Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.     

A critique of humanitarian reason: agency,power, and privilege

This paper offers a critical analysis of the work of western humanitarian NGOs operating in the African continent. We argue that in most cases, NGOs and their supporters are deaf to the actual wants, needs, and desires – or, in other words, the agency – of those they are trying to aid. We do this by first offering a series of ways of understanding the ideological commitments that inform the work of many humanitarian NGOs and those who donate to them. In this, we expose the reasons leading to the failure of such individuals and organizations to recognize and take account of the agency of those they seek to help. Second, we offer evidence of the problematic outcome of this failure when coupled with a lack of recognition of the wider context of many of the conflicts that lead to the suffering of those that such NGOs intend to aid. In doing this, we expose the ways in which an NGO's own position can reinforce and contribute to the continuance of this suffering. This, we argue results from the simplified, inaccurate, and de-politicized ways in which NGOs tend to portray the problem of suffering both to those they solicit for donations and in their own conception of the problems and the ‘moral’ role that the organization itself plays in its work.     

Beyond ‘voice’, beyond ‘agency’, beyond ‘politics’? Hybrid childhoods and some critical reflections on children's emotional geographies

In this paper I argue that a significant proportion of research on children's emotional geographies has been deployed to reinforce the importance of children's ‘voices’, their (independent) ‘agency’, and the various ways in which voice/agency maybe deemed ‘political’. Without wishing to dismiss or dispense with such approaches, I explore potential ways to go ‘beyond’ concerns with voice/agency/politics. Initially, I review studies of children's participation (and participatory methods), activism and everyday lives that mobilise emotion and affect in productive ways. I contrast such studies with important questions raised by a reinvigoration of interest in the need for children to be able to represent themselves. I then explore the possibilities raised by so-called ‘hybrid’ conceptions of childhood – which go beyond biosocial dualisms – to enable further strides beyond voice/agency. Drawing on examples from alternative education and contemporary attachment theories, I explore some potential implications for children's emotional geographies and relational geographies of age of what I term ‘more-than-social’ emotional relations. Yet I do not offer an unequivocal endorsement of these hybrid emotions. Thus, I end the paper by issuing some words of caution – both in terms of the critical questions raised by more-than-social emotional relations, specifically, and in terms of engendering broader debate about how and why scholars do (children's) emotional geographies.     

Attributing Agency to Automated Systems: Reflections on Human–Robot Collaborations and Responsibility-Loci

Many ethicists writing about automated systems (e.g. self-driving cars and autonomous weapons systems) attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human–robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think.     

‘So you did what you wanted then’: Discourse analysis,personal agency,and psychotherapy

This paper explores issues concerning personal agency in discursive psychology and discourse analysis, with a particular emphasis on agency in terms of motivational accounts of the person. Issues are discussed in relation to the efficacy, acceptability, and accessibility of discourse analytic research for the practising psychotherapist. We suggest that such an approach may raise problems in four areas. First, we argue that without explicit theorization of the subject as language user, discourse analysis may be vulnerable to the charge of determinism. Second, theorization of the subject as language user may be required to account successfully for individual consistency and continuity of identity. Third, although claiming to critique commonsense notions of subjectivity, implicit dualist assumptions facilitate a reading of discursive psychology that is compatible with a motivational model of the person. Finally, we argue that discursive psychology itself implies a particular model of the strategically motivated language user. We conclude that, although these issues require clarification, discursive psychology and discourse analysis have much to offer psychotherapy research.     

Conceptual Structure and the Emergence of the Language Faculty: Much Ado about Knotting

Abstract

One perspective in contemporary linguistic theory defends the idea that the language faculty may result from the combinations of diverse systems and principles. As a case study, I critique a recent proposal by Juan Uriagereka and colleagues according to which the evolutionary emergence of the language faculty can be identified through studying the computational structure of knots as present within the fossil record. I here argue that the ability to conceptualize and, thereby, create knots is not parasitic on the ability to conceptualize and create language. On the contrary, these two domains are entirely distinct, unrelatable in terms of their computational complexity, expressive power or, most importantly, in terms of their requisite mental operations and principles. The overall approach defended here can profitably be employed in the study of the relationship between language and thought, as I briefly discuss in the case of the role of language in spatial reorientation.     

