A dual-process account of the development of scientific reasoning: The nature and development of metacognitive intercession skills

Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.     

Individual differences in conditional reasoning: A dual-process account

Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, ). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). On WA problems, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent were related to each other and to verbal ability. Modus ponens was linked to verbal ability only when disabling conditions were activated. In accord with the predictions of Stanovich and West (), on most problems, thinking dispositions predicted variance in inferences independently from verbal ability. We argue that a largely automatic experiential processing system governs performance on modus ponens, unless disablers are activated. Consciously controlled analytic processing predominates on the uncertain forms and, under some conditions, on modus tollens.     

Conditional reasoning in context: A developmental dual processes account

The way individuals interpret “if p then q” conditionals varies with content and context, often resulting in a biconditional reading. Surprisingly, truth table tasks reveal the existence of two different types of biconditional interpretations: equivalence, as for promises and threats, and defective biconditional, as for causal conditionals or indicative conditionals involving binary terms. The aim of this study was to determine how the interpretation of indicative conditionals is affected in children, adolescents, and adults, by restricting their context of enunciation to only one possible alternative for both the antecedent and the consequent. Moreover, we wanted to determine what is the exact nature of the biconditional interpretation induced by these restricted contexts. For this purpose, third, sixth, and ninth graders and adults performed a truth-value task on indicative conditionals presented either in restricted on non-restricted contexts. Restricted contexts had no effect on children who have a conjunctive interpretation of the conditional, but elicited a predominant defective biconditional reading in adolescents and adults. These results corroborate the developmental dual process account of conditional reasoning proposed by Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009).     

Wisdom in clinical reasoning and medical practice

Exploring informal components of clinical reasoning, we argue that they need to be understood via the analysis of professional wisdom. Wise decisions are needed where action or insight is vital, but neither everyday nor expert knowledge provides solutions. Wisdom combines experiential, intellectual, ethical, emotional and practical capacities; we contend that it is also more strongly social than is usually appreciated. But many accounts of reasoning specifically rule out such features as irrational. Seeking to illuminate how wisdom operates, we therefore build on Aristotle’s work on informal reasoning. His account of rhetorical communication shows how non-formal components can play active parts in reasoning, retaining, or even enhancing its reasonableness. We extend this account, applying it to forms of healthcare-related reasoning which are characterised by the need for wise decision-making. We then go on to explore some of what clinical wise reasoning may mean, concluding with a case taken from psychotherapeutic practice.

自我-朋友冲突情境下智慧推理的文化差异及其机制

相对于面对自己的人际冲突, 以独立自我为主的西方人在面对朋友的人际冲突时表现更智慧(所罗门悖论)。在以互依自我为主的中国人身上所罗门悖论是否会有不同特点?研究1通过在线平台招募中美两国被试, 随机分配到自我与朋友冲突组考察其智慧推理水平, 并考察自我类型的影响。对齐法与方差分析的结果均显示美国文化下朋友组智慧推理显著高于自我组, 而中国文化下两组差异不显著, 进一步分析发现中国文化下独立自我与冲突类型的交互项显著预测智慧推理。在此基础上, 研究2~4在中国文化背景下, 通过启动不同自我类型, 考察个体在自我或朋友冲突组中的智慧推理差异, 结果显示启动独立自我的朋友组显著高于自我组, 而启动互依自我的两组差异不显著。研究表明所罗门悖论可能只存在独立自我高的人身上, 并不具有普适性。可见心理学研究除了关注样本多样性问题外, 更需关注使用单一样本却默认结论具有文化普适性的研究者。     

Researching trauma, the body and transformation: A situated account of creating safety in unsafe places

This paper is based on a study of how childhood trauma can be experienced in the body and the resources individuals have chosen to deal with that. Ten individuals (including myself) wrote stories showing how they had made sense of those experiences and found ways to heal. In this paper, I tell the story of that research, contextualising myself as researcher and researched, against a changing societal, research and practitioner background to show how social constructionist and poststructuralist ideas have influenced the way I undertook and re-presented my study. This paper also provides me with an opportunity to focus for the first time on aspects of the stories that demonstrate how people created safe enough environments as children and as adults in order to heal.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

The development of complex metarepresentational reasoning: The case of situational irony

Situational irony requires the representation of events that end contrary to expectation, as if in mockery of the fitness of things. It entails metarepresentational reasoning because event representations must be manipulated to recognize and construct ironic events. Ironic ability in 6-and 8-year-olds was tested in a story-completion task. Story stems based on a familiar event, for which a structured, detailed representation is available, were more facilitative of irony at both ages than stems based on a less familiar activity for which no such representation is available. These data support the idea that irony is a metarepresentational skill. Younger children's irony was restricted to ironic forms that entail cognitively simpler representational manipulations, whereas older children's irony included complex forms. Irony was not easily accomplished at either age, however, suggesting that this metarepresentational skill is more difficult than those theory-of-mind behaviors typical of 5-to 8-year-olds. The relation of Situational irony to consciousness and the self is discussed.     

