Dynamic and consequential consistency of choices between paths of decision trees

The generally prescribed procedure for choosing a decision strategy from a decision tree employs a backward induction analysis that entails 3 fundamental consistency principles: dynamic, consequential, and strategic. The first requires the decision maker to follow through on plans to the end, the second requires the decision maker to focus solely on future events and final consequences given the current state of events, and the third is the conjunction of the first 2. Five experiments were reported to test these principles using different subject populations, different procedures for estimating consistency, and different factors for manipulating the attractiveness of the gamble at the final stage of the tree. The main findings were that strategic and dynamic consistency principles were violated at rates that exceeded choice inconsistency.     

Robustness of Additive Value Function Methods in MCDM

A simulation model is constructed of choice between a discrete number of non-dominated alternatives. The long-run goals of the decision maker are assumed to be consistent with a hypothetical preference structure which satisfies assumptions of completeness, transitivity and additive independence for an ideal set of criteria. The use of additive value functions to aid the decision maker in this choice is simulated for a variety of contexts and under a number of non-idealities such as the omission of criteria, confounding of criteria and inconsistent responses. It is found that ideal preference orderings are well identified by additive value functions provided that the non-idealities are moderate and that sufficient effort is put into modelling changing marginal values for different levels of performance. One of the potentially most sensitive areas is that of shifts in the decision maker's reference points as a result of the types of preference information asked.     

A parameter analysis method for the weight‐set to satisfy preference orders of alternatives in additive multi‐criteria value models

In the context of the additive multi‐criteria value model, this paper investigates how the set of criteria weights (weight‐set hereafter) can be determined according to the preference orders of alternatives given by the decision maker. A construction method is proposed for the weight‐set for different intervals of β, where β is a differential amount of value between the preference information on two alternatives. The results of this paper are important for sensitivity analysis in multi‐criteria decision making (MCDM) problems and multi‐criteria group decision analysis. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An evolutionary approach to support decision making with linear decision models

In this paper we consider decision problems that can be described as linear decision models. These models have been traditionally solved using linear programming, fuzzy linear programming, multiple-objective linear programming or ‘what-if’ analysis. Using these approaches, one encounters a number of difficulties. We propose an ‘evolutionary approach’ to overcome these difficulties. In the proposed approach the decision maker does not have to precisely specify the model (i.e. the objective functions, the RHS values, etc.) at the beginning of the solution procedure. In fact, the model evolves as the solution procedure proceeds.     

The Effect of Decision Strategy on Deciding to Defer Choice

Recent research has examined consumer decision making when the option of not choosing any of the alternatives is also provided. The findings from this research suggest that the decision to defer choice is sensitive to the uncertainty of choosing the most preferred option from the set of alternatives provided. Building on this research, the author tests whether the decision to defer choice is also influenced by task variables that influence decision uncertainty. In the first experiment, this proposition is tested for choice problems in which information on three relatively equally attractive alternatives is presented either sequentially or simultaneously. As predicted, the preference for the defer-choice option was greater when the three alternatives were presented simultaneously. A second study forced subjects into using one of four decision strategies in order to choose between two non-dominated alternatives. The preference for the no-choice option was found to be higher when the rule required explicit attribute tradeoffs and lower when it simplified choice. These results suggest that choice uncertainty is influenced by the decision strategy used to determine the preference among alternatives. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results for marketers' communication strategies.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Experimental consideration of preference in decision making under certainty

This paper describes an experiment in decision making under certainty with multiple, conflicting objectives and continuous decision variables. Two techniques for analysing such problems are considered: one taken from the paradigm of multicriteria decision making (MCDM), a non-directed approach called the NAIVE technique, and one from the paradigm of multiattribute decision analysis (D/A), the SMART technique. While the two techniques seek and are throught to arrive at the same end—a solution which is in some sense optimal for the decision maker (DM)—the former approach implicitly incorporates DM preferences while the latter approach considers preferences explicitly. The setting is a laboratory study using a sample of university students on a three-criteria problem which is designed to study the extent to which value functions implied/assessed by the techniques are consistent with DMs' holistic ranking of alternatives. Results show that (1) the two techniques of interest show significantly better rank order correlation with holistic judgement compared with other techniques, (2) DMs prefer the non-directed MCDM approach and (3) subjects break down into two groups: those that use assessable value functions when ranking and those that do not. This implies that for small-dimensioned problems DMs may first need to be classified as to the assessability of their value functions before a solution method is chosen.     

