Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

It's Personal—Or Not At All: On God as Love/r

Abstract : Henriksen discusses what it means that God is personal, with special regard to the claim that God is love. If God is love, God must be understood as personal. This approach is related to different elements concerning human life and human freedom, and how to engage in human life. Also the radical alternative is suggested: instead of understanding God as love, the alternative is considered that death is God (as the final and strongest power there is). This alternative shows that it is the most likely interpretation of actual human conduct to opt for the alternative that God is love. Hence, to understand God as love is part of what it means to relate humanely and with hope to what is taking place in human life.     

The Right to Strike and the Right to Work

ABSTRACT L. J. MacFarlane has contended that the right to strike is a keystone of democratic society. The right to strike is a right to free expression, association, assembly and power. And the right to strike is dependent upon the right to employment. MacFarlane denies that the right to employment is a universal right. I argue that unless the right to work is indeed universal MacFarlane's main contention is false. Forced unemployment is, amongst other things, the denial of full citizen status, for the range of liberties that constitutes the right to strike is essential to full participation in democracy. It is only when the traditional liberty-rights of free expression and striking are seen as being based upon such recipient rights as rights to media space and time and upon the right to work, that they can play their proper democratic role. This conception of those rights is missing from the work of Rawls and Nozick as well as from MacFarlane.     

A response to Dr Anthony Daniels

One of the sources of the diversity within psychotherapy is the conceptualization of the body. There are three main ways in which the body is seen. These correspond to three levels within the Wilber (1996) structural model. At level 1 the body is seen as something quite separate from the mind. We can treat the mind independently and leave the body to other specialists, such as medical doctors. If we do deal with the body, it is only in an external and behavioural way. At level 2 the body is seen as integrated with the mind, and the client is encouraged to see it this way too. One of the aims is bodymind unity. The body is continually referred to, and may be touched or asked to go through certain motions as part of the therapy. At level 3 the body is seen as the site for symbolic representations of divine archetypes, and reference is made to the subtle body. Both mind and body are seen as part of something greater, the soul. All three of these approaches are to be found within psychotherapy. It is argued that, unless these divisions are taken seriously, psychotherapy will remain confused. It is already confusing to others. By removing this particular form of confusion, it will be easier for psychotherapists to know what they are doing, and the scope and limits of their own particular orientation. Of these three versions of the body, the third is probably the least well known, but is growing the fastest. More lengthy attention is therefore paid to that.     

Relating therapy with individuals, couples and families

This paper introduces a theoretical system within which relating behaviour may be defined, classified and measured. It is emphasized that a person both relates to and is related to by others. Relating may be of a positive or negative kind, and it is argued that the object of psychotherapy is both to eliminate the person's negative relating and enable the person to tolerate the negative relating of others. The term 'interrelating' is used to refer to the combination of relating and being related to of two people. Couple therapy is aimed at correcting the negative interrelating of partners, and family therapy is aimed at improving the interrelating of pairs of family members. A set of questionnaires based upon the theoretical system is introduced. These measure the negative relating of individuals and negative interrelating between individuals, and are proposed as useful adjuncts to individual, couple and family therapy.     

论亚里士多德的善

善是存在的本体。它是幸福。最完美的幸福是沉思。对于这种活动,人们不能够言说（称赞）。善是好。好是主体的私意的表达。这意味着善依据于主体的自愿、私意,并能够带来欢乐。善是真它陈述了现象的关系。真仅仅关注现象而不是作为存在的真正的善因此,真的善其实并不真。     

World Government,Social Contract and Legitimacy

Abstract

The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.     

Formal operations and simulated thought

For reasons internal to the concepts of thought and causality, a series of representations must be semantics-driven if that series is to add up to a single, unified thought. Where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. There is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. It doesn't matter how perfect the simulation is; nor does it matter how reliable the causal mechanism involved is. Where semantics is inert, there is no thought. In connection with this, this paper also argues that a popular doctrine—the so-called ‘computational theory of mind’ (CTM)—is based on a confusion. CTM is the view that thought-processes consist in ‘computations’, where a computation is defined as a ‘form-driven’ operation on symbols. The expression ‘form-driven operation’ is ambiguous, and may refer either to syntax-driven operations or to morphology-driven operations. Syntax-driven operations presuppose the existence of operations that are driven by semantic and extra-semantic knowledge. So CTM is false if the terms ‘computation’ and ‘form-driven operation’ are taken to refer to syntax-driven operations. So if CTM is to work, those expressions must be taken to refer to morphology-driven operations. But, as previously stated, an operation must be semantics-driven if it is to qualify as a thought. Thus CTM fails on every disambiguation of the expressions ‘formal operation’ and ‘computation’.     