The impact of semantic distance and induced stress on analogical reasoning: A neurocomputational account

In a study of reasoning with four-term verbal analogy problems, we explored the relationship between the effects of an acute, mild stressor and the complexity of the reasoning process. Participants judged whether analogy problems in the form A:B :: C:D were valid or invalid, on the basis of whether the relation in the A:B term matched that in the C:D term. Half of the problems contained a C:D pair semantically near the A:B pair (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: TONGUE:TASTE), and the other half contained ones semantically far from A:B (e.g., NOSE:SCENT :: ANTENNA:SIGNAL). After an initial block without stress, participants were randomly assigned to count backward by 13?s from 1,000 while being told to go faster, or to count forward by 1?s from 0. The stress-induced participants reported a significant increase in state anxiety as compared to controls immediately after the mental arithmetic task. Stressed participants performed less accurately (as measured by d') on both near and far analogy problems, mainly due to an increase in false alarms. We were able to model the influence of semantic distance using the ??learning and inference with schemas and analogies?? (LISA) model. Our findings indicated that even mild increases in stress impair analogical reasoning. However, the decrement does not seem to directly involve the integration of relations, but rather is due to a shift in decision strategy: Under stress, people show an increased tendency to endorse analogies as valid when the terms in the individual pairs are semantically related to each other, even if the overall analogical relationship is not valid.     

A rational account of pedagogical reasoning: Teaching by,and learning from,examples

Much of learning and reasoning occurs in pedagogical situations—situations in which a person who knows a concept chooses examples for the purpose of helping a learner acquire the concept. We introduce a model of teaching and learning in pedagogical settings that predicts which examples teachers should choose and what learners should infer given a teacher’s examples. We present three experiments testing the model predictions for rule-based, prototype, and causally structured concepts. The model shows good quantitative and qualitative fits to the data across all three experiments, predicting novel qualitative phenomena in each case. We conclude by discussing implications for understanding concept learning and implications for theoretical claims about the role of pedagogy in human learning.     

Boosting wisdom: distance from the self enhances wise reasoning, attitudes, and behavior

Although humans strive to be wise, they often fail to do so when reasoning over issues that have profound personal implications. Here we examine whether psychological distance enhances wise reasoning, attitudes and behavior under such circumstances. Two experiments demonstrate that cueing people to reason about personally meaningful issues (Study 1: Career prospects for the unemployed during an economic recession; Study 2: Anticipated societal changes associated with one's chosen candidate losing the 2008 U.S. Presidential election) from a distanced perspective enhances wise reasoning (dialecticism; intellectual humility), attitudes (cooperation-related attitude assimilation), and behavior (willingness to join a bipartisan group).     

A computational account of children's analogical reasoning: balancing inhibitory control in working memory and relational representation

Theories accounting for the development of analogical reasoning tend to emphasize either the centrality of relational knowledge accretion or changes in information processing capability. Simulations in LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003), a neurally inspired computer model of analogical reasoning, allow us to explore how these factors may collaboratively contribute to the development of analogy in young children. Simulations explain systematic variations in United States and Hong Kong children's performance on analogies between familiar scenes (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006; Richland, Chang, Morrison & Au, 2010). Specifically, changes in inhibition levels in the model's working-memory system explain the developmental progression in US children's ability to handle increases in relational complexity and distraction from object similarity during analogical reasoning. In contrast, changes in how relations are represented in the model best capture cross-cultural differences in performance between children of the same ages (3-4 years) in the United States and Hong Kong. We use these results and simulations to argue that the development of analogical reasoning in children may best be conceptualized as an equilibrium between knowledge accretion and the maturation of information processing capability.     

The belief in a just world and immanent justice reasoning in adults

Deciding that negative experiences are punishment for prior misdeeds, even when plausible causal links are missing, is immanent justice (IJ) reasoning (Piaget, 1932/1965). Three studies examined a just world theory analysis of IJ reasoning in adults (Lerner, 1980). Studies 1 and 2 varied the valence of a target person's behavior prior to them experiencing an unrelated negative (car accident, Study 1) or positive (lottery win, Study 2) outcome. Participants viewed the outcomes as the result of prior behavior most when they fit deservingness expectations (good person won the lottery, bad person injured in automobile accident), suggesting that just world concerns influenced IJ reasoning. The lottery-winning finding (Study 2) also extends IJ reasoning to positive experiences. A third study found that a manipulation of just world threat in one context (prolonged or ended suffering of an HIV victim) influenced IJ responses in a subsequent unrelated context (automobile accident scenario).     

