Isolating causal effects through experimental changes in parent-child interaction

A distinction is made between functionaland intentionalcontrol in parent-child interaction. These concepts are drawn, respectively, from opérant and cognitive models of interaction process. Experimental evidence is presented that cognitive factors such as expectations or hypotheses indeed affect the relations between parents and their own children. This necessitates a further distinction between long-termand short-termcausal effects: Since changes in parents' expectations for their children may lag behind actual changes in children's behavior, short-term effects inferred from observations of ongoing interactions may not reflect the long-term dynamics of the relationship.     

Motivation towards closure and cognitive processes: An individual differences approach

Two studies (N = 212) examined the relationships between elementary cognitive processes and individual differences in the need for cognitive closure. The results indicated that the need for closure is linked with certain cognitive deficits, specifically a restricted pool of cognitive resources allocated to a current activity. It was also found that these cognitive limitations tend to be compensated for by a particularly efficient process of information-selection from the environment. However, the selection process is costly, thus in a situation of drainage of cognitive resources its effectiveness also drops and the selection advantage of high (vs. low) need for closure individuals is eliminated.     

Are you for real? Exploring language use and unexpected process questions within the detection of identity deception

The current study was to test whether reality monitoring and language use could distinguish identity liars from truth tellers when answering outcome questions and unexpected process questions. Truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 30) discussed their identity in a recruitment interview. No differences emerged between truth tellers and liars in the details they provided. In terms of language use, liars used more positive language than truth tellers, whereas truth tellers used more cognitive process words than liars. However, neither were more pronounced when asking process questions. Overall, process questions elicited more cognitive process and cause words than outcome questions. Therefore, process questions may be able to contribute to the cognitive load approach. The findings suggest that reality monitoring may not be diagnostic when applied to identity deception. We discuss the language use differences in relation to impression management theory.     

Cognitive appraisal,vulnerability and coping: An integrative analysis of appraisal and coping mechanisms

Research on stress has generally concluded that stress occurs within the person as a result of their cognitive appraisal of experience. However although a number of cognitive theories of emotion exist, an integrative analysis of cognitive appraisal and vulnerability to stress has not been produced. This report contains two studies. Study 1 draws together the major variables identified in the literature in an analysis of their power to differentiate between a clinical sample (n = 48), a self-help group (n = 54), and a control sample (n = 509). The analysis shows that achievement motivation, attributional style, problem-solving style, emotional reactivity; hopelessness, perceived control and perceived social support are significant discriminators. In a second study the relationship between these variables and aspects of life stress, work stress, life satisfaction, depression, anxiety, and positive affect were investigated. Again the data support an explanatory role for these variables. The suggestion is that these variables can be utilized in an integrative model of cognitive appraisal in the stress process to guide intervention.     

Make up your mind: octopus cognition and hybrid explanations

In order to argue that cognitive science should be more accepting of explanatory plurality, this paper presents the control of fetching movements in the octopus as an exemplar of a cognitive process that comprises distinct and non-redundant representation-using and non-representational elements. Fetching is a type of movement that representational analyses can normally account for completely—but not in the case of the octopus. Instead, a comprehensive account of octopus fetching requires the non-overlapping use of both representational and non-representational explanatory frameworks. What this need for a pluralistic or hybrid explanation implies is that cognitive science should be more open to using both representational and non-representational accounts of cognition, depending on their respective appropriateness to the type of cognition in question.

     

Theoretic Note: The Relation of Embryology to Linguistic and Cognitive Process

This paper is a conceptual essay that views the unfolding or individuation from the ovum to mind/brain form and process as the outcome of a unitary highly conserved pattern of epigenetic growth. The principle question concerns the extent to which the cognitive process can be understood as an extension or replication of primordial trends in the growth of organism. There are several lines of embryological study, some with a clear relation to cognitive process, others perhaps merely analogous, but there are sufficient data to support the claim that fundamental patterns in development recur in a momentary act of thought or perception. Indeed, the Bauplan that accounts for brain maturation at the cellular level accounts for the generation of the mind/brain state in maturity. The specification of cells in fetal brain growth corresponds with the progressive individuation of psychic structures in the course of early development. Growth trends in epigenetic process that translate the genetic code to morphology and physiology persist in the brain or psyche as patterns of mental process. Psychic structure is temporal, not spatial, and the structure of the mind/brain is ongoing formative process, not the resultant stabilities. One can say that in the brain, morphology is the form that process takes early in development, while brain function is the form process takes once structure is relatively settled. Put otherwise, morphogenesis first lays down form as structure, then lays down form as function (see Goodwin in J Theor Biol 97:43–55, 1982). The structure of the mind/brain is not a circuit board that outputs function, but is a recurrent activity that actualizes in behavior. Cognition is a mode of growth that is carried over from embryonic to adult life.     

