Curiosity Is Contagious: A Social Influence Intervention to Induce Curiosity

Our actions and decisions are regularly influenced by the social environment around us. Can social cues be leveraged to induce curiosity and affect subsequent behavior? Across two experiments, we show that curiosity is contagious: The social environment can influence people's curiosity about the answers to scientific questions. Participants were presented with everyday questions about science from a popular on-line forum, and these were shown with a high or low number of up-votes as a social cue to popularity. Participants indicated their curiosity about the answers, and they were given an opportunity to reveal a subset of those answers. Participants reported greater curiosity about the answers to questions when the questions were presented with a high (vs. low) number of up-votes, and they were also more likely to choose to reveal the answers to questions with a high (vs. low) number of up-votes. These effects were partially mediated by surprise and by the inferred usefulness of knowledge, with a more dramatic effect of low up-votes in reducing curiosity than of high up-votes in boosting curiosity. Taken together, these results highlight the important role social information plays in shaping our curiosity.     

States of curiosity and interest enhance memory differently in adolescents and in children

Curiosity – broadly defined as the desire to acquire new information – enhances learning and memory in adults. In addition, interest in the information (i.e., when the information is processed) can also facilitate later memory. To date, it is not known how states of pre‐information curiosity and post‐information interest enhance memory in childhood and adolescence. We used a trivia paradigm in which children and adolescents (N = 60, 10–14 years) encoded trivia questions and answers associated with high or low curiosity. States of high pre‐answer curiosity enhanced later memory for trivia answers in both children and adolescents. However, higher positive post‐answer interest enhanced memory for trivia answers beyond the effects of curiosity more strongly in adolescents than in children. These results suggest that curiosity and interest have positive effects on learning and memory in childhood and adolescence, but might need to be harnessed in differential ways across child development to optimize learning.     

Individual differences in the functional neuroanatomy of verbal discrimination learning revealed by positron emission tomography

Why do some people have better memory abilities than others? This issue has been of long-standing interest to scientists and lay people. However, using purely behavioral methods, psychologists have made little progress in illuminating it. Now that functional brain imaging techniques have become available to study mind/brain relations, there is a new promise of understanding individual differences in learning and memory in terms of corresponding differences in brain activity. In this paper, we will present a positron emission tomography (PET) study designed to examine individual differences in learning and memory abilities. The basic assumption is that different patterns of brain activity serve as strong predictors of memory performance. Two specific questions were addressed in this study: (i) Can PET illuminate the relations between memory processes and their neuroanatomical correlates among individual learners and rememberers? and (ii) if so, how are these relations affected by the stage of practice on a given memory task? Our PET study examined individual differences in the neuroanatomical correlates of multi-trial verbal discrimination learning in 16 young healthy subjects. The results identified patterns of brain regions in which blood flow correlated with subjects' retrieval performance. However, these regions did not correlate with performance during all learning trials. Instead, a gradual shift was observed from one pattern of brain regions to another over the course of learning. These results suggest that individual differences in memory performance are related to differences in neural activity within specific brain circuits.     

Influencing prior knowledge through a short reading impacts curiosity and learning

Curiosity predicts memory performance and it is influenced by prior knowledge. Reading a well-organized text can increase curiosity in a classroom setting, however it is not clear if reading a short text written in an encyclopedic style can increase curiosity and learning without explicit educational goals. We presented participants with a short text and examined if questions related to this reading could elicit higher curiosity ratings and better recall in a thematized version of the trivia task. In the first experiment, participants subjectively judged their prior knowledge of trivia questions. The curiosity of the participants was not influenced by the reading, but the memory effect of curiosity was amplified for the questions related to it. In the second experiment, we objectively verified whether the participants knew the answers. The curiosity ratings were higher for the questions related to the reading, but only the curiosity ratings influenced recall performance. These results show that prior knowledge induced by reading can have an effect on curiosity and learning, but it depends on how this knowledge is assessed by the learner.     

Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.     

Using the regulation of accuracy to study performance when the correct answer is not known

We examined memory performance in multiple‐choice questions when correct answers were not always present. How do participants answer when they are aware that the correct alternative may not be present? To answer this question we allowed participants to decide on the number of alternatives in their final answer (the plurality option), and whether they wanted to report or withhold their answer (report option). We also studied the memory benefits when both the plurality and the report options were available. In two experiments participants watched a crime and then answered questions with five alternatives. Half of the questions were presented with the correct alternative and half were not. Participants selected one alternative and rated confidence, then selected three alternatives and again rated confidence, and finally indicated whether they preferred the answer with one or with three alternatives (plurality option). Lastly, they decided whether to report or withhold the answer (report option). Results showed that participants’ confidence in their selections was higher, that they chose more single answers, and that they preferred to report more often when the correct alternative was presented. We also attempted to classify a posteriori questions as either presented with or without the correct alternative from participants’ selection. Classification was better than chance, and encouraging, but the forensic application of the classification technique is still limited since there was a large percentage of responses that were incorrectly classified. Our results also showed that the memory benefits of both plurality and report options overlap.     

What constitutes an episode in episodic memory?

The idea of episodic memory implies the existence of a process that segments experience into episodes so that they can be stored in memory. It is therefore surprising that the link between event segmentation and the organization of experiences into episodes in memory has not been addressed. We found that after participants read narratives containing temporal event boundaries at varying locations in the narrative, their long-term associative memory for information across event boundaries was lower than their memory for information within an event. This suggests that event segmentation during encoding resulted in segmentation of those same events in memory. Further, functional imaging data revealed that, across participants, brain activity consistent with the ongoing integration of information within events correlated with this pattern of mnemonic segmentation. These data are the first to address the mechanisms that support the organization of experiences into episodes in long-term memory.     

Mental search processes in problem solving

A new approach to problem solving was applied to multisolution problems in a memory search task. Subjects memorized a list of eight four-letter foods, and then searched mentally through the list for answers to questions. The times between successive answers (IRTs) were recorded along with the answers themselves. This allowed a comparison of two possible memory search strategies: (1) sampling with replacement, and (2) sampling without replacement. The results were largely in agreement with the sampling-without-replacement strategy. However, a more detailed breakdown of the data revealed that most subjects searched through the list in a rigid serial order. Further, an analysis of questions with identical answers showed that the IRTs were very nearly additive. This led to an additive time component model based on the independent summation of (a) read-in time, (b) memory-search time, (c) decision-making time, and (d)response-output time. This approach appeared generally more satisfactory than previous attempts to account for problem-solving behavior.     

Eyewitness testimony and memory distortion

Abstract: Do memories change as we acquire new information? Recent research on memory distortion using implicit tests along with research using confidence is reviewed and new studies are presented. Two new studies asked misinformed subjects to provide reasons for their answers. In each study 15% to 27% of subjects said they remembered seeing items they had only read about. In another study subjects were asked to identify the source of misleading items they had seen in slides or read in misleading questions. Subjects were more likely to say they had seen in slides something they read about in the questions than they were to confuse information from two nearly identical sets of slides. Recent work shows that, not only is it possible to distort memory for events, it is possible to implant an entire memory for something that never happened. The evidence is now clear that we can become mentally tricked into making large as well as small changes in the way we recall the past.     

Painting with broad strokes: Happiness and the malleability of event memory

The present study investigated how knowledge-gaps, measured by feeling-of-knowing, and individual differences in epistemic curiosity contribute to the arousal of state curiosity and exploratory behaviour for 265 (210 women, 55 men) university students. Participants read 12 general knowledge questions, reported the answer was either known (“I Know”), on the tip-of-the-tongue (“TOT”), or unknown (“Don't Know”), and indicated how curious they were to see each answer, after which they could view any answers they wanted. Participants also responded to the Epistemic Curiosity (EC) and Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation (CFD) scales. “TOT” was associated with the smallest knowledge-gap, most curiosity and exploration, and feelings of uncertainty and tension as measured by the CFD scale. “Don't Know” corresponded with the largest knowledge-gap, less curiosity and exploration, and positive feelings of interest as measured by the EC scale. “I Know” states, which reflected the absence of a knowledge-gap, involved the least curiosity and exploration.     

