Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein

Being and Time argues that we, as Dasein, are defined not by what we are, but by our way of existing, our “existentiell possibilities.” I diagnose and respond to an interpretive dilemma that arises from Heidegger's ambiguous use of this latter term. Most readings stress its specific sense, holding that Dasein has no general essence and is instead determined by some historically contingent way of understanding itself and the meaning of being at large. But this fails to explain the sense in which Being and Time is a work of fundamental ontology, concluding in Heidegger's claim to have found the meaning of Dasein's being in the concept of originary temporality. On the other hand, readings that stress the general sense of “existentiell possibilities” find Heidegger on a fruitless quest for the transcendental conditions necessary for Dasein's existence, which seems to founder on the claims that Dasein is constitutively thrown, factical, and “in‐each‐case‐mine” [jemeinig]. Both readings are problematic and, I contend, result from a failure to disambiguate and explain the ontologically unique relationship between the specific and general aspects of Dasein's essence. I argue that we can better explain this relationship, Heidegger's method for investigating it, and the sense in which Dasein has an essence that is open to philosophical investigation, if we read Being and Time's ontology of Dasein in terms of what Anton Ford calls “categorial” genus‐species relationships.     

Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe

Modes‐of‐being (Seinsarten) figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes‐of‐being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode‐of‐being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those advocated by Taylor Carman and Cristina Lafont, I interpret a mode‐of‐being as a universal that defines a district (Bezirk)—that is, a natural class of entities that ought to be conceptualised in a special way. As such, every mode‐of‐being plays an important metaphysical and epistemic role: serving both to unify a natural class of a high degree of generality and as the interpretandum of an act yielding the basic‐concepts (Grundbegriffe) pertaining to the entities therein. In explicating and arguing for this interpretation, I attribute a characteristically Aristotelian philosophical position to the early Heidegger, encompassing both metaphysical and epistemological realism and a conceptualist theory of universals.     

Ethics and practices of re‐presentation: Witnessing self and other

Context: The challenge of producing ethical representational practices is of critical interest to both practitioner‐researchers and research theorists. For practitioners becoming researchers a central ethical question may be how to manage a relational presence in writing their research, in ways that acknowledge participants, the research relationship, and a researcher's own subjectivity. Focus: The article offers examples from practitioner research to illustrate and theorise how researcher subjectivity is managed through the use of witnessing practices as a representational strategy. Witnessing practices – translated into counselling research from narrative therapy – offer researchers a strategy to take up a reflexive, relational presence in research reports. Discussion: Researcher witnessing honours the contributions of research participants as well as making visible the shaping effects of the research on a researcher's life. Through witnessing self and other, and thus declaring presence, privilege and partiality, re‐presentational ethics are made transparent.     

A Phenomenology of Excorporation,Bodily Alienation,and Resistance: Rethinking Sexed and Racialized Embodiment

The article examines how some culturally shared and corporeally enacted beliefs and norms about sexed and racialized embodiment can form embodied agency, and this with the aid of the concepts of incorporation and excorporation. It discusses how the phenomenological concept of excorporation can help us examine painful experiences of how one's lived body breaks in the encounter with others. The article also examines how a continuous excorporation can result in bodily alienation, and what embodied resistance can mean when one has undergone or undergoes excorporation. Elaborating on the work of, among others, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Martin Heidegger, Drew Leder, and Sarah Ahmed, I discuss incorporation and excorporation of beliefs and norms regarding sexual difference, such as beliefs and norms regarding female and male embodiment, through a reading of Jeffrey Eugenides' novel Middlesex. I also suggest that it is useful to understand the postcolonial scholar Frantz Fanon's narrative of how he could not but attend to his own skin color while living in France in the 1940s and 1950s, in terms of excorporation. Whereas these are different narratives in many ways, I regard them as helpful for clarifying what excorporation implies and what analytic work this concept can enable.     

