These two are different. Yes,they’re the same: Choice blindness for facial identity

We examined the manipulability of face identity judgements by combining a sorting task for unfamiliar faces with a standard test of choice blindness. In Experiment 1, 50 participants completed a sorting task and then justified grouping specific pairs of photos together or apart. On manipulated trials, the presented pairings were different from those the participants had actually produced. Detection rates for these identity manipulations were strikingly low (∼21%). Moreover, participants readily provided justifications for identity decisions that they had not made, typically referring to specific facial features. Experiment 2 was conducted along similar lines and confirmed that lower task difficulty and higher confidence in one’s face identity judgements increase detection rates. We conclude that observers can easily be led to believe that they made identity judgements they did not make. As well as underscoring the fragility of unfamiliar face matching, our findings have implications for identity judgements in legal settings.     

Why preschoolers are reluctant to count spontaneously

Two experiments are reported which examine children's counting and its role in reasoning about the relative numerosity of two arrays. In the first experiment, children's number judgements were compared under different conditions designed to evaluate the importance of three different cues to number—length and density of rows, small number perception and counting. Children were found to count very rarely unless specifically asked to do so. Experiment 2 investigated some possible reasons why children who count readily in some situations are reluctant to count spontaneously in this number judgement task. Spontaneous counting in 4-year-olds increased in one condition only: when they were given feedback as to the correctness of their previous judgements. This feedback showed that basing judgements on number as counted was always correct whereas length and density judgements were only sometimes correct. Preschoolers' preference for length as a cue to number may therefore be due to their belief that length is a more reliable cue than counting, rather than to their ignorance about the link between counting and numerical reasoning.     

Audiovisual identity perception from naturally-varying stimuli is driven by visual information

Identity perception often takes place in multimodal settings, where perceivers have access to both visual (face) and auditory (voice) information. Despite this, identity perception is usually studied in unimodal contexts, where face and voice identity perception are modelled independently from one another. In this study, we asked whether and how much auditory and visual information contribute to audiovisual identity perception from naturally-varying stimuli. In a between-subjects design, participants completed an identity sorting task with either dynamic video-only, audio-only or dynamic audiovisual stimuli. In this task, participants were asked to sort multiple, naturally-varying stimuli from three different people by perceived identity. We found that identity perception was more accurate for video-only and audiovisual stimuli compared with audio-only stimuli. Interestingly, there was no difference in accuracy between video-only and audiovisual stimuli. Auditory information nonetheless played a role alongside visual information as audiovisual identity judgements per stimulus could be predicted from both auditory and visual identity judgements, respectively. While the relationship was stronger for visual information and audiovisual information, auditory information still uniquely explained a significant portion of the variance in audiovisual identity judgements. Our findings thus align with previous theoretical and empirical work that proposes that, compared with faces, voices are an important but relatively less salient and a weaker cue to identity perception. We expand on this work to show that, at least in the context of this study, having access to voices in addition to faces does not result in better identity perception accuracy.     

Discounting in causality and covariation judgements

In two experiments, humans were asked to judge the strength of a moderate contingency between a cue and an outcome in the presence of a second strong contingency between another cue and the outcome. The first experiment replicated the discounting effect whereby a strong contingency causes subjects to reduce or discount judgements of a moderate contingency. This experiment used a video-game procedure in which subjects camouflaged a tank to make it safe from mines. The second causal cue was the presence or absence of a spotter plane. Experiment 1 also ruled out the possibility that judgements might be determined by the number of co-occurrences of the cue and outcome as opposed to the level of contingency. The second experiment used an abstract scenario in which discounting was demonstrated when subjects were asked to judge the relationship between the occurrence of geometric objects. The instructions were neutral to discourage causal hypotheses. These results support the notion that judgements result from associative or connectionist processes and not from a two-step cognitive retrospective process in which an estimate of covariation is calculated between cue and outcome and then in a second step this information is used in a normative manner when a decision is made.     

