Adult Age Differences in Dual Information Processes: Implications for the Role of Affective and Deliberative Processes in Older Adults' Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Age differences in affective/experiential and deliberative processes have important theoretical implications for judgment and decision theory and important pragmatic implications for older-adult decision making. Age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-quality decisions as we age. However, age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation. The aim of the current review is to examine adult age differences in affective and deliberative information processes in order to understand their potential impact on judgments and decisions. We review evidence for the role of these dual processes in judgment and decision making and then review two representative life-span perspectives (based on aging-related changes to cognitive or motivational processes) on the interplay between these processes. We present relevant predictions for older-adult decisions and make note of contradictions and gaps that currently exist in the literature. Finally, we review the sparse evidence about age differences in decision making and how theories and findings regarding dual processes could be applied to decision theory and decision aiding. In particular, we focus on prospect theory ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ) and how prospect theory and theories regarding age differences in information processing can inform one another.     

Designing Health Communications: Harnessing the Power of Affect,Imagery, and Self‐Regulation

We review recent advances in self‐regulation theory and research, highlighting implications for communication strategies aimed at persuading individuals to adopt health‐protective behaviors. We focus on the role of affect and imagery processes in health persuasion, reviewing research on how fear arousal and imagery influence health information processing and decision‐making. Despite ongoing controversy over the use of fear‐arousing appeals, considerable empirical evidence supports their efficacy. Such threat appeals can backfire, however, if they fail to address key aspects of self‐regulation processes. Research on the cognitive and emotional influences of imagery and other concrete‐perceptual stimuli points to strategies for integrating them into health persuasion efforts. Mental simulation techniques represent another promising avenue for communications aimed at fostering health behavior change. New directions of inquiry include research on appeals that arouse emotions other than fear (e.g., positive emotions), more nuanced applications of fear arousal in communications, and applications for computer‐based and Internet communications.     

"Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

ABSTRACT— For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to "irrational" decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to "leak" into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.     

Salad = success and fries = failure? Conceptualizing and assessing self‐control outcome measures in food decision‐making research

Researchers studying decisions about food utilize a wide variety of measures to assess self‐control outcomes in experimental studies. However, it is often unclear whether or not the chosen dependent variables truly implicate self‐regulatory mechanisms in decision making. In the present research, we provide a conceptual framework for evaluating self‐control outcome measures, concentrating specifically on the domain of food and eating self‐control decisions. We propose and empirically examine the essential characteristics [i.e., (i) recognized as self‐control relevant by study population, (ii) related to individual differences in self‐control, and (iii) recognized as self‐control relevant by individual] of good self‐control outcome measures and provide specific methodological recommendations (including the “rank‐then‐choose” method) for capturing exhibited self‐control in the domain of food decision making. Our conceptual developments and recommendations seek to enhance the consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness of food‐related decision research. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moving beyond categorization to understand affective influences on real world health decisions

This paper provides an overview of affect and health decision‐making research, with a focus on identifying gaps, opportunities, and challenges to guide future research. We begin by defining common categorical distinctions of affective processes that influence health decisions: integral (i.e., related to the decision) and incidental (i.e., normatively unrelated to the decision) influences, and current (experienced in the moment) and anticipated (“cognitive representations” of future affect) affect. We then summarize key discoveries within the most common categories of affective influences on health decision making: current integral affect, current incidental affect, and anticipated integral affect. Finally, we highlight research gaps, challenges, and opportunities for future directions for research aimed at translating affective and decision science theory to improve our understanding of, and ability to intervene upon, health decision making.     

The impact of self‐confidence on the compromise effect

This research reports an investigation into whether the personality aspect of self‐confidence affects the compromise effect. We hypothesize that highly self‐confident people have greater certainty in making decisions and are more attracted to risk‐taking, which makes them less likely to choose the safe or middle option in a large choice set. The three studies involved are conducted using between‐ and within‐subjects experimental designs. Various product categories are used to generalize the findings. Study 1 looks at purchasing decisions and utilizes three scales of self‐confidence, risk preference, and uncertainty; it demonstrates that consumers with high self‐confidence are less likely to choose a compromise option due to high certainty in their decision‐making. Study 2 discovers that people with low self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option in a risky condition than in a nonrisky condition. Study 3 decomposes self‐confidence into general and specific self‐confidence, and reveals that people with low general self‐confidence and low specific self‐confidence are more likely to choose the middle option.     

