Top-down search for color prevents voluntary directing of attention to informative singleton cues

Visuo-spatial attention can be directed in a top-down controlled way to search for color targets and it can be captured by color contrasts, regardless of color identity. Here we tested whether participants can both search for a particular color target (e.g., red) and make use of a color-contrast cue that predicted the target's most likely position to direct their attention voluntarily. Our results show that this was impossible for the participants. Results support that top-down search for particular colors is incommensurate with directing attention to just any color contrast. The results are discussed in light of the current debates concerning the roles of color and color contrast for visuo-spatial attention.     

Partial color constancy of isolated surface colors examined by a color-naming method

Color samples selected from the OSA Uniform Color Scales set were viewed without any surround. Separate light sources were used to illuminate the samples and to control the state of adaptation of the subject, thereby separating two factors that are normally confounded. A color-naming procedure was used to assess shifts in color appearance produced by altering the spectral distributions of one or both light sources. The results confirm that chromatic adaptation, when it is the only factor operating, can mediate partial color constancy.     

A programmable circuit for varying light intensity

An inexpensive circuit is described for the control of light intensity. The control is obtained by a method that produces no color changes and may be programmed by any system that can express itself in four-digit binary numbers.     

The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors

Color experience is structured. Some “unique” colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as “pure,” or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as “binary colors.” According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails.     

Visual acuity in children as a function of hue

Ninety-six suburban school children, 7 to 14 years old, were tested, with colored parallel bars as acuity targets, to assess relative effects of hue, age, and intelligence on visual acuity. The main effects of color and age were found to be significant but with no significant interaction. A one-way analysis of variance for each color indicated blue and black acuity improved with age while red did not. Since natural myopia for blue light may have accounted for the effect with blue, a second experiment was undertaken with focusing being introduced as a variable. Focusing eliminated the effect of age, but the color effect remained significant. Lowest resolution thresholds were obtained with black, next red, and blue highest. There was no relationship between acuity and intelligence nor were there any sex differences.     

Color constancy and dispositionalism

This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of the most challenging objections that have been pressed against it. It explains why colors do not seem to “come on” when the lights come on, and why the right thing to say seems to be that the light causes the objects to reveal their colors. It explains why the content of visual experience need not be problematically circular. It eliminates the problem of intrapersonal variation in color appearance. And it even provides resources for dealing with the problem of interpersonal variation. It is true that in moving to the more complex view, the dispositionalist becomes subject to a new objection, which has been called “the problem of unity.” The paper offers a solution to this problem as well.     

Skin color as post-colonial hierarchy: a global strategy for conflict resolution

The post-colonial hierarchy is a critical dynamic of global coexistence. Power is associated with those sovereignties characterized by light-skinned populations. Those characterized by dark skin are denigrated and assumed less qualified to negotiate global issues as equals. Although political objectives are expected to stimulate conflict, skin color is directly correlated with the present world order. Moreover, most post-colonial sovereignties are heterogeneous in one way or another and yet do not engage in destructive conflict. From a global perspective, conflict resolution will require post-colonial sovereignties--particularly those of relative light skin--to forfeit their self-serving denigration of others. Strategies for conflict resolution should ignore skin color and incorporate measures designed to improve problem solving, moral reasoning, and the general etiquette skills of those engaged in any negotiation process.     

Is the Lateralized Categorical Perception of Color a Situational Effect of Language on Color Perception?

This study investigated whether and how a person's varied series of lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors affect his or her perception of colors. In three experiments, Chinese participants were primed to categorize four graduated colors—specifically dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue—into green and blue; light color and dark color; and dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue. The participants were then required to complete a visual search task. Reaction times in the visual search task indicated that different lateralized categorical perceptions (CPs) of color corresponded to the various priming situations. These results suggest that all of the lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors can influence people's perceptions of colors and that color perceptions can be influenced differently by distinct types of lexical categories depending on the context.     

A Light Theory with Heavy Burdens

In “ A Light Theory of Color”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and David Sparrow argue that color is neither a primary quality of objects, nor a disposition that objects have, nor a property of our visual fields. Rather, according to the view they present, color is a property of light. The present paper aims to show, first, that the light theory is vulnerable to many of the very same objections that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow raise against rival views. Second, the paper argues that the strategies that Sinnott-Armstrong and Sparrow use to avoid certain objections are also available to proponents of rival accounts. This might only seem to show that the light theory is in the same shaky boat as other theories: suffering from the same problems but having the same tools for solving them. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to why this is not the case, but why the existence of the light theory is nevertheless likely to bring increased clarity to the debate about color realism.     

