An evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development

The purpose of this research was to test the proposition that moral development and social evolution have progressed together, each enabling the other. Stage 1 and Stage 2 reasons for behaving morally are to avoid punishment and achieve rewards. Since moral behavior at these stages is externally determined they do not form a basis for cooperative living. Stage 3 morality involves the reasoning that people are obligated to care for their family and friends; this would appear to be the morality of hunter and gatherer societies. Stage 4 morality involves the reasoning that people must obey authority in the form of traditional norms, written laws, and the legal system; this would appear to be the morality of nation states. Stage 5 morality involves the reasoning that people should obey democratically created rules which presumably create the greatest good for the greatest number and Stage 6 morality involves the reasoning that people should follow universal ethical principles like justice. These moralities would appear to be the morality of international social organizations. To test the hypothesis that moral development and social evolution progressed together, the Measures of Moral Reasoning Scale was created, consisting of six scales measuring Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. As a measure of social evolution (i.e., inclusion), participants were asked how many of their resources they intended to invest in the following targets over their lifetimes: self, biological children, mate, biological parents, biological siblings, friends (but not relatives), American strangers, and non-American strangers. Supporting the hypothesis, Stage 1 and 2 measures correlated with the intent to invest in the self but not others; the Stage 3 measure correlated with the intent to invest in the participant’s children, mate, parents, siblings, and friends (a hunter-gatherer social organization); the Stage 4 measure correlated with investment in all of the above targets except self and non-American strangers (a nationalistic social organization); the Stage 5 measure correlated with investment in children, mate, parents, and American strangers (a nationalistic social organization), and the Stage 6 measure correlated with investment in all of the targets except self (a global social organization).

     

Change in values and moral reasoning during higher education

The aim of this study was to examine whether personal value priorities, measured by Schwartz et al.'s method, change during higher education, whether moral reasoning measured by the DIT develops and whether values predict gain in moral development. Moreover, we explored the simultaneous changes in value priorities and moral reasoning. Our sample consisted of 132 students from a university of applied sciences who filled out the value measure and the DIT both at the beginning and at the end of their studies. The results revealed that universalism and security values became more important whereas achievement decreased in importance during the three-year period. We also found significant gain in moral development and that universalism and hedonism values predicted this gain significantly. Significant correlated change was found between moral reasoning and stimulation, conformity and security values. The meaning of the results is discussed in terms of the theories of Schwartz and Kohlberg.     

A re-investigating of the religious orientation-moral reasoning relationship: a relational developmental systems perspective

This study re-investigates the relationship between religious orientation and Kohlberg’s moral reasoning among students at a midwestern (USA) university. Multiple regression analyses revealed that quest-oriented religiosity was significantly positively related to principled moral reasoning, as consistently found in previous studies, while intrinsic religious orientation showed no relation to principled moral reasoning. We discuss our findings through a lens of relational developmental systems theory, suggesting that a more integrative measure is needed to better understand the complex relationship between religious orientation and moral reasoning.     

The Moral Implications of Immorality

This essay focuses on the issue of immorality, an issue that has largely been understudied in anthropology. It examines two types of immoral behavior in contemporary Chinese society, drawing on cases widely agreed upon by ordinary people to be morally wrong. Next, it analyzes moral experiences and moral sentiments among individuals who either were victims of immoral acts or recalled their own feelings of being immoral. Ethnographic evidence shows that immorality tends to be intuitive and emotional in actual social actions but in recollections of moral experiences it is reflected upon with rational reasoning and justification. Immorality is essentially the violation of the social, which may explain why ordinary people use immorality to define and defend their social behavior in everyday life. The recent emphasis on moral reasoning and ethical choice in anthropological studies of moralities has overlooked the social in the moral as well as the role of moral sentiments and intuitions in social actions.     

Care and Justice Moral Orientation: A Scale for Its Assessment

A quantitative measure of adult moral orientation, based on the theoretical frameworks of Kohlberg and Gilligan, was developed to measure preference for "justice" or "care"-oriented moral thinking. The Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (MOS), a short, objective measure, presents adults with a series of dilemmas frequently faced by children, each followed by two care-oriented and two justice-oriented responses to the dilemma. The procedures for developing and scoring the measure are discussed, and validity and reliability data are presented. Used with both male and female social work and law students, as expected, the MOS shows males to be more justice-oriented in their moral reasoning than females who are shown to be more care-oriented. Moreover, in further agreement with Gilligan's theory that gender and experience, taken together, are related to moral reasoning style, male lawyers and female social workers are shown to have the strongest preferences.     

