幸福的炼金术(一)CSSCISSCI

本书原名 ,汉语译名为《幸福的炼金术》。原书是波斯语,本文翻译自收集在 （《安萨里论文集》）中的阿拉伯语摘要版,简明扼要地概括了原书的主旨和精华。幸福是人类哲学、神学思考,社会、宗教实践的最终目的。有人认为幸福是美德,有人认为幸福是知识,有人认为幸福是享乐。在伊斯兰思想史中,普通人将幸福理解为今世的富足和后世的天堂。安萨里在本书中告诉我们,幸福是认识真主,直观真主的庄严和美,庄严表示真主本体的超越,美表示他属性的完满。实现幸福的途径是认识自己的灵魂,让内外各个感官、以及欲望和愤怒完全服从理智的支配,让身体受到沙里亚的约束,践行道德的要求。     

幸福的炼金术(一)

<正>奉至仁至慈的真主之名译者按:本书原名?????????????,汉语译名为《幸福的炼金术》。原书是波斯语,本文翻译自收集在?????????????????(《安萨里论文集》)中的阿拉伯语摘要版,简明扼要地概括了原书的主旨和精华。幸福是人类哲学、神学思考,社会、宗教实践的最终目的。有人认为幸福是美德,有人认为幸福是知识,有人认为幸福是享乐。在伊斯兰思想史中,普通人将幸福理解为今世的富足和后世的天堂。安萨里在本书中告诉我们,幸福     

穆斯林应重视自律

穆斯林应重视自律从恩霖自律，作为伦理学概念并非人人皆知。但作为穆斯林不仅要知，而且要加以做到。伊斯三教是以信仰和崇拜安拉为思想主体的宗教。其中对至高无上真主的崇拜，对未来后世的信仰，对未来幸福的向往构成了穆斯林思想和行为的心理依据。也就是说，作为穆斯...     

安萨里论真主的本质和属性

真主的本质与属性问题是伊斯兰教义学当中的一个核心问题。安萨里在《信仰之中道》中对这一问题有详细阐述。他不仅论证了真主本质的存在及相关特性,说明了真主属性的共同特点,还指出了本质与属性关系上的相对二元化特征。其思想的独特之处在于,以理性的方式论证了真主对世界万物的直接创造和绝对支配。安萨里的很多重要思想如宇宙论、因果论、获得说、以及他同哲学家的一系列争论,都可以从这个角度得到更深入的理解。     

穆斯林应重视自律

穆斯林应重视自律从恩霖自律，作为伦理学概念并非人人皆知。但作为穆斯林不仅要知，而且要加以做到。伊斯三教是以信仰和崇拜安拉为思想主体的宗教。其中对至高无上真主的崇拜，对未来后世的信仰，对未来幸福的向往构成了穆斯林思想和行为的心理依据。也就是说，作为穆斯...     

卢梭伦理思想研究

本论文共分五个部分:(1)引论;(2)哲学方法论和伦理学的出发点;(3)个体道德论;(4)社会道德论;(5)卢梭在伦理思想史上的地位和影响。 在引论部分指出,卢梭以使人民幸福而有德行为其伦理学宗旨,但他没有亚里士多德式的分立形态的伦理学理论,而是将这一宗旨贯穿在他的政治哲学和文学著作中。卢梭伦理思想的理论渊源,一是文艺复兴运动以来的人道主义思想为卢梭的基本人权思想的形成提供了理论基础,把资产阶级人道主义的基本原则进一步化为自由平等的社会伦理政治要求;一是在伦理学的理论形式上兼收并蓄,以洛克唯物主义感觉论为其理论基础,而经验主义的、情感论的伦理学都是重要理论来源。     

道德完善之路--伊斯兰教伦理学

穆斯林学者认为，人类达到道德完善的途径有两个方面，一是众先知的模范作用，特别是穆罕默德生前的言行，二是通过科学方式探讨一条人类生活的理想之路，探讨关系到人类生活幸福与否的行为方式，也就是伦理学。伊斯兰教的伦理学包含两大内容，分别从神学与哲学两个角度探讨道德问题。 关于道德的基础和道德的标准问题，在神学争论中同伊斯兰教的真主观紧密联系在一起，随着对真主的认识不断深化。在早期，穆斯林坚信，只要树立真主独一、真主全能的信仰，人类的善恶行为自不待说。因为世间一切事物的发生都归结为真主的创造，人类的一切行…     

浅谈伊斯兰教“六大信仰”

伊斯兰教作为一种宗教文化,其最重要的构成部分乃是宗教信仰,这也是穆斯林宇宙观、人生观的集中反映《。古兰经》云:“信道的人们啊,你们当确信真主和使者,以及他所降示给使者的经典,和他以前所降示的经典。谁不信真主、天神、经典、使者、末日,谁确已深入迷误了。(4∶136)根据《古兰经》的内容和包括信前定在内的“六大信仰”,是伊斯兰教的信仰基础;穆斯林的一切宗教行为都是围绕这个中心信仰而履行的。信真主是伊斯兰教“六大信仰”的核心和根本,是其余信仰的渊源所在。穆斯林坚信:在茫茫宇宙中,存在着独一的,无所不能,无始无终,创造并执…     

本体与属性:正统教义学与苏非认主学的融合——从马联元的《天方性理》阿拉伯文译本看

如果说刘智的《天方性理》是伊斯兰教与儒学会通的典范,那么马联元对《天方性理》的阿拉伯文注释本《性理微言注释》则充分体现了中国伊斯兰教内部正统教义学和苏非认主学的相互包容。本文从正统教义学和苏非认主学共同关注的真主本体与属性问题为切入点,对照《天方性理》和《性理微言注释》对真主的本体与属性及其关系的讨论,分析中国伊斯兰教正统教义学与苏非认主学的彼此借鉴和相互融通。     

