Structuralism and Metaphysics

I consider different versions of a structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which characteristic mathematical objects have no more of a 'nature' than is given by the basic relations of a structure in which they reside. My own version of such a view is non-eliminative in the sense that it does not lead to a programme for eliminating reference to mathematical objects. I reply to criticisms of non-eliminative structuralism recently advanced by Keränen and Hellman. In replying to the former, I rely on a distinction between 'basic' and 'constructed' structures. A conclusion is that ideas from the metaphysical tradition can be misleading when applied to the objects of modern mathematics.     

葛洪与玄学

玄学是魏晋时期兴起的一种影响深远的社会思潮,两晋之际玄学在理论上发展到极至,其影响开始渗入社会生活的各个方面。葛洪早年深受儒家学说熏陶,又是官方道教理论的创立者,无论是为了维护传统的儒家思想,还是出于为官方道教建立理论的需要,葛洪在主观上都反对玄学所促发的行为方式。但客观上,葛洪却不自觉地受了玄学的影响。本文力图通过分析葛洪思想中玄学的成分,来揭示玄学对当时士人的巨大影响力。     

Real Metaphysics

Book Information Real Metaphysics. Real Metaphysics Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds., London : Routledge, 2003, VIII + 248, £65 (cloth), £19.99 (paper) Edited by Hallvard Lillehammer; and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Routledge. London. Pp. VIII + 248. £65 (cloth:), £19.99 (paper:),     

Introverted Metaphysics

This paper pulls together three debates fundamental in metaphysics and proposes a novel unified approach to them. The three debates are (i) between bundle theory and substrate theory about the nature of objects, (ii) dispositionalism and categoricalism about the nature of properties, and (iii) regularity theory and production theory about the nature of causation. The first part of the paper suggests that although these debates are metaphysical, the considerations motivating competing approaches in each debate tend to be epistemological. The second part argues that the two underlying epistemological pictures supporting these competing views lead to highly unsatisfying conceptions of the world. The final part proposes an alternative epistemological picture, which I call “introverted empiricism,” and presents the way this alternative provides for a more satisfying grasp of the ultimate nature of objects, properties, and causation. It is a consequence of this alternative picture that there is a kind of intimate self‐understanding that underlies our understanding of the deep nature of reality.     

Hegel's Essentialism. Natural Kinds and the Metaphysics of Explanation in Hegel's Theory of ‘the Concept’

Several recent interpretations see Hegel's theory of the Concept as a form of conceptual realism, according to which finite reality is articulated by objectively existing concepts. More precisely, this theory has been interpreted as a version of natural kind essentialism, and it has been proposed that its function is to account for the possibility of genuine explanations. This suggests a promising way to reconstruct the argument that Hegel's theory of objective concepts is based on—an argument that shows that the possibility of explanation rests on metaphysical preconditions and that natural kind essentialism gives the only adequate account of those preconditions. But in order for such a reconstruction to be successful, one needs to spell out the metaphysical features in virtue of which Hegelian natural kinds can account for the possibility of explanation. The article takes up this challenge. It offers the first detailed analysis of the modal fine‐structure of Hegel's natural kind essentialism and shows how Hegel's position, thus understood, provides the details needed to complete the explanation‐based argument.     

Metaphysics,Intuitions and Physics

Ladyman and Ross (2007) do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work – provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this paper is to undermine some of their arguments against contemporary metaphysics as it is currently practiced. 1     

Pure Processes and Projective Metaphysics

Philosophical Studies -     

真之形而上学

“真”是语言哲学的核心概念,由于该词本身的特性,它的语义特征在日常使用中并不明显。围绕“真”有许多讨论,形成不同理论。这样的讨论和理论既有语言学层面的问题,也有形而上学层面的问题。戴维特详细分析论述了这两个层面的差异,并试图说明二者的优劣以及孰为先孰为后。无论他的观点是不是正确,不管他的论证是不是充分,他的文章至少是一篇出色的综述,从中可以使我们大致领略当前关于真之形而上学是一种什么样的讨论。     

形而上学中的虚构主义

虚构主义是在过去20年间涌现出来的一种很有竞争力的反实在论理论。这种理论认为,某些领域(如数学、伦理)中的理论言谈所涉及的对象在本体论上是不存在的,因此这些理论言谈实际上都不是真的;然而我们可以把它们作为像虚构作品中的言谈一样继续使用下去。本文介绍和讨论了虚构主义的历史和理念,特别强调了这种理论在语言哲学、模态理论、数学哲学、道德哲学、真理理论等领域中的应用和发展。