Aggressive behaviors of the japanese brown bear

Film analysis and direct observation suggest that 2 very different types of intra-specific fights occur among Japanese brown bears maintained in large stable colonies. Disputes arising over food are short, and involve such activities as threatening, muzzling, chasing, and flight. Weapon use during feeding fights primarily involves slashing blows to the back or head areas of the opponent. In contrast, “spontaneous” fights are longer, and consist almost exclusively of wrestling, with bites and forepaw blows directed at the opponent's ruff area. These spontaneous fights occur primarily among the larger and higher-ranked male bears, especially among animals with closely adjacent rankings. It is suggested that such fights facilitate the establishment of dominance relationships by providing an opportunity for mutual assessment of strength and stamina without serious risk of injury.     

Information availability,goodness of outcome,and attributions of causality

H. H. Kelley's (American Psychologist, 1973, 28, 107–128) framework for studying attribution processes is introduced as a means of accounting for characteristic asymmetries in success/failure attributions. It is argued that while success/failure asymmetries should occur in the presence of single-observation information, asymmetries should be eliminated when individuals are allowed to observe the covariation between their own actions and outcomes. Subjects participated in a 15-trial stock market simulation in which type of information (single-observation or covariation) and goodness of outcome (relative success or failure) were manipulated. The obtained results supported the experimental hypotheses. Given single-observation information, subjects were more likely to accept personal responsibility for good than for poor outcomes. However, subjects' attributions were not affected by goodness of outcome when they were provided with covariation information. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the current debate between motivational and information-processing explanations of asymmetries in success/failure attributions.     

Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation,Free Will,and Moral Responsibility

If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent , but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2–7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that “bypassing” a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.     

Causal attributions and emotional reactions to outcome in a sporting contest

24 male and 22 female undergraduates competed in same-sex pairs in a bicycle ergometer ‘race’. Ratings of how important participants felt it was to win were gathered before the race. After the contest, ratings of satisfaction with performance and attributions for the causes of winning or losing together with ratings of the intensity of a variety of emotional feelings, were made by participants. Results showed that both male and female race winners attributed their win to internal factors (the effort they made, their motivation and personality). Losers attributed their loss to external factors (their opponent's effort and personality). For both winners and losers, however, emotional reactions were related only to internal attributions. Feelings of satisfaction among winners, and feelings of irritation experienced by losers, were related to internal attributions irrespective of how important participants thought it was to win the race. But the relationship between attributions and feelings of pride in winners and feelings of unhappiness in losers were influenced by the importance attached to winning the race. Some evidence emerged to suggest that losers who had considered it important to win, used defences against emotional feelings of disgust, dissatisfaction and discontent.     

The strategic pursuit of moral credentials

Moral credentials establish one's virtue and license one to act in morally disreputable ways with impunity (Monin & Miller, 2001). We propose that when people anticipate doing something morally dubious, they strategically attempt to earn moral credentials. Participants who expected to do something that could appear racist (decline to hire a Black job candidate in Studies 1 and 2, or take a test that might reveal implicit racial bias in Study 3) subsequently sought to establish non-racist credentials (by expressing greater racial sensitivity in Studies 1 and 2, or by exaggerating how favorably they perceived a Black job candidate in Study 3). Consistent with prior research, a follow-up study revealed that the opportunity to establish such credentials subsequently licensed participants to express more favorable attitudes towards a White versus a Black individual. We argue that strategically pursuing moral credentials allows individuals to manage attributions about their morally dubious behavior.     

Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self‐attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good.     

Moral reasoning and emotion attributions of adolescent bullies,victims, and bully‐victims

This study investigated different facets of moral development in bullies, victims, and bully‐victims among Swiss adolescents. Extending previous research, we focused on both bullying and victimization in relation to adolescents’ morally disengaged and morally responsible reasoning as well as moral emotion attributions. A total of 516 adolescents aged 12–18 (57% females) reported the frequency of involvement in bullying and victimization. Participants were categorized as bullies (14.3%), bully‐victims (3.9%), and victims (9.7%). Moral judgment, moral justifications, and emotion attributions to a hypothetical perpetrator of a moral transgression (relational aggression) were assessed. Bullies showed more morally disengaged reasoning than non‐involved students. Bully‐victims more frequently indicated that violating moral rules is right. Victims produced more victim‐oriented justifications (i.e., more empathy) but fewer moral rules. Among victims, the frequency of morally responsible justifications decreased and the frequency of deviant rules increased with age. The findings are discussed from an integrative moral developmental perspective.     

