NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

In the present article, the neo-Piagetian theories that were presented in the previous articles are placed in historical context; then compared and contrasted. It is suggested that all the theories arose in response to a common dilemma, namely that of building a revised theory of development which would preserve the strengths of classical Piagetian theory, while elminating its weaknesses. Since one of the strengths of the classical theory was its ability to explain the universal features of cognitive development, most of the new theories retained the core set of structural postulates which made this explanation possible. This gives the new theories a strong family resemblance with regard to their structural claims. Since one of the weaknesses of the classical theory was its inability to explain the aspects of cognitive development that are not universal, most of the new theories have modified and/or added to this set of core postulates, and specified a set of structural transformation processes which go beyond the classical theory as well. In this latter regard there are more dissimilarities among the new theories than there are similarities. Two reasons for this divergence are suggested. The first is that Piaget's structural transformation model was less clearly falsified than other aspects of his theory, by the data on cognitive-developmental non-universality. It was therefore less clear which aspects of the transformation model should be retained, and which eliminated. The second reason is that current theorists are divided on the question of which other theoretical approach - among those that are currently available in other branches of psychology - offers the greatest promise, when it comes to extending Piaget's transformation model in a productive fashion.     

DEGREES OF FREEDOM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM FIELD THEORY

Nick Huggett and Robert Weingard (1994) have recently proposed a novel approach to interpreting field theories in physics, one which makes central use of the fact that a field generally has an infinite number of degrees of freedom in any finite region of space it occupies. Their characterization, they argue, (i) reproduces our intuitive categorizations of fields in the classical domain and thereby (ii) provides a basis for arguing that the quantum field is a field. Furthermore, (iii) it accomplishes these tasks better than does a well-known rival approach due to Paul Teller (1990, 1995). This paper contends that all three of these claims are mistaken, and suggests that Huggett and Weingard have not shown how counting degrees of freedom provides any insight into the interpretation or the formal properties of field theories in physics.     

CRITICAL REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: RESPONSE TO ROBBINS, VAN HUYSSTEEN, AND HEFNER

Abstract. I read Robbins's essay as a hermeneutics of suspicion against the claims of critical realism, especially the tendency of critical realism to achieve correspondence with the world rather than participation in changing it. I read van Huyssteen's essay as an application of critical realism which tends toward correspondence in spite of his correct statement of the theory. I read Hefner's paper as an exposition of both claims and methods capable of conveying truth and genuine knowledge. As such, Hefner's paper illustrates an adequate application of the theory of critical realism and overcomes the suspicion suggested by Robbins.     

Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) makes use of explicit procedures for grading evidence for causal claims. Normally, these procedures categorise evidence of correlation produced by statistical trials as better evidence for a causal claim than evidence of mechanisms produced by other methods. We argue, in contrast, that evidence of mechanisms needs to be viewed as complementary to, rather than inferior to, evidence of correlation. In this paper we first set out the case for treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation in explicit protocols for evaluating evidence. Next we provide case studies which exemplify the ways in which evidence of mechanisms complements evidence of correlation in practice. Finally, we put forward some general considerations as to how the two sorts of evidence can be more closely integrated by EBM.     

On the inconclusiveness of “crucial” cognitive tests of dissonance versus self-perception theories

Several recent experiments are claimed to have tested conflicting predictions of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories. It is argued that these claims fail to take into account the capacity of each formulation to account adequately for results “predicted” by the other. This argument is then continued, at a metatheoretical level, to reach the conclusion that the two theories are not capable of producing unequivocally contradictory predictions of cognitive consequences of experimental procedures.     

Variations in Strictness and Religious Commitment Within and Among Five Denominations

Iannaccone (1994) claims that members of churches with strict rules (e.g., no smoking or drinking) have higher average commitment because strict rules discourage involvement by less committed potential members. Most previous studies of Iannaccone's assertions have studied congregations within a single denomination, and these studies have found little support for his claims. However, Iannaccone (1996) has responded that strictness is primarily a characteristic of denominations that varies little within a single denomination. If true, multidenominational studies are needed to detect the potential effects of strictness. Using data from a five-denomination, 625-congregation study, we find that within each denomination, strictness is not significantly related to measures of commitment. However, we also find, as Iannaccone claims, that most of the variation in strictness occurs between, rather than within, denominations. Thus, when we examine data from all five denominations, we find that strictness is strongly correlated with several important measures of member commitment levels.     

