Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Cooperating If One's Goals Are Collective‐Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal Transformation1

Prior studies of the effect of group identification on cooperation in social dilemmas have advanced 2 competing accounts: the goal‐transformation hypothesis, which holds that identification makes personal and collective goals interchangeable; and the goal‐amplification hypothesis, which states that identification induces positive expectations about others’ cooperative behavior. However, prior studies have neglected to assess the process measures necessary to pit the one account against the other. The present study showed that the effect of identification was moderated by participants’ social value orientation. Identification influenced proselfs’ cooperation more than prosocials’ cooperation. Mediational analyses further showed that the effect of our identification manipulation was mediated by participants’ sense of collective self, and not by their expectations.     

Injustice for All or Just for Me? Social Value Orientation Predicts Responses to Own Versus Other's Procedures

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.     

Self-activation is a two-edged sword: The effects of I primes on cooperation

Two studies examined the influence of I primes on cooperative behavior. Two contrasting hypotheses were tested, using prosocial allocations (Experiment 1) and behavior in a give-some dilemma (Experiment 2) as dependent variables and assessing subjects’ social value orientation. The self-activation hypothesis (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) predicts that social value orientation influences behavior to a stronger degree when activated. That is, proselfs should behave less cooperatively, whereas prosocials should behave even more cooperatively in an I prime condition. The independent self-construal hypothesis (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999) predicts a stronger concern for one’s own outcome and less cooperative behavior for individuals with an activated independent self-construal. In both studies an interaction between priming and social value orientation occurred, supporting the self-activation hypothesis. Implications for the importance of social cognitive processes underlying cooperative behavior, as well as, implications for research on independent vs interdependent self-construals are discussed.     

A Social Dilemma Analysis of Commuting Preferences: The Roles of Social Value Orientation and Trust1

The current research advances a social dilemma analysis of commuting, examining the roles of preexisting personality differences in social value orientation (i.e., prosocial vs. proself orientation) and trust (i.e., a general belief in the honesty and cooperative intentions of others) in determining preferences for collectively desirable commuting options: preferences for commuting by public transportation (Study 1) and carpooling (Study 2). Consistent with predictions, both studies revealed that, relative to p of prosocials, preferences of proselfs were more strongly associated with beliefs about the relative efficiency of cars (i.e., an outcome affecting personal well-being). Also, greater preferences for collectively desirable actions were observed among prosocials with high trust—relative to prosocials with low trust and proselfs with high or low trust—providing support for the claim that 2 conditions (i.e., prosocial goals and trust in others) must be met to obtain collectively desirable commuting preferences.     

The boundaries of reciprocal cooperation

The current research examines the role of social value orientation in determining the extent to which individuals are inclined to reciprocate cooperation exhibited by others perceived as either honest, intelligent, or unintelligent. Results revealed that individuals with prosocial orientation reciprocated high levels of cooperation regardless of other's characteristics. Individuals with proself orientation (i.e. individualists and competitors) exhibited some reciprocal cooperation toward others perceived as honest, yet took advantage of others perceived as intelligent or unintelligent. These results suggest that proselfs can be motivated to reciprocate cooperation by others if they have faith in others' benign intentions and trustworthiness. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

The present study examines the influence of pre-existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro-social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross-cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro-social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.     

The Influence of Other's Morality and Own Social Value Orientation on Cooperation in The Netherlands and the U.S.A.

The present study examines a two-person social dilemma characterised by the conflict between the pursuit of own benefits and collective benefits. The main purpose is twofold: (1) to examine the effect of perceptions of one person's morality (e.g. honesty) on expected cooperation from another and own cooperation, and (2) to examine whether pre-existing differences between individuals in their social value orientation, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to self and others (McClintock, 1978), would modify these effects of other's morality. As predicted on the basis of the Might over Morality hypothesis (Liebrand, Jansen et al., 1986), it was found that considerably more cooperation was expected from one perceived as highly moral than from another perceived as low on morality. Contrary to a second Might over Morality prediction, however, this effect was not moderated by individual differences in social value orientation. In addition, it was found that subjects with pro-social value orientations, as well as those with individualistic and competitive orientations cooperated considerably more with a person perceived as highly moral than with another perceived as low on morality. This latter finding extends previous work on social value orientation in that it suggests that individuals who are predisposed to choose noncooperatively in social dilemmas are willing to cooperate if they are quite confident that the other has truly cooperative and good intentions. Finally, the aforementioned findings were observed in two experiments, one conducted in The Netherlands, the other in the United States. This supports the cross-cultural generalisability of the present findings.     