不同照明条件下中国青年女性彩色图片的喜爱肤色

本研究采用类例判断法,在不同光源下对22张图片肤色样本逐一地进行主观评价。使用的照明光源为D65、CWF和A三种标准光源,色温分别为6500K、4150K和2856K。垂直照明,45°观察．肤色样本的视角为2°。实验结果表明：观察者在A光源下比D65光源更容易地评价肤色样本的质量,即在D65光源下的满意样本,在A光源下其喜爱程度趋于提高,而对不满意样本的喜爱程度趋于降低或基本相同;在三种照明条件下,被评为最佳肤色的样本与真实肤色有些偏离,色调略为偏黄,亮度较高,饱和度则非常接近;在肤色的波长范围内,亮度较高而饱和度偏低的肤色样本往往是优选样本。     

右视野颜色范畴知觉是长期习得语言范畴还是即时分类颜色的结果?

本研究探讨了右视野颜色范畴知觉是由长期习得语言范畴还是即时分类颜色引起的。实验1让被试先将深绿、浅绿、浅蓝和深蓝四种颜色分为四种范畴,再接受视觉搜索任务。结果发现,视觉搜索任务中出现了与颜色分类相应的右视野颜色范畴知觉,且这一效应在任务的早段就表现出来,提示右视野颜色范畴知觉并非由分类颜色所引起。实验2让被试将四种渐进的蓝色分为两种范畴,并在之前与后接受视觉搜索任务。结果表明,分类后的视觉搜索中并未出现右视野颜色范畴知觉。先前研究表明,习得语言范畴使四种颜色为两种范畴后,颜色辨别会出现右视野范畴效应。因此,这一结果提示右视野颜色范畴知觉并非由分类颜色,而是由习得语言范畴所引起的。总体上,本研究提示右视野颜色范畴知觉是由长期习得语言范畴,而非即时分类颜色引起的,进一步揭示了语言与颜色知觉的关系。     

Color primitivism

The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available – if the colors are primitive sui generis properties – this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind–body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-reductive physicalism are staples, realist primitivism is by and large a recent addition to the color literature. And it remains a minority position, although one that is perhaps gaining support. In this paper, we investigate whether it should be accepted, and conclude it should not be.     

Curvature-specific color aftereffects

Adaptation to convex and concave arcs in different colored light results in curvature-specific color aftereffects when arcs are later viewed in white light. In three experiments, it was shown that these color aftereffects often are partial (restricted to limited regions of the test arcs) rather than uniform, and in addition that aftereffects induced by exposure to arcs transfer to straight-line displays of particular orientation, and vice versa. These data were interpreted as evidence that arcs are processed in the visual system in relation to the orientations of local straight line approximations instead of on a global basis. In these terms, curvature-specific color aftereffects are merely complex forms of the orientation-specific color aftereffects first described by McCollough (1965).     

Movement aftereffects contingent on color,intensity, and pattern

We have found contingent movement aftereffects (CMAEs) lasting several days, contingent upon the color, intensity, and stripe width of moving patterns. Ss adapted for 10 min to a patterned disk rotating clockwise under red light, alternating every 10 sec with counterclockwise under green light. When stopped, the disk then appeared to rotate counterclockwise under red light and clockwise under green light. The effect lasted only a second or two, reappearing each time the field’s color was changed. But it increased in strength over the first 1/2 hand was still present 1 or 2 days later. Color transposition effects were found: after adaptation to red-clockwise (long wavelength) alternating with green-counterclockwise (short wavelength), a stationary yellow (long wavelength) test field appeared to rotate counterclockwise and a blue (short wavelength) field appeared to rotate clockwise. Relative, not absolute, color of the test triggered the CMAE. Similar CMAEs and transposition effects were produced by pairing direction of movement with intensity, with width of moving stripes and with orientation of a stationary grating projected onto a rotating patterned disk.     

“What do gay Asian men want?”: Desiring otherwise in the work of Richard Fung

A vast literature on queer of color critique, and increasingly on queer of color geographies, has shed greater light on how queer people of color negotiate racialized sexual economies. This paper considers how cultural geography, informed by psychoanalysis and queer of color critique, might contribute additional sophistication and critical insight to conversations about sexual racism – by not only decrying sexual racism, but by shedding light on racialized people's complex forms of psychical agency, as well as political agency, in relation to it. It turns to the work of gay Trinidadian-Canadian artist and scholar Richard Fung, whose films and essays both proffer underrepresented images of racialized queer sexual subjectivities and grapple with the ways in which queer people of color can themselves become enlisted in racial-sexual hierarchies. Providing geographical and historical context for Toronto's stratified racial and sexual politics as they play out in ordinary life, I point to moments in which Fung's films both decry such inequality and meditate on alternatives that detour from dramas of mis/recognition by whiteness.     