Hypercorrection of high-confidence errors in the classroom

People often have erroneous knowledge about the world that is firmly entrenched in memory and endorsed with high confidence. Although strong errors in memory would seem difficult to “un-learn,” evidence suggests that errors are more likely to be corrected through feedback when they are originally endorsed with high confidence compared to low confidence. This hypercorrection effect has been predominantly studied in laboratory settings with general knowledge (i.e., trivia) questions, however, and has not been systematically explored in authentic classroom contexts. In the current study, college students in an introductory horticulture class answered questions about the course content, rated their confidence in their answers, received feedback of the correct answers, and then later completed a posttest. Results revealed a significant hypercorrection effect, along with a tendency for students with higher prior knowledge of the material to express higher confidence in, and in turn more effective correction of, their error responses.     

Individual capacity differences predict working memory performance and prefrontal activity following dopamine receptor stimulation

Dopamine receptors are abundant in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), a critical region involved in working memory. This pharmacological fMRI study tested the relationships between dopamine, PFC function, and individual differences in working memory capacity. Subjects performed a verbal delayed-recognition task after taking either the dopamine receptor agonist bromocriptine or a placebo. Behavioral effects of bromocriptine treatment depended on subjects’ working memory spans, with the greatest behavioral benefit for lower span subjects. After bromocriptine, PFC activity was positively correlated with a measure of cognitive efficiency (RT slope) during the probe period of the task. Less efficient subjects with slower memory retrieval rates had greater PFC activity, whereas more efficient subjects had less activity. After placebo, these measures were uncorrelated. These results support the role of dopamine in verbal working memory and suggest that dopamine may modulate the efficiency of retrieval of items from the contents of working memory. Individual differences in PFC dopamine receptor concentration may thus underlie the behavioral effects of dopamine stimulation on working memory function.     

Memory for Early Life Events: Consistency of Retrieval of Memories Over a One-year Interval

Adults who had previously answered questions about a sibling's birth experienced when they were 2 or 3 years old were asked the same question again after a oneyear interval. The results showed considerable consistency in reported memories. The majority of answers given on the second occasion provided substantially the same information as on the first occasion. However, those who were only just 2 years old when their sibling was born recalled less information overall and showed less consistency in their answers. A second group of adults was asked for a second time about a family birth for which they could have no memory. They also produced answers that were consistent with those given before, but there was no age effect in the consistency of their responses. The implications of these patterns of consistency are discussed.     

Memory and metamemory: a study of the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon in amnesic patients

Accuracy of the feeling of knowing was tested in patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, patients prescribed electroconvulsive therapy, four other cases of amnesia, and control subjects. In Experiment 1, we tested feeling-of-knowing accuracy for the answers to general information questions that could not be recalled. Subjects were asked to rank nonrecalled questions in terms of how likely they thought they would be able to recognize the answers and were then given a recognition test for these items. Only patients with Korsakoff's syndrome were impaired in making feeling-of-knowing predictions. The other amnesic patients were as accurate as control subjects in their feeling-of-knowing predictions. In Experiment 2, we replicated these findings in a sentence memory paradigm that tested newly learned information. The results showed that impaired metamemory is not an obligatory feature of amnesia, because amnesia can occur without detectable metamemory deficits. The impaired metamemory exhibited by patients with Korsakoff's syndrome reflects a cognitive impairment that is not typically observed in other forms of amnesia.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Considering the Knowledge You Have: Effects on Realism in Confidence Judgements

