The role of action effects in infants’ action control

In adults, the selection and the planning of actions are influenced by the anticipation of desired action effects. However, the role of action effects for action control in infants is still an unresolved issue. One important prerequisite for infants action control is that infants are able to relate certain movements to certain effects. To test this assumption, it was investigated how infants action control is affected by action effects. By applying an imitation paradigm, we studied 12- and 18-month-old infants who first observed an adult experimenter demonstrating a three-step action sequence on a toy bear. In three experimental groups, the second action step, the third action step, or no action step elicited an arbitrary sound as an additional acoustic action effect. It was coded how often each of the target actions was performed by the infant in a subsequent 90-s test phase. As predicted, the frequency of the infants target action varied depending on which action step elicited the action effect. In both age groups, the target action that was combined with an acoustical effect was not only produced more often but also occurred with lower latency and was in most cases the first target action shown by the infants. These results are interpreted as evidence of the important role of action effects in infants action control.     

Explaining adolescents’ cigarette smoking: A comparison of four modes of action control and test of the role of self-regulatory mode

The present study compared how well four modes of action control (intentional, habitual, reactive and stereotype activation) explain adolescents’ cigarette smoking, and examined whether individual differences in self-regulation (locomotion and assessment tendencies; Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003 Higgins, ET, Kruglanski, AW and Pierro, A. 2003. Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as distinct orientations. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25: 293–344.  [Google Scholar]) moderate the behavioural impact of the respective modes. Findings from a prospective questionnaire survey showed that (a) willingness, prototype perceptions and past behaviour–but not intention–predicted smoking behaviour, and explained 63% of the variance, and (b) the assessment mode of self-regulation moderated the past behaviour–future behaviour relation such that past behaviour had less impact on future smoking behaviour at high levels of assessment. These findings suggest that adolescents’ smoking is controlled by stereotype activation, habitual and reactive processes. Implications of the results for designing effective adolescent smoking cessation programmes are considered.     

Action–effect anticipation in infant action control

There is increasing evidence that action effects play a crucial role in action understanding and action control not only in adults but also in infants. Most of the research in infants focused on the learning of action-effect contingencies or how action effects help infants to infer goals in other persons' actions. In contrast, the present research aimed at demonstrating that infants control their own actions by action-effect anticipation once they know about specific action-effect relations. About 7 and 9-month olds observed an experimenter demonstrating two actions that differed regarding the action-effect assignment. Either a red-button press or a blue-button press or no button press elicited interesting acoustical and visual effects. The 9-month olds produced the effect action at first, with shorter latency and longer duration sustaining a direct impact of action-effect anticipation on action control. In 7-month olds the differences due to action-effect manipulation were less profound indicating developmental changes at this age.     

Metacognitive control of action: Preparation for aiming reflects knowledge of Fitts’s law

Metacognitive control has been studied in intellectual skills but has not yet been studied in perceptual-motor skills. To probe metacognitive control in a perceptual-motor context, we developed a task in which participants chose the position of a cursor relative to two targets. One of the two targets was randomly erased. Participants tried to move the cursor into the remaining target within a limited amount of time. The target widths were varied, making the difficulty of moving to either target dependent on the chosen cursor position. Predictions were based on the assumption that participants could use an analogue of Fitts’s law to choose optimal positions. The fit between observed and predicted positions was excellent, suggesting that participants used information about movement speed-accuracy trade-offs to guide movement preparation. The findings suggest that metacognition applies to both perceptual-motor skills and intellectual skills, and that these two domains are more similar than traditionally assumed.     

No anticipation–no action: the role of anticipation in action and perception

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.     

Does control of the environment enhance the perception of control?

It has been proposed that control over the environment increases the perception of control, thereby enhancing motivation. Revesman and Perlmuter (1981) found that when subjects were permitted to choose response terms to be learned on a paired-associate task, decision latencies were faster if the announcement of the desired option caused the screen upon which materials were printed to go blank. On the basis of the results of the present experiment, it was concluded that control of the environment does result in faster decision latencies, but that this effect occurs despite a decrease in the perception of control.     

Metaplasticity rendered visible in paint: How matter ‘matters’ in the lifeworld of Human action.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Recent theoretical and philosophical movements within the study of material culture are more carefully attending to the variety of ways in which human...     

