Infant shy temperament predicts preschoolers Theory of Mind

The aim of this longitudinal study was to investigate the relation between infant temperament at 18 months and early Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities at 3 years of age. Temperament was assessed with the Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire (ECBQ) and ToM by assessing children's understanding of divergent desires and beliefs, and of knowledge access. Our results are in line with a social-emotional reactivity perspective postulating more sophisticated ToM abilities for children with less reactive more observant temperament. Children with shy temperament at 18 months and at 3 years were better in reasoning about others’ mental states at age 3. Language, siblings and parental education had no effect on ToM. Findings indicate that temperament is related to ToM earlier in development than previously found, and that this relation is thus not unique to false-belief understanding.     

Towards a better understanding of the relationship between executive control and theory of mind: an intra‐cultural comparison of three diverse samples

Previous research has consistently indicated that theory of mind (ToM) is associated with executive control in the preschool years. However, interpretation of this literature is limited by the fact that most studies have focused exclusively on urbanized Western cultural samples. Consequently, it is not clear whether the association between ToM and executive control reflects the specific features of this particular cohort or instead reflects a universal pattern. The present study provides the first empirical assessment of these two constructs in three diverse groups of Iranian children. Participants were 142 preschoolers (4–5 years old) from high–socioeconomic status (SES) urban (n = 33), low–SES urban (n = 37) and rural villages (n = 77). The results show that there is a robust association between ToM and executive control in all three groups, and that executive control contributes significant unique variance to ToM understanding, even after controlling for a range of variables that have been proposed as potential confounders of this relationship. However, although the three groups were equated in ToM, significant differences in executive control were evident. Moreover, cluster analysis identified three distinct clusters that were relatively homogeneous with respect to executive control and SES. One of these clusters was characterized by both low SES and low executive functioning, and showed little evidence of ToM understanding. Taken together, these findings provide possibly the clearest evidence to date that the association between ToM and executive control is not dependent on children's previous experiences on the tasks, or their family and cultural background. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxh_-3gCB8o     

Fonctions exécutives et théorie de l’esprit chez le jeune enfant : une relation réciproque ?

The aim of this study was to assess the specific relation between 18-month-olds’ performance on tasks measuring language skills, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The ToM tasks included measures of intention and false-belief understanding whereas working memory and inhibitory control were assessed with three EF tasks. Expressive vocabulary was assessed with the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. The main findings showed that both aspects of ToM are strongly linked at this age to inhibitory control, but not to working memory abilities. Language skills were not associated with either ToM or EF abilities. With regard to inter-tasks coherence within EF and ToM, we replicated previous findings with no consistency across EF tasks but an association between false-belief and intention understanding. Overall, these findings provide evidence for a link between executive function and theory of mind at the youngest age ever tested. They also challenge the view that EF is not required to succeed on the false-belief task based on spontaneous responses.     

The influence of inhibitory processes on affective theory of mind in young and old adults

The primary aim of this study was to examine the impact of an inhibition manipulation on the effect of age on theory of mind (ToM) in an ecologically valid, affective ToM task. Participants were 30 young and 30 old adults. The Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery was used to measure ToM; in addition, measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence were taken. Participants were subjected to three levels of inhibitory demand during ToM reasoning: emotional inhibition, non-emotional inhibition, and no inhibition. Old adults performed worse than young adults. The emotional and non-emotional inhibition conditions resulted in worse ToM performance compared to the no inhibition condition. There were no differences in the impact of the inhibition conditions on old and young adults. Regression analyses suggested that old adults’ crystallized intelligence was a significant predictor of ToM performance, whereas it did not predict young adults’ ToM performance. Results are discussed in terms of verbal ability as a possible compensatory mechanism in coping with verbal inhibitory load in ToM reasoning.     

Theory of mind and emotion understanding predict moral development in early childhood

The current study utilized longitudinal data to investigate how theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding (EU) concurrently and prospectively predicted young children's moral reasoning and decision making. One hundred twenty‐eight children were assessed on measures of ToM and EU at 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. At 5.5 years, children were also assessed on the quality of moral reasoning and decision making they used to negotiate prosocial moral dilemmas, in which the needs of a story protagonist conflict with the needs of another story character. More sophisticated EU predicted greater use of physical‐ and material‐needs reasoning, and a more advanced ToM predicted greater use of psychological‐needs reasoning. Most intriguing, ToM and EU jointly predicted greater use of higher‐level acceptance‐authority reasoning, which is likely a product of children's increasing appreciation for the knowledge held by trusted adults and children's desire to behave in accordance with social expectations.     