A Light Theory of Color

Traditional theories locate color in primary qualities of objects, indispositional properties of objects, in visual fields, or nowhere. Incontrast, we argue that color is located in properties of light. Morespecifically, light is red iff there is a property P of the lightthat typically interacts with normal human perceivers to give thesensation of red. This is an error theory, because objects and visualfields that appear red are not really red, since they lack theproperties that make light red. We show how this light theory solvesor avoids problems that afflict its competitors.     

Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint

The relations among consciousness, brain behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke's "inverted spectrum argument" about the undetectability of color transformations. A symmetry analysis of color space shows that the literal interpretation of this argument--reversing the experience of a rainbow--would not work. Three other color to color transformations might work, however, depending on the relevance of certain color categories. The approach is then generalized to examine behavioral detection of arbitrary differences in color experiences, leading to the formulation of a principled distinction, called the "isomorphism constraint," between what can and cannot be determined about the nature of color experience by objective behavioral means. Finally, the prospects for achieving a biologically based explanation of color experience below the level of isomorphism are considered in light of the limitations of behavioral methods. Within-subject designs using biological interventions hold the greatest promise for scientific progress on consciousness, but objective knowledge of another person's experience appears impossible. The implications of these arguments for functionalism are discussed.     

Effects of color on perceptual and conceptual tests of implicit memory

Two experiments are reported that explore why recent investigations of implicit memory failed to find any effects of color information on test performance. In the first experiment, participants studied colored pictures as well as words printed in colored ink without any memory instructions. During the test phase, a verbal and a pictorial version of a color-choice task (a conceptual priming test) were compared to two perceptual tests (word-stem completion and picture-fragment identification). Similar and significant amounts of priming to color occurred in both color-choice tasks. The perceptual tests were found to be sensitive to changes in the stimulus-presentation mode from study to test, but stimuli remaining the same color and those changed to black-and-white did not differ in the priming scores. In the second experiment, a mild division of attention was introduced in the study phase. Once again, priming to color was observed only in the verbal version of a color-choice test and not in the word-stem completion test. Dividing attention did not decrease performance on both implicit tests, whereas an explicit test of color recall for studied pictures suffered from dividing attention at encoding. It is concluded that a perceptual attribute such as color may be represented and coded by conceptual processing. Furthermore, automatic (or not attention-demanding) encoding processes may suffice for later conceptual tests of implicit memory. Previous failures to find any effects of color information on implicit performance are attributed to the use of perceptual priming tests. Received: 30 June 1997 / Accepted: 20 April 1998     

Outflow and inflow in movement duplication

Following prolonged exposure to two vertical grating patterns differing in spatial frequency—one pattern illuminated in green light alternated with the other pattern illuminated in red light—human observers will sometimes report seeing desaturated complementary colors when presented with a neutrally illuminated test field consisting of adjacent halves of the two adapting gratings. The number of such color reports increases as the difference between the spatial frequencies of the adapting gratings increases. This frequency-specific chromatic aftereffect is similar to that obtained with orientation-specific color adaptation and may be mediated by neural “channels,” sensitive to both color and frequency input, which are similar to units known to exist in the visual systems of lower organisms.     

The role of skin color and facial physiognomy in racial categorization: Moderation by implicit racial attitudes

Previous research has not sufficiently addressed factors that define and moderate racial categorization judgments. This study independently manipulated skin color and facial physiognomy to determine their relative weighting in racial categorization. Participants (N = 250) judged faces varying on 10 levels of facial physiognomy (from Afrocentric to Eurocentric) and 10 levels of skin color (from dark to light) under either no time constraints, a modest time constraint, and under a stringent time constraint. Skin color was a powerful predictor of racial typicality ratings at all levels of facial physiognomy, but participants relied upon facial physiognomy more when rating faces of light than dark skin color. Skin color was a more important cue than facial physiognomy under no time constraints, but as time constraints became more severe, skin color's importance decreased, yet it remained a more important cue at extreme physiognomy levels. The relationship between skin color and racial typicality ratings was stronger for those with more negative implicit racial attitudes. These findings suggest the primary role of skin color in racial categorization and underscore the importance of implicit attitudes in explicit categorization judgments.