Recognizing the un-real McCoy: priming and the modularity of face recognition

Fodor (1983) has proposed that face perception is carried out by an informationally encapsulated module, whose operation is unaffected by context or expectancies. We tested the modularity hypothesis by examining whether discriminations between normal and distorted versions of famous faces can be primed, either by the name of an associated person (semantic context) or by a valid cue as to the identity of the target face (expectancy). A preliminary experiment showed that, in the absence of priming, discriminations between normal and distorted versions of a face were unaffected by whether the target faces were familiar or not, confirming that these judgments tap perceptual, not postperceptual (semantic), coding processes. In Experiment 1, accuracy was significantly higher when target face pairs were preceded by related name primes, as compared with unrelated ones. In Experiment 2, reaction times were significantly faster for targets preceded by a valid identity cue than for targets preceded by an invalid one. Neither effect could be explained as a speed—accuracy tradeoff. These results fail to support Fodor’s conjecture that face processing is encapsulated.     

Attitude change in face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication: private self‐awareness as mediator and moderator

Two types of social influence can be distinguished: norm‐based influence occurs when social identity is salient and interpersonal influence occurs when personal identity is salient. In two experiments the impact of trait and state private self‐awareness on interpersonal influence during face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication (CMC) was investigated. It is argued that interpersonal influence resulting from face‐to‐face communication is stronger than interpersonal influence resulting from CMC because CMC heightens state private self‐awareness. As a result, it leads to a focus on personal perceptions and thoughts which in turn reduces attitude change. Experiment 1 suggests that communication media may influence attitude change via private self‐awareness. Experiment 2 showed that trait private self‐awareness moderates the effect of communication media on interpersonal influence. Interpersonal influence was stronger in face‐to‐face communication than in CMC only for individuals higher in private self‐awareness. This finding indicates that the impact of situational variations of a concept can be limited to individuals who have a more elevated sense of private self‐awareness. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shared and distinct cue utilization for metacognitive judgements during reasoning and memorisation

Metacognitive research is dominated by meta-memory studies; meta-reasoning research is nascent. Accessibility – the number of associations for a stimulus – is a reliable heuristic cue for Feeling of Knowing when answering knowledge questions. We used a similar cue, subjective accessibility, for exposing commonalities and differences between meta-reasoning and meta-memory. In Experiment 1, participants faced solvable Compound Remote Associate problems mixed with unsolvable random word triads. We collected initial Judgement of Solvability (iJOS), final JOS (fJOS) and confidence. Experiment 2 focused on confidence, controlling for potential interactions among judgements. In Experiment 3, the participants memorised the same triads and rated Ease of Learning and Judgement of Learning. sAccessibility was associated with all judgements. Notably, it reliably predicted memory judgements and confidence in the provided solutions. However, it was unreliable for judging solvability (iJOS and fJOS). The findings highlight the importance of studying meta-reasoning for exposing the biasing factors in reasoning processes and for getting a broad perspective on metacognitive processes.     

Knowledge mediates the timeframe of covariation assessment in human causal induction

How do humans discover causal relations when the effect is not immediately observable? Previous experiments have uniformly demonstrated detrimental effects of outcome delays on causal induction. These findings seem to conflict with everyday causal cognition, where humans can apparently identify long-term causal relations with relative ease. Three experiments investigated whether the influence of delay on adult human causal judgements is mediated by experimentally induced assumptions about the timeframe of the causal relation in question, as suggested by Einhorn and Hogarth (1986). Causal judgements generally decreased when a delay separated cause and effect. This decrease was less pronounced when the thematic context of the causal relation induced participants to expect a delay. Experiment 3 ruled out an alternative explanation of the effect based on variations of cue and outcome saliencies, and showed that detrimental effects of delay are reduced even more when instructions explicitly mentioned the timeframe of the causal relation in question. Knowledge thus mediates the impact of delay on human causal judgement. Implications for contemporary theories of human causal induction are discussed.     

