The Power of Language and Labels: “The Mentally Ill” Versus “People With Mental Illnesses”

Undergraduate students (N = 221), adults in a community sample (N = 211), and professional counselors and counselors‐in‐training (N = 269) were given a measure of tolerance. Within each sample, half of the participants were given a version that used the term “the mentally ill” and half were given a version that used the term “people with mental illnesses.” Individuals receiving the version with the term “the mentally ill” had lower levels of tolerance. Professional counselors had the largest differences in tolerance on the basis of language.     

“Patching up Virtue”

Herdt's Putting On Virtue has two chief aims. The first is to champion the virtue tradition against Christian moral quietism and modern deontological ethics. The second is to facilitate reconciliation between Augustinian and Emersonian virtue. To accomplish these tasks Herdt constructs a counter‐narrative to Schneewind's Invention of Autonomy, in which Luther's resignation and Kant's innovation are tragic consequences of “hyper‐Augustinianism”—a competitive conception of divine and human agency, which leads to excessive suspicion of acquired virtue. This review argues that Putting On Virtue succeeds in its first aim but leaves its second intriguingly uncompleted. Despite this deficiency, however, this essay also argues that Putting On Virtue makes plausible Herdt's audacious suggestion that Augustinian and Emersonian perfectionism may be reconciled by bringing acquired and infused virtue under a single term.     

“Higher” and “lower”: Comparative and categorical interpretations by children

Three-, four-, and five-year-old children's categorical and comparative understanding of high and low were examined in two experiments. Categorical knowledge was assessed by presenting subjects with a single object at varying heights (from 0 to five feet above the ground), and asking if the object was high or low. Comparative understanding of the terms was assessed by showing children two objects at a time and asking which was higher or lower. We observed two patterns of performance in children's categorical treatments: younger children in particular defined disjoint categories for high and low such that they only labelled the extreme heights as high or low, and maintained that middle heights were neither high nor low. Older children defined either-or categories such that all heights were labelled either high or low. We also found that children who defined either-or categories made correct comparative judgments across the entire range of variation whereas children who defined disjoint categories could only judge which of two objects was higher if the objects were not low (at 0 and 1 feet) and which of the objects was lower if the objects were not high (at 4 and 5 feet). The results were interpreted as reflecting a lack of appreciation that the terms are interdefined as negations of each other, and were discussed in terms of the similar semantic-congruity effects found in adults.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

A note on the origin of the term “social science”

The previous literature concerning the origin of the term social science has traced the earliest usage of the English phrase to J. S. Mill in 1829 and of the French science sociale to Charles Fourier in 1808. A prior, albeit vague, employment of the term is found in a 1785 letter by John Adams. In addition, an unambiguous usage of social science has been discovered in the 1825 Articles of Agreement of the London Cooperative Society. The label social scientist appears as early as 1875.     

THE “AS‐YET SITUATION” IN WINNICOTT'S “FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS”: YOUR FATHER “NEVER DID YOU THE HONOR OF”… YET

The author proposes a new hypothesis in relation to Winnicott's “Fragment of an Analysis”: that as early as 1955, in the case described in this text, Winnicott is creating the paternal function in his patient's psychic functioning by implicitly linking his interpretations regarding the father to the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit. The author introduces an original clinical concept, the as‐yet situation, which she has observed in her own clinical work, as well as in Winnicott's analysis of the patient described in “Fragment of an Analysis” (1955).     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

Engaging “Resistant” Families in Treatment

Many families, when presented with the option of family therapy, are less than eager to participate. This paper comprises the second and third parts of a series on engaging “resistant” families. ¹ 1 The first paper in this series, authored by J. M. Van Deusen, M. D. Stanton, S. M. Scott, and T. C. Todd, is entitled “Engaging “Resistant” Families in Treatment: I. Getting the Drug Addict to Recruit His Family Members” and appeared in the International Journal of the Addictions 15 (7): 1069–1089, 1980. A revised and expanded version of Part II is presented in M.D. Stanton, T. C. Todd, and Associates, The Family Therapy of Drug Abuse and Addictions New York, Guilford, in press.
Part II presents 21 principles and a number of techniques and strategies that have been developed for successfuly recruiting such families. These techniques should be applicable for engaging resistant families with all types of presenting problems. Part III provides an analysis of the important variables involved, along with data on cost efficiency and administrative costs. It was found that when therapists had administrative control of their cases, serving in dual roles as both therapists and drug counselors, the recruitment effort was (a) more effective (i.e., complete families, including both parents or parent surrogates, were recruited in 77 per cent of the cases), and (b) twice as cost efficient. Two-thirds of the non-engaged families were not recruited because the index patient would not allow family members to be contacted. Black families were more difficult to recruit than whites. Data on cost efficiency and on the actual administrative costs of recruiting families are also provided. We conclude that the engagement process requires a revision in therapeutic philosophy, since such families are often desperately in need of help but are unavailable unless therapists make a special effort to reach them.     