VARIETIES OF VIRTUE ETHICS

The revival of virtue ethics over the last thirty-five years has produced a bewildering diversity of theories, which on the face of it seem united only by their opposition to various features of more familiar Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories. In this paper I present a systematic account of the main positive features of virtue ethics, by articulating the common ground shared by its different varieties. I do so not to offer a fresh defence of virtue ethics, but rather to provide a conceptual map that locates its main claims and arguments in relation to those of rival theories, and identifies its distinctive contribution to contemporary ethics. I set out six specific claims which are made by all forms of virtue ethics, and I explain how these claims distinguish the theory from recent character-based forms of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism. I then use this framework to briefly survey two main strands of virtue ethics which have been developed in the literature.¹     

Rights and claims

Conclusion By way of conclusion, I have tried to show that rights do not come from nowhere, that is, rights are not sui generis. They come from claims. Rights do not make claims possible; rather claims make rights possible. For out of claims come claims to rights and from the welter of such claims to rights a legal system is established which, after sifting and refining, accepts some claims to rights and dignifies these as deeds, titles, rights and rejects others; and provides rules enabling persons to exercise their rights. A system of rights and rules thus generated gives one the right to make strong claims. Although having a right is not a condition for making a claim, having a right is necessary to sustain and appraise a claim. Appealing to rights enables us to distinguish weak from strong claims. For rights may sustain or rebut claims though they are not themselves claims.How can we appraise claims? A claim to implies a claim that, the latter being an outcome of the former. If the resulting claim is open to appraisal of the sustain/reject or true/false kind, then it is a claim in a sense other than a primitive cry in the wild. If one can go on to say of a claim that is open to appraisal that one has a right to make such a claim or that one has a strong claim, this is to give favorable, initial appraisal to a claim thus made; and is a claim not in a primitive but in a secondary and ultimately more significant sense.A slightly revised version of a paper read at the Long Island Philosophical Society, May 15, 1971. I wish to thank Lowell Kleinman, Alex Orenstein, Peter Manicas and Karsten Struhl for their helpful criticisms.     

Exorcising the double-nail confusion: a reply to Ono

Contrary to the claims of Ono it is argued that the principles and rules of direction vision do not account for the double-nail illusions, and that the 'ghost' concept is hidden rather than exorcised in Ono's approach.     

Differentiation and integration: guiding principles for analyzing cognitive change

Differentiation and integration played large roles within classic developmental theories but have been relegated to obscurity within contemporary theories. However, they may have a useful role to play in modern theories as well, if conceptualized as guiding principles for analyzing change rather than as real-time mechanisms. In the present study, we used this perspective to examine which rules children use, the order in which the rules emerge, and the effectiveness of instruction on water displacement problems. We found that children used systematic rules to solve such problems, and that the rules progress from undifferentiated to differentiated forms and toward increasingly accurate integration of the differentiated variables. Asking children to explain both why correct answers were correct and why incorrect answers were incorrect proved more effective than only requesting explanations of correct answers, which was more effective than just receiving feedback on the correctness of answers. Requests for explanations appeared to operate through helping children notice potential explanatory variables, formulate more advanced rules, and generalize the rules to novel problems.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference

It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive.     

ON THE METHODS AND THEORY OF CLUSTERING

The need for methods of clustering individuals into homogeneous groups seems clear. One hopes, by applying them to his data, to discover clusterings which may prove to be important. This aim appears straightforward, but the methods which exist do not necessarily satisfy them. The procedures which employ the correlation measure of profile similarity, and those which employ the distance measure are discussed. Technical and logical problems are shown to exist for both measures. The key defect in almost all clustering procedures seems to be the absence of a statistical model. The suggestion is made that the clustering problem be stated as a mixture problem. The need for further work by psychologists and statisticians is pointed out.     

