In defence of the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT)—a reply.

A paper by I. Zuber and B. Ekehammar in this Journal (38, 1997) is reviewed. The paper advocates that the non-veridical contents in the series of reports in the DMT should preferably be referred, not to psychoanalytic defence mechanisms, but to factors of stimulus order. The methods and the arguments of this investigation are critically examined.     

In defence of the criticism of the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT): A reply to Kragh (1998)

Kragh ( Scandinavian Journal of Psychology , 1998, 39, 123–124) criticises a recent empirical study of the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) conducted by the present authors (Zuber & Ekehammar, 1997) concerning methodological and other shortcomings. The present paper reviews and responds to Kragh's critical points. As to the most serious criticism, the methodological, the main conclusion is that Kragh's own published empirical studies of the DMT, and also those of other researchers, can be criticised along similar lines. Furthermore, and surprisingly, in contrast to our study, Kragh's main DMT studies do not employ the DMT picture(s) at all.     

In focus. Life after BioethicsLine: a reply to Joyce Plaza

The recent closure and removal of BioethicsLine led many researchers to wonder where to turn for their research needs. Joyce Plaza wrote that the closure is a mistake. In this essay I maintain, contra Plaza, that due to its cross-disciplinary nature researchers can find bioethics literature in other databases. In developing the search strategy the researcher needs to consider what the problem is about. If the researcher has a philosophical approach in mind, a wise choice would be to use Philosopher's Index; a legal approach suggests using Academic Universe, Westlaw, Lexis or legal databases freely available through state and federal websites. Further, in so far as the National Library of Medicine is integrating citations in BioethicsLine into the NLM Gateway databases (PubMed and LOCATORplus) I point out suggestions on using the latter databases effectively. There is a wealth of information readily available and researchers have much to learn by trying the alternatives.     

A commentary on criticism of the keyword method of learning foreign languages

Thomas and Wang in a series of recent papers (Thomas and Wang, 1996; Wang and Thomas, 1992; Wang, Thomas and Ouellette, 1992) demonstrate one condition under which the Keyword Method fails to enhance the longer-term retention of foreign language vocabulary, namely when immediate testing of learned material is prevented. However, they then go on to use this demonstration to argue that the Keyword Method in general is inferior to rote learning in the longer-term retention of vocabulary. They discount the considerable evidence, some of which they produce themselves, that where immediate retrieval is required of learned vocabulary, the longer-term retention of vocabulary is considerably superior to any rote-learning condition. In practical terms, where interaction with testing is allowed, therefore, Keyword learning is the manipulation which most enhances later retention. Again, at a practical level, in real-life situations, interactions determine actual performance, not just one variable acting on its own. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In defence of fact-dependency

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1^?1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Dutch Conference for Practical Philosophy, the practical philosophy seminar at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the seminar of the Horizon research group at Utrecht University. I am grateful for the comments and questions I received on these occasions.     

In defence of departure: Justice and the right to leave

I have previously argued that liberal states are limited in the means by which they can respond to the emigration of skilled professionals. In particular, the right to leave is a right of sufficient strength that it must be defended even when its suspension would create more robust institutions for those in the state of origin. Against this, four critics offer arguments in favour of positions which – like those of Gillian Brock – would allow states more leeway in their legitimate policy options. These critics offer arguments from legitimate authority; from solidarity; from burden-sharing under non-ideal circumstances; and from gradualism in both the acquisition and dissolution of membership. In this paper, I defend my original view against these objections. I am grateful to these critics, as well as the other authors who have written in this volume.