Cognitive contributions to theory of mind ability in children with a traumatic head injury

The objective of the current study is to examine the contribution of intellectual abilities, executive functions (EF), and facial emotion recognition to difficulties in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in children with a traumatic head injury. Israeli children with a traumatic head injury were compared with their non-injured counterparts. Each group included 18 children (12 males) ages 7–13. Measurements included reading the mind in the eyes, facial emotion recognition, reasoning the other’s characteristics based on motive and outcome, Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, similarities and digit span (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised 95 subscales), verbal fluency, and the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Functions. Non-injured children performed significantly better on ToM, abstract reasoning, and EF measures compared with children with a traumatic head injury. However, differences in ToM abilities between the groups were no longer significant after controlling for abstract reasoning, working memory, verbal fluency, or facial emotion recognition. Impaired ToM recognition and reasoning abilities after a head injury may result from other cognitive impairments. In children with mild and moderate head injury, poorer performance on ToM tasks may reflect poorer abstract reasoning, a general tendency to concretize stimuli, working memory and verbal fluency deficits, and difficulties in facial emotion recognition, rather than deficits in the ability to understand the other’s thoughts and emotions. ToM impairments may be secondary to a range of cognitive deficits in determining social outcomes in this population.     

On the relation between theory of mind and executive functioning: A developmental cognitive neuroscience perspective

Theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) show marked interrelatedness across childhood, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in understanding the nature of this association. The present review addresses this issue from a cognitive neuroscience perspective by exploring three hypotheses regarding their functional overlap: (1) ToM relies on EF (EF→ToM); (2) EF relies on ToM (ToM→EF); and (3) ToM and EF are mutually related, owing to shared neural structures or networks (ToM?EF). Drawing on evidence from normative brain development, neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative diseases, patient lesion studies, and brain-imaging studies, we suggest that only a strict version of the ToM?EF proposal of complete neural overlap can be confidently ruled out on the basis of existing evidence. The balance of evidence suggests that separable neurobiological mechanisms likely underlie ToM and EF, with shared mechanisms for domain-general processing that support both abilities. We highlight how future studies may empirically substantiate the nature of the ToM–EF relationship using various biobehavioral approaches.     

Moral reasoning in autistic individuals: a theoretical review / El razonamiento moral en personas con Trastorno del Espectro Autista: una revisión teórica

Abstract

Individuals diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often find it difficult to attribute mental states to others and to understand their own and others’ behaviour (Theory of Mind, [ToM]/social cognition). These difficulties can affect their moral judgements. The present article focuses on evidence on moral reasoning and ToM, with the aim of analysing theoretical and review research into autism. The weight intention has in moral reasoning and the causal relation between mental states, actions and outcomes is an essential part of this study. Evidence in the field of autism reports how autistic people would not be able to make moral judgements based on the agent’s intention. Instead, they would reason based on the outcomes of the action. For example, this can be translated into misunderstandings, malicious judgements or ‘over-blaming’ in accidental situations (ambiguous valences). These impairments can confirm the association between ToM and moral reasoning.     

Investigating the relationship between trait and ability emotional intelligence and theory of mind

Theoretical links between emotional knowledge and theory of mind (ToM) have previously been proposed. This study investigates this relationship using measures of both ability and trait emotional intelligence (EI). Our sample comprised 194 children, divided into two age groups (5–7 years and 8–10 years). Children participated in measures of false belief understanding, advanced tests of ToM, ability EI and trait EI, and a standardized language assessment. For both age groups, we found that only ability EI was related to false belief understanding. Furthermore, regression analyses revealed that the understanding and managing branches of ability EI predicted unique variance in false belief understanding once controlling for age, language, and the other ability EI branches. Trait EI failed to display any association with false belief understanding. Ability and trait EI were associated with more advanced ToM tasks undertaken only by the older sample. These results offer support for previous research that has found a relationship between emotion perception and labelling and ToM. They also provide new knowledge: (1) higher order emotional knowledge, measured by ability EI, is associated with advanced ToM; and (2) emotional self efficacy, as measured by trait EI, is also important in advanced ToM. Furthermore, they provide the first account of associations between standardized EI measures and ToM.     

Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g. inhibition). Special circumstances such as early bilingualism may enhance ToM development or other capacities required by ToM tasks. Here we compare 3‐year‐old bilinguals and monolinguals on a standard ToM task, a modified ToM task and a control task involving physical reasoning. The modified ToM task mimicked a language‐switch situation that bilinguals often encounter and that could influence their ToM abilities. If such experience contributes to an early consolidation of ToM in bilinguals, they should be selectively enhanced in the modified task. In contrast, if bilinguals have an advantage due to better executive inhibitory abilities involved in ToM tasks, they should outperform monolinguals on both ToM tasks, inhibitory demands being similar. Bilingual children showed an advantage on the two ToM tasks but not on the control task. The precocious success of bilinguals may be associated with their well‐developed control functions formed during monitoring and selecting languages.     