Evolutionary ethics and moral theory

Conclusion This example, like the others, demands further discussion. My conclusion must therefore remain modest: an agent-neutral theory of our moral competence is not biologically implausible. Agent-centered rules like tit-for-tat, prerogatives, special obligations, and duties not to harm others might be best regarded as belonging to the theory of moral performance rather than the theory of moral competence. For biologists who may think otherwise, the general argument of this essay is that any claims to the contrary must be based on more empirically well-developed theories of our moral competence and moral performance.More adequate theories of both kinds are worth developing, even if by themselves they determine nothing about how we ought to live our lives. Biology may help us understand the broad taxonomical categories of moral performance. It may also explain why, at the deepest levels of our moral thinking, we so easily slide into agent-neutral ways of reasoning. But how we ought to live our lives is something that must be determined by social experiment and moral argumentation. Discoveries regarding the empirical nature of morality cannot be made independently of the actual workings of our moral competence, which is itself only one factor in broader social and psychological processes that are capable of leading human beings down any number of more or less morally laudable paths.

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Contrast,inference and scientific realism

The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from the phenomena’.     

Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order

I discuss theories about the way in which we determine the precedence ofperceived events. I examine Mellor's account, which claims that it is thetiming of our perceptions of events that enables us to determine their order,and Dennett's criticism of this. Dennett cites psychological experimentswhich suggest that it is the content of our perceptions, rather than theirtiming, which allows us to determine the order of the events perceived. Iargue that by distinguishing between two different ways of construing'perception' we can see not only that the two accounts are compatible, but that Dennett's account presupposes Mellor's.     

WHAT'S WRONG WITH CONTEXTUALISM?

This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest-dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favour of attributor contextualism over 'subject-sensitive invariantism', both in epistemology and in moral theory. But here we note an interesting result: the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its anti-sceptical force.     

Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer

This paper addresses Peter Singer's claim that cognitive ability can function as a universal criterion for measuring moral worth. I argue that Singer fails to adequately represent cognitive capacity as the object of moral knowledge at stake in his theory. He thus fails to put forth credible knowledge claims, which undermines both the trustworthiness of his moral theories and the morality of the actions called for by these theories. I situate Singer's methods within feminist critiques of moral reasoning and moral epistemology, and argue that Singer's methods are problematic for moral reasoning because they abstract from their object valuable contextual features. I further develop this claim by showing the importance of embodiment for the construal of objects of moral knowledge. Finally, I develop the moral and scholarly implications of this critique. By showing that the abstract, universal methods of reasoning Singer employs cannot credibly construe the objects of ethical inquiry, I call into question the validity of these methods as a means to moral knowledge in general. Furthermore, since moral reasoning takes place within an embodied moral landscape, it is itself a moral enterprise. Singer's moral reasoning, and ours, must be held accountable for its knowledge claims as well as its concrete effects in the world.     

In defence of high-speed memory scanning

This paper reviews some of the evidence that bears on the existence of a mental high-speed serial exhaustive scanning process (SES) used by humans to interrogate the active memory of a set of items to determine whether it contains a test item. First proposed in the 1960s, based on patterns of reaction times (RTs), numerous later studies supported, elaborated, extended, and limited the generality of SES, while critics claimed that SES never occurred, that predictions from SES were violated, and that other mechanisms produced the RT patterns that led to the idea. I show that some of these claims result from ignoring variations in experimental procedure that produce superficially similar but quantitatively different RT patterns and that, for the original procedures, the most frequently repeated claims that predictions are violated are false. I also discuss evidence against the generality of competing theories of active-memory interrogation, especially those that depend on discrimination of directly accessible “memory-strength”. Some of this evidence has been available since the 1960s but has been ignored by some proponents of alternative theories. Other evidence presented herein is derived from results of one relevant experiment described for the first time, results of another described in more detail than heretofore, and new analyses of old data. Knowledge of brain function acquired during the past half century has increased the plausibility of SES. The conclusion: SES is alive and well, but many associated puzzles merit further investigation, suggestions for which are offered.     

A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism

We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.