Cognitive Metaphor Theory and the Metaphysics of Immediacy

One of the core tenets of cognitive metaphor theory is the claim that metaphors ground abstract knowledge in concrete, first‐hand experience. In this paper, I argue that this grounding hypothesis contains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations, empirical difficulties. I present evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coherent and cognitively valid concept of “metaphor” and “concrete meaning,” and some general problems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I conclude from these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual metaphors, the available evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structure organized according to the immediacy of experience.     

Lesbian Angels & Other Matters

In this commentary on Joyce Trebilcot's “Dyke Methods or Principles for the Discovery/Creation of the Withstanding,” I discuss four areas of difficulty in Trebikot's proposed methods: (1) an overly negative view of “the intention to persuade,” (2) a tendency towards epistemological relativism and loss of cultural authorities, (3) a circularity in defining the proposed methods as dyke methods, and (4) a hint of repressive tolerance towards differences among lesbians by avoidance of painful confrontation involving those differences. Unlike Trebilcot, I make a distinc' turn between the abuse of persuasion and the art of persuasion, re'claiming the latter as a caring and challenging strategy, rather than an invasion of adversarial heteropatriarchal tactics.     

Alfred Schutz’ Theory of Communicative Action

This paper addresses the notion of communicative action on the basis of Alfred Schutz’ writings. In Schutz’ work, communication is of particular significance and its importance is often neglected by phenomenologists. Communication plays a crucial role in his first major work, the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt from 1932, yet communication is also a major feature in his unfinished works which were later completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann: The Structures of the Life World (1973, 1989). In these texts, Schutz sometimes refers to “communicative action,” and he comes to ascribe a crucial role to communication within the domain of the life world he calls everyday life. Based on Schutz’ texts, I shall first attempt to critically reconstruct the defining features of his notion of communication and communicative action. As a result, it emerges that Schutz’ notion of communication, particularly in its early incarnation, seems to be, at first glance, characterized by a dichotomy between virtual communication, that is communicative action in a narrow sense, and non-virtual communication. As I want to show with respect to the seemingly established dichotomous distinction between “mediated” and “immediate social action,” Schutz himself started to overcome this dichotomy. Based on this thesis, I will try to sketch a basic outline of a theory of communicative action, a theory less formulated by Schutz’ than built on Schutz’ writings. As the idea of communicative action, and particularly the transgression of the distinction between mediated and immediate action, affects the very structures of the life-world described by Schutz and Luckmann, I will ultimately demonstrate that any mundane phenomenology of the life-world requires a triangulatory method.     

Measuring racial essentialism in the genomic era: The genetic essentialism scale for race (GESR)

Current Psychology - Racial essentialism is the belief that races are biologically distinct groups with defining core “essences,” a notion associated with increased social distance and...     

On the Origin of the Concept of “Deviant Subculture” in Criminology: W. I. Thomas and the Chicago School of Sociology

“Deviant subculture” has been a key concept in sociology of deviance and crime for a long time. It has often been argued that Albert K. Cohen was the person who first developed the concept. However, this article argues that the concept first emerged in the work of the Chicago School of Sociology and that W. I. Thomas’ notion of “the definition of the situation” was at the core of it. The notion allowed Thomas to redefine the problem of deviance and crime from one caused by psychological and physiological defects to one caused by normative disorganization.     

正念是什么——从正念内涵研究发展角度的思考

"正念是什么"是正念研究中的基本问题,也是长期困扰研究者的难题,造成此困境的重要原因是正念跨越了佛学与心理学两种语境。在正念内涵研究历程中,研究者们先后试图以"去神秘化"、"去语境化"及"整合化"来解决跨语境所造成的问题。本研究认为:正念为多维概念,其内涵的复杂性决定了研究者对正念的认识并非静态的判断,而是逐步成熟的过程;应深入整合佛学与心理学语境,以发展的视角看待正念。     

Self-reference in memory: Recognition of personality items

The hypothesis that the “self” concept is active in memory was tested in a series of recognition experiments involving first- and third-person sentences under several instructional conditions. The results confirmed the hypothesis and indicated a degree of sentence specificity for the effect. These results were interpreted as congruent with the notion that the “self” can be seen as a cognitive structure with both a memory component as well as an involvement in the evaluation and processing of incoming materials.     