Building Cognition: The Construction of Computational Representations for Scientific Discovery

Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery (Foldit, EteRNA etc.), are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model‐building by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition (DC) analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account.     

Knowledge,Cognitive Achievement,and Environmental Luck

This article defends the view that knowledge is type‐identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non‐abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by showing that this explanation is not ad hoc as it can be generalized to apply to causal features besides cognitive abilities.     

Eye Movements in Strategic Choice

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance‐solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Refraining Resistance and Noncompliance in Cognitive Therapy

Despite its general success, not everyone responds to cognitive therapy. Some clients have difficulty complying with assignments and others appear to be frankly resistant. This article considers strategies for dealing with passive noncompliance and active resistance within cognitive therapy. In general, it is argued that the process of therapy is usually facilitated by staying within the cognitive model—that is, by exploring and working through those beliefs and attitudes that underlie noncompliance and resistance in the same manner that other problematic beliefs and attitudes are approached. Also considered are strategies for dealing with unrealistic expectations regarding the pace of change, therapists' errors leading to noncompliance and resistance, and instances in which the therapeutic model is simply insufficient.     

George Kelly and the Concept of Construction

Abstract

A distinction is drawn between a predicational and a mediational model. Predication involves the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying broader patterns of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning. Mediation occurs when something formed outside a process is taken in and comes to play a role in that process that is not intrinsic to it. Fundamental to predication is the fact that meanings under processing are oppositional. George Kelly's theoretical understanding of construction was as a predicational process. The term construction is often confounded with these two views of cognition. Kelly's interpretation of construction is contrasted with the cognitive approach of Piaget and the social constructionist views of Harre and Gergen. It is demonstrated that Kelly's clearer understanding of construction as a predicational process enables him to lend the individual a capacity for personal agency that the other theories fail to capture     

RELIGION IS EASY,BUT SCIENCE IS HARD … UNDERSTANDING McCAULEY'S THESIS

Robert N. McCauley's new book Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (2011) presents a new paradigm for investigating the relationship between science and religion by exploring the cognitive foundations of religious belief and scientific knowledge. McCauley's contention is that many of the differences and disagreements regarding religion and science are the product of distinct features of human cognition that process these two domains of knowledge very differently. McCauley's thesis provides valuable insights into this relationship while not necessarily leading to a dismissive view of theology or religious belief. His paradigm allows the research lens to focus on cognitive differences in processing scientific versus religious information and the important role of automatic, unconscious, and intuitive cognitive processes in understanding both the natural and supernatural worlds.     

Subjectivity in the act of representing: The case for subjective motion and change

The objective in the present paper is to analyze the aspect of subjectivity having to do with construing motion and change where no motion and change exists outside the representation, that is, in cases where the conceptualizer does not intend to convey the idea that these properties exist in the state of affairs described. In the process of doing so, I will elaborate on a critique of the notion of fictivity as it is currently being used in cognitive linguistics.     

Why we still need a mark of the cognitive

What makes a process a cognitive process? I’m not just asking for a list of cognitive processes, but for what makes an item on that list a cognitive process. Why should it be on the list? This is a question that has been ignored far too long in the domain of research calling itself cognitive science. It is time to give an answer and that is what I propose in this paper. I contrast my answer with others that have been given and defend the need against some claims in the literature that a mark of the cognitive is not needed.     

The relationship between confidence and self-concept — Towards a model of response confidence

According to Stankov [Stankov, L. (2000). Complexity, metacognition and fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 28, 121–143.] response confidence in cognitive tests reflects a trait on the boundary of personality and abilities. However, several studies failed in relating confidence scores to other known traits, including self-concept. A model of response confidence is proposed which predicts that confidence judgements do reflect self-concept, but only to the extent that they do not reflect a calibration process based on task-inherent cues. In the current study, 101 students completed various tests of cognitive abilities and skills as well as scales of the SDQ III measuring general academic and problem-solving self-concept. As expected, self-concept predicts a significant proportion of variance in the confidence factor that is over and above the influence of test scores.     