Falsification cueing in collective reasoning: example of the Wason selection task

This paper focuses on the effectiveness of groups, as opposed to individuals, in benefiting from falsification cueing in solving the Wason selection task. Consistent with the idea that groups use information that often individuals fail to use, Experiment 1 showed that groups (but not individuals) that received falsification cueing focused more on cue‐consistent evidence in their reasoning. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the increment in focus on cue‐consistent evidence is moderated by the distribution of the falsification cue within a group. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the cue distribution affects collective focus on cue‐consistent evidence through the content of the group discussion, namely through mentioning the cue during the discussion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reduced adaptability,but no fundamental disruption,of norm‐based face coding following early visual deprivation from congenital cataracts

Faces are adaptively coded relative to visual norms that are updated by experience, and this adaptive coding is linked to face recognition ability. Here we investigated whether adaptive coding of faces is disrupted in individuals (adolescents and adults) who experience face recognition difficulties following visual deprivation from congenital cataracts in infancy. We measured adaptive coding using face identity aftereffects, where smaller aftereffects indicate less adaptive updating of face‐coding mechanisms by experience. We also examined whether the aftereffects increase with adaptor identity strength, consistent with norm‐based coding of identity, as in typical populations, or whether they show a different pattern indicating some more fundamental disruption of face‐coding mechanisms. Cataract‐reversal patients showed significantly smaller face identity aftereffects than did controls (Experiments 1 and 2). However, their aftereffects increased significantly with adaptor strength, consistent with norm‐based coding (Experiment 2). Thus we found reduced adaptability but no fundamental disruption of norm‐based face‐coding mechanisms in cataract‐reversal patients. Our results suggest that early visual experience is important for the normal development of adaptive face‐coding mechanisms.     

Predicting face similarity judgements with a computational model of face space

Current models of face representation involve the notion of a high-dimensional face space. Computational models of face space based on principal components analysis (PCA) have been successfully used to predict human judgements of face sex or race. In this work the capability of PCA-based face spaces to predict human judgements of face similarity is examined. Three different paradigms were used. In Experiment 1 subjects learned face-name associations for 18 faces and identified these faces on tachistoscopic presentation. The number of confusions was used as a measure of face similarity. In Experiment 2 the same subjects subjectively rated the similarity of all 153 possible face pairs. In Experiment 3 reaction time to identify a face in an odd-man-out task was measured as an index of face similarity. These empirical measures were correlated with distance of the faces in PCA-based spaces of different dimensionalities. For Experiments 1 and 2 these correlations were highest for one-or two-dimensional face spaces (r=−0.27 vs. −0.28). For Experiment 3 the correlation was highest for a space consisting of 13 dimensions (r=−0.51). Thus PCA-based spaces seem capable to predict human similarity judgements to some extent. Possible reasons for the differences in predictability between paradigms are discussed.     

Attentional shift by eye gaze requires joint attention: Eye gaze cues are unique to shift attention1

Researchers have demonstrated that attentional shift triggered by gaze direction is reflexive. However, here we show that attentional shift by gaze direction was not always reflexive, but could be modulated by another's perspective. In Experiment 1, a schematic face's line of sight to a peripheral target was obstructed by a vertical barrier located between the face and the target under two conditions. However, the line of sight of the face was clear under another two conditions, in which the barrier was located behind the line of sight by utilizing a depth cue. The gaze cue shifted attention only when the line of sight was not blocked (i.e. joint attention was attained). The arrow cue did not shift attention regardless of the obstruction conditions in Experiment 2. These results suggest that attentional shift by gaze cues, but not arrow cues, involve a higher social cognitive process such as interpretation of the gaze.     

