Reaction of mock jurors to testimony of a court appointed expert

A study was conducted to assess the impact of court appointed experts on the judgments of mock jurors. A civil proceeding was adopted for the experiment. Mock jurors heard testimony about a plaintiff's injury in an automobile accident. In some conditions, medical testimony for the plaintiff and defendant was provided by experts hired by each side. In other conditions, a medical expert appointed by the court testified in addition to the two adversarial experts. In one of these conditions, the court expert sided with the plaintiff; in another, the expert sided with the defendant. The plaintiff in the case was always an individual. The defendant was sometimes a corporation and sometimes an individual. The results showed that mock jurors sided with the court appointed expert in every condition except when the expert favored a corporate defendant. The results were discussed in terms of heuristic processing of persuasive information.     

Confession evidence,psychological vulnerability and expert testimony

There have been major changes in English Law with regard to confession evidence, which followed the implementation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in January 1986. This paper reviews the main legal changes that are relevant to the admissibility and reliability of confessions and their psychological importance within the context of both research and expert testimony.     

Predicting the present: expert testimony and civil commitment

This article uses the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert as an opportunity to address a chronic concern regarding the disparity between mental health law as officially enunciated and the practical application of that law. After Daubert, admissibility of expert evidence under the federal rules requires a qualified expert, a reliable basis for the testimony, and relevance to the legal issue. Ongoing psychological research pursues empirical data that expands the scope of psychological expertise and clarifies its limits. This article addresses the requirement of relevance by examining the logical relationship between the psychologist's actuarial and clinical expertise and the legal issues addressed by the court in civil commitment proceedings. Ideally, Daubert might stimulate a process of cooperative analysis in which psychologists and lawyers clarify the proper roles of psychological experts and of the courts with which those experts interact. This article begins that project by clarifying the legal determination required in civil commitment proceedings and by explicating the relationship between the responsibilities of experts and those of courts.     

Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability before and after Daubert: the state of the law and the science

This article examines the legal and scientific issues inherent in the use of expert psychological testimony on the factors that affect eyewitness reliability. First, the history of the use of such expert testimony is traced. Next, we look at the criteria that state and federal courts have used in determining whether to admit such testimony, as well as the grounds upon which the testimony has been excluded. We then examine the Daubert decision and discuss its implications for the use of expert eyewitness testimony. We conclude by reviewing eyewitness research and research on jury decision-making that is likely to assume new importance in the post-Daubert era.     

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

Past research has shown that counterfactual (“If…then…”) thoughts influence causal and responsibility attribution in the judicial context. However, little is known on whether and how the use of counterfactuals in communication affects lay jurors' and judges' evaluations. In two studies, we asked mock lay jurors (Study 1) and actual judges (Study 2) to read a medical malpractice case followed by an expert witness report, which included counterfactuals focused on either the physician, the patient, or external factors. Results showed that counterfactual focus had a strong effect on both lay jurors' and judges' causal and responsibility attributions. Counterfactual focus also moderated the effect of outcome foreseeability on responsibility attribution. Discussion focuses on how counterfactual communication can direct causal and responsibility attribution and reduce the importance of other factors known to influence judicial decision‐making. The potential implications of these findings in training programs and debiasing interventions are also discussed.     

Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The admissibility of expert testimony regarding malingering and deception

This article discusses the legal admissibility of expert testimony and the ability of mental health professionals to detect malingering and deception among defendants. A legal analysis of the admissibility of expert testimony regarding malingering and deception in formal legal proceedings is presented. Some guidelines are provided to help mental health professionals and attorneys determine the admissibility of evidence they intend to introduce. Although psychologists and psychiatrists currently have a limited ability to identify accurately malingering and deception, expert testimony about the genuineness of a defendant's mental illness is likely to be held admissible for both practical and evidentiary reasons. In contrast, evidence about a witness' credibility is rarely admissible. In addition, psychologists are ethically obliged to recognize their limitations in making representations about their skills.     

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the expert's testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.     

Judicial gatekeeping and the social construction of the admissibility of expert testimony

Content analysis of 192 U.S. District Court cases was conducted to investigate judges' evaluations of expert characteristics and evidence characteristics for toxicology, psychological/psychiatric, and damages testimony. Judges evaluated more expert characteristics, but not more evidence characteristics, as the number of months post-Daubert increased (Hypotheses 1 and 2). More evidence characteristics were evaluated when evidence was quantitatively rather than qualitatively based (Hypothesis 3). The greatest number of evidence characteristics examined was for toxicology evidence (Hypothesis 4). Fewer expert characteristics were evaluated for admissible evidence, but more evidence characteristics were evaluated for inadmissible evidence (Hypothesis 5). All analyses were significant at .05. Implications for judges, attorneys, and experts are discussed.     

‘The witness who saw, /he left little doubt’: a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence—especially when mental disability is an issue—raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (‘cherry picking’ evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context—in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bias and expert testimony of mental health professionals in adversarial proceedings: A preliminary investigation

The role of mental health professionals testifying as expert witnesses has been the subject of increasing criticism. Cases in which opposing experts reach different conclusions are dismissed as “battles of the experts” and psychologists and psychiatrists are described as “hired guns.” This preliminary, analogue study examined the degree to which the opinions and testimony of mental health professionals may differ according to which side retains the expert. Results provided some support for the proposition that mental health professionals' testimony may vary according to the side by which they are retained.     

Legal realisms: on law and politics

The focus of this work is the issue of whether, and to what extent, the nature of the law is affected by politics, has been taken up by the American and Scandinavian legal realists. By the very fact of their being products of␣the socio-political conditions of the most recent century, the American and Scandinavian legal realisms are the movements that have most explicitly and systematically brought to the surface one particular characteristic phenomenon of contemporary Western legal systems: the existence of two basic forces simultaneously attracting and repelling, affecting the law in its relations with the political world.I would like to deeply thank Brian Bix, Laura Carlson, Roger Cotterrell and Jori Munukka for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors remaining are my own.     

Of witches,madmen, and products liability: An historical survey of the use of expert testimony

The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Mewell Dour Pharmaceutical Inc. has focused attention on judicial treatment of expert testimony. A survey of the development of the forensic use of such testimony helps to explain the salient characteristics of modem American practice. The survey, in the context of medical experts, discloses a several centuries long trend toward an adversarial approach that places selection, preparation, and presentation of expert witness testimony ever more completely in the hands of the litigants. This trend has been challenged since at least the 1800s by those desiring an inquisitorial alternative featuring court's witnesses or neutral panels of experts. These proposals have generally been rejected. Daubert represents a modest step in the direction of greater judicial control of the presentation of expert evidence but raises questions about the evenhandedness of heightened judicial scrutiny of proffered expert testimony.     

Determining dangerousness in sexually violent predator evaluations: cognitive-experiential self-theory and juror judgments of expert testimony

Past research examining the effects of expert testimony on the future dangerousness of a defendant in death penalty sentencing found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony and tend to devalue scientific actuarial testimony. This study was designed to determine whether these findings extend to civil commitment trials for sexual offenders and to test a theoretical rationale for this effect. In addition, we investigated the influence of a recently developed innovation in risk assessment procedures, Guided Professional Judgment (GPJ) instruments. Consistent with a cognitive-experiential self-theory based explanation, mock jurors motivated to process information in an experiential condition were more influenced by clinical testimony, while mock jurors in a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. Participants responded to clinical and GPJ testimony in a similar manner. However, participants' gender exerted important interactive effects on dangerousness decisions, with male jurors showing the predicted effect while females did not. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.