Attitudes,values and moral reasoning as predictors of delinquency

Attitudes to institutional authority, strength of support for moral values and maturity of socio‐moral reasoning have all been identified as potential predictors of adolescent delinquency. In a sample of 12–15‐year‐old boys (N = 789), after checking for effects of age, IQ, social background and ethnicity, self‐reported delinquency was significantly and independently predicted by attitudes to authority (r = ?.47) and moral values (r = ?.27), but not by a structural measure of moral reasoning level (r = ?.04). The findings argue for closer attention to the developmental determinants of attitudes to institutional authority and strength of moral value commitments than these have received hitherto. On the other hand, lack of an association between moral reasoning level and delinquent conduct does leave unanswered questions about the consequences of this kind of moral competence.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

The Roles of Religiosity and Spirituality in Moral Reasoning

To better understand the influence of religiosity and spirituality on moral reasoning, 1,037 college students completed a survey including demographic questions, a religiosity measure, a spirituality measure, and Forsyth's Ethical Position Questionnaire. Religiosity and spirituality positively correlated with moral idealism, whereas spirituality negatively correlated with moral relativism. However, religiosity and spirituality accounted for a very little variability in moral reasoning, suggesting that they do not directly influence moral reasoning. In addition, female participants reported higher spirituality, but there were no gender differences on a spirituality measure. Future research is needed to examine other factors that may influence moral reasoning.     

Authoritarianism,Social Dominance,and Other Roots of Generalized Prejudice

The search for the personological roots of generalized prejudice (or ethnocentrism) began with the authoritarian personality, but in recent years, the twin constructs of right‐wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have been widely treated as the dual processes that lead to generalized prejudice. However, studies conducted for this article show that other constructs, notably empathy and principled moral reasoning, contribute important additional variance. Whereas authoritarianism and social dominance positively predict generalized prejudice, empathy and principled moral reasoning are related negatively to it. For the final study, a structural model of these relationships was tested. To fully understand individual differences in the propensity for generalized prejudice, it is necessary to move beyond the dual processes union of authoritarianism and social dominance.     

WHO CARES? THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND CONTEXT ON THE SELF AND MORAL REASONING

Theorists suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in the self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach, whereas men feel separate from others and adopt a justice approach. Using a self-categorization analysis, the current research suggests that the nature of the self–other relationship, rather than gender, predicts moral reasoning. Study 1 found moral reasoning to be dependent upon the social distance between the self and others, with a care-based approach more likely when interacting with a friend than a stranger. Study 2 suggests that when individuals see others as ingroup members they are more likely to utilize care-based moral reasoning than when others are seen as outgroup members. Further, traditional gender differences in moral reasoning were found only when gender was made salient. These studies suggest that both the self and moral reasoning are better conceptualized as fluid and context dependent.     

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.     

Moral growth among athletes and nonathletes: a comparative analysis

Sport may be described as a unique moral context encouraging adaptations in participants' moral reasoning. The relation between sport participation and maturity of moral reasoning regarding general social problems and sport-specific dilemmas was investigated in two related studies. Study 1 involved 100 high school and college basketball players and nonathletes, with an equal distribution of females and males. Moral protocols were administered and scored according to Haan's (1978, 1983) interactional model of moral development. Multivariate analyses of variance revealed no moral reasoning differences between high school basketball players and nonathletes, but high school females' moral reasoning was more mature than was males'. Within the college sample, nonathletes' moral reasoning was significantly more mature than was athletes'. Also, females' moral reasoning about sport was more mature than that of their male counterparts, though no sex differences were found in general life moral reasoning. In Study 2, 20 swimmers were added to the college sample. Basketball players employed less mature moral reasoning about sport than both swimmers and nonathletes (who did not differ from each other). Results were discussed in terms of sport-specific experiences.     

