FEMALE PARTNERS OF BISEXUAL MEN What They Don't Know Might Hurt Them

Individual interviews with 350 behaviorally bisexual men aged 18–30 revealed that 71% of their female sexual partners and 59% of their steady female sexual partners in the past 6 months had not been aware of their homosexual activity. Rates of nondisclosure were higher for African-American than White men. Compared to nondisclosers, men who disclosed to all their female partners were less self-homophobic and perceived their friends, families, and neighbors as more accepting of their homosexual behavior. Compared to men who had disclosed, the nondisclosers had more female partners and used condoms less consistently with women.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Psychological Tests Don't Think: An Appreciation of Schafer's Psychoanalytic Interpretation In Rorschach Testing

Roy Schafer 's Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing has, for nearly 40 years, represented a hallmark of psychodynamically informed psychological assessment. In this article, Schafer's contribution is reviewed in light of recent contributions to the Rorschach literature. Following a summary of the main sections of the work, Schafer's approach to the Rorschach is critically re-examined from the perspective of modem assessment practice. Differences between the epistemological bases of psychoanalytic and empirical methods of Rorschach interpretation are highlighted, and the prospects for an integration of these two approaches are considered. It is concluded that Schafer's contribution remains as fresh today as when written 40 years ago.     

What You Don't Know Can Help You: The Ethics of Placebo Treatment

Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly administer a placebo in a clinical setting? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are typically said to be ‘sham’ treatments, with no ‘active’ properties and so giving a placebo is usually thought to involve tricking or deceiving the patient who expects a genuine treatment. Nonetheless, some physicians have recently suggested that placebo treatments are sometimes the best way to help their patients and can be administered in an honest way. These physicians conclude that placebo treatments are a perfectly acceptable, and ethically unproblematic, mode of treatment. While I grant the common idea that placebos are deceptive is correct, I argue that widespread misunderstandings concerning why this is so has led proponents of placebo treatments to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Relating Personality and Creativity: Considering What and How We Measure

Creativity is a complex construct that is conceptualized and measured in multiple ways. This study examined the relationship between creativity and personality taking this into account. It was hypothesized that applying different conceptions and measures would cause variation in the creativity–personality relationship. The participants (N = 224) were undergraduate students and completed six creativity measures, a personality inventory, and a demographic questionnaire. Personality predicted more creative production (R² = .277) than creative potential (R² = .176) and more self‐reported creativity (R² = .348) than that which was externally rated (R² = .149). Openness was most consistently and strongly related to creativity, but other personality factors varied in their influence and some demonstrated suppression effects. Overall, the results suggest that despite relatively small effects of personality on creativity, there appear to be meaningful differences in the relationships depending on conception and measurement. Implications for educational settings and future research are discussed.     

What Counselors Should Know About the Use and Interpretation of Psychological Tests

The effective use of tests in counseling depends on the choice of appropriate tests for the particular individual and problem under consideration, as well as the proper interpretation of test scores and their integration within the total assessment process. The knowledge needed for these purposes is discussed with reference to, first, statistical and technical knowledge about tests, and second, substantive psychological knowledge about the behavior domain that the tests assess. Because of the rapid accumulation of knowledge in both areas, counselors need to keep abreast of current developments through continuing efforts to update their knowledge.     

The Predictive Validity of Ideal Partner Preferences in Relationship Formation: What We Know,What We Don't Know,and Why It Matters

A great deal of research on interpersonal attraction implicitly assumes that stated ideal partner preferences guide the mate selection, and therefore relationship formation, process. Nevertheless, recent research has yielded contradictory results. Whereas some research has failed to demonstrate that ideal partner preferences influence attraction to actual potential romantic partners, other studies have provided empirical evidence for the predictive validity of ideal partner preferences following interactions with potential romantic partners. A new meta‐analysis on the predictive validity of ideal partner preferences concluded that people may not preferentially pursue potential partners that more closely match their stated preferences. This conclusion has significant implications for several empirical literatures that have relied on self‐reported ideal partner preferences to test hypotheses. We demonstrate, however, that the majority of the research on the predictive validity of ideal partner preferences, and thus research included in this meta‐analysis, focuses on interpersonal attraction or later relationship processes and not on individuals transitioning into actual new relationships. We suggest that research that directly focuses on the transition into actual relationships is needed before firm conclusions can be made regarding the predictive validity of ideal partner preferences in the formation of new relationships.