Bad for me or bad for us? Interpersonal orientations and the impact of losses on unethical behavior

The present research examines the role of allocations of losses versus gains on the emergence of unethical behavior as a function of people's social value orientation. The authors demonstrate that (a) proselfs regard unethical behavior to prevent losses as more justified than prosocials (Study 1) and (b) proselfs engage in more unethical behavior to prevent losses than prosocials (Study 2). These differences are explained by prosocials' greater concern for harm to interdependent others in the domain of losses. A third study further substantiates these findings by revealing that unethical behavior to prevent losses increases among prosocials as harm to others is reduced. In sum, these results reveal that depending on whether people attend only to their self-interest or also consider the outcomes of others, losses either may increase or curtail unethical conduct. Considering social value orientations thus may reconcile conflicting theoretical perspectives on the impact of losses on social decisions.     

What other's disappointment may do to selfish people: emotion and social value orientation in a negotiation context

The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientation moderate responses to other's expressions of disappointment in negotiation. The literature suggested competing hypotheses: First, prosocials are more responsive to other's disappointment because they have a greater concern for other; second, proselfs are more responsive because they see other's disappointment as a threat to their own outcomes. Results of a computer-mediated negotiation in which a simulated opponent expressed disappointment, no emotion, or anger supported the second prediction: Proselfs conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to a neutral or angry one, whereas prosocials were unaffected by the other's emotion. This effect was mediated by participants' motivation to satisfy the other's needs, which disappointment triggered more strongly in proselfs than in prosocials. Implications for theorizing on emotion, social value orientation, and negotiation are discussed.     

Your Data are (Not) My Data: The Role of Social Value Orientation in Sharing Data About Others

The personal data consumers share with companies on a daily basis often also involves other people. However, prior research has focused almost exclusively on how consumers make decisions about their own data. In this research, we explore how consumers’ social value orientation impacts their decisions regarding data about others. In contrast to the notion of proselfs as “selfish” decision-makers, across four studies we find that proselfs are less likely than prosocials to share data about others with third parties. We show that this effect arises because proselfs feel less ownership over data they hold about others than prosocials, which in turn reduces their willingness to share it. Overall, this work contributes to literature on social value orientation as well as privacy decision-making and helps marketers and policy makers in designing interdependent privacy choice contexts.     

Social dilemmas as strong versus weak situations: Social value orientations and tacit coordination under resource size uncertainty

This study investigates how environmental uncertainty in resource dilemmas influences the decisions of participants differing in social value orientations. We argue that under resource size certainty people anchor their decisions on tacit coordination rules such as the equal division rule, whereas under resource size uncertainty people rely more on their own social value orientations to determine their choice behavior. The results corroborate our line of reasoning. When the size of the resource was certain, proselfs as well as prosocials anchored their decisions on the equal division rule. Under resource size uncertainty, the equal division rule appeared to lose its coordinating potential, inducing proselfs to harvest more than prosocials.     

Mother Teresa versus Ebenezer Scrooge: mortality salience leads proselfs to endorse self-transcendent values (unless proselfs are reassured)

Recently, Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski demonstrated that mortality salience (MS) increased contributions to (an ingroup) charity (i.e., the Scrooge effect). The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientations would moderate the Scrooge effect. In line with an Ebenezer shift hypothesis, proselfs were less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values in a dental pain control condition but were indistinguishable from prosocials in an MS condition as proselfs increased endorsement of self-transcendent values under MS (Experiments 1 and 2a). However, when participants gave their impressions of an unfavorable prosocial or a favorable proself prior to the MS manipulation, proselfs were again less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values (Experiments 2a and 2b), suggesting that proselfs are unlikely to transform into prosocials under conditions of MS when given reasons to disidentify with prosocial values or identify with proself values.     

Reactions to group success and failure as a function of identification level: a test of the goal-transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas

This study examined the combined effects of identification level, social value orientation, and feedback on contributions in a public goods dilemma. Previous research has shown that strengthening group identity promotes cooperation. One explanation for this finding is that a strong group identity transforms people's motives from the personal to the collective level (the goal transformation hypothesis). Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in studies showing that a strong sense of group identity influences proselfs, relative to prosocials, to make larger contributions. In this experiment, we demonstrated that these findings are restricted to situations in which no feedback about a group's performance is provided. When performance feedback is provided, a strong group identity cancels the effects of individual differences in social value orientations. In particular, when a group fails, contributions increase if group identity is salient, but decrease if personal identity is salient, regardless of a person's social value orientation. But when a group succeeds, no differences between group and personal identity are found. These results are discussed in terms of the goal transformation hypothesis.     