Does Science Influence the Logic we Ought to Use: A Reflection on the Quantum Logic Controversy

In this article I argue that there is a sense in which logic is empirical, and hence open to influence from science. One of the roles of logic is the modelling and extending of natural language reasoning. It does so by providing a formal system which succeeds in modelling the structure of a paradigmatic set of our natural language inferences and which then permits us to extend this structure to novel cases with relative ease. In choosing the best system of those that succeed in this, we seek certain virtues of such structures such as simplicity and naturalness (which will be explained). Science can influence logic by bringing us, as in the case of quantum mechanics, to make natural language inferences about new kinds of systems and thereby extend the set of paradigmatic cases that our formal logic ought to model as simply and naturally as possible. This can alter which structures ought to be used to provide semantics for such models. I show why such a revolution could have led us to reject one logic for another through explaining why complex claims about quantum mechanical systems failed to lead us to reject classical logic for quantum logic.     

Cares,Identification, and Agency Reductionism

Reductionists about agency maintain that an agent's causing something is reducible to states and events involving the agent causing something. Some worry that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self‐determination. One reductionist answer to this worry, which I call ‘identification reductionism,’ contends that self‐governing agents are identified with certain attitudes, and so these attitudes causing a decision count as the agent's self‐determining the decision. I argue that a prominent species of identification reductionism developed by Harry Frankfurt, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jeffrey Seidman, and David Shoemaker – according to which an agent is identified with his (deepest) cares – is inadequate.     

Cerebral asymmetry: motoring on

I argue that the phylogenetic and neurobiological bases for cerebral asymmetry in humans are likely to be found in motor systems rather than in perceptual systems. Current genetic models of human laterality suggest that a `dextral' allele might be responsible for right-handedness and left-cerebral dominance for speech in the majority of humans. The linking of handedness with language lateralization might reflect the early evolution of language as predominantly a system of manual gestures, perhaps switching to a mainly vocal system only with the emergence of Homo sapiens. So-called `mirror neurons' in the prefrontal cortex of the monkey, which fire both when the animal makes a grasping response and when it sees the same response performed by others, might be part of a circuit that is the precursor to language circuits in the brain. This circuit appears to be bilateral in monkeys, but left-hemispheric in humans.     

EXPLAINING EMERGENCE: TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF LEVELS

The vitalism/reductionism debate in the life sciences shows that the idea of emergence as something principally unexplainable will often be falsified by the development of science. Nevertheless, the concept of emergence keeps reappearing in various sciences, and cannot easily be dispensed with in an evolutionary world-view. We argue that what is needed is an ontological non reductionist theory of levels of reality which includes a concept of emergence, and which can support an evolutionary account of the origin of levels. Classical explication of emergence as “the creation of new properties” is discussed critically, and specific distinctions between various kinds of emergence is introduced for the purpose of developing an ontology of levels, framed in a materialistic and evolutionary perspective. A concept of the relation between levels as being inclusive is suggested, permitting the “local” existence of different ontologies. We identify, as a working hypothesis, four primary levels and explicate their nonhomomorphic interlevel relations. Explainability of emergence in relation to determinism and predictability is considered. Recent research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems represents a revival of the scientific study of emergence, and we argue that these recent developments can be seen as a step toward a final “devitalisation” of emergence.     