道德和习俗领域幼儿义务推理的发展

采用Keller, Gummerum, Wang和Lindsey (2004)的不知情义务推理范式, 探讨了96名4、5、6岁幼儿对通过条件规则表述的鼓励性或禁止性的道德规则、以及习俗规则的义务推理能力的发展。结果表明：1)幼儿对两种不同领域规则的义务推理表现出基本一致的发展规律, 表现出显著的“角色效应”, 即多数幼儿都能指出同伴违反, 随年龄增大指出妈妈违反、双违反的人次百分比逐渐增多, 尤其是一些4岁幼儿就能正确指出道德和习俗领域中的妈妈违反, 部分5岁幼儿即可正确指出双违反。2)在不知情的义务推理范式下, 一些4岁幼儿错误指出本来是妈妈违反约定的情境中同伴违反、一些6岁幼儿错误指出本来是同伴违反约定的鼓励性规则情境中妈妈违反。3)尽管幼儿对道德和习俗规则的义务推理没有差异, 他们对不同性质社会规则的义务推理却表现出显著差异。5、6岁幼儿对禁止性的道德规则中同伴违反的检测显著低于对鼓励性的道德规则, 而6岁幼儿对双违反中妈妈违反的检测则相对更高; 6岁幼儿对习俗规则的义务推理也表现出类似的不同性质之间的差异。这些结果在一定程度上突破了以往的研究结论, 反映出幼儿对道德和习俗规则进行义务推理时表现出的跨领域的一般性及其领域内的特殊性。     

道德判断的社会直觉模型述评

传统的理性主义模型认为,道德判断是一系列理性推理的结果;而当前的社会直觉模型认为,道德判断包括直觉系统和推理系统两种加工,很多时候人们的道德判断更多的是一种直觉和情感的结果。近期神经心理学研究的一些成果证实了社会直觉模型的理念。     

The intelligence of the moral intuitions: comment on Haidt (2001)

The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.     

Islamic Personal Religion and Moral Reasoning in Social Justice and Equality: The Evidence From Indonesian College Students

Researchers have long been concerned with the relationship between religion and social justice and equality. Hoping to understand this association at the individual level, researchers have taken on the psychological models of personal religion and Kohlberg's moral reasoning. This article extends this line of inquiry to Islam, using Muslim college and graduate students in Indonesia. Specifically, it explores the extent to which religious orientations and Islamic doctrinal orthodoxy relate to Kohlbergian principled reasoning in justice and equality. In view of the results, the Muslim respondents are skewed toward the nonprincipled mode of Kohlbergian moral reasoning. In addition, those with greater intrinsic religiosity are likely to respond in an increasingly principled manner to moral dilemmas, whereas personal extrinsic religiosity tends to increase conventional practice of moral reasoning. Quest religiosity and doctrinal orthodoxy have little to do with Kohlbergian principled reasoning. The implications of these findings are discussed by giving attention to the accent of personal mediation, Islam as a belief system, and congregational worship to principled reasoning in social justice.     

Enhancing moral growth: is communication the key?

Traditional approaches in stimulating moral growth following Turiel's (1966) "+1" intervention strategy have been only marginally successful. This failure rate may be due to (a) the inconsistent control of both the cognitive and social perspective-taking prerequisites to moral growth, and (b) an overestimation of subjects' interpersonal communication skills. In this study, 17 college undergraduates (8 males, 9 females), possessing either basic or consolidated formal operations, received eight weeks of interpersonal skills training, along with pre- and posttraining assessments of social perspective-taking and moral reasoning. It was expected that gains in moral reasoning would be related to subjects' possessing the prerequisite cognitive and perspective-taking competencies necessary for moral growth. Results showed that posttraining changes in moral reasoning were in the predicted direction. In addition, gender differences in social perspective-taking were evident; males had significantly lower social perspective-taking scores at pretraining and showed significant gains in perspective-taking at posttesting. Females, however, scored relatively high in social perspective-taking at pretraining and showed no significant change in ability at posttesting. The results are interpreted as supportive of existing theoretical models regarding these domains of development.     

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.     

Post-conventional moral reasoning and reputation

Kohlberg’s theory of moral development conceives conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning as consecutive levels in a developmental sequence. This claim was examined in terms of the relationship between preference for these two styles of reasoning on the one hand and moral identity as perceived by others (reputation) and as self-perceived and on the other. Participants (n = 172), in groups of four mutual acquaintances, provided ratings of one another’s standing, and estimates of their own standing and reputation, on four trait dimensions (moral responsibility, consideration for others, respect for authority, and political orientation). Post-conventional moral reasoning, assessed using the Defining Issues Test, was not significantly related either to reputation or to self-rating on any dimension except political orientation. Conventional reasoning was related to politics though in the opposite direction, but additionally to both self- and other-ratings of moral responsibility and to the corresponding ratings of respect for authority. Findings do not support the view that the conventional/post-conventional distinction in moral reasoning is a developmental difference. An alternative proposed is that these are independent domains of moral thought, related to quite different aspects of social behaviour and political attitudes.