Whenis category learning holistic?

Ward and Scott (1987) recently provided evidence consistent with the idea that category learning can occur analytically whether that learning takes place under intentional or incidental conditions and whether the learner is an adult or a young child. Kemler Nelson (1988) raised concerns about Ward and Scott’s conclusions as well as about the logic of some of their arguments. Kemler Nelson also attempted to strengthen the argument that incidental learning conditions induce a less strategic approach to tasks, which necessarily results in a holistic mode of processing. The present paper answers Kemler Nelson’s concerns. It also presents arguments in favor of the idea that incidental learning is neither necessarily holistic nor necessarily analytic. It is argued that tasks, whether intentional or incidental, encourage the participant to process particular types of information. If the task encourages or demands the processing of separate features, then that type of information will be stored whether or not the participant was explicitly asked to learn the category membership of presented items. There are varieties of both intentional and incidental category learning, and what the learner does with the presented material is more important than his/her intent to learn. Furthermore, it is argued that the apparently discrepant results discussed by Kemler Nelson and Ward and Scott are all interpretable as specific cases within a more general episodic trace model of processing.     

Combination or Differentiation? Two theories of processing order in classification

Does cognition begin with an undifferentiated stimulus whole, which can be divided into distinct attributes if time and cognitive resources allow (Differentiation Theory)? Or does it begin with the attributes, which are combined if time and cognitive resources allow (Combination Theory)? Across psychology, use of the terms analytic and non-analytic imply that Differentiation Theory is correct—if cognition begins with the attributes, then synthesis, rather than analysis, is the more appropriate chemical analogy. We re-examined four classic studies of the effects of time pressure, incidental training, and concurrent load on classification and category learning (Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Shapiro, 1989; Ward, 1983). These studies are typically interpreted as supporting Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory, while more recent work in classification (Milton et al., 2008, et seq.) supports the opposite conclusion. Across seven experiments, replication and re-analysis of the four classic studies revealed that they do not support Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory—two experiments support Combination Theory over Differentiation Theory, and the remainder are compatible with both accounts. We conclude that Combination Theory provides a parsimonious account of both classic and more recent work in this area. The presented data do not require Differentiation Theory, nor a Combination–Differentiation hybrid account.     

Consistency and evidence

Williamson (2000) appeals to considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that all and only knowledge is evidence. It is argued here that the relevant considerations do not support this claim, and in fact conflict with it.     

Causal order does not affect cue selection in human associative learning

Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) presented evidence in support of the claim that cue selection does not emerge in “diagnostic” human learning tasks in which the cues are interpretable as effects and the outcomes as the causes of those effects. Waldmann and Holyoak argued that this evidence presents a major difficulty for associationist theories of learning and instead supports a “causal model” theory. We identify a number of flaws in Waldmann and Holyoak’s experimental procedures and report three new experiments designed to test their claim. In Experiment 1, cue selection was observed regardless of causal order and regardless of whether the cues were abstractly or concretely specified. In Experiments 2 and 3, cue selection was again observed when subjects predicted causes from effects. We conclude that our results are consistent with simple associationist theories of learning but contradict Waldmann and Holyoak’s causal model theory.     

Social learning in captive African elephants (Loxodonta africana africana)

Social learning is a more efficient method of information acquisition and application than trial and error learning and is prevalent across a variety of animal taxa. Social learning is assumed to be important for elephants, but evidence in support of that claim is mostly anecdotal. Using a herd of six adult female African bush elephants (Loxodonta africana africana) at the San Diego Zoo’s Safari Park, we evaluated whether viewing a conspecific’s interactions facilitated learning of a novel task. The tasks used feeding apparatus that could be solved in one of two distinct ways. Contrary to our hypothesis, the method the demonstrating animal used did not predict the method used by the observer. However, we did find evidence of social learning: After watching the model, subjects spent a greater percentage of their time interacting with the apparatus than they did in unmodeled trials. These results suggest that the demonstrations of a model may increase the motivation of elephants to explore novel foraging tasks.     

Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics

Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about (ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.

Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism

Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self‐interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some people's intentional actions are ultimately other‐regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that there are experiments that provide support for a theory called the ‘empathy‐altruism hypothesis’, which entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson's conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson's claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.     

Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?

What evidence could bear on questions about whether humans ever perceptually experience any of another’s mental states, and how might those questions be made precise enough to test experimentally? This paper focusses on emotions and their expression. It is proposed that research on perceptual experiences of physical properties provides one model for thinking about what evidence concerning expressions of emotion might reveal about perceptual experiences of others’ mental states. This proposal motivates consideration of the hypothesis that categorical perception of expressions of emotion occurs, can be facilitated by information about agents’ emotions, and gives rise to phenomenal expectations. It is argued that the truth of this hypothesis would support a modest version of the claim that humans sometimes perceptually experience some of another’s mental states. Much available evidence is consistent with, but insufficient to establish, the truth of the hypothesis. We are probably not yet in a position to know whether humans ever perceptually experience others’ mental states.     