The own‐age face recognition bias is task dependent

The own‐age bias (OAB) in face recognition (more accurate recognition of own‐age than other‐age faces) is robust among young adults but not older adults. We investigated the OAB under two different task conditions. In Experiment 1 young and older adults (who reported more recent experience with own than other‐age faces) completed a match‐to‐sample task with young and older adult faces; only young adults showed an OAB. In Experiment 2 young and older adults completed an identity detection task in which we manipulated the identity strength of target and distracter identities by morphing each face with an average face in 20% steps. Accuracy increased with identity strength and facial age influenced older adults' (but not younger adults') strategy, but there was no evidence of an OAB. Collectively, these results suggest that the OAB depends on task demands and may be absent when searching for one identity.     

Why are moving faces easier to recognize?

Previous work has suggested that seeing a famous face move aids the recognition of identity, especially when viewing conditions are degraded (Knight & Johnston, ; Lander, Christie, & Bruce, ). Experiment 1 investigated whether the beneficial effects of motion are related to a particular type of facial motion (expressing, talking, or rigid motion). Results showed a significant beneficial effect of both expressive and talking movements, but no advantage for rigid motion, compared with a single static image. Experiment 2 investigated whether the advantage for motion is uniform across identity. Participants rated moving famous faces for distinctiveness of motion. The famous faces (moving and static freeze frame) were then used as stimuli in a recognition task. The advantage for face motion was significant only when the motion displayed was distinctive. Results suggest that a reason why moving faces are easier to recognize is because some familiar faces have characteristic motion patterns, which act as an additional cue to identity.     

Face value: testing the utility of contextual face cues for face recognition

The presence of multiple faces during a crime may provide a naturally-occurring contextual cue to support eyewitness recognition for those faces later. Across two experiments, we sought to investigate mechanisms underlying previously-reported cued recognition effects, and to determine whether such effects extended to encoding conditions involving more than two faces. Participants studied sets of individual faces, pairs of faces, or groups of four faces. At test, participants in the single-face condition were tested only on those individual faces without cues. Participants in the two and four-face conditions were tested using no cues, correct cues (a face previously studied with the target test face), or incorrect cues (a never-before-seen face). In Experiment 2, associative encoding was promoted by a rating task. Neither hit rates nor false-alarm rates were significantly affected by cue type or face encoding condition in Experiment 1, but cuing of any kind (correct or incorrect) in Experiment 2 appeared to provide a protective buffer to reduce false-alarm rates through a less liberal response bias. Results provide some evidence that cued recognition techniques could be useful to reduce false recognition, but only when associative encoding is strong.     

Is subjective shortening in human memory unique to time representations?

Three experiments compared forgetting of the duration of a bar-like visual stimulus with forgetting of its length. The main aim of the experiments was to investigate whether subjective shortening (a decrease in the subjective magnitude of a stimulus as its retention interval increased) was observable in length judgements as well as in time judgements, where subjective shortening has been often observed previously. On all trials of the three experiments, humans received two briefly presented coloured bars, separated by adelay ranging from 1 to 10 s, and the bars could differ in length, duration of presentation, or both. In Experiment 1 two groups of subjects made either length or duration judgements, and subjective shortening-type forgetting functions were observed only for duration. Experiments 2 and 3 used the same general procedure, but the stimuli judged could differ both in length and duration within a trial, and different subject groups (Experiment 2) or the same subjects in two conditions (Experiment 3) made either length or duration judgements of stimuli, which were on average physically identical. Subjective shortening was only found with duration, and never with length, supporting the view that subjective shortening may be unique to time judgements.     

The effects of distinctiveness on memory and metamemory for face–name associations

We examined the influence of face and name distinctiveness on memory and metamemory for face–name associations. Four types of monitoring judgements were solicited during encoding and retrieval of face–name pairs that contained distinct or typical faces (Experiment 1) or names (Experiment 2). The beneficial effects of distinctiveness on associative memory were symmetrical between faces and names, such that relative to their typical counterparts, distinct faces enhanced memory for names, and distinct names enhanced memory for faces. These effects were also apparent in metamemory. Estimates of prospective and retrospective memory performance were greater for face–name associations that contained a distinct face or name compared with a typical face or name, regardless of whether the distinct item was a cue or target. Moreover, the predictive validity of prospective monitoring improved with name distinctiveness, whereas the predictive validity of retrospective monitoring improved with facial distinctiveness. Our results indicate that distinctiveness affects not only the strength of the association between a face and a name, but also the ability to monitor that association.     