The neuropsychological profile of vascular cognitive impairment not demented: A meta‐analysis

The most common cause of vascular cognitive impairment not demented (VCIND) is cerebral small vessel disease leading to diffuse subcortical white matter lesions. While many studies indicate that the core cognitive features of VCIND are executive dysfunction and impaired processing speed, this finding is not always consistent, and may be partially dependent on the comparison group applied. Hence, we undertook two systematic meta‐analytic reviews on neuropsychological test performance across eight cognitive domains: between VCIND and healthy controls (data from 27 studies), and between VCIND and non‐vascular mild cognitive impairment (nv‐MCI; data from 20 studies). Our quantitative synthesis of the research literature demonstrates that individuals with VCIND show weaknesses across all cognitive domains relative to healthy controls, with the greatest impairment in the domain of processing speed (Md = ?1.36), and the least affected being working memory (Md = ?.48) and visuospatial construction (Md = ?.63). When compared directly with nv‐MCI, individuals with VCIND had significantly greater deficits in processing speed (Md = ?.55) and executive functioning (Md = ?.40), while those with nv‐MCI exhibited a greater relative deficit in delayed memory (Md = .41). Our analyses indicate that disruption to subcortical white matter tracts impairs more cognitive processes than is typically thought to be directly related to the fronto‐subcortical network. The data also suggest that differing brain aetiologies can be responsible for similar cognitive profiles. Although the findings do not evince diagnostic value, they allude to the interconnectivity of disparate cognitive processes and call for further research on the behavioural outcome of network disruption.     

Noncognitive factors in high-road/low-road learning: I. Modes of abstraction in adulthood

Since the termscognition andcognitive are broadly used but not clearly defined, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant bynoncognitive factors. In cognitive science, the termscognition andcognitive generally describe mental processes that are informational insofar as they carry information about the organism's own body and the material world. Thus defined, there are three sorts of noncognitive organismic factors important in adult learning:affective processes, self-developmental processes, andhardware factors (i.e., noninformational, purely organismic constraints such as mental capacity/working memory limitations, gestaltist field factors, etc.). In this series of papers, we attempt to show how these noncognitive factors interact with cognitive factors to facilitate adult learning. We outline and give reference to a dialectical constructivist (neoPiagetian) model of the psychological organism that integrates noncognitive with cognitive factors and that can serve to explicate the findings of the literature and to process/task analyze adult learning. An important aim is the integration of the findings of decline and regression from the cognitive literature with the findings regarding the increase in self-directedness reported by adult education theorists. This is explicated through a process-analytic account of the will, particularly as it pertains to noncognitive factors. In Part II, we continue our explication of a dialectical model of the ego and conclude with a discussion of modes of learning/instruction in adulthood.     

Experiential Avoidance as an Emotion Regulatory Function: An Empirical Analysis of Experiential Avoidance in Relation to Behavioral Avoidance,Cognitive Reappraisal,and Response Suppression

The purpose of the present study was to empirically test the suggestion that experiential avoidance in an emotion regulation context is best understood as an emotion regulatory function of topographically distinct strategies. To do this we examined whether a measure of experiential avoidance could statistically account for the effects of emotion regulation strategies intervening at different points of the emotion-generative process as conceptualized by Gross' (1998) process model of emotion regulation. The strategies under examination were behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression. The specific hypotheses to be tested were (1) that behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression would statistically mediate the differences in measures of psychological well-being between a clinical and nonclinical sample, but that (2) these indirect effects would be reduced to nonsignificant levels when controlling for differences in experiential avoidance. The results provide clear support for the first hypothesis with regard to all the studied strategies. In contrast to the second hypothesis, the results showed the predicted outcome pattern only for the response-focused strategy “response suppression” and not for cognitive reappraisal or behavioral avoidance. The results are interpreted and discussed in relation to theories on experiential avoidance and emotion regulation.     

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one's information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such.     

Cognition and emotion from the ret viewpoint

This article discusses the considerable overlap between my own (R. S. Lazarus) and Albert Ellis' cognitive view of emotions. In discussing Ellis' approach, the hallmarks of a cognitive theory of emotion are identified. My own theory concerning the role of cognitive appraisal and coping in emotions is discussed as well as the crucial metatheoretical concepts of transaction and process. It is stretching things to say that Albert Ellis has presented a fully elaborated theory of emotion. Rather, he has achieved the beginnings of a good theory especially as applied to the pathology of emotional life and how to correct it. Most lacking is how the emotion process works from encounter to encounter, moment to moment. Irrational beliefs as structural, static variables do not adequately account for emotional flux nor adequately explain the content and intensities of the full range of positive and negative emotions. The present article is a condensed and updated version of a previously published chapter: Lazarus, R. S. Cognition and emotion from the RET viewpoint. In M.E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.),Inside rational-emotive therapy (pp. 47–68). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.