Institute report: The annual summer program in phenomenology

Abstract

This article presents Merleau‐Ponty's concept of “flesh” as a possible factor in the (re)defining of the Rogerian theory in terms of its concept (perspective) of man and the world. It describes Merleau‐Ponty's study of phenomena, emphasizing those aspects which are most closely related to his concept of man, on the course which brings one to his concept of “flesh.” It will include some cases of therapeutic treatment from the view point of “man in the world,” which is proposed by the philosopher.     

Theological Education in Epistemological Perspective: The Significance of Michael Polanyhi's “Personal Knowledge” for a Theological Orientation of Theological Education

Of what significance to theological education is critical reflection? Representing an influential perspective, Charles Wood seems to ascribe to critical reflection the highest priority by defining theology as “critical reflection upon the validity of the Christian witness.” This article argues that such a perspective devalues participatory modes of knowing. In contrast, the scientific epistemology of Michael Polanyi better illumines the pedagogical nature and theological orientation of theological education. Specifically, his notion of “indwelling” serves as a point of integration by which participative knowing is extended and intensified by the clarificatory power of critical reflection.     

儒家的宗教性及其与西方基督教精神之比较

本文力图从一个中西学术界争论颇多的问题———“儒家是否是宗教”的问题中发掘出问题背后所隐含的中西宗教文化交流的时代契机。作者首先对儒家“宗教性”的概念进行定义 ,然后从哲学、道德和超越性三方面阐释了儒家宗教性的具体体现 ,并比较分析了传统向度意义上的儒家和西方基督教在宗教精神方面的不同 ,包括超越意识、终极性宗教存在、对“人”的认识以及对“心灵”的认识。最后探讨了儒家与基督教对话的可能性和必要性。     

Tolerance or Hospitality?

Facing the development of pluralistic cultures and the conflict of varied civilizations, we should examine political theory frameworks, particularly as concerns the construction of world order. On the problem of “tolerance or hospitality,” tolerance has been the target of opposition. Jacques Derrida deconstructs this concept and supports Immanuel Kant’s notion of hospitality instead of tolerance. However, Jürgen Habermas advocates reconstructing the concept of tolerance, although he does note its limits. We should regard hospitality as the fundamental spirit of international relations and take the notion of “Seeking Sameness and Respecting Diversity” as a principle for handling relations between different cultures.     

Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics of Freedom and Absolute Evil

Simone de Beauvoir held that human experience is intrinsically ambiguous and that there are no values extrinsic to experience, but she also designated some actions as absolute evil. This essay explains how Beauvoir utilized an intrinsic absolute value to ground an action‐guiding principle of freedom that justifies her notion of evil. Morgan's analysis counters Robin May Schott's objections that Beauvoir failed to systematically justify her notion of absolute evil and that Beauvoir shifted from a “logic of action” to a “logic of history” when she utilized the concept.     

Hegel after Nancy: Sensibility,Singularity, and the Problem of the … x

This article takes up two models of punishment in Hegel, one that is underdeveloped in the Phenomenology of Spirit and one more fully developed in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Both models focus on the notions of law and the legality of personhood. I argue that beyond this, they share a common concept of singularity as an excess over and above the ethical-political order. This concept opens up to what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the “event” of freedom in Hegel. This point about excess lets me deploy Lacan and then Nancy to underscore how, for Hegel, problems concerning the question “what is law?” might be a clue as to how the bad infinite is opposed to the good or “actual” infinite. I take this up in the context of Hegel’s theory of “value,” including the value of the “good.” Altogether this analysis reveals that Hegel’s method allows for a more complex humanism than is typically understood, since his points about law and punishment lead to a more radicalized notion of intentionality and forgiveness than usually derived from the logic of recognition.     