Decoherence and the Copenhagen cut

While it is widely agreed that decoherence will not solve the measurement problem, decoherence has been used to explain the “emergence of classicality” and to eliminate the need for a Copenhagen edict that some systems simply have to be treated as classical via a quantum-classical “cut”. I argue that decoherence still relies on such a cut. Decoherence accounts derive classicality only in virtue of their incompleteness, by omission of part of the entangled system of which the classical-appearing subsystem is a part. I argue that this omission is only justified by implicit classical assumptions that objectify a subsystem and are employed via either a traditional Copenhagen cut or a functionally equivalent imposition of separability on a system in a non-separable state. I argue that decoherence cannot derive classicality without assuming it in some other form, and I provide an analysis of when it is appropriate to make these otherwise implicit classical assumptions by adopting a minimalistic Copenhagen-style approach to measurement. Finally, I argue that, ironically, the conditions for making these assumptions may be better satisfied in standard measurement situations than in cases of environmental monitoring.     

Communicative Feedback in language acquisition

Children start to communicate and use language in social interactions from a very young age. This allows them to experiment with their developing linguistic knowledge and receive valuable feedback from their – often more knowledgeable – interlocutors. While research in language acquisition has focused a great deal on children's ability to learn from the linguistic input or social cues, little work, in comparison, has investigated the nature and role of Communicative Feedback, a process that results from children and caregivers trying to coordinate mutual understanding.In this work, we draw on insights from theories of communicative coordination to formalize a mechanism for language acquisition: We argue that children can improve their linguistic knowledge in conversation by leveraging explicit or implicit signals of communication success or failure. This new formalization provides a common framework for several lines of research in child development that have been pursued separately. Further, it points towards several gaps in the literature that, we believe, should be addressed in future research in order to achieve a more complete understanding of language acquisition within and through social interaction.     

Understanding reading as a form of language-use: A language game hypothesis

Reading research and research on conversation have followed different paths: While the research program for reading committed itself to a relatively static view of language, where objective text properties serve to elicit specific effects on cognition and behavior of a reader, research on conversation has embraced a language-use perspective, where language is primarily seen as a dynamic, context dependent process. In this essay I contrast these two perspectives, and argue that in order to reach a unified understanding of natural language – be it reading, talking, or conversing – one needs to adopt a language-use perspective. Furthermore, I describe how reading can be seen as a form of language-use, and how the current landscape of research on reading can be re-interpreted in terms of a dynamic, context-sensitive perspective on language. In particular, I propose that the concept of ‘language games’ serves as a good starting point to conceive reading as a form of language-use, describe how one can derive first concrete hypotheses by re-interpreting reading in terms of language games, and show how they can be readily operationalized using tools from dynamic systems analysis.     

Modeling continuity and discontinuity in utterance length: a quantitative approach to changes, transitions and intra-individual variability in early grammatical development

The confluence of an anomaly such as a growth spurt or a temporary regression on the one hand and a temporary increase in intra-individual variability on the other hand, forms a strong indicator of a major transition in early language development. Data concern one-word (W1), two- and three-word (W2-3), and four-and-more-word (W4+) utterances from two French children during their second and third years. A dynamic growth model was fitted, based on a structure of supportive, conditional and competitive relationships. Using a statistical simulation method, we showed two striking peaks of variability in addition to a temporary regression or rapid growth in the proportions of W1, W2-3 and W4+ utterances. We argue that these phenomena show transitions corresponding to critical points in grammatical development, which could be indicative of the emergence of simple combinatorial and syntactic stages of language successively. Our results emphasize the relevance of time-serial data and of intra-individual variability in the study of developmental transitions in general.     

What Must We Mean By “Community”? A Processive Account

The term "community" in ethics and bioethics traditionally has been used to designate either a specific kind of moral relationship available to rational agents or, in contrast, the context in which any sense of rational agency can even be understood. I argue that bioethics is better served when both "selves" and "community" are expressed through a more processive language that highlights the functional character of such concepts. In particular, I see the turn to "processive" community in bioethics as a turn towards method, contextualization, and narrative. In clinical practice, such a processive account demands that bioethics concentrate on methods of developing healthy dialogue and deeper understanding from within the problematic situation rather than trying to "fix" problems using ethical tools developed from outside the present situation. "Community," I argue, is in and of the interactive processes of inquiry itself. Such inquiry, such "communitying," requires that we engage individual patients in context; it demands more than simply gaining their permission or mere consent; it demands developing a supportive environment for participation.     

Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today's Debate on Divine Action

Various authors within the contemporary debate on divine action in nature and contemporary science argue both for and against a Thomistic account of divine action through the notions of primary and secondary causes. In this paper I argue that those who support a Thomistic account of divine action often fail to explain Aquinas' doctrine in full, while those who argue against it base their objections on an incomplete knowledge of this doctrine, or identify it with Austin Farrer's doctrine of double agency – again failing to do Aquinas justice. I analyse these objections, indicating how they do not address Aquinas' doctrine by offering a brief but full account of the latter.     

Emergence in physics

In this paper we intend to examine whether there are examples for emergence to be found in physics. The answer depends on the concept of emergence one invokes. We distinguish two such concepts, those of Broad and Kim. We will argue that it is unlikely that there will be examples with respect to the former because it runs counter to an explanatory strategy that is both well entrenched in physical practice and to a certain degree flexible. On the other hand we will argue that all those physical systems that provide an example for supervenience are at the same time examples for emergence - at least if one defines emergence the way Kim does.     

The shape of thought

When children learn the name of a novel object, they tend to extend that name to other objects similar in shape – a phenomenon referred to as the shape bias. Does the shape bias stem from learned associations between names and categories of objects, or does it derive from more general properties of children's understanding of language and the world? We argue here for the second alternative, presenting evidence that the shape bias emerges early in development, is not limited to names, and is intimately related to how children make sense of categories.     

A Dynamical Systems Approach to the Development and Expression of Female Same-Sex Sexuality

ABSTRACT— Researchers have documented substantial variability in the development and expression of same-sex sexuality, especially among women, posing challenges to traditional linear developmental models. In this article, I argue for a new approach to conceptualizing the development and expression of female same-sex sexuality over the life course, based in dynamical systems theory. Dynamical systems models seek to explain how complex patterns emerge, stabilize, change, and restabilize over time. Although originally developed by mathematicians and physicists to model complex physical phenomena in the natural world, they have increasingly been applied to social-behavioral phenomena, ranging from motor development to cognition to language. I demonstrate the utility of this approach for modeling change over time in female same-sex sexuality, reviewing extant published research and also introducing data collected from an ongoing, 10-year longitudinal study of young nonheterosexual women. I provide evidence that female same-sex sexuality demonstrates the emblematic features of a dynamical system: nonlinear change over time, spontaneous emergence of novel forms, and periodic reorganizations and phase transitions within the overall system. I highlight the specific contribution of a dynamical systems perspective for understanding such phenomena and suggest directions for future study.     

The Senses Considered as One Perceptual System

ABSTRACT

J. J. Gibson (1966) rejected many classical assumptions about perception but retained 1 that dates back to classical antiquity: the assumption of separate senses. We suggest that Gibson's retention of this assumption compromised his novel concept of perceptual systems. We argue that lawful, 1:1 specification of the animal–environment interaction, which is necessary for perception to be direct, cannot exist in individual forms of ambient energy, such as light, or sound. We argue that specification exists exclusively in emergent, higher order patterns that extend across different forms of ambient energy. These emergent, higher order patterns constitute the global array. If specification exists exclusively in the global array, then direct perception cannot be based upon detection of patterns that are confined to individual forms of ambient energy and, therefore, Gibson's argument for the existence of several distinct perceptual systems cannot be correct. We argue that the senses function as a single, irreducible perceptual system that is sensitive exclusively to patterns in the global array. That is, rather than distinct perceptual systems there exists only 1 perceptual system.