A trimodal behavioral conceptualization of clinical pain.

A trimodal behavioral conceptualization of pain is outlined in the current article. It proposes that pain should be viewed as an interacting cluster of gross motor, cognitive, and physiological responses. Such a conceptual system is thought to contain the basic properties needed to incorporate current divergent views of pain held by medical and behavior science into a common conceptual framework.     

Learning How to Generalize

Generalization is a fundamental problem solved by every cognitive system in essentially every domain. Although it is known that how people generalize varies in complex ways depending on the context or domain, it is an open question how people learn the appropriate way to generalize for a new context. To understand this capability, we cast the problem of learning how to generalize as a problem of learning the appropriate hypothesis space for generalization. We propose a normative mathematical framework for learning how to generalize by learning inductive biases for which properties are relevant for generalization in a domain from the statistical structure of features and concepts observed in that domain. More formally, the framework predicts that an ideal learner should learn to generalize by either taking the weighted average of the results of generalizing according to each hypothesis space, with weights given by how well each hypothesis space fits the previously observed concepts, or by using the most likely hypothesis space. We compare the predictions of this framework to human generalization behavior with three experiments in one perceptual (rectangles) and two conceptual (animals and numbers) domains. Across all three studies we find support for the framework's predictions, including individual‐level support for averaging in the third study.     

Organic Unity Theory: An Integrative Mind-Body Theory for Psychiatry

The potential of psychiatry as an integrative science has been impeded by an internal schism that derives from the duality of mental and physical. Organic unity theory is proposed as a conceptual framework that brings together the terms of the mind-body duality in one coherent perspective. Organic unity theory is braided of three strands: identity, which describes the relationship between mentally described events and corresponding physically described events; continuity, which describes the linguistic-conceptual system that contains both mental and physical terms; and dialectic, which describes the relationship between the empirical way of knowing that is associated with the physical domain of the linguistic-conceptual system and the hermeneutic way of knowing that is associated with the mental domain. Each strand represents an integrative formulation that resolves an aspect of mental-physical dualism into an underlying unity. After the theory is presented, its implications for psychiatry are briefly considered.     

Michael Polanyi, Tacit Cognitive Relativist

Celebrated as a theorist of science, and a source of stimulating ideas for theologians and philosophers of religion, Michael Polanyi explicitly denied cognitive relativism. Yet cognitive relativism, this paper suggests, is implied by Polanyi's account of conceptual frameworks and intellectual controversies.
In ' The Stability of Beliefs ' (1952) Polanyi understands conceptual frameworks (science, psychoanalysis, Azande witchcraft, Marxism) as embedded in, and as expressed in the use of, their own languages. The language-with-theory limits the range of discussable subjects, interprets relevant facts in its own terms, permits only certain questions to be asked, with answers to these questions serving to confirm the framework.
In Polanyi's masterwork, Personal Knowledge (1958), these ideas inform his discussion of controversies over scientific frameworks and frameworks vying to become part of science. In each controversy, frameworks are logically disconnected, Polanyi foreshadowing the incommensurability thesis
I argue that Polanyi's ideas satisfy recognised criteria of cognitive relativism. Perception is undetermined by objects and conditioned by language. Empirical propositions, in Polanyi's view, are accepted as true only within a conceptual framework. Polanyi regards supporters of logically disconnected frameworks as thinking differently, living in different worlds, speaking different languages and as experiencing communication failure. There is no framework-independent argument or evidence to distinguish any framework as the best available approximation to the truth. Frameworks are logically disconnected and incommensurable.     

Complex Concepts

For some time cognitive anthropology, and indeed cognitive science generally, have been concerned with issues of conceptual representation. Inadequacies in classical and more recent approaches, in particular, prototype theories, have motivated a search for alternative accounts. We propose an approach to conceptual representation that requires the specification of domain theories, from which conceptual definitions are generated, and within which the relations among concepts can be formalized. We demonstrate the utility of a formal characterization of this view of domains and concepts in the analysis of an aspect of the basic metaphysics constructed by the people of West Futuna, Vanuatu. In the process, we expand the set of formal devices traditionally relied upon by anthropologists and others involved in cognitive studies, and thereby gain insight into the complexity of the metaphysical beliefs of an Oceanic people.     