Self psychology and projective identification—whither shall they meet? a reply to the editors (1995)

The concept of projective identification continues to be viewed as alien, even dangerous, by self psychologists. Six aspects of self‐psychology/intersubjectivity theory are explored in an attempt to understand the presumed incompatibility of self psychology and projective identification: 1) the empathic vantage point; 2) the focus on subjective reality; 3) the emphasis on the analyst's personal contribution; 4) the focus on selfobject experience; 5) the disruption—restoration process; and 6) the defining of transference and countertransference as “organizing activity.”; The self‐psychological/intersubjective concepts that come closest to describing the phenomenon of projective identification—that is, empathic immersion, affect resonance, and reciprocal mutual influence—fail to capture at least three of its essential elements 1) the patient's persistent, unconscious intent to communicate certain unformulated aspects of self through the other; 2) the analyst's sense of being “taken over”; by the patient's experience; and 3) the intensely visceral quality of the analyst's experience. It is argued that self psychology ignores this important form of patient communication to its own detriment and that the concept of projective identification needs to be reformulated in terms that are more experience near to self psychologists. It is suggested that there exists a normal, developmental need, a selfobject need, to communicate intolerable, unsymbolized affective experience through the other's experience—a need that remains more pervasive and intense in some of us than in others—and that the longed‐for selfobject response is to have one's communication received, contained, and given back in such a way that one knows the other has “gotten”; it from the inside out.     

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context. But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking. My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention. My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication. To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria. Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics.”     

Voice as Materialistic Principle

In this reply, three core notions from Schürmann’s comment The materiality of the abstraction “voice” are picked out and discussed: the ethos, the so called trialogical self and vocality as principle. The notion of ethos is explored through the word’s history, coming to say that ethos develops in relation to a certain geographical place and is determined by the social practices of a historically situated community. Thus, the concept allows to see how current scientific activities are rooted in reality, taken in the socio-cultural sense. The “trialogical self” is discussed in its implications, leading to firmly retain “dialogical self” as sign of a movement leading through the other to self. Schürmann’s distinction of voice as phenomenon and vocality as principle is seen as fruitful supplement to own ideas, especially as it highlights the fact that it is the act of uttering in different modes which matters for a language notion based in addressivity.     

Definition and the Question of “Woman”

Within recent feminist philosophy, controversy has developed over the desirability, and indeed, the possibility of defining the central terms of its analysis—"woman,”“femininity,” etc. The controversy results largely from the undertheorization of the notion of definition; feminists have uncritically adopted an Aristotelian treatment of definition as entailing metaphysical, rather than merely linguistic, commitments. A “discursive” approach to definition, by contrast, allows us to define our terms, while avoiding the dangers of essentialism and universalism.     

Specifying the Concept of Future Generations for Addressing Issues Related to High-Level Radioactive Waste

The nuclear community frequently refers to the concept of “future generations” when discussing the management of high-level radioactive waste. However, this notion is generally not defined. In this context, we have to assume a wide definition of the concept of future generations, conceived as people who will live after the contemporary people are dead. This definition embraces thus each generation following ours, without any restriction in time. The aim of this paper is to show that, in the debate about nuclear waste, this broad notion should be further specified and to clarify the related implications for nuclear waste management policies. Therefore, we provide an ethical analysis of different management strategies for high-level waste in the light of two principles, protection of future generations—based on safety and security—and respect for their choice. This analysis shows that high-level waste management options have different ethical impacts across future generations, depending on whether the memory of the waste and its location is lost, or not. We suggest taking this distinction into account by introducing the notions of “close future generations” and “remote future generations”, which has important implications on nuclear waste management policies insofar as it stresses that a retrievable disposal has fewer benefits than usually assumed.     

Are Lesbians Women?

I argue that Mordque Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category “woman.” I develop an articulation of the concept “woman” in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of “woman” through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.     

The social concept of disease

In the discussion of such social questions as “how should alcoholics be treated by society?” and “what kind of people are responsible in the face of the law?”, is “disease” a value-free or value-laden notion, a natural or a normative one? It seems, for example, that by the utterance ‘alcoholism should be classified as a disease’ we mean something like the following: the condition called alcoholism is similar in morally relevant respects to conditions that we uncontroversially label diseases, and therefore we have a moral obligation to consider alcoholism a disease. So there are grounds to think that, in the discussion of social questions, our concept of disease is strongly value-laden. However, it does not follow that the medical concept of disease is likewise value-laden. In this paper I distinguish between the medical and social concepts of disease, arguing that the naturalist-normativist debate is concerned with the former, but not the latter. Therefore, we need not settle the naturalist-normativist debate in order to conclude that the social concept of disease is value-laden.