“Maleness” Revisited

My response to the preceding commentaries draws on recent events such as the Thomas/Hill hearings to illustrate some of my central arguments in “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy.” I also attempt to clarify frequently misunderstood aspects of my use of gender as an analytical category, and discuss why, in my opinion, we should continue to care about the “maleness” of philosophy.     

A Response to My “Critics”

This essay is a response to comments made by Shane Fhelan, Cheshire Calhoun, and Naomi Scheman on my book The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern (1999). I reiterate my belief that we best approach the issue of consensus and dissension in second’ Order justifications of social and political claims not philosophically but sociologically, politically, historically. I suggest similar approaches for dealing with the question of meaning. This mow signals an endorsement not of indifference but rather of commitment and humility.     

“Consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that “androgyny” or “sex role transcendence” is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or “inconsistent” about androgyny and sex role transcendence.     

The Distinct Psychologies of “Looking” and “Leaping”: Assessment and Locomotion as the Springs of Action

Actions require two essential functions: assessment and locomotion. Assessment determines one’s goals and selects the means. Locomotion translates these into concrete behavior. In past work, assessment and locomotion have been portrayed as co‐ordinated and interdependent, or associated with different action phases. In contrast, we review recent theorizing and research that depict assessment and locomotion as autonomous and complementary. Recent evidence supports this conception for the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations, and cultures in reference to actions at different levels of analysis.     

The Continuum of “Survivorship”: Definitional Issues in the Aftermath of Suicide

In light of prevailing confusion over the meaning of the term “suicide survivor,” we propose a more exact terminology for designating different levels of impact on those left behind by suicide, ranging on a continuum from those exposed to suicide through those who are affected by it and finally to those who are bereaved by suicide in the short‐ or long‐term, as a function of their loss of a close emotional attachment through this tragic form of loss. We briefly note the possible utility of this terminological specificity in promoting more clearly targeted research and intervention efforts, and call for closer investigation of various categories of “survivorship” in future studies.     

Her Terrain Is Outside His “Domain”

A Response to Puka's “The Liberation of Caring: A Different Voice for Gilligan's ‘Different Voice’“     

“Equal Discipleship”

Feminist theology is known for its various critical principles and methods of biblical interpretation. In the process of doing feminist biblical interpretation, feminist theologians have started to build their theological frameworks. This article takes the feminist biblical scholar Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and her construction of the New Testament as an example. In her book Discipleship of Equals, Schüssler Fiorenza put forward the important viewpoint of “equal discipleship.” This viewpoint provides a dialogue between Schüssler Fiorenza and the theological concerns of women in China. Like Schüssler Fiorenza, Chinese theologians have also noted the testimonies of Chinese women Christians in the development of the church. These can help female Christians realize who they are and the significance of being a member of the church. Christian Chinese traditional culture still influences the understanding of women's identity. This will be a significant challenge and task in practising Chinese feminist theology.     

Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action‐guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons. 1     

On Abolishing “Death”: An Etymological Note

The distinction is made between two uses of the word “death,” specifically, your death (the death of the other) and my death (the death of the self). It makes (logical, epistemological and phenomenological) sense for me to speak of your death, but not for me to speak of my death—inasmuch as, by reasonable definition, I cannot possibly ever experience my death. Dying is experienceable—although one can never be certain. The word death is a perfectly good word for the demise of the other; the word omega is suggested to allude to that non-event (the cessation of the self) now routinely spoken of as “my death,”     

The “Healthy Person”: A Review

Two general approaches in the analysis of a “healthy” person were identified as (1) operational and (2) conceptual. Criterion problems seem crucial in the former, while in the latter, semantic and value problems are to be resolved. Consideration might profitably be given to, first, the concept of dynamic equilibrium or active adaptation (assimilation and accommodation) and, second, to that of developmental mastery of tasks along the “dimension of depth” and toward discovery of the meaning of life and of man's position in the universe. Such a model implies client's exploration of his existence in the world in the perspective of a continuous life process. Both being and becoming can and should be of legitimate concern to mental health workers.