“WHITE CRISIS” AND/AS “EXISTENTIAL RISK,” OR THE ENTANGLED APOCALYPTICISM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In this article, I present a critique of Robert Geraci's Apocalyptic artificial intelligence (AI) discourse, drawing attention to certain shortcomings which become apparent when the analytical lens shifts from religion to the race–religion nexus. Building on earlier work, I explore the phenomenon of existential risk associated with Apocalyptic AI in relation to “White Crisis,” a modern racial phenomenon with premodern religious origins. Adopting a critical race theoretical and decolonial perspective, I argue that all three phenomena are entangled and they should be understood as a strategy, albeit perhaps merely rhetorical, for maintaining white hegemony under nonwhite contestation. I further suggest that this claim can be shown to be supported by the disclosure of continuity through change in the long‐durée entanglement of race and religion associated with the establishment, maintenance, expansion, and refinement of the modern/colonial world system if and when such phenomena are understood as iterative shifts in a programmatic trajectory of domination which might usefully be framed as “algorithmic racism.”     

INVESTIGATING THE “SCIENCE” IN “EASTERN RELIGIONS”: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

This article explores some of the understandings of “science” that are often employed in the literature on “science and Eastern religions.” These understandings crucially shape the raging debates between the avid proponents and the keen detractors of the thesis that Eastern forms of spirituality are uniquely able to subsume the sciences into their metaphysical–axiological horizons. More specifically, the author discusses some of the proposed relations between “science” and “Eastern religions” by highlighting three themes: (a) the relation between science and metaphysics, (b) the relation between science and experience, and (c) the European origins of science. The analysis of these relations requires a methodological inquiry into some of the culturally freighted valences of “science,” “metaphysics,” and “experience.”     

TWO TYPES OF “EXPLAINING AWAY” ARGUMENTS IN THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

This article discusses “explaining away” arguments in the cognitive science of religion (CSR). I distinguish two rather different ways of explaining away religion, one where religion is shown to be incompatible with scientific findings (EA1) and one where supernatural entities are rendered superfluous by scientific explanations (EA2). After discussing possible objections to both varieties, I argue that the latter way offers better prospects for successfully explaining away religion but that some caveats must be made. In a second step, I spell out how CSR can be used to spell out an argument of the second kind. One argument (“Bias Explaining Away”) renders religion superfluous by claiming that it results from a cognitive bias and one (“Adaptationist Explaining Away”) does the same by claiming religion was (is) a useful evolutionary adaptation. I discuss some strengths and weaknesses of both arguments.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.     

A NOTE ON THE POSSIBLE DETERMINANT OF “SPLIT REPRESENTATION” AS AN ARTISTIC STYLE

L'A. fait L'hypothèse que le dédoublement de la représentation, qui est caractéristique du style graphique de certaines cultures, provient d'une préférence universelle pour ce type de dessin chez les tout jeunes enfants de toutes cultures; mais dans la plupart des cultures, cette préférence serait supprimée parce que, paradoxalement, les dessins doubles ne permettent pas de reconnaître les objets dessinés aussi facilement que les dessins conventionnels qui sont plus proches de la projection rétinienne des objets. Les dessins avec enchaînement ou dédoublement de la représentation seraient conservés chaque fois qu'ils sont appréciés en tant que code utilisé à d'autres fins que L'information sur les objets peints et pour leur valeur esthétique.     

“SCIENCE,” “RELIGION,” AND “SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION” IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Many intellectuals wrote texts on the relations between Islam and science in the nineteenth‐century Ottoman Empire. These texts not only addressed the massive social and cultural changes the Empire was going through, but responded to European authors’ claims about the extent to which Islam was compatible with the modern world. Focusing on several texts written in the second half of the nineteenth century by the influential Muslim Ottoman authors Namik Kemal, Ahmed Midhat, and ?emseddin Sami, this article shows the influence of these exigencies on arguments on Islam and science. In order to represent Islam as a respectable religion in harmony with science, these intellectuals defined a “pure Islam” that was a set of basic principles that could be found in the Qur'an. Rather than an embedded way of life, Islam in these texts was an objectified, delimitable entity that could be imagined as having relations with other entities, such as science.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

PROGRAMMING “LOOSE TRAINING” AS A STRATEGY TO FACILITATE LANGUAGE GENERALIZATION

This study investigated the generalization of spontaneous complex language behavior across a nontraining setting and the durability of generalization as a result of programming and “loose training” strategy. A within-subject, across-behaviors multiple-baseline design was used to examine the performance of two moderately retarded students in the use of is/are across three syntactic structures (i.e., “wh” questions, “yes/no” reversal questions, and statements). The language training procedure used in this study represented a functional example of programming “loose training.” The procedure involved conducting concurrent language training within the context of an academic training task, and establishing a functional reduction in stimulus control by permitting the student to initiate a language response based on a wide array of naturally occurring stimulus events. Concurrent probes were conducted in the free play setting to assess the immediate generalization and the durability of the language behaviors. The results demonstrated that “loose training” was effective in establishing a specific set of language responses with the participants of this investigation. Further, both students demonstrated spontaneous use of the language behavior in the free play generalization setting and a trend was clearly evident for generalization to continue across time. Thus, the methods used appear to be successful for training the use of is/are in three syntactic structures.