Three kinds of error-signalling responses in a serial choice task

During serial self-paced choice response tasks mean reaction times (RTs) for responses which are made in order to correct errors are faster than mean RTs for other correct responses. Experiment I showed that subjects can accurately correct errors in a four-choice task by making the response which they should have made, even though they are given no indication that an error has occurred. Experiment 2 showed that subjects correct their errors faster and more accurately when they use correction procedure than when they make a common response to all errors. The implication that subjects can correct errors because they know what response they should have made allows some comments on the constraints which must be met by various models which have been proposed to explain error-correction.     

Optimism facilitates the utilisation of prior cues

It has been shown that optimists tend to rely more on their prior expectations than sensory input when making decisions of an intense nature (Geers & Lassiter, 2002). We investigated the degree to which this tendency persists over a range of discrepancies between prior cues and actual stimuli. Eighty‐seven participants were shown a subset of happy, sad and fearful pictures drawn from the Ekman facial expressions of emotion (Ekman & Oster, 1979). Each picture was preceded by a verbal cue indicating the impending emotional expression and intensity. The displayed pictures were either in agreement, slightly discrepant or very discrepant with the cue. Participants rated the extent to which they agreed/disagreed with the expectation cue. Probit signal detection models were used to produce acquiescence for each subject at each level of discrepancy. Correlation analysis was performed on acquiescence and dispositional optimism scores. There was a significant correlation between all acquiescence scores for levels of discrepancies and dispositional optimism. Optimism appears to be a trait associated with acquiescence. The apparent tendency of optimists to comply may be due to a cognitive style that relies on expectations, such that it takes them longer to recognise the extent of discrepancy between expectations and incoming information. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What does a man do after he makes an error? an analysis of response programming

When people make errors during continuous tasks they temporarily pause and then slow down. One line of explanation has been that they monitor feedback to detect errors, that they may make incidental responses when errors occur (e.g. they may swear) and that they may pause to analyse their errors. In all these cases they may be assumed to act as single channel information processing systems of limited capacity, and to be unable to recognise any new signal until these processes have been completed.

Analysis of response after errors shows that this cannot be the case. Responses after errors are inaccurate, but are not slow when they require the subject to make the response which he should have made on the previous trial (i.e. to make an error correction response). Subjects thus must recognise new signals as soon as they occur. The present results require a new model of error detection and correction, and a model for response programming and priming.     

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the “intent-to-outcome” shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

Crossing No Man's Land: Cooperation From the Trenches

This paper represents an attempt to bridge the gap between rational and psychological models of choice, as represented by expected utility theory and prospect theory, and to show how researchers from different traditions can start to work together on problems of interest to both. A central issue for both models concerns the origin of preferences and how they might be predicted. Two questions of interest to all social scientists are related to the formation of preferences: What determines what people want, and what determines what people do once they know what they want? The incorporation of emotion into models of decision‐making may help users of divergent models find common ground for exploration and investigation.     

Is the acquiescent response style problem not so mythical after all? Some results from a successful balanced F scale

It is shown that Rorer's exoneration of the F scale from acquiescent response style contamination is dependent on the finding-that various acquiescence measures fail to intercorrelate. When acquiescence is measured as the total score on adequate balanced scales scored without reversals, significant internal reliability is found. It is found, in fact, even with scales that are not particularly ambiguous. It is concluded that some scales are not responded to meaningfully by some people and if these people are not to be confounded with real high scores, balancing against acquiescence is still needed.     

Sensorimotor synchronization: A review of the tapping literature

Sensorimotor synchronization (SMS), the rhythmic coordination of perception and action, occurs in many contexts, but most conspicuously in music performance and dance. In the laboratory, it is most often studied in the form of finger tapping to a sequence of auditory stimuli. This review summarizes theories and empirical findings obtained with the tapping task. Its eight sections deal with the role of intention, rate limits, the negative mean asynchrony, variability, models of error correction, perturbation studies, neural correlates of SMS, and SMS in musical contexts. The central theoretical issue is considered to be how best to characterize the perceptual information and the internal processes that enable people to achieve and maintain SMS. Recent research suggests that SMS is controlled jointly by two error correction processes (phase correction and period correction) that differ in their degrees of cognitive control and may be associated with different brain circuits. They exemplify the general distinction between subconscious mechanisms of action regulation and conscious processes involved in perceptual judgment and action planning.     

