The word-superiority effect does not require a T-scope.

Six experiments examined the possibility of obtaining a word-superiority effect (WSE) without the use of brief stimulus exposures or a poststimulus mask. In each experiment, subjects were presented a stimulus string and two alternative strings that differed by a single letter (Reicher, 1969). The alternatives and stimulus remained in view until subjects responded, and subjects were under no pressure to respond quickly. In Experiments 1-3, the stimuli were presented in very small type so that they were difficult to see. Subjects were significantly more accurate with words than with nonwords, letters embedded among digits, or letters embedded among number signs (#s). In Experiments 4 and 5, the stimuli were embedded in a simultaneously present pattern mask. Subjects were significantly more accurate with words than with single letters by themselves. In the final experiment, the stimuli were presented in a mask with specific spatial frequency characteristics, and performance was significantly better with words than with nonwords. The WSE is a more general phenomenon than previously supposed; it is not limited to a tachistoscopic exposure.     

Grouping does not require attention

Many theories of visual perception stipulate that Gestalt grouping occurs preattentively. Subjects' failure to report perceiving even salient grouping patterns under conditions of inattention challenges this assumption (see, e.g., Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992), but Moore and Egeth (1997) showed that although subjects are indeed unable to identify grouping patterns outside the focus of attention, effects of these patterns on visual perception can be observed when they are assessed using implicit, rather than explicit, measures. However, this finding, which is the only one to date demonstrating grouping effects without attention, is open to an alternative account. In the present study, we eliminated this confound and replicated Moore and Egeth's findings, using the Müller-Lyer illusion (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we found converging evidence for these findings with a variant of the flanker task (Experiment 3), when the amount of available attentional resources was varied (Experiments 4 and 5). The results reinforce the idea that, although grouping outside the focus of attention cannot be the object of overt report, grouping processes can occur without attention.     

The word-superiority effect and phonological recoding

Previous work indicates that the locus of the word-superiority effect in letter detection is nonvisual and that letter names, but not letter shapes, are more accessible in words than in nonwords, that is, scrambled collections of letters (e.g., Krueger & Shapiro, 1979; Krueger & Stadtlander, 1991; Massaro, 1979). The nonvisual (verbal or lexical) coding may be phonological, or it may be more abstract. In the present study, a word advantage in the speed of letter detection was found even when the target letter was silent in the six-letter test word (e.g., s in island). Other test words varied in their frequency of occurrence in English and number of syllables (1, 2, or 3). The word advantage was larger for higher frequency words but was not affected by syllable length. The presence of unpronounceable nonwords and silent letters in the words discouraged reliance upon the phonological code but did not thereby eliminate the word advantage. Thus, the word-superiority effect with free viewing is not based entirely upon phonological recoding.     

On the word-superiority effect

Summary Four experiments tested Johnston's (1981) hierarchical-activation account and McClelland and Rumelhart's (1981) interactive-activation account of the word-superiority effect. The hierarchical-activation account claims that the effect depends on masking. Using both a luminance manipulation and direct feature removal, however, we showed that the word-superiority effect can be obtained without a mask. Moreover, when words were made hard to read by displaying them in a column, the context advantage with both the luminance and the feature-removal techniques was reduced to zero. With masking, in contrast, a context effect remained because of lower accuracy in the no-context (control) condition. Thus, masking confounds enhancement on context trials with inhibition on no-context trials and is neither a necessary nor a desirable procedure with which to demonstrate a context advantage.The advantage of word context is reduced when words are printed with extra space between the letters. The amount of space needed depends on the size of the letters — the reduction requires a manipulation about the size of a blank character. Although both define visual features spatially, neither model includes an internal representation of space. Thus, neither model can represent the configural manipulations, and neither can explain why column orientation and blank characters reduce the word-superiority effect.The research is based on a Ph.D thesis (Marchetti, 1983) supervised by the second author. The work was supported by post-graduate awards from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) and from the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Fund to the first author. Laboratory facilities were made possible by grants from NSERC to the second author.Preliminary reports of the data were presented at the meeting of the Psychonomic Society in San Diego, November 1983 and at a conference, Common processes in speaking, listening, reading, and writing, held at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research. University of Bielefeld, July, 1985     

The SIMPLE T-scope

The SIMPLE system for a computer-based tachistoscope is reviewed, and features of its structure are described. An example is explained in detail.     