Theory of mind and joint action in Parkinson’s disease

It has been suggested that the Theory of Mind (ToM) may rely on more basic processes of social cognition, such as action control (e.g., joint action), even if little is known about this relationship. The relationship between ToM and joint action can be studied in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD), because they are characterized not only by a deficit in ToM (and in its cognitive and affective subcomponents) but also by a deficit in the inhibition of competing responses. Sixty PD patients and 60 matched healthy controls (HCs) performed a go/no-go Flanker task in both joint and individual conditions. Cognitive (Advanced Test or AT) and affective (Emotion Attribution Task or EAT) ToM also were measured. Thirty-five PD patients and matched HCs also performed the standard Flanker task, as a control measure. In patients, only individuals with high AT scores exhibited a joint Flanker effect, whereas in HCs the joint effect was found irrespectively of AT score. Patients with low EAT scores showed a greater interference effect than patients with high scores, whereas the opposite pattern was found for HCs. In regression analysis AT and EAT scores predicted the Flanker effect in the joint condition only. In the standard task, both groups showed a Flanker effect. The role of different fronto-striatal circuits, especially in PD patients, could explain the different involvement of cognitive and affective ToM in joint tasks. The Flanker effect is discussed considering the referential coding account and the attention-focus account as possible candidates to explain joint action effects.     

Toddlers’ cognition of adding and subtracting objects in action and in perception

A first experiment tested infants’ perceptual discrimination between correct and incorrect adding and subtracting objects with a standardized violation-of-expectation procedure. Eleven-, 16- and 21-month-olds did not look longer at incorrect (one object) than at correct (two objects) results of adding one object to another, nor at incorrect (two objects) than at correct (one object) results of subtracting one object from two. A second experiment tested 21-month-olds’ sensorimotor production of addition and subtraction results using a search-for-objects procedure. They already searched correctly for two objects when one object is added to another and for one object when one is subtracted from two objects. These findings support the constructivist hypothesis that infants’ active sensorimotor production may develop before their reactive perceptual discrimination of adding and subtracting objects.     

The effects of alerting signals in action control: activation of S–R associations or inhibition of executive control processes?

Non-informative, task-irrelevant auditory alerting signals often lead to increased interference effects in selective attention paradigms (e.g., Simon, Eriksen flanker). Some authors conclude that the alerting attentional network, activated by the alerting signal, reveals an inhibitory influence upon the executive attentional network, resulting in attenuated executive control. Alternatively, in the present study we argue that increased interference effects might be explained by alerting signals facilitating response activation processes (i.e., the activation of established S–R links). In a modified Eriksen-flanker paradigm, we contrasted these assumptions. We used word flanker stimuli for which S–R associations were established and word flanker stimuli without S–R associations. The presence of an alerting signal increased flanker compatibility only for flanker stimuli for which S–R associations existed while flanker compatibility effects were the same for all flanker types in conditions without alerting signals. Therefore, we conclude that alerting signals enhance stimulus triggered visuo-motor response activation processes.     

Bridging the intention–behaviour gap: Planning,self-efficacy,and action control in the adoption and maintenance of physical exercise

Although some people may develop an intention to change their health behaviour, they might not take any action. This discrepancy has been labelled the “intention–behaviour gap.” Detailed action planning, perceived self-efficacy, and self-regulatory strategies (action control) may mediate between intentions and behaviour. This was examined in a longitudinal sample of 307 cardiac rehabilitation patients who were encouraged to adopt or maintain regular exercise. At the first time point, the predictors of intention and intention itself were assessed. Two months and four months later, the mediators and outcomes were measured. Results confirmed that all the three factors (planning, maintenance self-efficacy, and action control) served to mediate between earlier exercise intentions and later physical activity, each of them making a unique contribution. The results have implications for research on the “intention–behaviour gap,” and indicate that planning, maintenance self-efficacy and action control may be important volitional variables.     

Human inferior parietal cortex ‘programs’ the action class of grasping

If one writes with a pen grasped between the toes, or a pencil held in the mouth, the handwriting style may be of poor quality but can be identified as belonging to a particular individual. Like other actions, such as grasping or pointing, different body parts can be used to produce the movement. These findings, of reasonably consistent spatial and temporal productions by different effectors, have been used to argue for the concept of motor equivalence and the existence of motor programs abstracted from particular effectors. In this study subjects were required to perform an action (grasping a sweet) with different effectors (the mouth or the hand) while the brain was scanned. Activation of the inferior parietal lobe during real and imagined mouth grasping, and during real hand grasping actions was demonstrated. Primate neurophysiological research has implicated this region in a movement-planning role. Our results confirm the importance of the inferior parietal lobe in integrating converging multimodal sensory information for coding of general action patterns in humans.     

