Critical thinking ability and belief in the paranormal

A study was conducted to assess the relationship between critical thinking and belief in the paranormal. 180 students from three departments (psychology, arts, computer science) completed one measure of reasoning, the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), and a scale of paranormal experiences. Half of the subjects filled out the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millmann, 1985) and the Watson–Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), respectively. The results show no significant correlations between critical thinking and paranormal belief or experiences. Reasoning ability, however, had a significant effect on paranormal belief scores, but not on paranormal experiences. Subjects with lower reasoning ability scored higher on Traditional Paranormal Belief and New Age Philosophy than did subjects with higher reasoning abilities. Results suggest that those who have better reasoning abilities scrutinise to a greater extent whether their experiences are sufficient justification for belief in the reality of these phenomena.     

Belief in Pseudoscience,Cognitive Style and Science Literacy

Most studies of superstitious belief have focused on paranormal phenomena, but this study extended existing findings to non‐paranormal pseudoscience by exploring links between belief and dual‐process thought (cognitive ability and intuitive‐analytical thinking styles). In the present study, Japanese participants (N = 264; 188 women, 76 men; mean age = 25.0; range = 18–81) completed questionnaires on cognitive style and ability and level of beliefs and science literacy. Results showed that belief in paranormal and non‐paranormal pseudoscience correlated positively; after controlling for demographic variables, level of science literacy and cognitive ability, both analytic and intuitive cognitive styles positively predicted paranormal belief. Belief in non‐paranormal pseudoscience associated positively with analytic, but not intuitive style. These results follow the dual‐process view of belief perseverance; however, analytic style affected beliefs oppositely from previous studies. This discrepancy might emerge from Western and Eastern cultural differences in reasoning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Probabilistic reasoning,affirmative bias and belief in precognitive dreams

Three hundred and eighty‐six participants were interviewed about their experience of dreams that seem to predict an event in the future, and their belief about whether such dreams can be explained naturally or paranormally. For those without university education, participants who had had a dream that seemed to predict the future (termed experiencers) and believers in paranormal explanations for such dreams (termed believers) made more errors on a probabilistic reasoning task about a lottery. Contrary to the chance baseline shift hypothesis experiencers and believers did not give lower estimates than non‐experiencers and non‐believers for the frequency with which others would answer three simple personal questions affirmatively. However, they were more likely to answer the three simple personal questions affirmatively about themselves than were non‐experiencers and non‐believers, which suggests an affirmative bias. This affirmative bias either affects paranormal experience and belief, or is a confound in the methods used in assessing experience and belief. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Belief in the Paranormal and Reality Testing: A Reappraisal

The present study examined the degree to which specific probabilistic biases (misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy) were associated with belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing (RT) deficits. Participants completed measures assessing probabilistic reasoning, belief in the paranormal and RT. Perception of randomness predicted the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. These results provide support for the notion that paranormal believers demonstrate greater misrepresentation of chance. With regard to conjunction, a framing effect occurred. Problems presented in a paranormal context correlated negatively with the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Story Remembering Among Children

Abstract

The hypothesis that belief in the paranormal is related to reasoning errors was tested. College students were administered the Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones, Russell, &; Nickel, 1977) and a syllogistic reasoning test. A slight but statistically significant correlation was observed between BPS scores and the number of errors made on the reasoning test. This relationship was larger but not significantly so for reasoning items with paranormal content than for symbolic content. An a priori comparison indicated that the relationship between BPS scores and reasoning errors was significantly greater for problems that required subjects to determine the validity of hypotheses given statements of evidence than for problems that required subjects to determine the validity of deduced empirical predictions given hypotheses. Thus, belief in the paranormal among college students was very moderately correlated with reasoning ability and was observed most clearly when the reasoning problems contained paranormal content and when they required subjects to determine the validity of hypotheses given evidential statements.     

Paranormal belief and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

Numerous studies have shown paranormal believers misperceive randomness and are poor at judging probability. Despite the obvious relevance to many types of alleged paranormal phenomena, no one has examined whether believers are more susceptible to the ‘conjunction fallacy’; that is to misperceiving co‐occurring (conjunct) events as being more likely than singular (constituent) events alone. The present study examines believer vs. non‐believer differences in conjunction errors for both paranormal and non‐paranormal events presented as either a probability or a frequency estimation task. As expected, believers made more conjunction errors than non‐believers. This was true for both event types, with both groups making fewer errors for paranormal than for non‐paranormal events. Surprisingly, the response format (probability vs. frequency) had little impact. Results are discussed in relation to paranormal believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and more generally, to their propensity for probabilistic reasoning biases. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.     