Between Races and Generations: Materializing Race and Kinship in Moraga and Irigaray

Juxtaposing Cherríe Moraga's Loving in the War Years and Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman, I explore the ways that sex and race intersect to complicate an Irigarayan account of the relations between mother and daughter. Irigaray's work is an effective tool for understanding the disruptive and potentially healing desire between mothers and daughters, but her insistence on sex as primary difference must be challenged in order to acknowledge the intersectionality of sex and race. Working from recent work on the psychoanalysis of race, I argue that whiteness functions as a master signifier in its own right, and as a means of differentiation between the light‐skinned Moraga and her brown‐skinned mother. Irigaray's concept of blood deepens Moraga's account of her healing and subversive return to her mother. The juxtaposition of Moraga, Irigaray, and contemporary psychoanalysis of race can allow for a necessary revision of Irigaray's psychoanalysis that acknowledges the ways in which sexual difference is indexed by race and sheds new light on her account of the mother–daughter relation.     

Luther's Small and Large Catechisms: Defining and Confessing Christian Faith From the Centre in a Religiously Plural World

Abstract : In this article, the author argues that in his Small and Large Catechisms, which were both written in 1529, Martin Luther centres the Christian faith in a way that others can recognise as authentic and faithful to the Gospel vis‐à‐vis the relativism that is posited as the appropriate Christian articulation of the Gospel in a world of religious diversity. Luther's non‐negotiable centring on God for us in Jesus Christ, through whom God is uniquely and decisively revealed, speaks to the contemporary intra‐Christian and inter‐religious questions. The author finds evangelical and persuasive resonance in Lesslie Newbigin's call to indwell the Christian story and George Lindbeck's argument to attend to the grammar of the faith.     

Originary Temporality and Existential Commitment: A Defense of Heidegger's A Potiori Claim

Being and Time's fundamental ontoogy and existentialism both rest on the A Potiori Claim, which states that originary temporality is, although non‐sequential, a genuine and basic concept of time from which we derive our more ordinary, sequential concept of time. In this paper, I develop a new reading and defense of this claim against the readings of William Blattner, which ties originary temporality too tightly to the particular roles and identities we live out and must therefore find Heidegger's project a failure, and Tony Fisher, who implies that our various roles and identities hang together in time in a merely accidental and non‐rational way. On my reading, originary temporality is the structure of Dasein's characteristic activity of existential commitment. Through this activity, we each work out, in our own case, what it takes to embody the capacity for sense‐making, at all. Here, the non‐sequentiality of originary temporality reflects the way in which commitments are revised and sustained through time, while the sequence of nows derives from our need to embody our commitment in a single life that negotiates among the practical demands that our various identities make of us.     

Living in Ambiguity: Mission Formation as Living among Counter‐communities

This article has been developed from a short response given to Prof Néstor Míguez's paper, “Mission Formation for Transforming Discipleship” (featured in this issue of IRM) at the Commission for World Mission and Evangelism's Consultation on Mission Formation, held in Matanzas, Cuba, from 10 to 15 September 2016. The article sets out to explore Míguez's concept of living in ambiguity as a call to mission formation to create transformative counter‐communities, which can equip people to live with the struggle of justice promised and justice denied. The paper explores this through a number of lenses. The letter of Jeremiah to the exiles in Jeremiah 29 offers a biblical context for creating communities which are counter to dominant and imperial values. The work of French philosopher Michel Foucault on heterotopias offers a philosophical framework for such communities.     

WHOSE RIGHTS,AND WHAT's THE DIFFERENCE? A CRITIQUE OF BETH SINGER'S “HUMAN RIGHTS: SOME CURRENT ISSUES”

Abstract: In this article I argue against the rights‐based framework defining the abortion debate, and do so by considering the views of Beth Singer, a philosopher whose work conveys a broadly pragmatist formulation of traditional rights‐based language. Although Singer's schema presents a fruitful vantage point from which to consider the abortion question through the discourse of rights, even Singer's use of the language of rights ultimately fails adequately to address the subject. I challenge Singer's view by taking up John Dewey's concept of reflective morality, elucidated in his 1932 Ethics.     