The detection of temporally defined objects does not require focused attention

Perceptual grouping is crucial to distinguish objects from their background. Recent studies have shown that observers can detect an object that does not have any unique qualities other than unique temporal properties. A crucial question is whether focused attention is needed for this type of grouping. In two visual search experiments, we show that searching for an object defined by temporal grouping can occur in parallel. These findings suggest that focused attention is not needed for temporal grouping to occur. It is proposed that temporal grouping may occur because the neurons representing the changing object elements adopt firing frequencies that cause the visual system to bind these elements together without the need for focused attention.     

The detection of temporally defined objects does not require focused attention

Perceptual grouping is crucial to distinguish objects from their background. Recent studies have shown that observers can detect an object that does not have any unique qualities other than unique temporal properties. A crucial question is whether focused attention is needed for this type of grouping. In two visual search experiments, we show that searching for an object defined by temporal grouping can occur in parallel. These findings suggest that focused attention is not needed for temporal grouping to occur. It is proposed that temporal grouping may occur because the neurons representing the changing object elements adopt firing frequencies that cause the visual system to bind these elements together without the need for focused attention.     

The word-superiority effect under conditions that approximate reading

Observers detected a briefly flashed target letter embedded in word, pronounceable nonword, and unpronounceable nonword contexts. The word context facilitated perception under both holistic and analytical processing strategies; the facilitative effect was enhanced when processing was analytical.     

Representing visual recursion does not require verbal or motor resources

The ability to form and use recursive representations while processing hierarchical structures has been hypothesized to rely on language abilities. If so, linguistic resources should inevitably be activated while representing recursion in non-linguistic domains. In this study we use a dual-task paradigm to assess whether verbal resources are required to perform a visual recursion task. We tested participants across 4 conditions: (1) Visual recursion only, (2) Visual recursion with motor interference (sequential finger tapping), (3) Visual recursion with verbal interference – low load, and (4) Visual recursion with verbal interference – high load. Our results show that the ability to acquire and use visual recursive representations is not affected by the presence of verbal and motor interference tasks. Our finding that visual recursion can be represented without access to verbal resources suggests that recursion is available independently of language processing abilities.     

The role of meaning in inflection: why the past tense does not require a rule

How do we produce the past tenses of verbs? For the last 20 years this question has been the focal domain for conflicting theories of language, knowledge representation, and cognitive processing. On one side of the debate have been similarity-based or single-route approaches that propose that all past tenses are formed simply through phonological analogies to existing past tenses stored in memory. On the other side of the debate are rule-based or dual-route approaches which agree that phonological analogy is important for producing irregular past tenses (e.g., think-->thought), but argue that regular past tenses (e.g., walk-->walked) are generated via a +ed rule and that a principled account of regular inflection can only be given by recourse to explicit rules. This debate has become a crucial battleground for arguments concerning the necessity and importance of abstract mental rules, embracing not only language processing, but also the of nature cognition itself. However, in centering on the roles of phonological similarity and rules, the past tense debate has largely ignored the possible role of semantics in determining inflection. This paper presents five studies that demonstrate a striking and decisive role of semantic similarity in inflection. In fact, semantic factors appear to be more important in inflection than the grammatical considerations put forward by the dual-route account. Further, these new findings provide a new way of discriminating between the claims of single-route (similarity-based) and dual-route (rule-based) approaches. It appears that inflection is carried out through analogical reminding based on semantic and phonological similarity and that a rule-based route is not necessary to account for past tense inflection.     

Functional specialization does not require a one-to-one mapping between brain regions and emotions

Lindquist et al. have assumed that functional specialization requires a one-to-one mapping between brain regions and discrete emotions. This assumption is in tension with the fact that regions can have multiple functions in the context of different, possibly distributed, networks. Once we open the door to other forms of functional specialization, neuroimaging data no longer favor constructionist models over natural kind models.     

Spatial localization does not require the presence of local cues

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that rats can rapidly learn to locate an object that they can never see, hear, or smell provided it remains in a fixed spatial location relative to distal room cues. Four groups of rats were permitted to escape from opaque water onto a platform which was either just above or just below the water surface, and in either a fixed or varied location. Learning occurred rapidly except for the group for whom the escape platform was below the water surface and moved about from place to place. Transfer tests revealed that a spatial location search strategy was employed by the group for whom the platform was below water but in a fixed location. A second experiment investigated this learning further, revealing instantaneous transfer when the rats were required to approach the platform from a novel starting position. The data of both studies are discussed in relation to recent work on spatial memory in the rat. The concept of the “acuity” of spatial memory is introduced and the procedures used may provide a new approach to comparing spatial memory with classical and instrumental conditioning.     

