Self-presentations of happiness: sincere, polite, or cautious?

Two studies addressed the meaning of expressed happiness in social relationships. In the first study, men expected to interact with a socially desirable or a socially undesirable woman. It was predicted that (a) when about to meet a socially undesirable woman, men would display more happiness publicly than is felt privately and (b) when about to meet a socially desirable woman, men would display less happiness publicly than felt privately. Results supported the former and tended to support the latter prediction. In the second study, the authors predicted that women would mistrust men's expressions of happiness upon meeting them such that (a) unattractive women would suspect men of inflating happiness and (b) attractive women would suspect men of suppressing happiness. Results supported the former but not the latter hypothesis. Taking relationship-specific goals into account appears to be important in determining whether emotion will be accurately conveyed and can be trusted.     

Does physical attractiveness buy happiness? Women’s mating motivation and happiness

Motivation and Emotion - Given the centrality of physical attractiveness in women’s mate value, we predicted that mating motive salience would increase the weight of physical attractiveness...     

Can money buy happiness?

Income was negatively associated with the mood states of confusion and tense in a sample of 406 community residents, but controls for age, sex, and education eliminated these associations.     

Who expressed what emotion? Men grab anger,women grab happiness

When anger or happiness flashes on a face in the crowd, do we misperceive that emotion as belonging to someone else? Two studies found that misperception of apparent emotional expressions—“illusory conjunctions”—depended on the gender of the target: male faces tended to “grab” anger from neighboring faces, and female faces tended to grab happiness. Importantly, the evidence did not suggest that this effect was due to the general tendency to misperceive male or female faces as angry or happy, but instead indicated a more subtle interaction of expectations and early visual processes. This suggests a novel aspect of affordance-management in human perception, whereby cues to threat, when they appear, are attributed to those with the greatest capability of doing harm, whereas cues to friendship are attributed to those with the greatest likelihood of providing affiliation opportunities.     

Whatever happened to "What might have been"? Regrets, happiness, and maturity

Although lost opportunities and mistaken expectations are unpleasant to think and talk about, these experiences may have a role to play in personality development. Drawing on research using narratives of lost possible selves, the authors review the relations of regrettable experiences to 2 important and independent aspects of maturity, happiness and complexity. Thinking about a lost possible self is related to concurrent regrets, distress, and lowered well-being; however, elaborating on a lost possible self is related, concurrently, to complexity and predicts complexity, prospectively, over time. In this article, the authors describe the role that regrettable experiences have in promoting both happiness and complexity. Finally, expanding on previous work, the authors examine potential affordances of happy maturity and suggest psychological capacities that may promote happy maturity.     

The contribution of temperament,popularity, and physical appearance to children’s happiness

The relation between the happiness of 9–12 year old children and their temperament, popularity, and physical appearance was examined. Participants included 432 children and their parents and teachers. Happiness in children was assessed using a self-rating scale, parents’ ratings, teachers’ ratings, and the Happiness and Satisfaction Subscale of the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale 2 (Piers-Harris 2) [Piers, E. V., & Herzberg, D. S. (2002). Manual for the Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale, 2nd ed. Los Angeles: Western Psychological Services]. Estimates of children’s temperament, popularity, and physical appearance included parents’ ratings, individual items on the Piers-Harris 2, and three domain scales from the Piers-Harris 2: the Freedom From Anxiety Subscale, Popularity Subscale, and Physical Appearance and Attributes Subscale. Children’s happiness was correlated with and predicted by ratings of their temperament, popularity, and appearance. Demographic variables did not account for appreciable variance in children’s happiness. The results parallel the common finding that internal factors (e.g., personality), but not external factors (e.g., demographics), predict adults’ happiness.     

Should happiness guide social policy?

Since the 1970s, and especially since the 1990s, the concept of happiness has grown in importance in both the academic and popular domains. This article focuses on studies that collect empirical data on happiness with the aim of informing public policies that maximise collective happiness. These studies are characterised by two assumptions that are mostly taken for granted: that happiness is a psychological state and that it has a moral and ethical value. In this contribution, I will question this conception of happiness as a social goal from the point of view of political philosophy. I begin by examining the historical origin of the modern political concept of happiness. Following this, I evaluate the principle of happiness maximisation, comparing it to other wide-ranging principles (justice, equity, freedom and plurality), and bringing to the fore some implications of happiness maximisation that place it in conflict with democratic rights and freedoms. Finally, I sum up my line of reasoning and briefly reflect on some proper uses of happiness in public policy.     

Can orange colour facilitate the processing of happiness? An exploration study on happiness metaphor

Colour is a ubiquitous perceptual stimulus, and theoretical models of colour and psychological functioning posit that colour plays a key role in influencing the behaviour and mental function of a person. One investigation and two experiments investigated the colour metaphor representation of happiness concepts and the mapping mode of the colour metaphor of happiness concepts. A questionnaire was conducted to explore the relationship between colour preference and happiness. Study 2 shows that the identification of happiness words was facilitated more when words were viewed on an orange background than when viewed on a blue background. Study 3 further verifies the links of the connection between colour and happiness at the sentence level, and the orange-happiness facilitation effect was replicated. These results document a novel influence of colour on emotion recognition processes, where an orange background may facilitate the processing of the concept of happiness and provide support for conceptual metaphor theory and colour-in-context theory.     

Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you have, or both?