The momentary realist

Research suggests that people initially take their subjective experience of an object as an accurate reflection of the object's properties, and only subsequently, occasionally, and effortfully consider the possibility that their experience was influenced by extraneous factors. The two studies reported here demonstrate that this is true even when the extraneous factors are the person's own dispositions. Dispositionally happy and unhappy participants were falsely told that they had been subliminally primed with words that might have influenced their moods, and were then asked to identify those words. Dispositionally happy participants were more likely than dispositionally unhappy participants to conclude that they had been primed with positive words, but only when they made these judgments under time pressure. The results are discussed in terms of correction models of human judgment.     

Outcome effects: The impact of decision process and outcome controllability

An ‘outcome effect’ refers to the phenomenon whereby performance evaluations of decision makers are affected by the outcomes of those decisions. Although some consider such an effect to be a judgmental error, judgment by outcomes may not be dysfunctional when the evaluator does not know how the decision maker chose his or her action. In such situations, outcomes may provide some noisy information about decision quality. We test whether an outcome effect will still occur when the decision methodology and quality are more explicitly identified. Further, we test whether outcome controllability, a previously unexplored moderator variable, will have an impact on the outcome effect. Our first experiment, using undergraduates as subjects, shows that decision quality and controllability have an impact on performance evaluations but that the ubiquitous outcome effect still obtains. These results were replicated with experienced business people, except that controllability only affected their judgments in the case of negative outcomes. Implications of these results are discussed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Advice as a form of social influence: Informational motives and the consequences for accuracy

In this article, we ask how well people fulfill informational motives by using the judgments of others. We build on advice‐taking research from the judgment and decision making literature, which has developed a distinct paradigm to test how accurately people incorporate information from others. We use a literature review to show that people have mixed success in fulfilling informational motives—they increase their accuracy through the use of advice, but not as much as they could. We develop insights about how people perceive advisors and try to pursue advice—and where their perceptions may lead them astray. We conclude by proposing that future work further investigate the reasons people fail to use advice by building on the current advice taking paradigm used in judgment and decision making, but with a richer understanding of advice taking as a dynamic process that often entails complex decisions and normative motives.     

Acquiescence as a source of bias and model and person misfit: A theoretical and empirical analysis

In personality and attitude measurement, the presence of acquiescent responding can have an impact on the whole process of item calibration and test scoring, and this can occur even when sensible procedures for controlling acquiescence are used. This paper considers a bidimensional (content acquiescence) factor‐analytic model to be the correct model, and assesses the effects of fitting unidimensional models to theoretically unidimensional scales when acquiescence is in fact operating. The analysis considers two types of scales: non‐balanced and fully balanced. The effects are analysed at both the calibration and the scoring stages, and are of two types: bias in the item/respondent parameter estimates and model/person misfit. The results obtained theoretically are checked and assessed by means of simulation. The results and predictions are then assessed in an empirical study based on two personality scales. The implications of the results for applied personality research are discussed.     

Appropriateness of decisions as a moderator of the psychology of voice

This paper focuses on the psychology of the voice effect (the effect that people show more positive reactions when they are allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion in the decision‐making process than when they are denied such an opportunity). It is argued that it is important to ask about what decisions people are allowed voice. More specifically, results of two experiments suggest that when participation in decision making is appropriate (i.e. voice is allowed about decisions that are relatively important to participants) the voice effect is found: People's procedural judgements and other reactions are more positive following voice as opposed to no‐voice procedures. However, when participation in decision making is inappropriate (i.e. voice is allowed about decisions that are unimportant to participants) no effect or even a reversal of the voice effect is found. These people do not react differently or even react more negatively following voice as opposed to no‐voice procedures. It is concluded that these results further our insights into the psychology of procedural justice in general and voice in particular. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

If I imagine it,then it happened: The Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.     