For better or for worse: the congruence of personal and group outcomes on targets' responses to discrimination

This paper reports two studies examining how (in‐) congruence between personal and group outcomes affects emotional well‐being, outcome attributions and procedural justice perceptions of individuals who are exposed to subtle discrimination. In Study 1 (N = 82) participants are either accepted or rejected in a (bogus) job application procedure, and either do or do not receive additional information indicating group‐level disadvantage. In Study 2 (N = 79), participants were either accepted or rejected, and received information indicating either advantage or disadvantage for members of their group. Results of both studies reveal that not only emotional well‐being and outcome attributions, but also procedural justice perceptions are primarily guided by personal outcomes. That is, being informed of group‐level disadvantage does not intensify but can instead alleviate negative affect resulting from personal rejection. Furthermore, group disadvantage is only seen as an indicator of an unjust procedure by individual group members who have personally suffered rejection. Results are discussed in relation to current insights on discrimination, tokenism and social justice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mediums and messages: an argument against biotechnical enhancement of soldiers in the armies of liberal democracies

Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force (in short, that just wars are morally possible), one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself (assuming throughout the discussion that the state is a just combatant in a just war) can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle? For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve.     

Disruptive boys with stable and unstable high fighting behavior patterns during junior elementary school

Boys' fighting was assessed at ages six, eight, and nine. The boys (N = 69) had been selected from the 30% most disruptive children in kindergartens from low socioeconomic neighborhoods. Twenty-three percent of these disruptive boys were rated as high fighters on three assessments ("stable high fighters"), and 28% were rated as high fighters on two of the three assessments ("variable high fighters"). Forty-two percent were rated as high fighters only one out of three assessments ("occasional high fighters") and 7% were never rated as high fighters. Only high fighting in two successive years significantly increased the risk of being rated a high fighter in a following year. At age 10, stable high fighters (high fighters at ages 6, 8, 9) were perceived by teachers, peers, mothers, and the boys themselves as more disruptive and more antisocial than occasional high fighters. These results show an impressive self-other agreement in boys who have adopted a physically aggressive life style from an early age. The three groups did not differ on individual family demographic characteristics, but stable high fighters had a higher mean on an index of family socioeconomic disadvantage. Results indicate that the aggression scales which include only a few physical aggression items and many disruptive items (oppositional behavior, rejection, hyperactivity, inattention, etc.) probably aggregate two kinds of disruptive boys, the high-frequency fighters at high risk for stable disruptive, physically aggressive, and antisocial behaviors, and the disruptive low-frequency fighters who are at a lower risk of stable disruptive behavior and at a lower risk of early antisocial behavior.     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

Controllability and stability in the self-serving attributions of sport spectators

Spectators often attribute their athletic team's victories to internal causes and its losses to external causes (e.g., A. H. Hastorf & H. Cantril, 1954; R. R. Lau, 1984; L. Mann, 1974). This self-serving attributional pattern is most common among fans with a strong psychological attachment to their team (D. L. Wann & T. J. Dolan, 1994). The authors examined the relationships among identification, game outcome, and controllable and stable attributions. Their 1st hypothesis was that high-identification fans after a victory, compared with high-identification fans after a loss and low-identification fans after either outcome, would be more likely to exhibit self-serving attributional patterns by attributing their team's successes to controllable and stable causes. Their 2nd hypothesis was that high-identification fans would be more likely than low-identification fans to attribute their team's successes to internal causes and its failures to external causes. U.S. college students high and low in identification first watched their university's men's basketball team win or lose a contest and then completed measures of identification and attribution. The results confirmed the hypotheses.     

Perspective Effects on Causal Attributions of Success and Failure

The performance attributions of actors (participants on a task or in an interaction), active observers (co-actors who make observations of the actor) and passive observers (non-participants who observe but do not interact with the actor) were compared on a task in which actors succeeded or failed after competing or working independently. Contrary to Jones and Nisbett's (1971) divergent perspectives hypothesis, the results indicated that the subjects' person attributions were influenced interactively by the actor's outcome and the subjects' perspective while their situation attributions were influenced interactively by their perspective and the nature of the task. The implications of these findings for the divergent perspectives hypothesis were discussed.     