The SNARC effect does not imply a mental number line

In this study, we directly contrast two approaches that have been proposed to explain the SNARC effect. The traditional direct mapping account suggests that a direct association exists between the position of a number on the mental number line and the location of the response. On the other hand, accounts are considered that propose an intermediate step in which numbers are categorized as either small or large between the number magnitude and the response representations. In a magnitude comparison task, we departed from the usual bimanual left/right response dimension and instead introduced the unimanual close/far dimension. A spatial-numerical association was observed: small numbers were associated with a close response, while large numbers were associated with a far response, regardless of the movement direction (left/right). We discuss why these results cannot be explained by assuming a direct mapping from the representation of numbers on a mental number line to response locations and discuss how the results can be explained by the alternative accounts.     

Lexical factors in the word-superiority effect

In the Reicher-Wheeler paradigm, fluent readers can identify letters better when they appear in a word than when they appear in either a pronounceable pseudoword (a lexicality effect) or a single letter (a word-letter effect). It was predicted that if both of these effects involve a lexical factor, then adult acquired dyslexic subjects whose deficit prevents access to visual word form should show disruptions of the normal effects on the Reicher-Wheeler task. The results were that dyslexic subjects as well as matched control subjects showed a lexicality effect; however, while the control subjects showed a normal word-letter effect, the dyslexic subjects showed a reverse letter-superiority effect. Both effects, however, showed a systematic variation: As performance on lexical decision improved, the subjects' performance on words in the Reicher-Wheeler task was better than that for all the other conditions. These subject correlations were replicated by using data from a second lexical decision experiment, which utilized the same words and pseudowords that were used in the Reicher-Wheeler task. In addition, an item analysis showed that the words that the subjects had discriminated correctly in lexical decision showed a significant advantage over those that they had not, as well as an improvement relative to the other conditions. These results suggest that there is a lexical factor underlying the lexicality and word-letter effects, and it is proposed that the abnormal letter-superiority effect can be accounted for as the manifestation of other competing factors.     

Categorical perception of emotional facial expressions does not require lexical categories

Does our perception of others' emotional signals depend on the language we speak or is our perception the same regardless of language and culture? It is well established that human emotional facial expressions are perceived categorically by viewers, but whether this is driven by perceptual or linguistic mechanisms is debated. We report an investigation into the perception of emotional facial expressions, comparing German speakers to native speakers of Yucatec Maya, a language with no lexical labels that distinguish disgust from anger. In a free naming task, speakers of German, but not Yucatec Maya, made lexical distinctions between disgust and anger. However, in a delayed match-to-sample task, both groups perceived emotional facial expressions of these and other emotions categorically. The magnitude of this effect was equivalent across the language groups, as well as across emotion continua with and without lexical distinctions. Our results show that the perception of affective signals is not driven by lexical labels, instead lending support to accounts of emotions as a set of biologically evolved mechanisms.     

An analysis of the word-superiority effect

It is easier to decide which of two letters was presented tachistoscopically if the critical letter was in a word rather than in a scrambled word. We showed that this word-superiority effect holds just as strongly for pronounceable nonwords as for words, even when the critical letters are constant over all trials. This finding rules out word meaning and familiarity as variables accounting for the effect. In addition, it was found that the superiority of pronounceable stimuli holds for two-letter stimuli as well as four, and it is therefore concluded that the effect is not due to a memory limitation. An explanation of the effect in terms of the use of additional acoustic information is ruled out by showing that the effect was not diminished when the two possible words sounded exactly alike. An experiment using correctly and incorrectly spelled chemical formulas suggested that spelling regularities, regardless of pronounceability per se, account for the superiority effect. Finally, when decisions about two critical letters must be made on each trial, the correlation between being correct on one and on the other is higher for pronounceable stimuli under some conditions.     

The glare effect does not give rise to a longer-lasting afterimage

The glare effect is an illusion in which a region appears self-luminous when flanked by gradients that decrease in luminance with distance from the region (Zavagno, 1999 Perception 28 835-838). This region also appears brighter than a surface of the same luminance. We investigated, using the paradigm of afterimages, whether a low-level mechanism at the level of the retina or LGN could account for this apparent brighter sensation. We first replicated the result from the literature that brighter and longer-lasting physical stimuli generate longer-lasting afterimages. We then compared the glare-effect stimuli with their counterpart controls, and found that the glare-effect stimuli did not give rise to longer-lasting afterimages. This suggests that the apparent brighter sensation of the glare effect is not due to a retinal or LGN mechanism, but must have a cortical origin.