The physical symbol grounding problem

This paper presents an approach to solve the symbol grounding problem within the framework of embodied cognitive science. It will be argued that symbolic structures can be used within the paradigm of embodied cognitive science by adopting an alternative definition of a symbol. In this alternative definition, the symbol may be viewed as a structural coupling between an agent’s sensorimotor activations and its environment. A robotic experiment is presented in which mobile robots develop a symbolic structure from scratch by engaging in a series of language games. In this experiment it is shown that robots can develop a symbolic structure with which they can communicate the names of a few objects with a remarkable degree of success. It is further shown that, although the referents may be interpreted differently on different occasions, the objects are usually named with only one form.     

Extending the classical view of representation

Representation has always been a central part of models in cognitive science, but this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating the alternative approaches of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the representational view and these four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.     

Gibson's Affordances and Turing's Theory of Computation

The concept of affordance is a central component of the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson (1966, 1977, 1979/1986). Affordances are properties of the environment taken relative to an observer. Ecological theorists have developed formal models for the analysis of affordances. Models proposed by Shaw and Turvey (1981), Turvey (1992), and Greeno (1994) are described and evaluated, and another approach, using Turing's (1936-1937/1965) theory of computation, is outlined. Affordances are characterized as the configurations of Turing machines. It is shown that Turing's work provides a natural vehicle for exploring Gibson's ideas.     

Paradoxes,Double Binds,and Reflexive Loops: An Alternative Theoretical Perspective

This article presents a new theory of refiexivity in systems of social meaning and action. It is argued that Russell's Theory of Logical Types, which formed the basis of the early work of the Palo Alto group, rests upon an inappropriate and largely outdated epistemology. The theory offered here rejects the assumption that reflexivity and paradox are coterminous. It is further argued that reflexivity is a natural and necessary feature of human systems of meaning. New analytic tools are offered for discerning problematic from nonproblematic reflexive loops. The new tools take the form of a symbol system that can be used to represent the rules that organize reflexive relationships. The theory also contains a set of statements designed to delimit conditions under which problematic reflexive loops have ramifications for persons' mental health.     

Logic,art, and understanding in the philosophy of Nelson Goodman

This paper contains a reconstruction and discussion of some central subjects in Nelson Goodman's philosophical work. Goodman's creative symbol‐constructional philosophy concerns fundamental aspects of human cognition and practice. It is argued that this provides us with the intellectual tools for constructing a genuine relationship between logic, knowledge, art, and understanding. This is shown by focusing on subjects ranging from the projectibility of predicates and nominalistic mereology to constructive relativity, ways of worldmaking and a general theory of symbols.     

The changing relations of representation and cognitive structure during the development of a cognitive map

In recent years, workers in cognitive science have come to recognize that cognitive structures should not be equated with computational ones. This realization has often been experienced as confusing. It is argued that cognitive science is moving closer to positions defended by genetic epistemologists. The course of development of a cognitive structure consists of two phases. During the first (Piaget's “phenotypic” adaptation), knowledge about successful ways of interacting with the environment is encoded in a relatively unspecialized format. Selected structural aspects of the resulting data base may later form the basis for a specifically appropriate format. It is during the first phase that knowledge about the environment is manifested in a behavioural structure which does not correspond to any computational entity. In the second phase, the internalized structure becomes computationally defined, which improves the system's efficiency. These ideas are illustrated with the Traveller, a detailed computational model of cognitive map development.     

Quine on the Nature of Naturalism

Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” (1969a, 83) and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open‐minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science” (1993, 10). Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains a “deep‐seated and significant ambivalence” (1993a, 353). In this paper, I argue that a more charitable interpretation is possible—a reading that does justice to Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. I reconstruct Quine's position and argue (i) that Haack and Quine, in their exchanges, have been talking past each other and (ii) that once this mutual misunderstanding is cleared up, Quine's naturalism turns out to be more modest, and hence less scientistic, than many contemporary naturalists have presupposed. I show that Quine's naturalism is first and foremost a rejection of the transcendental. It is only after adopting a broadly science‐immanent perspective that Quine, in regimenting our language, starts making choices that many contemporary philosophers have argued to be unduly restrictive.     

Rationality and the psychology of inference

Recent advances in the cognitive psychology of inference have been of great interest to philosophers of science. The present paper reviews one such area, namely studies based upon Wason's “4-card” selection task. It is argued that interpretation of the results of the experiments is complex, because a variety of inference strategies may be used by subjects to select evidence needed to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Empirical evidence suggests that which strategy is used depends in part on the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic context of the inference problem at hand. Since the factors of importance are also present in real-world science, and similarly complicate its interpretation, the selection task, though it does not present a “quick fix”, represents a kind of microcosm of great utility for the understanding of science. Several studies which have examined selection strategies in more complex problem-solving environments are also reviewed, in an attempt to determine the limits of generalizability of the simpler selection tasks. Certain interpretational misuses of laboratory research are described, and a claim made that the issue of whether or not scientists are rational should be approached by philosophers and psychologists with appropriate respect for the complexities of the issue.     

SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND ITALY'S SEVENTEENTH‐CENTURY DECLINE: FROM FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS TO BENEDETTO CROCE

Historians have often argued that from the mid‐sixteenth century onward Italian science began to decline. This development is often attributed to the actions of the so‐called Counter‐Reformation Church, which had grown increasingly intolerant of novel ideas. In this article, I argue that this interpretation of the history of science is derived from an Italian liberal historiographical tradition, which linked the history of Italian philosophy to the development of the modern Italian state. I suggest that although historians of science have appropriated parts of this distinctive narrative to underpin their account of Italy's seventeenth‐century scientific decline, they have not always fully appreciated its complexity. In this article, I consider the work of two scholars, Francesco de Sanctis and Benedetto Croce. Both explicitly suggested that although the actions of the Church caused Italy to enter into a period of decline, they in fact argued that science represented one of the few areas in which Italian intellectual life actually continued to thrive.     

Kant and Kantian Themes in Recent Analytic Philosophy

This article notes six advances in recent analytic Kant research: (1) Strawson's interpretation, which, together with work by Bennett, Sellars, and others, brought renewed attention to Kant through its account of space, time, objects, and the Transcendental Deduction and its sharp criticisms of Kant on causality and idealism; (2) the subsequent investigations of Kantian topics ranging from cognitive science and philosophy of science to mathematics; (3) the detailed work, by a number of scholars, on the Transcendental Deduction; (4) the clearer understanding of transcendental idealism sparked by reactions to Allison's epistemic account; (5) the resulting need—prompted also by new studies of the thing in itself—to face up to the old question of the philosophical defensibility of such idealism; and (6) the active engagement with Kant's ethics and political philosophy that derives from Rawls's and others' work.     

Parallelism and Functionalism

It has recently been argued by Paul Thagard (1986) that parallel computational models of cognition demonstrate the falsity of the popular theory of mind known as functionalism. It is my contention that his argument is seriously mistaken and rests on a misunderstanding of the functionalist position. While my primary aim is to defend functionalism from Thagard's attack, in the process I hope to provide some much needed clarification of matters both philosophical and computational. Since I intend to untangle issues that are often troublesome in cognitive science, the paper should prove useful even for those unfamiliar with Thagard's original piece.     

Identifying rotated letter-like symbols

Previous research has shown that the identification of rotated alphanumeric symbols seems to be performed via the extraction of critical features encoded invariant to the symbol’s orientation. The present research argued that the use of such feature extraction processes might be a function of, first, a subject’s familiarity with the symbols, and second, the number of symbols from which a presented symbol is sampled. Earlier research has used highly over learned alphanumerics, in sets of six symbols; this practice is argued here as being seemingly conducive to feature extraction. In two experiments, the generality of a feature extraction interpretation, in contrast to one of mental rotation, was tested by having subjects previously trained to relative high- vs. low-familiarity criteria identify novel symbols in conditions in which a presented symbol was 1 of either 5 or 20 possibilities. Identification response times were found to be constant across all nonstandard orientations of presented symbols, irrespective of symbol familiarity or symbol set size. The findings support the generalization of a feature extraction interpretation to varying numbers of novel symbols of varying familiarity.     

Inside the Creative Sifter: Recognizing Metacognition in Creativity Development

The parallels between cognitive development and creativity are neglected in the literature. Piaget's information transformations are personalized, meaning individual constructions can involve creativity. Vygotsky's work considers the implications and interactions of social influences, conventions, and personal implications for creative development. The Cognitive‐Creative Sifting Model is proposed to focus attention on these and other connections between cognitive development and creativity. Other common methods of assessing creativity are compared to the proposed model. It is argued that the model provides a foundation to evaluate individual creative potentials more holistically. Specifically, the conceptual elements of metacognition are described and their role in the development of creativity is suggested. It is argued that future researchers should pay particular attention to the interaction effects metacognition has with traditional measures of creativity focused on ideation and product evaluation.     