Rabbi Hyman Schachtel (1954) proposed that "happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you have" (p. 37). In two studies, we tested Schachtel's maxim by asking participants whether or not they had and the extent to which they wanted each of 52 material items. To quantify how much people wanted what they had, we identified what they had and the extent to which they wanted those things. To quantify how much people had what they wanted, we identified how much they wanted and whether or not they had each item. Both variables accounted for unique variance in happiness. Moreover, the extent to which people wanted what they had partially mediated effects of gratitude and maximization on happiness, and the extent to which they had what they wanted partially mediated the effect of maximization. Results indicate that happiness is both wanting what you have and having what you want.     

Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? [corrected] Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness

Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach.     

Self-concordance, goal attainment, and the pursuit of happiness: can there be an upward spiral?

Two studies used the self-concordance model of healthy goal striving (K. M. Sheldon & A. J. Elliot, 1999) to examine the motivational processes by which people can increase their level of well-being during a period of time and then maintain the gain or perhaps increase it even further during the next period of time. In Study 1, entering freshmen with self-concordant motivation better attained their 1st-semester goals, which in turn predicted increased adjustment and greater self-concordance for the next semester's goals. Increased self-concordance in turn predicted even better goal attainment during the 2nd semester, which led to further increases in adjustment and to higher levels of ego development by the end of the year. Study 2 replicated the basic model in a 2-week study of short-term goals set in the laboratory. Limits of the model and implications for the question of how (and whether) happiness may be increased are discussed.     

New age advice: ticket to happiness?

The ‘New Age’ movement emerged in the second half of the 20th century and New Age ideas became the vogue in the Western world. New Age is much concerned with personal quality of life and offers both a philosophy of life and various therapeutic practices, presumed to raise happiness. This paper first describes the main recommendations to be found in New Age books. Next it considers the probable effects on happiness of these, by examining both the theoretical plausibility and the empirical conditions of happiness. This paper concludes that several recommendations are likely to produce beneficial consequences. It is argued, however, that the advice will not fit everybody equally well and that some New Age practices may reduce happiness, e.g., practices that undermine a realistic outlook on reality.     

Does happiness function like a motivational state?

According to Brehm's intensity of emotion theory, if an emotion has motivational properties, its intensity should be non-monotonically affected by factors similar to those determining the intensity of motivational states. These factors are called deterrents. In the case of emotion, one category of deterrents consists of factors that can potentially interfere with feeling the emotion, such as reasons for not feeling the emotion. Two experiments were carried out to examine whether happiness is a motivational state and, thus, if its intensity is non-monotonically determined by the importance of reasons for not feeling happy. We expected happiness to be reduced by a low importance reason for not feeling happy, to remain high in the presence of a moderately important reason, and to be reduced or eliminated by a very important reason. Both experiments supported the cubic function that results from these expectations, and when the results of the two studies were combined, each of the individual legs of the cubic function was found to be reliable along with the cubic function itself. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Gain face,but lose happiness? It depends on how much money you have

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of face consciousness on happiness and the moderating role of financial situation on this relationship. We first examined our hypotheses in study 1 in a particular setting of consumption, and replicated our findings in study 2 in a more generalized setting of interpersonal situations. The two studies produced essentially consistent results. We found individuals high on face consciousness tend to be less happy, and the negative association between face consciousness and happiness is ameliorated by their financial situation. These results revealed the importance of face consciousness as an individual difference in predicting happiness. The implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Steady happiness on a wheel-chair. Denial,masochism or after-effects of a near-death experience?

The author describes his weird affective condition of steady happiness, after a severe haemorrhagic stroke, that brought to a sudden stop of all his professional activities and caused multiple severe motoric symptoms. The author suggests that his affective state, wholly different from his baseline condition before the stroke, is very close to what is reported by survivors of near-death experience (NDE), as long-time after-effects of the experience. Therefore, it is suggested that the psychoanalyst, in confronting with weird conditions of well-being, should consider the possibility of after-effects of an NDE, alongside with the operation of primitive defences.     

Why is intelligence associated with stability of happiness?

In the National Child Development Study, life‐course variability in happiness over 18 years was significantly negatively associated with its mean level (happier individuals were more stable in their happiness, and it was not due to the ceiling effect), as well as childhood general intelligence and all Big Five personality factors (except for Agreeableness). In a multiple regression analysis, childhood general intelligence was the strongest predictor of life‐course variability in life satisfaction, stronger than all Big Five personality factors, including Emotional stability. More intelligent individuals were significantly more stable in their happiness, and it was not entirely because: (1) they were more educated and wealthier (even though they were); (2) they were healthier (even though they were); (3) they were more stable in their marital status (even though they were); (4) they were happier (even though they were); (5) they were better able to assess their own happiness accurately (even though they were); or (6) they were better able to recall their previous responses more accurately or they were more honest in their survey responses (even though they were both). While I could exclude all of these alternative explanations, it ultimately remained unclear why more intelligent individuals were more stable in their happiness.     

Is happiness the supreme good? Some philosophical objections

Modern philosophy is characterised by various objections to the Aristotelian conception of happiness as the supreme good of human life. In this paper, I focus on the objections raised by two key thinkers of the modern period, namely Blaise Pascal and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both philosophers formulate important counter- arguments to the teleological claim that happiness is the highest good towards which all human beings naturally direct their efforts. Their target is not any specific definition of happiness as a particular kind of activity, or a particular kind of good. Instead, they express a more fundamental scepticism about the very possibility of happiness being the ultimate end of human life. As I show, Pascal's and Nietzsche's radical point is that, since reason alone can never answer for certain the question of whether or not happiness is the ultimate aim of human existence, philosophy should not concern itself with the question of happiness. The paper has three parts. I first sketch an outline of Pascal's sceptical argument with regard to happiness, and then present his positive definition of happiness, after which I do the same for Nietzsche. The third part is devoted to a critical assessment of their positions in light of an alternative argument developed by John Cottingham.