Unintended embodiment of concepts into percepts: Sensory activation boosts attention for same-modality concepts in the attentional blink paradigm

This study shows that sensory priming facilitates reports of same-modality concepts in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants had to detect and report two target words (T1 and T2) presented for 53 ms each among a series of nonwords distractors at a frequency of up to 19 items per second. SOA between target words was set to 53 ms or 213 ms, with reduced attention expected for T2 under the longer SOA (attentional blink) and for T1 under the shorter SOA (lag-1 sparing). These effects were found but reduced when the sensory modality of the concepts matched that of a sensory stimulation occurring prior to the detection trial. Hence, sensory activation increased report for same-modality concepts. This finding reveals that grounded cognition effects (1) are involved in conceptual processing as soon as a word has reached the point of lexical identification and (2) occur independent of intentional access to sensory properties of concepts.     

The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

Social representation of aggression as an explanation of gender differences: A preliminary study

Academic theories of aggression can be dichotomized as expressive (in which aggression results from a failure of self control) or instrumental (in which aggression represents the exercise of control over others). We propose that the two sexes hold a parallel distinction in their social representations of aggression; women subscribe to an expressive model, men to an instrumental model. A 20-item questionnaire was generated by systematic comparison of the two theories with respect to their differential predictions concerning perceived social value, proximate causes, relevant emotions and congnitions, form, aim, social facilitators, and reputational aspects of aggression. Factor analysis indicated a first factor of expressive-instrumental aggression on which all items had significant loadings. A significant correlation (.46) was found between gender and questionnaire score confirming the hypothesis. The notion of gender-specific social representations is discussed in terms of its ability to coherently interpret patterns of differences in aggression found in experimental and observational studies.     

From anticipation to behavioral intention: Insights into human processing of multiple retrieval cues in road traffic

Anticipation in road traffic enables safer and more comfortable driving. Anticipatory driving is achieved through effective retrieval of prior driving-relevant knowledge using mental models and appropriate cues. Knowing when and which retrieval cues have a critical impact on the anticipation process and how information compatibility affects anticipation can be the basis for supporting people in anticipating and appropriate behavior in road traffic.For generating in-depth insights into the processing of retrieval cues, a video-based experimental study was conducted combining specific compatible and incompatible retrieval cues in urban driving scenarios. From a driver's perspective, participants were asked to anticipate in a two-step approach (measuring low and high certainty anticipation) whether a vehicle ahead would enter their lane or turn onto another street due to a lane blockage ahead. Further, they choose their preferred behavioral intention (accelerate, decelerate or maintain speed). In general, drivers strived for coherent situation representation, and in this process, multiple retrieval cues influenced anticipation in different ways. Participants were more likely to be consistent in their anticipation response. That is, they tend to follow their first intention (equivalent low and high certainty anticipation for either lane change or turn) even in the presence of incompatible stimuli. Inconsistent compared to consistent anticipation responses, however, led to reduced subjective confidence, and in part to increased criticality. Not only anticipation but also intended behavior was influenced by retrieval cues. In accordance, the anticipation of others' behaviors can be considered a predictor of specific intended behavior in road traffic.     

Post choice information integration as a causal determinant of confidence: Novel data and a computational account

Confidence judgments are pivotal in the performance of daily tasks and in many domains of scientific research including the behavioral sciences, psychology and neuroscience. Positive resolution i.e., the positive correlation between choice-correctness and choice-confidence is a critical property of confidence judgments, which justifies their ubiquity. In the current paper, we study the mechanism underlying confidence judgments and their resolution by investigating the source of the inputs for the confidence-calculation. We focus on the intriguing debate between two families of confidence theories. According to single stage theories, confidence is based on the same information that underlies the decision (or on some other aspect of the decision process), whereas according to dual stage theories, confidence is affected by novel information that is collected after the decision was made. In three experiments, we support the case for dual stage theories by showing that post-choice perceptual availability manipulations exert a causal effect on confidence-resolution in the decision followed by confidence paradigm. These finding establish the role of RT2, the duration of the post-choice information-integration stage, as a prime dependent variable that theories of confidence should account for. We then present a novel list of robust empirical patterns (‘hurdles’) involving RT2 to guide further theorizing about confidence judgments. Finally, we present a unified computational dual stage model for choice, confidence and their latencies namely, the collapsing confidence boundary model (CCB). According to CCB, a diffusion-process choice is followed by a second evidence-integration stage towards a stochastic collapsing confidence boundary. Despite its simplicity, CCB clears the entire list of hurdles.     

The interpretation of classically quantified sentences: a set-theoretic approach

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. We hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne's (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903/1988) lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions.     

Atheism is only skin deep: Geertz and Markusson rely mistakenly on sociodemographic data as meaningful indicators of underlying cognition

Cognitive scientists of religion and evolutionary theorists alike have been increasingly arguing in recent years that religion is “natural” in the sense of being motivated by core, evolved psychological intuitions. Atheism, and irreligion more generally, appear to pose problems for the naturalness hypothesis, especially considering the significant proportion of people in contemporary societies who reject supernatural beliefs. Although Geertz and Markusson clarify why the naturalness hypothesis does not imply religious determinism, they fail to weigh adequately the more conservative prediction, that of religious probabilism. Furthermore, unlike cognitive scientific accounts favoring the naturalness hypothesis, the authors base their arguments for the cultural scaffolding of atheistic cognition on sociodemographic data aloneda—source that is unlikely to be a meaningful reflection of “natural” underlying cognitive processes     

Atheism is only skin deep: Geertz and Markússon rely mistakenly on sociodemographic data as meaningful indicators of underlying cognition

Cognitive scientists of religion and evolutionary theorists alike have been increasingly arguing in recent years that religion is “natural” in the sense of being motivated by core, evolved psychological intuitions. Atheism, and irreligion more generally, appear to pose problems for the naturalness hypothesis, especially considering the significant proportion of people in contemporary societies who reject supernatural beliefs. Although Geertz and Markússon clarify why the naturalness hypothesis does not imply religious determinism, they fail to weigh adequately the more conservative prediction, that of religious probabilism. Furthermore, unlike cognitive scientific accounts favoring the naturalness hypothesis, the authors base their arguments for the cultural scaffolding of atheistic cognition on sociodemographic data alone—a source that is unlikely to be a meaningful reflection of “natural” underlying cognitive processes.