大学生在社会困境中的公平决策:社会价值取向的影响

通过两项研究考查大学生在社会困境中的行为决策及公平感体验,检验社会价值取向的影响作用,有效被试分别为85名和84名。结果表明:(1)亲社会者比亲自我者更倾向做公平决策;信息对称比不对称条件更促进被试做公平决策;女生比男生更倾向做公平决策。(2)性别在社会价值取向与信息对称性对公平决策的影响中起调节作用,社会价值取向显著影响男生的公平决策,信息对称性显著影响女生的公平决策。(3)社会价值取向显著影响个体对不公平的容忍度,亲社会者更不容忍不公平行为。(4)对于利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向接受,亲社会者并不比亲自我者体验到更强的内疚情绪;对于不利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向拒绝,且产生较强的不公平感及气愤情绪。     

Do not prime hawks with doves: the interplay of construct activation and consistency of social value orientation on cooperative behavior

Low and high consistent pro-socials and pro-selfs were primed with neutral, morality, or might concepts in mixed-motive situations. The authors expected participants' social value orientation to influence cooperative behavior among (a) high consistent individuals in all prime conditions and (b) low consistent individuals in the neutral prime condition only. The authors also expected the primes to influence cooperative behavior more among low than high consistent individuals. Four experiments using supra-liminal (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or subliminal (Experiment 3) priming and 2-person (Experiments 1-3) or N-person (Experiment 4) social dilemmas partially supported these initial predictions. One intriguing exception was that morality primes reduced cooperation among high consistent pro-selfs. Experiments 2-4 allowed testing for the potential role of expectations in shaping participants' cooperative behavior.     

Perceived rationality,morality, and power of social choice as a function of interdependence structure and social value orientation

The present study examines how individuals with different social value orientations (i.e. prosocial, individualistic, and competitive) construe the rationality, morality, and power of choices in four distinct interdependence structures which systematically differ in the motives that could underlie the most prosocial or least aggressive choice: (a) altruism only, (b) altruism and cooperation, (c) altruism, cooperation, and individualism, and (d) altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition. Results revealed that rationality ratings, and to a lesser degree morality and power ratings, increased most when the motives that could underlie a choice were part of the perceiver's social value orientation. Overall, the pattern of rationality ratings provided reasonable support for the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle. Ratings of morality and power suggested a corresponding Goal Prescribes Morality/Power Principle (for prosocials and individualists), but revealed only mixed support for the Might Over Morality Hypothesis. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is smart in a social dilemma? differential effects of priming competence on cooperation

Prior theorizing of rationality in social dilemmas suggests that individuals pursuing different interaction goals may ‘perceive’ different associations between competence and behaviour in a social dilemma, arguing that competitive individuals associate competence with noncooperation (i.e. noncooperation=smart), whereas prosocial individuals associate competence with cooperation (i.e. cooperation=smart; goal‐prescribes‐rationality principle, Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The present research examines whether cooperative interaction can be affected by subtle activation (or priming) of competence, and whether the effects may differ for competitive versus prosocial participants. Consistent with hypotheses, two experiments revealed that priming competence yielded reduced levels of cooperation (and greater exploitation) among competitors, and yielded no effects (Experiment 1) or a tendency towards enhanced cooperation (Experiment 2) among prosocials. The discussion considers theoretical implications of relatively subtle influences on cooperative interaction in social dilemmas. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The consequences of mimicry for prosocials and proselfs: Effects of social value orientation on the mimicry–liking link

People often mimic each other's behaviors. As a consequence, they share each other's emotional and cognitive states, which facilitates liking. Mimicry, however, does not always affect liking. In two studies, we investigate whether the mimicry–liking link is influenced by people's social value orientations. More specifically, we examine whether prosocials and proselfs are differently affected when being mimicked or not. Prosocials and proselfs indicated their liking for the interaction partner after being or not being mimicked in a face‐to‐face interaction. The results of two studies showed that prosocials rated the interaction partner as less likeable when they were not mimicked than when they were mimicked. Proselfs, however, were not affected by mimicry. These results show that people's social motives play a role in whether or not the effects of mimicry on liking occur: Proselfs are less sensitive to the mimicry acts of others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.