Remembering kinds: new evidence that categories are privileged in children's thinking

What are the representations and learning mechanisms that underlie conceptual development? The present research provides evidence in favor of the claim that this process is guided by an early-emerging predisposition to think and learn about abstract kinds. Specifically, three studies (N = 192) demonstrated that 4- to 7-year-old children have better recall for novel information about kinds (e.g., that dogs catch a bug called “fep”) than for similar information about individuals (e.g., that a particular dog catches a bug called “fep”). By showing that children are particularly likely to retain information about kinds, this work not only provides a first empirical demonstration of a phenomenon that may be key to conceptual development but also makes it apparent that young children’s thinking is suffused with abstractions rather than being perceptually-based and concrete.     

用“你”表述物体的功能会抑制成因对归类的影响

已有研究显示物体的成因等变量会影响人造物概念的分类;但这种影响的中介变量为何,基于设计和基于用途的理论有不同的假设。实验采用物体自由命名任务,在陈述物体的功能时,操纵角色词的类型（旁观者“有人”和使用者“你”）,比较被试对物体的命名在领域水平的分类倾向。结果发现,呈现“旁观者”角色词时,呈现或不呈现物体自然形成的成因故事会造成不同的分类倾向;但是在呈现“使用者”角色词时,成因故事对分类倾向的影响消失了。提示物体的功能是成因和分类的中介变量,支持基于用途的人造物分类模型     

Of words,tools, and actions

The author rejects Leon Galis's claim (Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 2) that in ‘Of Words and Tools’ (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) he attacks a form of the ‘use’ theory of meaning that no one has held. Galis's other claim, that the author criticizes a needlessly weak form of the theory, is found to be justified, but the author argues that his procedure was adequate, and parallel to that oi Galis's own reconstruction of the ‘use’ theory in terms of ‘goal‐directed action’. Difficulties in this reconstruction are pointed out, and some meta‐semantic issues about theories of meaning raised.     

The Lazy Person's Approach to Depiction

It has been argued (for example, by Nelson Goodman and John Hyman) that ‘depicts’ and similar terms such as ‘is a picture of’ and ‘represents’ are semantically ambiguous: sometimes they are two‐place predicates expressing a relation, and sometimes they are not. This article takes issue with this claim and develops an alternative theory according to which the ambiguity in question is pragmatic rather than semantic.     

Testability and Ockham’s Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction

Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is linked to minimizing expected predictive error. In contrast, formal learning theory appeals to Ockham’s razor, which it justifies by reference to the goal of enhancing efficient convergence to the truth. In this essay, I show that, despite their differences, statistical and formal learning theory yield precisely the same result for a class of inductive problems that I call strongly VC ordered, of which Goodman’s riddle is just one example.     

Imperfect epistemic duties and the justificational fecundity of evidence

Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties whatsoever. A theory of epistemic obligation based on Kant’s idea of an imperfect duty is outlined. It is suggested that such a theory is consistent with the inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence. Finally, one feature of our epistemic practice suggestive of the existence of imperfect epistemic duties is identified and promoted.     

Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination

Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two arguments. I provide support for Brueckner’s claim that the underdetermination argument is the more fundamental sceptical argument. I do so by responding to a challenge to this claim put forward by Stewart Cohen (“Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1, 1998). Cohen invokes an alternative epistemic principle which he thinks can be used to challenge Brueckner. Cohen’s principle raises interesting questions about the relationship between evidential considerations and explanatory considerations in the context of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. I explore these questions in my defence of Brueckner.     

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception*

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3‐D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.     

Alvin Plantinga on Paul Draper’s evolutionary atheology: implications of theism’s noncontingency

In his recently published Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, & Naturalism 2011 Alvin Plantinga criticises Paul Draper’s evolutionary argument against theism as part of a larger project to show that evolution poses no threat to Christian belief. Plantinga focuses upon Draper’s probabilistic claim that the facts of evolution are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, and with regard to that claim makes two specific points. First, Draper’s probabilistic claim contradicts theism’s necessary falsehood; unless Draper wishes to acknowledge that theism is necessarily true, his claim commits him to theism’s contingency and so sets him at odds with a mainstream that sees God’s existence as decidedly noncontingent. Second, Plantinga argues that Draper’s probabilistic claim is, even if true, overwhelmed by counterclaims about facts that are more likely on theism than naturalism. I argue this critique of Draper depends upon a serious error, and that Plantinga overlooks the full implications of his own presuppositions. Correcting these shortcomings shows that Plantinga’s own probabilistic-apologetics (e.g., the ‘Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism’) requires theism’s contingency no less than does Draper’s atheology.