Sociability and gazing toward humans in dogs and wolves: Simple behaviors with broad implications

Sociability, defined as the tendency to approach and interact with unfamiliar people, has been found to modulate some communicative responses in domestic dogs, including gaze behavior toward the human face. The objective of this study was to compare sociability and gaze behavior in pet domestic dogs and in human‐socialized captive wolves in order to identify the relative influence of domestication and learning in the development of the dog–human bond. In Experiment 1, we assessed the approach behavior and social tendencies of dogs and wolves to a familiar and an unfamiliar person. In Experiment 2, we compared the animal's duration of gaze toward a person's face in the presence of food, which the animals could see but not access. Dogs showed higher levels of interspecific sociability than wolves in all conditions, including those where attention was unavailable. In addition, dogs gazed longer at the person's face than wolves in the presence of out‐of‐reach food. The potential contributions of domestication, associative learning, and experiences during ontogeny to prosocial behavior toward humans are discussed.     

Constraints on strategy construction in a speeded discrimination task

In three experiments, subjects reported the identity of a word (above or below) that appeared above or below a fixation point. On some trials, a cue presented 100, 200, 400, 600, 800, or 1,000 msec before the word indicated the relation between position and identity (i.e., whether the dimensions were compatible, e.g., above/above and below/below, or conflicted, e.g., above/below and below/above). On the other trials, the cue was withheld (Experiment 2) or it bore no information about the relation between dimensions (Experiment 1 and 3). In each experiment, the cue reduced reaction time below the level of no-cue or neutral-cue controls, indicating strategic use of the relation between dimensions. Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated the number of potential cues that could occur in a block. A stronger cuing effect was found when one cue could occur (Experiment 2) than when two cues could occur (Experiment 1). Experiment 3 manipulated practice; it revealed that with practice the cuing effect reached asymptote at shorter delays. The asymptote itself did not change. Experiment 4 showed that cue-delay effects were independent of warning interval (warning interval and cue delay confounded in Experiment 1, 2, and 3). The experiments demonstrate construction and utilization of strategies; they show that construction is sensitive to constraints imposed by the subject's goals and abilities and by the structure of the task environment.     

Holistic face perception: Mind the gap!

The most widely used measurement of holistic face perception, the composite face effect (CFE), is challenged by two apparently contradictory goals: having a defined face part (i.e., the top half), and yet perceiving the face as an integrated unit (i.e., holistically). Here, we investigated the impact of a small gap between top and bottom face halves in the standard composite face paradigm, requiring matching of sequentially presented top face halves. In Experiment 1, the CFE was larger for no-gap than gap stimuli overall, but not for participants who were presented with gap stimuli first, suggesting that the area of the top face half was unknown without a gap. This was confirmed in Experiment 2, in which these two stimulus sets were mixed up: the gap stimuli thus provided information about the area of a top face half and the magnitude of the CFE did not differ between stimulus sets. These observations indicate that the CFE might be artificially inflated in the absence of a stimulus cue that objectively defines a border between the face halves. Finally, in Experiment 3, observers were asked to determine which of two simultaneously presented faces was the composite face. Perceptual judgements for no-gap stimuli approached ceiling; however, with a gap, participants were almost unable to distinguish the composite face from a veridical face. This effect was not only due to low-level segmentation cues at the border of no-gap face halves, because stimulus inversion decreased performance in both conditions. This result indicates that the two halves of different faces may be integrated more naturally with a small gap that eliminates an enhanced contrast border. Collectively, these observations suggest that a small gap between face halves provides an objective definition of the face half to match and is beneficial for valid measurement of the behavioural CFE.