Elements of the Oedipus complex: A Kleinian account1

The author discusses and illustrates the place in current Kleinian practice of the analysis of the Oedipus complex. He outlines the development of the concept of the Oedipus complex by Freud and by Klein and later writers in the Kleinian tradition. Because the child's exclusion from his parents' sexual relationship represents such a fundamental aspect of reality for the child, analysis of the patient's responses to the oedipal situation constitutes the central task of analysis. Despite the Oedipus complex being in this way central, it is sometimes hard to discern because what is most visible are the patient's defensive responses to the oedipal situation. The emergence of meaning in analysis is often understood unconsciously as the product of the parental intercourse, represented by the work of the patient with the analyst, or of the analyst's or the patient's mind. The analysis of the patient's characteristic reactions to moments of meaningfulness in analysis is therefore an especially fruitful focus for the analysis of the Oedipus complex. The author illustrates these ideas by three clinical examples, from a 3½‐year‐old child, a borderline psychotic patient and a more neurotic patient.     

Indigenous theorizing in a complex world

Indigenization in psychology leads to modes of theorizing based within local knowledge communities and defined in terms of culturally relevant criteria. The present study offers a conceptualization of the social psychology of science in terms of complexity theory. The value of alternative choices in advancing psychological knowledge is shown by a knowledge landscape whose shape depends on the diversity of paradigms within the community. Dominance by a single paradigm (such as a Western world view) leads to a single-peaked landscape where advances in knowledge are judged using only the criteria of that paradigm. Here, the most effective form of working is incremental step-by-step research; but this ignores the historical context of the indigenous community and runs the risk of promoting a kind of psychology that is irrelevant to its values and priorities. Indigenization is presented as a complexification of the knowledge community building on a diversity of world views, leading to a rugged, multiple-peaked knowledge landscape. Four features of working on rugged landscapes are examined: path dependence, showing the importance of history for shaping the direction of research; fostering research progress through seeding of multiple starting points; the benefits of locally dense networks within knowledge communities; and the role of policy-makers in tuning knowledge landscapes. Examples are drawn from the development of indigenous psychology within a number of countries.     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

Mind over grammar: reasoning in aphasia and development

Research on propositional reasoning (involving ‘theory of mind’ understanding) in adult patients with aphasia reveals that reasoning can proceed in the absence of explicit grammatical knowledge. Conversely, evidence from studies with deaf children shows that the presence of such knowledge is not sufficient to account for reasoning. These findings are in keeping with recent research on the development of naming, categorization and imitation, indicating that children's reasoning about objects and actions is guided by inferences about others’ communicative intentions. We discuss the extent to which reasoning is supported by, and tied to, language in the form of conversational awareness and experience rather than grammar.     

人慧与物慧:基于智慧描述词与提名智慧者的分类

为揭示一般人内隐的智慧分类机制及智慧类型,考察了51名硕士生对智慧描述词和提名智慧者的分类。多维标度分析与聚类分析表明,40个智慧描述词的语义空间包括人文才能/科技才能和内在特质/外在表现两个维度,分为自然科学才能、社会科学才能和人文科学才能三类;40个提名智慧者的语义空间包括自然科学者/人文社科者和人际间的/个人内的两个维度,分为自然智慧者、社会智慧者和人文智慧者三类。综合分类结果及中西智慧文化,根据智慧内包含才能或能力的性质或要解决的问题性质,智慧可分为人慧与物慧两大类型。     

Speed of reasoning and its relation to reasoning ability

The study investigates empirical properties of reasoning speed which is conceived as the fluency of solving reasoning problems. Responses and response times in reasoning tasks are modeled jointly to clarify the covariance structure of reasoning speed and reasoning ability. To determine underlying abilities, the predictive validities of two cognitive covariates, namely perceptual and executive attention, are investigated. A sample of N = 230 test takers completed a reasoning test, Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), and attention tests indicating perceptual and executive attention. For modeling responses the two-parameter normal ogive model, and for modeling response times the two-parameter lognormal model was applied. Results suggest that reasoning speed is a unidimensional construct representing significant individual differences, and that reasoning speed and ability are negatively correlated but clearly distinguishable constructs. Perceptual and executive attention showed differential effects on reasoning speed and reasoning ability, i.e., reasoning speed is explained by executive attention only, while reasoning ability is explained by both covariates. Implications for the assessment of reasoning are discussed.