An “Ideology in Pieces” Approach to Studying Change in Teachers’ Sensemaking About Race,Racism, and Racial Justice

This article makes a unique contribution to the literature on teachers’ racialized sensemaking by proposing a framework of “ideology in pieces” that synthesizes Hall's (1982, 1996) theory of ideology and diSessa's (1993) theory of conceptual change. Hall's theory of ideology enables an examination of teachers’ sensemaking as situated within a structured society and diSessa's research on conceptual change provides an analytical lens to understand the elements of ideological sensemaking and the processes of ideological transformation. I use the framework of ideology in pieces to analyze and interpret the ideological sensemaking and transformation of a teacher engaged in a collaborative teacher research group in which participants explored issues of social justice in their high school math and science classrooms. The framework and analysis presented in the article offer a more comprehensive theory of teachers’ ideological sensemaking and transformation that includes their cognitive, social, and structural dimensions.     

Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism be Informed about the Sciences?

In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations of the former kind are in terms of the truth and reality of the posits of current science, in terms of warranted belief, in terms of mind-independent unobservable entities. Using illustrations mainly from the social sciences, doubly local scientific realism denies the global applicability of such formulations and seeks to make adjustments in their elements in response to information about local units of science: It is sufficient for a realist to give the existence of an entity (and the truth of a theory) a chance, while in some areas we may be in s position to make justified claims about actual existence (and truth). Logical inquiry-independent existence is sufficient for the social and human sciences, while mind-independence will be fine for many other domains. It should not be insisted that the theoretical posits of realist science be strict unobservables in all areas: most theoretical posits of the social sciences are idealized commonsensibles, such as elements in folk psychology. Unsurprisingly, this sort of local strategy will create space for realism that is able to accommodate larger areas of science without sacrificing traditional realist intuitions.     

Constraints on Analogical Mapping: A Comparison of Three Models

Three theories of analogy have been proposed that are supported by computational models and data from experiments on human analogical abilities. In this article we show how these theories can be unified within a common metatheoretical framework that distinguishes among levels of informational, behavioral, and hardware constraints. This framework clarifies the distinctions among three computational models in the literature: the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME), the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME), and the Incremental Analogy Machine (IAM). We then go on to develop a methodology for the comparative testing of these models. In two different manipulations of an analogical mapping task we compare the results of computational experiments with these models against the results of psychological experiments. In the first experiment we show that increasing the number of similar elements in two analogical domains decreases the response time taken to reach the correct mapping for an analogy problem. In the second psychological experiment we find that the order in which the elements of the two domains are presented has significant facilitative effects on the ease of analogical mapping. Of the three models, only IAM embodies behavioral constraints and predicts both of these results. Finally, the immediate implications of these results for analogy research are discussed, along with the wider implications the research has for cognitive science methodology.     

The Nature and Organization of Individual Differences in Executive Functions: Four General Conclusions

Executive functions (EFs)-a set of general-purpose control processes that regulate one's thoughts and behaviors-have become a popular research topic lately and have been studied in many subdisciplines of psychological science. This article summarizes the EF research that our group has conducted to understand the nature of individual differences in EFs and their cognitive and biological underpinnings. In the context of a new theoretical framework that we have been developing (the unity/diversity framework), we describe four general conclusions that have emerged from our research. Specifically, we argue that individual differences in EFs, as measured with simple laboratory tasks, (1) show both unity and diversity (different EFs are correlated yet separable); (2) reflect substantial genetic contributions; (3) are related to various clinically and societally important phenomena; and (4) show some developmental stability.     