The Problem of Debt‐for‐Nature Swaps from a Human Rights Perspective

At first blush, debt‐for‐nature swaps seem to provide win‐win solutions to the looming problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. So, one might naturally assume that they are morally permissible, if not obligatory. This article will argue, however, that debt‐for‐nature swaps are sometimes morally questionable, if not morally impermissible. It suggests that some criticisms of traditional (economic) conditions placed on loans to poor countries also apply to the (environmental) conditionality implicit in such swaps. The article's main theoretical contribution is to suggest a general argumentative strategy for posing a challenge to the moral acceptability of many seemingly innocuous, or even apparently good, policies in the real world. Its discussion of how we should respond to seemingly tragic dilemmas (e.g. between protecting nature and respecting human rights) may also be of general interest.     

Understanding Intentions to Exercise Following a Structured Exercise Program: An Attributional Perspective1

The present study examined the relationships among perceived outcome, causal attributions, affect, expected success, and intentions to exercise following a structured exercise program. Participants were 105 volunteers who had just completed a 12-week exercise program. Results indicated that perceived outcome over objective outcome (% attendance) was significantly more important for understanding the attribution process. Interesting interactions indicated that (a) individuals who made personally controllable attributions reported higher positive affect following perceived success, but lower positive affect following perceived failure than those who made personally uncontrollable attributions, and (b) individuals who made external attributions following perceived failure reported higher expected success than those who made internal attributions. Finally, both positive affect and expected success showed positive relationships with intention to exercise following the program. It was suggested that attribution theory may be beneficial to understanding continued exercise following structured exercise programs.     

Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy

Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors suppose. We then turn to the crucial question of when an action is relevantly avoidable—when, in the parlance of the literature, an alternative possibility is robust. We call attention to two plausible tests for robustness that merit further consideration, showing that the agents in buffered Frankfurt cases don’t pass these tests, despite being morally responsible for their actions.     

Plans or Outcomes: How Do We Attribute Intelligence to Others?

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome-based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning-based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning-based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited.     

Fulfilment of intention and desire in children's judgements of emotion for sociomoral events

This study investigated whether children appreciate that enacting an intention can emotionally affect an agent separately from whether the agent's desire is fulfilled. Children ages 5–11 years and adults heard several vignettes about an agent who intended to take another child's toy in which the agent's intention was either enacted or blocked and desire was fulfilled or unfulfilled. The effect of intention on judgements of the agent's emotion varied according to desire fulfilment and age. Overall, participants judged that an agent who acted intentionally to fulfil a desire felt happier than an agent whose intention was blocked. When the agent's desire was unfulfilled, the effect of enacting an intention varied by age. Five‐ to 6‐year‐olds judged that acting intentionally could decrease the negative emotion associated with an unfulfilled desire. The findings show relatively early appreciation of intentionality in children's judgements of emotion. Happy victimizer attributions decreased between 5 and 8 years, but attributions of positive emotion to transgressors did not vary by intentionality. The relationships between intentionality, agency, and emotion are discussed.     

When contributions make a difference: Explaining order effects in responsibility attribution

In two experiments, we established an order effect in responsibility attributions. In line with Spellman (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 323-348, 1997), who proposed that a person's perceived causal contribution varies with the degree to which it changes the probability of the eventual outcome, Experiment 1 showed that in a team challenge in which the players contribute sequentially, the last player's blame or credit is attenuated if the team's result has already been determined prior to her acting. Experiment 2 illustrated that this attenuation effect does not overgeneralize to situations in which the experienced order of events does not map onto the objective order of events; the level of the last person's performance is only discounted if that person knew that the result was already determined. Furthermore, Experiment 1 demonstrated that responsibility attributions remain sensitive to differences in performance, even if the outcome is already determined. We suggest a theoretical extension of Spellman's model, according to which participants' responsibility attributions are determined not only by whether a contribution made a difference in the actual situation, but also by whether it would have made a difference had things turned out somewhat differently.     

For the Sake of a Stone? Inanimate Things and the Demands of Morality

Everyday inanimate things such as stones, teapots and bicycles are not objects to which moral agents could have direct duties; they do not have moral status. It is usually assumed that there is therefore no reason to think that a morally good person would, on account of her goodness, be disposed to treat them well for their own sakes. I challenge this assumption. I begin by showing that to act for the sake of an entity need not be to suppose that it has moral status, but simply to regard it as an end in itself. Having done this, I argue that it is not, as is conventionally assumed, implausible to suppose that to be morally good is to be disposed to treat at least some inanimate things gently, and to do so, moreover, for the sake of those things, rather than for some other reason.