How the Powerful Decide: Access to Research Participation by those at the Margins

How do those in power decide to include and exclude those at the margins from community life? We used simulated review of research vignettes to examine how researchers and members of Institutional Review Boards make decisions concerning the research participation of adults with and without intellectual disabilities. Results indicate that decision‐makers are influenced by the disability status of the sample, characteristics of the research in which they are engaged, and their attitudes toward the research participation of adults with intellectual disabilities as well as their own relationship to the research process. For example, decision‐makers may create situations that limit the self‐determination of adults with intellectual disabilities and adults without disabilities within the research context, particularly when the research poses some risk of harm to participants. Implications for theory, action and research are explored.     

Attitude Change Toward Animal Experimentation in an Academic Setting

Social values theory was used to examine how parents make decisions for their adolescent children. Social values theory states that decision making for others is based on the social value of an action, leading to a norm for how to decide for others, whereas self decisions are influenced by a number of additional factors. Consistent with a risk-aversion norm, in hypothetical health and safety scenarios parents made more risk-averse decisions for their adolescent children than for themselves. Further, the level of risk and inconvenience affected self decisions more than decisions for one's child. A second study showed that the norm was stronger for decisions for one's child than for oneself and more related to parents’ decisions for their child than for themselves. In sum, parents’ decisions for their children seem to be largely determined by a norm stating how they are supposed to decide, at least in the domain of health and safety. Implications for both the judgment and decision making and parenting literatures are discussed.     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Age differences in financial decision making: The benefits of more experience and less negative emotions

The emerging literature on aging and decision making posits that decision‐making competence changes with age, as a result of age differences in various cognitive and noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics. In a national life‐span sample from the United Kingdom (N = 926), we examined age differences in financial decisions, including performance measures of sunk cost and credit card repayment decisions, and self‐report measures of money management and financial decision outcomes. Participants also completed four individual‐differences characteristics that have been proposed as relevant to financial decision making, including two cognitive ones (numeracy and experience‐based knowledge) and two noncognitive ones (negative emotions about financial decisions). First, we examined how age was related to the four financial decision‐making measures and the four individual‐differences characteristics. Older age was correlated to better scores on each of the four financial decision‐making measures, more experience‐based knowledge, less negative emotions about financial decisions, whereas numeracy and motivation were not significantly correlated with age. Second, we found that considering both the two cognitive and the two noncognitive individual‐differences characteristics increased predictions of financial decision making, as compared with considering either alone. Third, we examined how these four individual‐differences characteristics contributed to age differences in financial decision making. Older adults' higher levels of experience‐based knowledge and lower levels of negative emotions seemed to especially benefit their financial decision making. We discuss implications for theories on aging and decision making, as well as for interventions targeting financial decisions.     

The effect of self‐regulated decision making on career path and major‐related career choice satisfaction

The present research examined the influence of self‐regulated decision making on satisfaction in career path (college major for Study 1, job for Study 2) and major‐related career choice. Results indicate a full mediating effect of fit in the relationship between self‐regulated decision making and satisfaction in career path. Self‐regulated decision making also influenced major–job congruence via satisfaction with a participant's college major. Findings suggest that individuals who possess self‐regulatory ability in decision‐making contexts were more likely to choose majors and jobs of good fit, experience satisfaction from their career decisions, and choose careers relevant to their college majors.     

How formulating implementation plans and remembering past actions facilitate the enactment of effortful decisions

Building on prior research studying effortful decision making and enactment processes (Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003; BDB), we identify and provide an in‐depth understanding of two specific self‐regulatory strategies: (1) formulating an implementation plan, and (2) remembering past actions, that decision makers can use in facilitating enactment of effortful decisions. The results of three experiments, in which the decision maker's goal and self‐regulatory strategy were manipulated, showed that for goals that decision makers chose volitionally, the motivational effects of both these strategies lay in increasing levels of proximal implementation‐related variables (implementation intentions, plan completeness, plan enactment, and goal realization) significantly. In contrast, for goals that were assigned to participants, these strategies' motivational effects additionally extended to significantly increasing distal goal‐related variables (goal desire, goal intentions, perceived self‐efficacy, and implementation desires). The theoretical implications of our findings are discussed, and future research opportunities are explored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual processes in decision making and developmental neuroscience: A fuzzy-trace model

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals—that reasoning biases emerge with development—have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer’s disease. For example, framing effects—that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrased in terms of gains vs. losses—emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making—prospect theory—can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes.     