The Relationship of Promotion Focus,Need for Cognitive Closure,and Categorical Accessibility in American and Hong Kong Chinese University Students

Categorical accessibility is a cognitive factor that limits the extent of creative conceptual expansion. In the present study, we sought to establish the categorical accessibility norms in five conceptual domains among American and Hong Kong Chinese university students. In addition, we predicted that the tendency to access normatively inaccessible exemplars in a conceptual domain is positively related to the motivation to maximize the likelihood of attaining positive outcomes (promotion focus) and negatively related to the need for cognitive closure. We obtained the predicted relationships among both American and Hong Kong Chinese university students. These findings were discussed in terms of their implications for promoting creativity across cultures.     

Genetic and environmental structure of adjectives describing the domains of the Big Five Model of personality: A nationwide US twin study

We applied multivariate models specifying genetic and environmental influences on adjectives describing each of the five personality domains specified in the Big Five Model of personality (BFM; Extraversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness). We selected the specific models to partition the observed covariance among the adjectives describing each domain into genetic and environmental components in order to assess the etiologic basis for each domain's phenotypic coherence. The sample on which our analyses were based was part of the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS). It consisted of 315 monozygotic and 275 same-sex dizygotic twin pairs. Results revealed both common and specific genetic and environmental influences for each domain, suggesting that all of the domains are etiologically complex. Models specifying the domains as latent phenotypic constructs fit more poorly than models suggesting more complex structures for all domains except Extraversion and Neuroticism. These results raise questions about the BFM as a coherent model of genetic and environmental influences on personality or, alternatively, about the etiological unity of latent phenotypic personality trait constructs beyond Extraversion and Neuroticism.     

Agent communication pragmatics: the cognitive coherence approach

Different approaches have investigated the syntax and semantics of agent communication languages. However, these approaches have not indicated how agents should dynamically use communications. Instead of filling this pragmatics gap, most approaches have mainly focused on the ‘structure’ of dialogues even though developers are more interested in agents’ capabilities of having ‘useful’ automated conversations with respect to their goals rather than in their abilities to structure dialogues. This led us to work on a theory of the use of conversations between agents. In this paper, we propose a pragmatics theory which extends and adapts the cognitive dissonance theory (a major theory of social psychology) to multi-agent systems by unifying it with the theory of coherence in thought and action that issues from computational philosophy of mind. Precisely, we show how this theory allows us to provide generic conceptual tools for the automation of both agent communicational behavior and attitude change processes. This new motivational model is formulated in terms of constraints and elements of cognition and allows us to define cognitive incoherences and dialogue utility measures. We show how these measures could be used to solve common problems and answer some critical questions concerning agent communication frameworks use. Finally, our exploration in applying the cognitive coherence pragmatics theory as a new communication layer over classical BDI agents is presented. It relies on our dialogue games based agent communication language (DIAGAL) and our dialogue games simulator toolbox (DGS). The resulting framework provides the necessary theoretical and practical elements for implementing our theory. In doing so, it brings in a general scheme for automatizing agents’ communicational behavior as it is exemplified in this article.     

Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition

"Force dynamics" refers to a previously neglected semantic category—how entities interact with respect to force. This category includes such concepts as: the exertion of force, resistance to such exertion and the overcoming of such resistance, blockage of a force and the removal of such blockage, and so forth. Force dynamics is a generalization over the traditional linguistic notion of "causative": it analyzes "causing" into finer primitives and sets it naturally within a framework that also includes "letting," "hindering," "helping," and still further notions. Force dynamics, moreover, appears to be the semantic category that uniquely characterizes the grammatical category of modals, in both their basic and epistemic usages. In addition, on the basis of force dynamic parameters, numerous lexical items fall into systematic semantic patterns, and there exhibit parallelisms between physical and psychosocial reference. Further, from research on the relation of semantic structure to general cognitive structure, it appears that the concepts of force interaction that are encoded within language closely parallel concepts that appear both in early science and in naive physics and psychology. Overall, force dynamics thus emerges as a fundamental notional system that structures conceptual material pertaining to force interaction in a common way across a linguistic range: the physical, psychological, social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of reference and conception.     

What drives the organization of object knowledge in the brain?