The predictive accuracy of intertemporal‐choice models

How do people choose between a smaller reward available sooner and a larger reward available later? Past research has evaluated models of intertemporal choice by measuring goodness of fit or identifying which decision‐making anomalies they can accommodate. An alternative criterion for model quality, which is partly antithetical to these standard criteria, is predictive accuracy. We used cross‐validation to examine how well 10 models of intertemporal choice could predict behaviour in a 100‐trial binary‐decision task. Many models achieved the apparent ceiling of 85% accuracy, even with smaller training sets. When noise was added to the training set, however, a simple logistic‐regression model we call the difference model performed particularly well. In many situations, between‐model differences in predictive accuracy may be small, contrary to long‐standing controversy over the modelling question in research on intertemporal choice, but the simplicity and robustness of the difference model recommend it to future use.     

When do children overestimate their knowledge of unfamiliar targets?

We report four investigations in which 5 to 7 year olds judged whether or not they knew familiar- and unfamiliar-named targets. Under some conditions judgments were made in relation to performance on a relevant task, e.g., children judged whether they knew the picture they had picked from a set was the target. Under other conditions, children judged their state of knowledge not in relation to performance, e.g., they answered "Do you know who (target) is?" Under both types of condition, children nearly always made correct "know" judgments when targets were familiar. Correct "don't know" judgments about unfamiliar targets were relatively common when judgments were not made in relation to performance on a task (average scores 80-90% correct), but were less frequent when knowledge was judged in relation to performance on a task (average scores 40-70% correct). Knowledge judged in relation to performance was overestimated even when children did not choose the picture they thought might be the target before making their judgment, when the pictures were face-down, and when children predicted performance on a task not yet present. It seems that although children can make relatively accurate judgments of their own knowledge states, they tend to overestimate their competence when assessing their knowledge in relation to performance on a task. We discuss why this might be.     

Comparison of classical and modern methods for measuring and correcting for acquiescence

Likert-type self-report scales are frequently used in large-scale educational assessment of social-emotional skills. Self-report scales rely on the assumption that their items elicit information only about the trait they are supposed to measure. However, different response biases may threaten this assumption. Specifically, in children, the response style of acquiescence is an important source of systematic error. Balanced scales, including an equal number of positively and negatively keyed items, have been proposed as a solution to control for acquiescence, but the reasons why this design feature worked from the perspective of modern psychometric models have been underexplored. Three methods for controlling for acquiescence are compared: classical method by partialling out the mean; an item response theory method to measure differential person functioning (DPF); and multidimensional item response theory (MIRT) with random intercept. Comparative analyses are conducted on simulated ratings and on self-ratings provided by 40,649 students (aged 11–18) on a fully balanced 30-item scale assessing conscientious self-management. Acquiescence bias was explained as DPF and it was demonstrated that: the acquiescence index is highly related to DPF; balanced scales produce scores controlled for DPF; and MIRT factor scores are highly related to scores controlled for DPF and the random intercept is highly related to DPF.     

Aging and decision‐making competence: an analysis of comprehension and consistency skills in older versus younger adults considering health‐plan options

Older adults need to maintain strong decision‐making capabilities as they age. However, we know little about how age‐related physical and psychological changes affect older adults' judgment and decision processes. This paper reports the results of research comparing older versus younger adults' performance on evaluation and choice tasks about health‐plan options. In particular, comprehension and consistency in judgments (across separate versus joint evaluation contexts) were examined. Results indicated that increasing age was related to greater comprehension errors and inconsistent preferences, even when covariates (education, income, gender, self‐perceived skill and health, decision style, and attitude toward delegation) were taken into account. Discussion of the results emphasizes difficulties in interpreting the meaning of age differences in performance on decision tasks and the need for research that ascertains the seriousness of the consequences of age differences in real‐life tasks. The implications for providing decision‐aiding interventions for older adults are highlighted. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.