Differences in risk-defusing behavior in deciding for oneself versus deciding for other people

In naturalistic risky decision-making tasks, risk-defusing behavior plays a central role. A risk-defusing operator (RDO) is an action carried out by the decision maker in order to decrease the risk of an alternative. Post-event RDOs (i.e., applied after the occurrence of a negative event) are more risky, but are associated with lower costs than pre-event RDOs (i.e., applied before the occurrence of a negative event). Two studies examine whether the choice between pre-event and post-event RDOs is influenced by detection probability, by involvement type (i.e., whether the decision has consequences for the decision maker or for other people), and by the interaction between these two variables. The results indicate that the effect of detection probability on choice was stronger if other people were involved than if the decision makers themselves were involved. Thus, in naturalistic risky decision tasks with consequences for themselves, people take detection probabilities into account to a lesser extent than in decisions with consequences for other people.     

What counts as a decision? Predictors of perceived decision making

We examined lay perceptions of what counts as a decision. Eighty-six subjects read 10 scenarios that described clear decisions (e.g., choosing a graduate school), clear “nondecisions” (e.g., an accidental wrong turn), or ambiguous actions (e.g., eating a donut when on a diet or allowing someone else to make the decision). The subjects rated each scenario as to whether the actor had made a decision and also rated six other attributes. The scenarios were rated as clearly illustrating a decision if the actor engaged in a lot of thought and did not act reflexively. Consideration of consequences and having alternatives were moderately related to decision ratings, whereas having self-control problems and the influence of physiological drives showed little relationship with decision ratings. Thus, lay concepts of decision making differ from decision theory in that thoughtful, intentional behavior is more important in defining a decision than are decision theoretic components, such as alternatives and consequences.     

Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty

Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking and responsibility by drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) versus acting responsibly (R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) option and a riskless (certain) option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decision makers from blame, despite being less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Salient Volunteering Behavior Increases Monetary Risk‐taking

Research finds that engaging in prosocial behavior has many positive psychological outcomes (e.g., enhanced well‐being, optimism, perceived control, and a boost in self‐concept), and research on monetary risk‐taking reveals these psychological outcomes are associated with increased risk‐taking. Merging these findings, we propose that when people's volunteering behavior is made salient in their minds, they take more monetary risks. Making research participants’ volunteering behavior salient by having them recall an act of prior volunteering (studies 1 and 3), choosing whether to volunteer (study 2), or choosing one of two volunteering activities (study 4), four experiments (and a fifth reported in the Appendix S2) reveal increased risk‐taking across several monetary‐risk outcomes (incentive‐compatible gambles, allocation of a windfall gain, and a behavioral risk‐taking measure involving escalating risk). Lastly, when the decision maker attributes a decision to volunteer to an external source, the effect of salient volunteering on monetary risk‐taking attenuates.     

Evaluating Decision Makers: The Role of Choice Congruence and Outcome

Two studies were conducted in which decision makers were evaluated by subjects who had agreed or disagreed with the decision maker's choice. Subjects read one of two vignettes describing the alternatives available to the decision maker, indicated which alternative they personally favored, and then learned about the decision maker's choice and the outcome that occurred. Study 1 varied whether the outcomes of the decision maker's choice were positive or negative, and whether the subject's preferred option matched (congruent choice) or did not match (incongruent choice) that of the decision maker. Subjects rated the extent to which they thought the decision maker was worthy of praise (in the case of positive outcomes) or blame (in the case of negative outcomes), and the decision maker's likableness and competence. Results revealed a strong effect of congruence on attributions of praise and blame: More praise was ascribed to an agreeing decision maker and more blame to a disagreeing decision maker. The degree to which the decision maker was seen as likable was affected by congruence only, whereas perceived competence was influenced by both outcome and congruence. Study 2 addresses some methodological issues that were unresolved in Study 1 and replicated the results of the first study, using new stimulus materials and an expanded set of dependent measures.     