Various forms of category-specificity have been described at both the cognitive and neural levels, inviting the inference that different semantic domains are processed by distinct, dedicated mechanisms. In this paper, we argue for an extension of a domain-specific interpretation to these phenomena that is based on network-level analyses of functional coupling among brain regions. On this view, domain-specificity in one region of the brain emerges because of innate connectivity with a network of regions that also process information about that domain. Recent findings are reviewed that converge with this framework, and a new direction is outlined for understanding the neural principles that shape the organization of conceptual knowledge.     

Sex and achievement domain: Cognitive patterns of success and failure

Subjects (N=439) were asked to write an account of an achievement of failure, and to describe it in terms of locus of standards (internal-external), conceptual focus (process-impact), and initial expectations for success (or failure). Additionally, accounts were classified on the basis of achievement domain (personal, interpersonal, mastery). Analyses of variance [2 (sex)×3 (domain)] for each cognitive measure revealed few sex differences. However, cognitive responses did vary as a function of achievement domain. Main effects for domain were observed under success instructions for locus of control (p<.0002) and under failure instructions for locus of control (p<.05), conceptual focus (p<.05), and expectations (p<.06). Interaction effects of sex and achievement domain were observed on locus of standards for success (p<.0002) and initial expectations preceding failure (p<.025), indicating that women were more responsive to domain differences than were men. Discriminant analyses indicated that cognitions were more readily patterned in terms of achievement domain than sex. Elaboration and incorporation of the concept of domain in cognitive models of achievement is suggested.     

Situating distributed cognition

We historically and conceptually situate distributed cognition by drawing attention to important similarities in assumptions and methods with those of American “functional psychology” as it emerged in contrast and complement to controlled laboratory study of the structural components and primitive “elements” of consciousness. Functional psychology foregrounded the adaptive features of cognitive processes in environments, and adopted as a unit of analysis the overall situation of organism and environment. A methodological implication of this emphasis was, to the extent possible, the study of cognitive and other processes in the natural (real world) contexts in which they occur. We therefore emphasize commonalities and differences between functional psychology and D-Cog. One purpose of the comparison is to consider the extent to which criticisms directed at functional psychology are relevant to D-Cog. We also examine the relation between functional psychology and philosophical pragmatism and conclude that D-Cog's conceptual framework would be strengthened through more explicit adoption of philosophical pragmatism, consistent with the eventual trajectory of functional psychology.     

Modelling the History of Ideas

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.     

The structure of paradigm change

I propose a concise picture of the core structure of paradigm change. It consists of the three basic steps which, I suggest, are common to all forms of paradigm change, individual as well as collective and in every conceptual domain. These steps are formularized so as to stimulate more precise theorizing about, and comparisons between various alleged forms of paradigm change. I explain the idea and give evidence for it using examples from the fields of cognitive psychology, moral psychology, and the history of science.     

Human cognition, space, and the sedimentation of meaning

The goal of this paper is to explore, from a phenomenologically informed perspective, the phenomenon of the operative spatialization of human thinking, viewed in its relationship with the embodied human organism’s spatial experience. Operative spatialization in this context refers to the cognitive role and functioning of spatial schematizations and differentiations in human thinking. My particular focus is the domain of conceptualization. By drawing on Husserl’s discussion of the (linguistic) process of a sedimentation of meaning, I aim to show that spatialization functions in a structurally ambivalent manner. On the one hand, spatialization predisposes and thus narrows the scope of human conceptual thought. On the other hand, spatialization establishes an implicit cognitive scaffold indispensable for the development and practice of human higher-order thinking. The structure and functioning of this scaffold, I argue, is intrinsically related to the spatial structure and dynamics of human embodiment. Synthesizing insights from phenomenological studies concerning the experiential constitution of space, and classic and recent research findings from fields such as cognitive linguistics and psychology concerning the cognitive dimension of image-schemas and gestural behavior, I argue that the living human body functions centrally as the sense-constitutive ‘site of conversion’ (Husserl) between concrete structures of spatial experience and abstract structures of conceptual thought.