The effect of social role on theory of mind reasoning

The aim of this project was to explore the effects of social status on Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning. Neurologically normal adults' ToM performance was manipulated experimentally by temporarily putting them in a higher or lower status condition. Half the participants ‘won’ a mock competition and subsequently acted as instructor and evaluator. The other half ‘lost’ and subsequently acted as learner. Participants then completed ToM and control tasks including embedded false belief tasks and cartoon comprehension tasks. The hypothesis tested was that social role manipulation could affect performance on ToM tasks independently of any effect on control tasks. Results show an interaction between assigned status and task type. That performance on theory of mind tasks can vary independently of performance on matched control tasks is consistent with the idea that ToM reasoning can change as a result of a change in social status.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.     

Perspective-taking and depth of theory-of-mind reasoning in sequential-move games

Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual's mental states to plan one's action and to anticipate others' actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated or planned Player II's strategy at the second step, and then determined Player I's optimal strategy at the first step. Participants more readily used predictive reasoning as Player II (i.e., planning one's own move) than as Player I (i.e., anticipating an opponent's move), although they did not differ when translating reasoning outcome about the second step to optimal action in the first step. Perspective-taking influenced likelihood of predictive reasoning, but it did not affect the rate at which participants acquired it during the experimental block. We conclude that the depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking mechanisms) and rational application of belief-desire to action (instrumental rationality) constitute separate cognitive processes in ToM reasoning.     

Cognitive load on working memory both encourages and discourages reasoning bias regarding the mental states of others

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.     

How language relates to belief,desire, and emotion understanding

Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.     

Phonological awareness, executive functioning, and theory of mind

Language plays a critical role in theory of mind (ToM) development, particularly the understanding of false beliefs (FB). Further, there is some evidence that the development of FB is important for metalinguistic development, such as the understanding of homonyms and synonyms. However, there is debate regarding the nature of this relationship. This study explored the role of ToM, including FB, understanding and executive function in another aspect of metalinguistic development involving phonological awareness, specifically rhyming. Of interest was the relative role of ToM and executive function, particularly inhibitory control, in children's ability to identify rhymes. Two studies of 4-year-olds demonstrated that ToM understanding was primarily associated with rhyming ability, whereas inhibitory control was not independently related. Results are discussed in terms of children's ability to flexibly shift between different perspectives, by bracketing one perspective and focusing on the other, in both metalinguistic and ToM tasks.     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

A child-centred exploration of the relevance of family and friends to theory of mind development

Theory of Mind (ToM) is said to develop at around 4 years old. But some studies suggest it develops considerably earlier than this, with others suggesting it develops much later. Although several recent studies have found that social factors (like gender, family size, number of siblings, and number of friends) can impact on ToM, other studies contradict those findings. We wondered whether addressing several procedural issues and ensuring the task concerns real protagonists in real time, would bear on the above issues. Here, 114 children of 3-6 years completed four ToM tasks incorporating controls from experimental psychology, including randomly varying the order of ToM and non-ToM questions across participants. Now, children passed ToM tasks from around 5 years old, rather than 4 years or earlier. Girls did not develop ToM any earlier than boys. There was clear correlational evidence for the older-sibling effect and effects of friends but no reliable effects of nuclear or extended family. However, when these factors were set in the context of one another, the sibling effect was driven by a negative influence from younger siblings (as opposed to older siblings) and the friends effect was driven by friends at school (as opposed to friends at home). Finally, "friends" was a stronger predictor than siblings but memory (a cognitive factor) and age (a maturational factor) were the strongest predictors of all.     

The link between preschoolers' executive function and theory of mind and the role of epistemic states

The aim of this study was to assess the specific relation between 3- to 6-year-olds’ performance on a task measuring executive function (EF), the Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS), and different developmental attainments in their theory of mind (ToM) by employing a battery of scaled ToM tasks that were comparable in task format and task demands. In addition, individual differences on the temperamental dimensions emotionality, activity, sociability, and shyness were assessed by parental rating. The main findings show that children’s (N = 195) performance on the DCCS related to their overall performance on the ToM scale but that this relation was specific to those ToM tasks that tap children’s understanding of epistemic states such as knowledge access, diverse beliefs, and false beliefs regarding content and location. The relation between children’s EF and overall ToM performance remained significant after controlling for age, sentence comprehension, child temperament, and parental education. Individual differences in child activity showed consistent negative relation to EF and ToM abilities. The findings point to a differential involvement of the various EF components in reasoning about different mental concepts.     

Gender and Theory of Mind in Preschoolers’ Group Effort: Evidence for Timing Differences Behind Children’s Earliest Social Loafing

This study explored mental state reasoning within the context of group effort and possible differences in development between boys and girls. Preschool children (59 girls, 47 boys) were assessed for theory of mind (ToM) ability using classic false belief tests. Children participated in group effort conditions that alternated from one condition, where individual effort was transparent and obvious, to one where individual effort remained anonymous. The aim was to investigate if emergent mental state reasoning, after controlling for age, was associated with the well-known phenomenon of reduced effort in group tasks (“social loafing”). Girls had slightly higher ToM scores and social loafing than boys. Hierarchical regression, controlling for age, indicated that understanding of others’ false beliefs uniquely predicted social loafing and interacted weakly with gender status.