The methodological role of mechanistic-computational models in cognitive science

This paper discusses the relevance of models for cognitive science that integrate mechanistic and computational aspects. Its main hypothesis is that a model of a cognitive system is satisfactory and explanatory to the extent that it bridges phenomena at multiple mechanistic levels, such that at least several of these mechanistic levels are shown to implement computational processes. The relevant parts of the computation must be mapped onto distinguishable entities and activities of the mechanism. The ideal is contrasted with two other accounts of modeling in cognitive science. The first has been presented by David Marr in combination with a distinction of “levels of computation”. The second builds on a hierarchy of “mechanistic levels” in the sense of Carl Craver. It is argued that neither of the two accounts secures satisfactory explanations of cognitive systems. The mechanistic-computational ideal can be thought of as resulting from a fusion of Marr’s and Craver’s ideals. It is defended as adequate and plausible in light of scientific practice, and certain metaphysical background assumptions are discussed.

     

JFGI: FROM DISTRIBUTED COGNITION TO DISTRIBUTED RELIABILISM*

While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard ( 2010 ) has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of a true belief. But the significance of the role played by the subject's cognitive agency in distributed cognitive systems is in fact highly variable: at one extreme, formation of a true belief seems clearly to be significantly creditable to the subject's agency; at the other extreme, however, the subject's agency plays such a peripheral role that it is at best unclear whether it should receive significant credit for formation of a true belief. The compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology thus turns on what it takes for a contribution to the formation of true belief to count as significant. This article argues that the inevitable vagueness of this notion suggests retreating from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism and explores the prospects for a distributed reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly with distributed cognition. In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Goldberg's recent extended reliabilist view (Goldberg 2010 ) by allowing the process the reliability of which determines the epistemic status of a subject's belief to extend to include not only processing performed by other subjects but also processing performed by non‐human technological resources.     

The philosophy of economic modelling: a critical survey

Economic modelling, the heart of orthodox economics, has long been accused of neglecting the interpretation of its models needed to generate knowledge claims about the real world. It is argued that recent developments in the philosophy of model and theory can help us to evaluate the scientific and policy relevance of economic models. McCloskey's attempt to finesse this issue by reference to the rhetoric of economics is argued not to be congruent with economics' revealed explanatory and policy objectives. Blaug's adherence to a Popper-Lakatos mode of appraisal may be a little dated, but none of the more recent approaches to the metaphysical foundations of economics—such as scientific realism, constructive empiricism or 'causal holism'—seem able to rebuff the criticism explicit and implicit in the recent work of, for example, Hausman and Rosenberg. An example of 'modelling without theory' and Rapport's recent defence of economic modelling's practice suggest the need for further detailed evaluation by case-studies of the development and application of economic models.     

From mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and implications

This paper examines the application of the mutual manipulability criterion as a way to demarcate constituents of cognitive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cognitive systems. In particular, it is argued that on at least one interpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion, the criterion is inadequate because the criterion is conceptualized as identifying synchronic dependence between higher and lower ‘levels’ in mechanisms. It is argued that there is a second articulation of the mutual manipulability criterion available, and that it should be preferred for at least two reasons. The first is that the criterion of mutual manipulability is an instance of continuous reciprocal causation. The second is that it has implications for how to understand this distinction between causation and constitution. It is shown that when considering dynamic systems, continuous reciprocal causation - ubiquitous in dynamical systems - is a form of constitutive causality, which entails that causal factors may, in the right circumstances, by genuine constitutive factors of cognition. This notion of constitutive causality lends support to conceiving of the mutual manipulability criterion as a genuine demarcation principle in the debate over the boundaries of mind.     

The Psychology of Religion and the Concept of Revelation

It is argued that the psychology of religion should be seen as interacting with theology in a broader way than is usual at present, especially in relation to the concept of revelation. Examination of revelatory experiences, especially Christ’s resurrection appearances, may be seen in terms of this broader interaction not only as solving certain historical puzzles, but as bringing to fruition Arthur Peacocke's hope for application to spiritual experience of understandings of divine action that have been developed within the science–theology dialogue. The pluralistic implications of this approach are examined, and the possibilities open to psychologists in relation to both interpretation and research strategies are outlined. It is stressed that what is required is not simply interdisciplinarity, as this is usually understood, but transdisciplinarity of the kind that questions the boundaries and methodologies accepted by specialists in one or other of the disciplines concerned.     

Kuhn's Structural Revolutions and the Development of Christian Doctrine: A Systematic Discussion

In 1845, John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote a treatise describing the development of Christian doctrine. Since then, his ideas have been challenged, in particular by Protestant theologians who have argued that the development of doctrine does not progress in either a smooth or linear path. In the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has challenged the idea that science is purely driven by objective and rational motives. In this paper, Kuhn's ideas are applied to the development of Christian doctrine. Drawing from historical examples, it is shown that Kuhn's contextual approach to describe the progress of science aids in understanding the way doctrines themselves develop. Although this is not the first time that theology and Kuhn have conversed, the notion of doctrinal development being systematically and methodically shown to have parallels with Kuhn's ideas is novel. Ultimately, this work is another important step in building interdisciplinary links between science and theology.