The Work of the Trinity and the Knowledge of God in Augustine's De Trinitate

This article seeks to set forth the contribution that book 8 of Augustine's De Trinitate makes to our understanding of Augustine's way of knowing and the structure of the De Trinitate. With regards to Augustine's way of knowing, I argue that, in contrast to the results to which the epistemological Christocentrism of Barthian theology can lead, Augustine is able to present an account of the knowledge of God that remains faithful to the witness of Scripture by building his account around the work of each person of the Trinity. With regards to the structure of the De Trinitate, I propose that Augustine's concern in De Trinitate 8 with vain mental images shows that the search for the true image of God in the second half of the De Trinitate is motivated by a concern for the way in which the imagination responds to teaching about the Trinity.     

A thousand pleasures are not worth a single pain: The compensation argument for Schopenhauer's pessimism

Pessimism is, roughly, the view that life is not worth living. In chapter 46 of the second volume of The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer provides an oft‐neglected argument for this view. The argument is that a life is worth living only if it does not contain any uncompensated evils; but since all our lives happen to contain such evils, none of them are worth living. The now standard interpretation of this argument (endorsed by Kuno Fischer and Christopher Janaway) proceeds from the claim that the value—or rather valuelessness—of life's goods makes compensation impossible. But this interpretation is neither philosophically attractive nor faithful to the text. In this article, I develop and defend an alternative interpretation (suggested by Wilhelm Windelband and Mark Migotti) according to which it is instead the actual temporal arrangement of life's goods and evils that makes compensation impossible.     

SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM AND A PRIORI SELF‐KNOWLEDGE

The argument known as the ‘McKinsey Recipe’ tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and a priori self‐knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know a priori that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of ‘natural kind concept’: (i) a concept which in fact denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which aims to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a Dry Earth scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian’s argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two‐dimensional semantics, using the notion of ‘considering a possible world as actual’, I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian’s question: which concept would ‘water’ express on Dry Earth?¹     

Reading Cristina García's The Agüero Sisters as Latina Feminist Philosophy

Through an analysis of the interconnections or lack thereof between gender and epistemology, I present Cristina García's The Agüero Sisters as a text of Latina feminist philosophy. First, I use the works of Linda Alcoff and Walter Mignolo to illustrate the political nature of epistemology and how women and people of color in particular are disenfranchised from such a political endeavor. Then I examine the connections among the concepts of origin, absence, inheritance, and knowledge‐construction in García's novel to further a critique of standard epistemology and point to an emphasis on reconnection with feminine and maternal knowledge for this text's female characters. Moreover, a depiction and elaboration of María Lugones's ideas of the “coloniality of gender” and “decolonial feminism” in this novel augments this critical examination of epistemology and places emphasis on women as knowledge‐producers.     

TOUCH,SOUND, AND THINGS WITHOUT THE MIND

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind‐independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so‐called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind‐independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them.     

Let's Talk: Getting Out of the Counseling Center to Serve Hard‐to‐Reach Students

This article describes Let's Talk, a counseling center outreach program. Counselors hold walk‐in hours across campus to engage students who might not otherwise seek counseling. Locations are chosen to reach underserved communities. Counselors offer informal consultation, a less formal alternative to traditional counseling. Este artículo describe Let's Talk (Hablemos), un programa de acercamiento a los centros de consejería. Los consejeros mantienen horas de puertas abiertas sin cita previa en distintos lugares del campus para atraer a estudiantes que de otra forma no buscarían acceso a la consejería. Las ubicaciones se eligen para alcanzar comunidades con servicios insuficientes. Los consejeros ofrecen consultas informales, una alternativa menos formal a la consejería tradicional.     

