for success affected perceived expectations of success, performance, and learning in a golf-putting task. Twenty-nine physical education students were divided into three experimental groups: (a) a large-circle (LC) group that practiced 10 blocks of five putts, each with a 40 cm diameter circle around the target; (b) a small circle (SC) group that practiced with a 10 cm diameter circle around the target; and (c) a control (C) group that practiced with a 25 cm diameter circle around the target. Forty-eight hours after practice, the participants performed a retention test and a transfer test with a 25 cm diameter circle. The transfer test included putting from a greater distance and from a different angle. Throughout the study, we asked the participants to tell us what they think their chances are to land 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 balls out of 5 possible balls in each block. There were four main findings: (a) the SC group had lower expectancies of success compared with the LC and C groups in acquisition; (b) there were no group differences in performance or learning among groups; (c) golf club kinematic parameters worsened in the transfer test; and (d) the LC group reduced their expectancies of success from the retention to the transfer test, but the expectancies of the SC and C groups remained the same. We conclude that changes in success criteria affect expectancies of success but do not affect actual putting performance or learning.     

Normative Reasons are not Good Bases: a Reply to Gregory

Philosophia - In a recent paper, Gregory defends the claim that a normative reason is a good basis for Φ-ing. He claims that a “basis” is what is commonly known as a motivating...     

Cues that chimpanzees do and do not use to find hidden objects

Chimpanzees follow conspecific and human gaze direction reliably in some situations, but very few chimpanzees reliably use gaze direction or other communicative signals to locate hidden food in the object-choice task. Three studies aimed at exploring factors that affect chimpanzee performance in this task are reported. In the first study, vocalizations and other noises facilitated the performance of some chimpanzees (only a minority). In the second study, various behavioral cues were given in which a human experimenter either touched, approached, or actually lifted and looked under the container where the food was hidden. Each of these cues led to enhanced performance for only a very few individuals. In the third study – a replication with some methodological improvements of a previous experiment – chimpanzees were confronted with two experimenters giving conflicting cues about the location of the hidden food, with one of them (the knower) having witnessed the hiding process and the other (the guesser) not. In the crucial test in which a third experimenter did the hiding, no chimpanzee found the food at above chance levels. Overall, in all three studies, by far the best performers were two individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans. It thus seems that while chimpanzees are very good at “behavior reading” of various sorts, including gaze following, they do not understand the communicative intentions (informative intentions) behind the looking and gesturing of others – with the possible exception of enculturated chimpanzees, who still do not understand the differential significance of looking and gesturing done by people who have different knowledge about states of affairs in the world. Received: 8 November 1999 / Accepted after revision: 24 January 2000     

How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act

If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan (2011) argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as a fact about the agent’s state of being, provides an additional normative reason to act to alleviate the state. This, I argue, is not correct, nor is it the best way to understand emotions as reason-reinforcers. In this paper, I thus do two things: I provide an examination of how and why the affect of emotion could provide reasons to act to alleviate it and I propose that the real way emotions reinforce reasons is through the way they orient our attention onto things that matter, registering them as salient.     

Decision noise may mask criterion shifts: Reply to Balakrishnan and MacDonald (2008)

J. D. Balakrishnan and J. A. MacDonald (2008) argue that RTbased measures of signal detection processes provide evidence against signal detection theory’s notion of a flexible decision criterion. They argue that this evidence is immune to the alternative explanation proposed by S. T. Mueller and C. T. Weidemann (2008), that decision noise may mask criterion shifts. We show that noise in response times can produce the same effects as are produced by noise in confidence ratings. Given these results, the evidence is not sufficient to categorically reject the notion of a flexible response policy implemented through shifts in a decision criterion. nt]mis|This research was supported in part by a postdoctoral fellowship to C.T.W. from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).     

Why not find out whether religious beliefs predict surgical outcomes? If they do, why not find out why? Reply to Freedland (2004).