Attributions of responsibility and affective reactions to decision outcomes

Immediate affective reactions to outcomes are more intense following decisions to act than following decisions not to act. This finding holds for both positive and negative outcomes. We relate this "actor-effect" to attribution theory and argue that decision makers are seen as more responsible for outcomes when these are the result of a decision to act as compared to a decision not to act. Experiment 1 (N = 80) tests the main assumption underlying our reasoning and shows that affective reactions to decision outcomes are indeed more intense when the decision maker is seen as more responsible. Experiment 2 (N = 40) tests whether the actor effect can be predicted on the basis of differential attributions following action and inaction. Participants read vignettes in which active and passive actors obtained a positive or negative outcome. Action resulted in more intense affect than inaction, and positive outcomes resulted in more intense affect than negative outcomes. Experiment 2 further shows that responsibility attributions and affective reactions to outcomes are highly correlated; that is, more extreme affective reactions are associated with more internal attributions. We discuss the implications for research on post-decisional reactions.     

Being responsible versus acting responsibly: Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments

In three experimental studies, with managers and students as participants, we explore in this paper the relation between two kinds of responsibility judgments, called Responsibility 1 (R1) and Responsibility 2 (R2). Decision makers can be viewed as being more or less responsible for their choice and its consequences (R1). Their actions can also be evaluated, from a normative point of view, as instances of more or less responsible behavior (R2). Experiment 1 showed that managers who depart from the default or “normal” course of action, by choosing a new (versus familiar) alternative, changing (versus sticking to) an initial decision, or going against (versus following) the advice of a management team, are rated as more responsible (R1) for the outcomes of their decision. At the same time, they are perceived to act in a less responsible way (R2). Experiment 2 compared decision makers choosing between more or less risky options. High risk takers were held more responsible (R1) for their choice and for its consequences, but were again viewed as behaving in a less responsible way (R2) than low risk takers. In Experiment 3, participants judged decision makers who followed or opposed others' advice by choosing either a high or a low risk option. Opposing others' advice led to higher R1 and lower R2 scores, especially when choosing the high risk option, moderated by outcome (successful decisions appearing more responsible than those that went wrong). Thus R1 and R2 judgments should be distinguished as having different and sometimes even opposite determinants.     

A Review and Taxonomy of Choice Architecture Techniques

We present a taxonomy of choice architecture techniques that focus on intervention design, as opposed to the underlying cognitive processes that make an intervention work. We argue that this distinction will facilitate further empirical testing and will assist practitioners in designing interventions. The framework is inductively derived from empirically tested examples of choice architecture and consists of nine techniques targeting decision information, decision structure, and decision assistance. An inter‐rater reliability test demonstrates that these techniques can be used in an intersubjectively replicable way to describe sample choice architectures. We conclude by discussing limitations of the framework and key issues concerning the use of the techniques in the development of new choice architectures. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bridging the gap between joint and individual decisions: Deconstructing preferences in relationships

Most choice research has studied how people make decisions within a narrowly defined choice context and has not paid sufficient attention to the role of social context. We commend Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman for directing the attention of choice researchers to the study of joint decision making and current theories on relationships. Building on SGR, we propose that a relationship partner's influence varies with the type of decision at hand and with situational factors. We propose four possible types of decision episodes, defined by whether the decision stage and the consumption stage each occur singly or jointly, and explore how the decision type impacts the extent to which a decision maker will take a partner's preferences into account. We further discuss how situational factors, such as the environment in which the decision is made, as well as the mindset and cognitive resources of the decision maker, are likely to influence decision outcomes.     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multiattribute Decision Making in Context: A Dynamic Neural Network Methodology

A theoretical structure for multiattribute decision making is presented, based on a dynamical system for interactions in a neural network incorporating affective and rational variables. This enables modeling of problems that elude two prevailing economic decision theories: subjective expected utility theory and prospect theory. The network is unlike some that fit economic data by choosing optimal weights or coefficients within a predetermined mathematical framework. Rather, the framework itself is based on principles used elsewhere to model many other cognitive and behavioral data, in a manner approximating how humans perform behavioral functions. Different, interconnected modules within the network encode (a) attributes of objects among which choices are made, (b) object categories, (c) and goals of the decision maker. An example is utilized to simulate the actual consumer choice between old and new versions of Coca-Cola. Potential applications are also discussed to market decisions involving negotiations between participants, such as international petroleum traders.     

The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals

The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value‐maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value‐maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.