THINKING THROUGH KIERKEGAARD'S ANTI-CLIMACUS: ART, IMAGINATION, AND IMITATION

What place do imagination and art have in Christian existence? This paper examines this question through the writings of Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti‐Climacus: The Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity. I focus on the latter work in particular because it best illustrates the importance of imagination in following after (Efterfølgelse) Christ in imitation, which Anti‐Climacus presents as the proper task of faithful Christian existence. After outlining both his critique and his affirmation of the imagination, I then consider what role the notion of ‘Christian art’ might play in his account of the imitation of Christ. Anti‐Climacus gives a severe critique of Christian art, insofar as it disposes the viewer to detached observation and admiration – rather than imitation – of Christ. However, an earlier passage in the same text gives a provocative yet cryptic indication of the sort of art that would not succumb to this danger. Taking a cue from the phenomenology of Jean‐Luc Marion, I draw out this suggestion and argue for the important role that visual art can play in imitating Christ. The final section illustrates this point briefly with three paintings: Matthias Grünewald's Crucifixion, Hans Holbein's The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, and Albrecht Dürer's Self‐Portrait (1500).     

Derrida's “Antigonanette”: On the Quasi‐Transcendental

In this article, I rely both on Derrida's 1974 work Glas, as well as Derrida's 1971–72 lecture course, “La famille de Hegel,” to argue that the concept of the quasi‐transcendental is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel and to trace its implications beyond the Hegelian system. I follow Derrida's analysis of the role of Antigone—or, as the lecture course has it, “Antigonanette”—in Hegel's thought to argue that the quasi‐transcendental indicates a re(con)striction of empirical difference into the transcendental, which is thereby only ever provisionally transcendental. I then argue that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is neither a general economy, nor is it in each case singular, but rather it ambivalently oscillates between these two. Finally, I treat the temporality of the quasi‐transcendental, arguing that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is not prior to the re(con)striction of empirical difference, but is paradoxically produced by it by being retroactively constituted. I take up this analysis for the sake of describing what I contend is the quasi‐transcendental structure of constitutive exclusion, a way of understanding the conceptual structure of political bodies, and the political structure of concepts.     

SYNCRETISM OR CORRELATION: TEILHARD AND TILLICH'S CONTRASTING METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

Abstract. I revisit Paul Tillich's theological methodology and contrast his practice of correlation with the syncretistic methodological practices of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. I argue that the method of correlation, as referred to in Robert John Russell's 2001 Zygon article, fails to uphold Tillich's self‐limitation of his own methodology with regard to Tillich's insistence upon the theological circle. I assert that the theological circle, as taken from Tillich's Systematic Theology I, is a central facet within his methodology and that this often‐ignored concept needs to be resuscitated if one is to remain authentically Tillichian in one's approach to the science‐and‐theology dialogue.     

The Atrocity Paradigm and the Concept of Forgiveness

In this article 1 discuss Claudia Card's treatment of war rape in relation to her discussion of the victim's moral power of forgiveness. I argue that her analysis of the victim's power to withhold forgiveness overlooks the paradoxical structure of witnessing, which implies that there is an ungraspable dimension of atrocity. In relation to this ungraspable element, the proposal that victims of atrocity have the power to either offer or withhold forgiveness may have little relevance.     

Better Dread (if Still Dead) than Red: High‐Brown Passing in John Hearne's Voices Under The Window

In his pioneering Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro‐Caribbean Philosophy, Paget Henry points out that because of the region's colonial history, Caribbean philosophy is far more often found ‘embedded’ in other discourses, such as literature, than in explicit theorising. Following Henry's lead, I seek to find the philosophical ‘moral of the story’ of Voices Under the Window, the 1955 first novel of the late Jamaican writer John Hearne (1926–94), which some critics regard as his best work. In a novel with significant autobiographical elements, Hearne, a ‘high‐brown’ or ‘red’ Jamaican, recounts the story of Mark Lattimer, likewise a ‘red man’ positioned at the upper edge of the ‘brown’ stratum of the white/brown/black Jamaican social pyramid. Lattimer moves from a race‐denying attempt to ‘pass’ in World War II Britain to a Marxist social activism upon his later return to post‐war Jamaica, but is killed in a black protest riot. His tragic fate raises important philosophical questions about race, colour, class, and personal and social transformation that remain very relevant today, especially considering the failure of 1970s Anglo‐Caribbean radicalism to fulfil its revolutionary promise.