Effects of context on the rate of conjunctive responses in the probabilistic truth table task

The probabilistic truth table task involves assessing the probability of "If A then C" conditional sentences. Previous studies have shown that a majority of participants assess this probability as the conditional probability P(C│A) while a substantial minority responds with the probability of the conjunction A and C. In an experiment involving 96 participants, we investigated the impact on the rate of conjunctive responses of the context in which the task is framed. We show that a context intended to lead participants to consider all the possible cases (i.e. the throw of a die known to allow six possibilities) elicited more conjunctive responses than a context assumed not to have this effect (an unfamiliar deck of cards). These results suggest that the step of inferring the probability can distort our assessment of participants' interpretation of conditional sentences. This might compromise the validity of the probabilistic task in studying conditional reasoning.     

Vitalistic thinking in adults

Vitalistic thinking has traditionally been associated with reasoning about biological phenomena. The current research aimed to investigate a broader range of vitalistic thinking than previously studied. Esoteric notions of ‘energy’ are frequently used by individuals when making causal attributions for strange occurrences, and previous literature has linked such thinking with paranormal, magical, and superstitious beliefs. Two experiments are described that aim to investigate whether adults are vitalistic when asked to make causal judgments, and whether this can be predicted by thinking styles and prior paranormal belief. Experiment 1 asked participants to rate three causal options (one of which was vitalistic) for six vignettes. Scores on one dimension of paranormal belief (New Age Philosophy) and analytical thinking significantly predicted vitalism, but scores on intuitive thinking and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs did not. Experiment 2 extended the findings by asking participants to generate their own causal responses. Again, paranormal belief was found to be the best predictor of vitalism, but this time Traditional Paranormal Beliefs were associated with vitalistic responses whilst both intuitive and analytical thinking were unable to significantly predict classification. Results challenge previous findings, suggesting that vitalistic thinking may operate differently when applied to everyday causal reasoning.     

Erosion of Belief and Disbelief: Effects of Religiosity and Negative Affect on Beliefs in the Paranormal and Supernatural

Abstract

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.     

Conditional reasoning,frequency of counterexamples,and the effect of response modality

Geiger and Oberauer (2007) found that when asked to reason with conditionals, people are very sensitive to information about the relative frequency of exceptions to conditional rules and quite insensitive to the relative number of disabling conditions. They asked participants to rate their degree of certainty in a conclusion. In the following studies, we investigated the possibility that this kind of response encourages a more probabilistic mode of processing compared with the usual dichotomous response. In Study 1, participants were given a variant of the problems used by Geiger and Oberauer with either the samescaled response format or a dichotomouscategorical response. The results with the scaled response were identical to those of Geiger and Oberauer. However, the results with the categorical response presented a very different profile. In Study 2, we presented similar problems using only frequency information, followed by a set of abstract conditional reasoning problems. The participants who performed better on the abstract problems showed a significantly different response profile than those who did worse on the abstract problems in the categorical response condition. No such difference was observed in the scaled response condition. These results show that response modality strongly affects the way in which information is processed in otherwise identical inferential problems and they are consistent with the idea that scaled responses promote a probabilistic mode of processing.     

The impact of event vividness,event severity,and prior paranormal belief on attributions towards a depicted remarkable coincidence experience: Two studies examining the misattribution hypothesis

Two studies examine the impact event vividness, event severity, and prior paranormal belief has on causal attributions for a depicted remarkable coincidence experience. In Study 1, respondents (n = 179) read a hypothetical vignette in which a fictional character accurately predicts a plane crash 1 day before it occurs. The crash was described in either vivid or pallid terms with the final outcome being either severe (fatal) or non‐severe (non‐fatal). Respondents completed 29 causal attribution items, one attribution confidence item, nine scenario perception items, a popular paranormal belief scale, and a standard demographics questionnaire. Principal axis factoring reduced the 29 attribution items to four attribution factors which were then subjected to a 2 (event vividness) × 2 (event severity) × 2 (paranormal belief) MANCOVA controlling for respondent gender. As expected, paranormal believers attributed the accurate crash prediction less to coincidence and more to both paranormal and transcendental knowing than did paranormal sceptics. Furthermore, paranormal (psychokinesis) believers deemed the prediction more reflective of paranormal knowing to both (1) a vivid/non‐fatal and (2) a pallid/fatal crash depiction. Vividness, severity, and paranormal belief types had no impact on attribution confidence. In Study 2, respondents (also n = 179) generated data that were a moderately good fit to the previous factor structure and replicated several differences across attributional pairings albeit for paranormal non‐believers only. Corresponding effects for event severity and paranormal belief were not replicated. Findings are discussed in terms of their support for the paranormal misattribution hypothesis and the impact of availability biases in the form of both vividness and severity effects. Methodological issues and future research ideas are also discussed.     

Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy

People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain‐general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. © 2014 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

The Implicit Relationship Between Religious and Paranormal Constructs

Several decades worth of research have produced mixed results concerning the relationship between beliefs in religious and paranormal phenomena. While this previous work focused on the explicit measurement of these beliefs, these studies focused on a new level of analysis. Specifically, what is the implicit relationship between religious and paranormal constructs? In Study 1, participants completed a version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to assess the association between religious and paranormal stimuli, as well as completed measures of religiosity and paranormal belief. Results supported an association between these constructs that was moderated by intrinsic religiosity and faith in science. Study 2 again provided evidence for an association while addressing a methodological concern regarding the IAT. The results are discussed in their impact on the understanding of the cognitive representation of religious and paranormal constructs and the respective belief systems.     

Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories

We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.     

Together we are strong: Explicit and implicit paranormal beliefs predict performance in a knowledge test of paranormal phenomena better than explicit beliefs alone

The belief in paranormal phenomena is a frequently studied topic. Studies predominantly assess explicit (i.e., conscious) parts of paranormal belief (PB) using questionnaire-based self-report measures which are prone to impression management and social desirability tendencies. In order to investigate the usefulness of measuring implicit (i.e., automatic) PB, we developed a PB Implicit Association Test (PB-IAT). Implicit PB was uncorrelated with explicit PB, but moderated the relationship between explicit PB and participants’ knowledge of paranormal phenomena. Participants with a weak implicit PB did not differ in their knowledge scores regardless of whether they had strong or weak explicit PB. But participants with strong implicit PB had higher scores when they also had strong explicit PB compared to participants with weak explicit PB. These results suggest that discrepant configurations of PB impair performance in a knowledge test about paranormal phenomena.     

The effect of superstitious thinking on psychosocial stress responses and perceived task performance

Previous research on superstitious belief, a subset of paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993 ), has suggested that people tend to invoke luck‐related superstitions in stressful situations as an attempt to gain an illusion of control over outcomes. Based on this, the current study examined whether luck‐related superstition, in the form of a “lucky” pen, could influence the psychological response to a psychosocial stressor. Participants (N = 114), aged between 17 and 59 years (M = 22.98, SD = 4.57) from James Cook University Singapore, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (a) no‐stress with no lucky pen; (b) no‐stress with a lucky pen; (c) stress with no lucky pen or; (d) stress with a lucky pen. The results revealed that participants provided with a lucky pen experienced lower state anxiety when exposed to the stressor. Further, participants provided with a lucky pen perceived their performance to be better than those without it. However, superstitious belief did not significantly change following exposure to stress. Taken together, the present findings add some support to the suggestion that belief in transferable luck may facilitate coping with a stressor. However, further research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms behind the potential benefits of superstitious belief.     

The Probability of Iterated Conditionals

Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth‐table task, and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point.     

Narcissism and belief in the paranormal

The present study was designed to assess whether the relationship between narcissistic personality and paranormal belief identified by Tobacyk and Mitchell earlier could be replicated with a general population and to see whether the effect could be found with a narrower definition of paranormal beliefs that focuses only on belief in psychic phenomena. 75 participants completed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and two measures of paranormal belief, the Paranormal Belief Scale and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale. There was no correlation between narcissism and Paranormal Belief Scale scores, but narcissism and Australian Sheep-Goat Scale scores were significantly positively correlated. Of the three subscales to the Australian Sheep-Goat measure, scores for narcissism correlated with belief in ESP and PK but not in Life after death. These relationships were interpreted in terms of need for control.     

Erosion of belief and disbelief: effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.