试析马启西与苏非主义的关系

本文从宗教行为和思想两个层面分析了中国伊斯兰教西道堂创始人马启西所受苏非主义的影响,及其对中国西北苏非主义传统的接纳和继承,肯定了马启西在中国苏非主义发展中的地位,并进一步申论了马启西与苏非主义关系的澄清在中国伊斯兰教史、教派关系史以及西道堂研究中的学术价值。     

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

This paper provides an analytical model representing four polar ethical approaches drawn from the main ethical positions suggested by the philosophical, psychological, and socio-economic literature. Moreover, it develops the model in order to obtain rankings of the four approaches in terms of happiness and, consequently, to provide insights into which ethical approach should best be adopted by each individual, according to his characteristics (income level, in developed countries (DCs) or in less developed countries (LDCs), aspiration level): some dynamics are also predicted, if the Golden and the Copper Rules are applied. Finally, this paper provides insights into which ethical approach should best be adopted by each society, according to its characteristics (DCs or LDCs, social distribution of aspiration levels), by predicting happiness levels in alternative countries, according to the prevailing ethics, and by comparing these predictions with the observed happiness levels, thus providing an empirical test of the analytical model: some dynamics are again predicted, with non-Protestant DCs moving to higher, and Protestant DCs towards lower, happiness levels (conditioned to the per capita income), due to the increasing and decreasing rejection of the Golden and Copper Rules, respectively, and with LDCs moving to lower (conditioned to the increasing per capita income) in the short-run and higher happiness levels in the long run, by establishing and entertaining conditions that set clear incentives for moral behaviour, in order to increase and decrease the adoption of the Golden and Copper Rules, respectively.     

由知识对伦理的辩护到伦理对知识的批判——论知识的伦理价值

古希腊哲学最早将美德与知识相联系,“真”的达到就是“善”的实现,人的合目的性是建立在其合规律性的基础上的,伦理学从此有了独立存在的根据。近代知识论提出“知识就是力量”,将获得知识与获得幸福视为同一,知识(理性)是建立伦理的绝对普遍的坚实基础,人的尊严和主体性成为伦理追求的最大价值。20世纪以来,由于科学知识的异化,“知识与人的幸福和命运问题”凸现在当代伦理学面前。为知识找寻一条“应然”的光明之路,不仅是伦理学的理论使命,也是人类自身的神圣使命。     

Happiness,morality, and politics

The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers. This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible. This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness.     

Life satisfaction,ethical reflection,and the science of happiness

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values.     

德性伦理论要

德性伦理强调以人类自身的内在品质作为人的一切生活的出发点,这不仅使德性伦理在人类伦理思想的起源处规避着人类伦理生活的方向,而且在现代人类遭遇道德困境的形势下,又指示着人类伦理生活所应该采取的态度。德性伦理最终的理论指向便是将成就德性与明其规范统一起来,从而真正实现人自身的价值。在现代社会价值多元化的背景下,对传统德性伦理资源的挖掘,显得尤为重要。无论是亚里士多德的德性传统,还是原始儒家的德性传统,都可以为现代伦理理论的建设提供丰富的智性资源。     

Training ethical psychologists: an acculturation model

This article presents an approach to graduate (and professional) training that views becoming an ethical psychologist as an acculturation process. J.W. Berry's (1980, 2003) model of acculturation strategies is used as a framework for understanding ethical acculturation, a developmental process during which students can use several types of adaptation strategies. Students enter training with their own moral value traditions and concepts but are confronted with new ethical principles and rules, some of which may be inconsistent with their ethics of origin. The article explores several applications of the framework to ethics courses, practicum supervision, and other areas of training.     

Should happiness guide social policy?

Since the 1970s, and especially since the 1990s, the concept of happiness has grown in importance in both the academic and popular domains. This article focuses on studies that collect empirical data on happiness with the aim of informing public policies that maximise collective happiness. These studies are characterised by two assumptions that are mostly taken for granted: that happiness is a psychological state and that it has a moral and ethical value. In this contribution, I will question this conception of happiness as a social goal from the point of view of political philosophy. I begin by examining the historical origin of the modern political concept of happiness. Following this, I evaluate the principle of happiness maximisation, comparing it to other wide-ranging principles (justice, equity, freedom and plurality), and bringing to the fore some implications of happiness maximisation that place it in conflict with democratic rights and freedoms. Finally, I sum up my line of reasoning and briefly reflect on some proper uses of happiness in public policy.     

Being bored: Heidegger on patience and melancholy

In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes’s view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in ‘a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes’s ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes’s defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes’s ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes’s purposes.     

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency.     

黄兴政治伦理思想述评

黄兴政治伦理思想是其伦理思想的一个重要方面,其政治伦理思想的主要内容包括四个方面：强调伦理道德在政权和政党建设中的重大作用,倡导政治伦理化;诚挚的爱国之心是黄兴政治伦理思想的主体;团结友善、敬业奉献是黄兴政治伦理思想的外在表现;“为大多数人谋幸福”是黄兴政治伦理思想实践的理想境界。黄兴政治伦理思想的主要特点：一是糅合了中西伦理文化的优点;二是将改造国民社会心理与建设国家统一起来;三是鲜明的政治性和实践性。