Skeptical theism and value judgments

One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an assumption that is prevalent in much of the literature concerning the problem of evil, and show that it is a factor in motivating commitment to the implication I mean to question. I argue that the assumption is false, and that once it is rejected there is room to endorse the skeptical theist’s strategy in responding to some arguments from evil without endorsing the putative implication that objectors find unacceptable.     

The morality of weapons research

I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as ‘defensive’ weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.     

A Guide to Thinking about Emergence

A basic survey of the issues that arise in discussing emergence is presented, together with suggestions on how the concept should be approached. Emergence is an alternative to reductionism. The emergence story invites us to see that nothing transcends nature like nature itself; it is a radically new way to think about the natural order, and it reshapes our ideas of matter. Special attention is given to the idea of meaning in life. Three options are discussed for thinking about the meaning of life: that it is fundamental to the nature of things, that it is an illusion, and that it is an emergent property of matter. The third option is favored—that the universe has no telos, and yet makes possible the spontaneous emergence of purpose. Caution is advised against exploiting the idea of emergence. The most important task is to understand the science of emergence and only then to move into interpretations from the humanities and theology.     

Neocortical and hippocampal activation relation to behavior: effects of atropine, eserine, phenothiazines, and amphetamine.

Evidence is presented to suggest that the hippocampus receives 2 nonspecific inputs from the brainstem, each capable of producing rhythmical slow activity. The neocortex appears to receive 2 similar inputs, each capable of producing low voltage fast activity. One input to both hippocampus and neocortex is blocked by atropine and stimulated by eserine, and is essentially unrelated to concurrent motor activity. A second input to both hippocampus and neocortex is resistant to atropine, is depressed by phenothiazines, and is activated by d-amphetamine. Activity in this system is closely related to concurrent "voluntary" movement.     

LIVING WITH THE WICKED PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Outlining the characteristics of “wicked” and “super‐wicked” problems, climate change is considered as a global super‐wicked problem that is primarily about the future. Being global‐ and future‐oriented makes climate change something we have to learn to live with but cannot expect to solve. Because the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) is a multidisciplinary society that yokes the natural and social sciences with values, it is in a position to explore strategies for living with climate change—exemplified by the articles in this section. Finally, asking “who/what is in charge,” it is suggested that in a dynamically interrelated and evolving world no one is. It is important to distinguish between good that is already created and the creative interactions that give rise to new good. In order to live with climate change, our primary orientation should be to live with the creativity that has created and continues to create our life on Planet Earth—since we are not able to know what the future holds.     

探测认知发展的非连续性:思路与方法

认知发展是连续性的还是非连续性的是发展心理学中一个重要理论问题.目前研究者逐渐认识到发展既有连续性的也有非连续性的,因而关键的问题是什么情况下是非连续性的,什么情况下是连续性的.该问题的回答与非连续性的检测标准有很大关系.本研究详细介绍了考察发展非连续性的三种思路和方法:量表图分析和多重任务法;Rasch模型分析和Saltus模型分析;突变理论的应用.最后,强调了影响发展非连续性问题探讨的一些因素.     

Some Features of Promises and their Obligations

Promises raise two main philosophical problems, one moral and the other conceptual. The moral problem concerns the normative significance of promising: what is the nature and basis of the obligations and rights to which promises typically give rise? The conceptual problem is to say what a promise is: what is involved in making a promise? In this paper I defend three controversial claims about promising. One is about the moral problem of promising, one is about the conceptual problem, and the last one is about the relationship between my conceptual claim and my moral claim. My conceptual claim is that a speaker makes a promise only if he communicates an intention to undertake an obligation to the hearer. (I refer to this as the “Obligation Conception Thesis.”) My moral claim is that the obligations typically attached to promises are such that they can be acquired only by those who communicate an intention to undertake an obligation. (I refer to this as the “Voluntary Obligation Thesis.”) My third claim is that if the Obligation Conception Thesis is true, the Voluntary Obligation Thesis is true.     