A Social Values Analysis of Self–Other Differences in Decision Making Involving Risk

Three experiments tested our social values analysis of self–other differences in decision making under risk. In Experiment 1, we showed that people make riskier decisions for others in domains where risk taking is valued but not in those where risk is not valued. Experiment 2 documented that it is considered more inappropriate to make a risk-averse decision for another person than for oneself in situations where risk is valued. Experiment 3 showed that self–other differences in decision making occur even when there are no self–other differences in prediction and for decisions made for a typical student as well as for a friend. We use these results to argue that decision making for others is based predominantly on the perceived value placed on risk, leading to a norm for how to decide for others in situations where such a social value exists.     

From Patterns To Prosperity: A Review Of Rachlin’s The Science Of Self-control.

The Science of Self‐Control (Rachlin, 2000) presents a clear overview of research and theory on self‐control, emphasizing important recent research by Rachlin and his students on temporally extended behavioral patterning as an aid to curbing impulsive decisions. We found the book well suited as a textbook in a graduate seminar on self‐control, particularly because it lucidly presents several provocative ideas about self‐control, decision making, addiction, and general theories of behavior. Of particular interest are his discussion of the “primrose path” to addiction and his behavioral research on the “prisoner's dilemma” as it relates to self‐control. Although we take some issue with teleological behaviorism, the theory of behavior advocated by Rachlin, we recommend this book to anyone interested in self‐control.     

Better to Decide Together: Shared Consumer Decision Making,Perceived Power,and Relationship Satisfaction

Shared consumer decisions, particularly those made with a relationship partner, can be very different from decisions that are made alone. Across multiple studies, we investigate how shared consumer decision making affects perceptions of power and relationship satisfaction. We integrate two streams of research to create a novel theory about consumer decision making and perceived power. Specifically, we suggest that shared consumer decision making combines two necessary components of power—an individual's influence over and a partner's engagement in the decision—and that these combined components drive power perceptions. In other words, individuals who relinquish some control and make a decision with their partner, ironically, perceive having greater power than if they had made the decision alone. We further find that shared decision making and greater perceived power lead to greater satisfaction with the relationship in which the decisions are made. By focusing on consumer decision making within relationships, the current research contributes to the literatures on decision making, social influences in consumer behavior, close relationships, consumer well-being, and power.     

‘If something doesn’t look right,go find out why’: how intuitive decision making is accomplished in police first-response

ABSTRACT

Intuition is an important mechanism by which organizational actors make significant decisions; however, precisely how intuitive decisions are taken is not well understood and hence is worthy of closer scrutiny. First-response decisions, because of the conditions under which they are executed, offer researchers an interesting and relevant context for the study of intuitive decision making in organizations. We used qualitative methods to explore how “peak performing” police officers used intuition in first-response decisions. Our findings show that intuition’s role in first-response occurs in two differing but complementary ways: “recognition-based intuition” and “intuition-based inquiry”. This finding builds on previous intuition research and informs current debates in behavioural sciences regarding “default-intervention” versus “parallel-competitive” variants of dual-process theory; it also reveals how a complex and situated mix of intuition and analysis can guide effective decision making and support peak performance in uncertain, dynamic and complex environments that typify many organizational decision processes. Our findings contribute to intuition research by extending the current theory of “intuition-as-expertise” in going beyond a simple “recognize-and-respond” model. We propose a “Perceiving-Knowing-Enacting-Closing” framework which captures the complex role that intuition in combination with analysis plays in police first-response decisions, and discuss implications for decision-making policies and practices in organizations.     

For the Win: Risk‐Sensitive Decision‐Making in Teams

Risk‐sensitivity theory predicts that decision‐makers should prefer high‐risk options in high need situations when low‐risk options will not meet these needs. Recent attempts to adopt risk‐sensitivity as a framework for understanding human decision‐making have been promising. However, this research has focused on individual‐level decision‐making, has not examined behavior in naturalistic settings, and has not examined the influence of multiple levels of need on decision‐making under risk. We examined group‐level risk‐sensitive decision‐making in two American football leagues: the National Football League (NFL) and the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I. Play decisions from the 2012 NFL (Study 1; N = 33 944), 2013 NFL (Study 2; N = 34 087), and 2012 NCAA (Study 3; N = 15 250) regular seasons were analyzed. Results demonstrate that teams made risk‐sensitive decisions based on two distinct needs: attaining first downs (a key proximate goal in football) and acquiring points above parity. Evidence for risk‐sensitive decisions was particularly strong when motivational needs were most salient. These findings are the first empirical demonstration of team risk‐sensitivity in a naturalistic organizational setting. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.