In three experiments, the hypothesis was tested that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements of their own answers to general knowledge questions would be improved by making the subjects heed content which might be expected to lower their confidence ratings. In each experiment, all subjects answered knowledge questions and then rated their confidence in their chosen answer. Before each question, the subjects in the experimental condition assessed the extent of their knowledge in a knowledge-area encompassing the knowledge question. Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in the design of the knowledge-area assessment scale. In Experiment 3, when making knowledge-area assessments, the subjects were asked to find examples of knowledge they lacked in the knowledge-area. Both Experiments 2 and 3 showed significantly improved realism in the subjects' confidence judgements. An aggregate assessment of the total number of questions believed to be answered correctly, given by the subjects at the end of Experiments 2 and 3, showed underconfidence in the experimental condition, particularly in Experiment 3. The results support the idea that the content active in subjects' memory at the time when confidence judgements are made affects their realism. Furthermore, our results show that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements can be improved without giving feedback.     

I Remember When You Taught Me That! Preschool Children's Memories of Realistic Learning Episodes

This study examined whether preschool children are able to identify the source of new knowledge that they acquired in a stimulating, interactive learning context. Sixty 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two staged learning events. Several days later, children were asked questions that assessed their knowledge of factual information presented during the events. Children indicated whether they knew the answer to each question and whether they remembered the moment they learned it (i.e. had an episodic memory of the learning event), and then recalled event details. A majority of preschoolers were able to accurately identify how they had learned at least some factual information, but this ability was not consistent across children and test items. Recall of event‐specific details was positively correlated with correct answers to factual questions. The results indicate that when preschool children are asked to reflect on past learning experiences that occurred in complex and realistic contexts, their source monitoring abilities are evident but not yet fully developed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Electrophysiological markers of working memory usage as an index for truth-based lies

People prefer to lie using altered truthful events from memory, perhaps because doing so can increase their credibility while reducing cognitive and working memory (WM) load. One possible way to counter such deceptive behavior is to track WM usage, since fabricating coherent lies or managing between truth and lies is likely to involve heavy WM load. In this study, participants memorized a list of words in the study session and used these old words to provide deceptive answers when cued later, in the testing session. Our behavioral results showed that people needed more time to make a deceptive response during the execution stage, and this prolonged deceptive reaction time (RT) was negatively correlated with each participant’s WM capacity. Event-related potential findings showed a more negative-going frontal amplitude between the lie and truth conditions during the preparation stage, suggesting that WM preparatory processes can be detected long before a deceptive response is verbalized. Furthermore, we observed a larger positive frontal-central amplitude during the execution stage, which was negatively correlated with participants’ lie–truth RT differences, suggesting that participants’ efficiency in producing deceptive responses can be readily traced electrophysiologically. Together, these findings suggest that WM capacity and preparation are crucial to efficient lying and that their related electrophysiological signatures can potentially be used to uncover deceptive behaviors.     

Beyond arousal and valence: The importance of the biological versus social relevance of emotional stimuli

The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention, memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies showed that (1) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than do socially emotional images, (2) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited cognitive resources, but (3) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images’ subjective arousal nor their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in the visual cortex and greater functional connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional images evoked greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger functional connectivity between the amygdala and MPFC than did biological images. Thus, it appears that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe activity.     

Neural basis of individual differences in impulsivity: contributions of corticolimbic circuits for behavioral arousal and control

The objective of the current study was to analyze the neural correlates of behavioral arousal and inhibitory control as they relate to individual differences in impulsivity via well-established functional MRI amygdala reactivity and prefrontal inhibitory control paradigms in healthy adult subjects. Impulsivity correlated positively with activity of the bilateral ventral amygdala, parahippocampal gyrus, dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 32), and bilateral caudate. Conversely, impulsivity correlated negatively with activity of the dorsal amygdala and ventral prefrontal cortex (BA 47). Together, these findings suggest that dispositional impulsivity is influenced by the functional interplay of corticolimbic behavioral arousal and control circuits.