Links between grievance, complaint and different forms of entitlement

The author argues that different kinds of object relationships underlie the phenomena of grievance and complaint. Grievance is addressed to an object held responsible for a failure of idealisation, and the object is scolded or punished for this failure. Nursing grievance can restore the ideal object in phantasy and block mourning the ideal. With pathological grievance the self is seen as ideal and awareness of dependence on the libidinal other is denied, as are the passage of time and the transience of experience. An attitude of narcissistic entitlement to be special and exempt from ordinary reality is seen as intrinsic to the more persistent and pathological forms of grievance, and this narcissistic entitlement fuels grievance. Turning to complaint, the author argues that complaint is addressed to an object that is less idealised; there is more open acknowledgement of the need for and dependence on the other to realise liveliness. Complaint is the voice of the authentic lively self and intrinsic to complaint is a sense of lively entitlement. The author presents clinical material to illustrate these themes, and to show movement between complaint and grievance. Some technical difficulties in working with grievance are discussed.     

The analyst's anxieties in the first interview: Barriers against analytic presence

To answer the questions: why don't more people enter analysis and how do we get more people to do so? Attention is drawn to anxieties in the analyst that become obstacles to the initiation of analysis. The main focus of the paper is how to understand why analysts, irrespective of patient characteristics, seem to have resistances against embarking on analysis. Being a meeting between strangers the consultation activates strong emotional reactions in both parties. One way of coping is defensively to diagnose, assess and exclude instead of being present as an analyst. The analytic frame of a consultation is ambiguous, and a secure analytic function is needed in order to meet the openness and unpredictability of this frame. A fragile psychoanalytic identity is seen as central to analysts' failure to create an analytic practice; it takes years to develop and maintain a robust analytic function, and analytic work continues to cause disturbing emotional reactions in the analyst. Analysts' vulnerable identity is also linked to the history of psychoanalysis that has fostered an ideal of analytic practice that is omnipotent and impossible to reach. Therefore it is no wonder that attempts to reach a convinced recommendation of analysis can become diverted in the process of consultation. Confronting these inner impediments in order to strengthen the analytic identity is suggested as a better way to get more analytic patients than to keep looking for so‐called analysability in patients.     

Questioning Hermeneutics with Freud: How to interpret dreams and mute-speech in Sikh scripture

This paper begins to question the interpretive endeavor when it is applied to the Adi Granth. The text itself expresses a view that the ‘world is a dream’ and that there is real difficulty in communicating the truth about reality, since it is like a mute person who enjoys, but is unable to express, the taste of his sweet; that is the sweetness of the mystic experience. I raise the question: what is hermeneutics to this situation? How is one to interpret a dream and a text that is the ‘speech’ of a mute person? Traditional hermeneutic theories (conservative, moderate and critical) do not seem to cater for this problematic since they do not concern themselves with the unconscious, the sub-text, the dreams underlying waking thought. I thus turn to Freud to gain clues about the interpretation of dreams, and thus attempt a preliminary radicalization of hermeneutic theory. It is suggested that perhaps a reversal is required where dreams precede worldly reality, and interpretation is a sign of delusion, obviously locating and implicating this very text within the very problematic it attempts to illuminate. Beyond this ironic tautology I ask: could there be a self that does not dream and does not interpret?     

What is the question you need to answer? How consultation can prevent professional systems immobilizing families

Consultation to an outside agency is an important part of the work of departments of child and adolescent psychiatry. This article describes and illustrates one particular approach to such consultations based on the principles of structural family therapy. It is premised on the belief that outside agencies have the capacity to arrive at a decision which is in the best interest of their clients. To do this the agency needs to define what is the question they need an answer in order to make a decision regarding their client. The consultants' role is to clarify what decision the consul tee agency needs to make by following up the question, What is the question you need to answer? How this question is followed up is discussed.     

两类常见的类别变量调节效应分析

类别变量在心理学和其他社科研究领域经常遇到,当自变量或调节变量为类别变量时,应当如何分析调节效应呢？详述了多类别变量的被试间设计和两水平被试内设计（因变量重复测量2次）的调节效应分析方法,并给出了分析流程。先进行调节效应的显著性检验,后用选点法或Johnson-Neyman法进行简单斜率检验。多类别变量被试间设计的简单斜率检验是先进行整体检验,后进行配对检验。用两个实际例子演示如何进行类别变量的调节效应分析,最后展望了两类设计的类别变量调节研究的拓展方向,例如更复杂的类别变量的调节模型等。