In this reply to K. E. Freedland's (see record 2004-13299-002) comments on R. J. Contrada et al. (see record 2004-13299-001), it is shown that the statistical issues he raised, and his preferred interpretation of the findings, were adequately addressed in the original article. It is argued that methodological limitations also were fully characterized and do not differ in kind from those of biomedical studies. Other issues discussed include the merits of focusing on distal versus proximal causation, plausibility of explanatory mechanisms for health effects of religious involvement, and potential practical applications that do not require manipulation of religious involvement. The article is concluded by commenting on subtle aspects of discourse that may unnecessarily polarize discussions of possible physical health effects of religious involvement.     

What preschool children do and do not do with ungrammatical word orders

Akhtar [J. Child Lang. 26 (1999) 339.] found that when 4-year-old English-speaking children hear novel verbs in transitive utterances with ungrammatical word orders (e.g., Elmo the tree meeked), they correct them to canonical SVO order almost all of the time. However, when 3-year-olds and older 2-year-olds hear these same utterances, they waver between correcting and using the ungrammatical ordering. In the current study, we adapted this task for children at 2;4, using an intransitive construction. The major finding was that children corrected the noncanonical word order less than half as often as Akhtar's 2-year-old subjects who were approximately 4 months older. At the same time, however, children showed in several ways that they had some implicit understanding of canonical SV order; for example, they used the novel verb which they heard used in grammatical word order more often than the novel verb which they heard in ungrammatical word order, and they consistently used pronouns and the progressive –s auxiliary in appropriate ways. The current findings thus contribute to a growing body of theory and research suggesting that the ontogenetic emergence of linguistic categories and schemas is a gradual process, as is the emergence of categories in other domains of cognitive development.     

A parent-report scale of behavioral inhibition: Validation and application to preschool-age children who do and do not stutter

PurposeThis two-part (i.e., Study 1, Study 2) study investigated behavioral inhibition (BI) in preschool-age children who do (CWS) and do not (CWNS) stutter. The purpose of Study 1 was to develop the Short Behavioral Inhibition Scale (SBIS), a parent-report scale of BI. The purpose of Study 2 was to determine, based on the SBIS, differences in BI between CWS and CWNS, and associations between BI and CWS’s stuttering frequency, stuttering severity, speech-associated attitudes, and stuttering-related consequences/reactions.MethodParticipants in Study 1 were 225 CWS and 243 CWNS with the majority of them being included in Study 2. In Study 2, a speech sample was obtained for the calculation of stuttering frequency and severity, and the parents of a subset of CWS completed the Communication Attitude Test for Preschool and Kindergarten Children Who Stutter (Vanryckeghem & Brutten, 2007), and the Test of Childhood Stuttering Disfluency-Related Consequences Rating Scale (Gillam, Logan, & Pearson, 2009).ResultsStudy 1 analyses indicated that SBIS is a valid and reliable tool whose items assess a single, relatively homogeneous construct. In Study 2, CWS exhibited greater mean and extreme BI tendencies than CWNS. Also CWS with higher, compared to CWS with lower, BI presented with greater stuttering frequency, more severe stuttering, greater stuttering-related consequences, and more negative communication attitudes (for CWS older than 4 years of age).ConclusionFindings were taken to suggest that BI is associated with early childhood stuttering and that the SBIS could be included as part of a comprehensive evaluation of stuttering.     

Rapid reacquisition of native phoneme contrasts after disuse: you do not always lose what you do not use

Infants attune to their birth language during the second half of infancy. However, internationally adopted children are often uniquely required to attune to their birth language, and then reattune to their adoptive language. Children who were adopted from India into America at ages 6-60 months (N = 8) and had minimal further exposure to their birth languages were compared to age-matched American non-adopted controls. Without training, neither group could discriminate a phonemic contrast that occurs in their birth language but not in English. However, after training on the contrast, the adopted group (N = 8) improved significantly and discriminated the contrast more accurately than their non-adopted peers. While English had explicitly replaced the birth language of the adopted sample, traces of early exposure conferred privileges on subsequent learning. These findings are consistent with behavioral and neurophysiological data from animals that have identified some of the mechanisms underlying such a 'retention without further use' phenomenon.