Cognitive control and parsing: Reexamining the role of Broca’s area in sentence comprehension

A century of investigation into the role of the human frontal lobes in complex cognition, including language processing, has revealed several interesting but apparently contradictory findings. In particular, the results of numerous studies suggest that left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG), which includes Broca’s area, plays a direct role in sentence-level syntactic processing. In contrast, other brain-imaging and neuropsychological data indicate that LIFG is crucial for cognitive control—specifically, for overriding highly regularized, automatic processes, even when a task involves syntactically undemanding material (e.g., single words, a list of letters). We provide a unifying account of these findings, which emphasizes the importance of general cognitive control mechanisms for the syntactic processing of sentences. On the basis of a review of the neurocognitive and sentence-processing literatures, we defend the following three hypotheses: (1) LIFG is part of a network of frontal lobe subsystems that are generally responsible for the detection and resolution of incompatible stimulus representations; (2) the role of LIFG in sentence comprehension is to implement reanalysis in the face of misinterpretation; and (3) individual differences in cognitive control abilities in nonsyntactic tasks predict correlated variation in sentence-processing abilities pertaining to the recovery from misinterpretation.     

Witnessing excellence in action: the ‘other-praising’ emotions of elevation,gratitude, and admiration

People are often profoundly moved by the virtue or skill of others, yet psychology has little to say about the ‘other-praising’ family of emotions. Here we demonstrate that emotions such as elevation, gratitude, and admiration differ from more commonly studied forms of positive affect (joy and amusement) in many ways, and from each other in a few ways. The results of studies using recall, video induction, event-contingent diary, and letter-writing methods to induce other-praising emotions suggest that: elevation (a response to moral excellence) motivates prosocial and affiliative behavior, gratitude motivates improved relationships with benefactors, and admiration motivates self-improvement. Mediation analyses highlight the role of conscious emotion between appraisals and motivations. Discussion focuses on implications for emotion research, interpersonal relationships, and morality.     

Is recursion language-specific? Evidence of recursive mechanisms in the structure of intentional action

In their 2002 seminal paper Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch hypothesize that recursion is the only human-specific and language-specific mechanism of the faculty of language. While debate focused primarily on the meaning of recursion in the hypothesis and on the human-specific and syntax-specific character of recursion, the present work focuses on the claim that recursion is language-specific. We argue that there are recursive structures in the domain of motor intentionality by way of extending John R. Searle’s analysis of intentional action. We then discuss evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience supporting the claim that motor-intentional recursion is language-independent and suggest some explanatory hypotheses: (1) linguistic recursion is embodied in sensory-motor processing; (2) linguistic and motor-intentional recursions are distinct and mutually independent mechanisms. Finally, we propose some reflections about the epistemic status of HCF as presenting an empirically falsifiable hypothesis, and on the possibility of testing recursion in different cognitive domains.     

Stimulus control and the growth of the infant’s effective visual field*

The size of the infant’s effective visual field was studied weekly in infants starting at 2 weeks of age until they were 10 weeks old, The field was initially quite small, 15 deg to either side of their line of regard. Over the 2-month period of the study, it more than doubled for stimulus conditions in which the peripheral event was in motion and the fixation object static, and it remained approximately the same size when motion was present in the fixation event and the peripheral object was static. As with adults, the infant’s effective visual field is directly related to the stimuli available.     

Executive function in Parkinson’s disease: contributions of the dorsal frontostriatal pathways to action and motivation

Disruption of the dorsal frontostriatal pathways in Parkinson’s disease (PD) is associated with impairments in motivation, as well as in executive function. The goal of this study was to investigate whether these impairments are related and, if so, whether the disruption of frontostriatal pathways compromises the ability to process the motivational aspects of feedback in such tasks. In Experiment 1, informative feedback improved the performance of young, healthy participants in a task-switching paradigm. This task-switching paradigm was then used in Experiment 2 to test whether feedback would improve the performance of 17 PD patients and age-matched controls. The PD group benefitted from feedback to the same degree as control participants; however, depression scores on the Beck Depression Inventory were significantly related to feedback usage, especially when response selection demands were high. Regardless of feedback, PD patients were more impaired when response demands were high than in an equally difficult condition with low action demands. These results suggest that response selection is a core impairment of insufficient dopamine to the dorsal frontal striatal pathways.     

Topics on the bordergrounds of action∗

The psychological conceptualization of phenomena involves characteristic explanations of animal movement. Conscientious attention to this fact results in a kind of behaviorism I call ‘conceptual epiphenomenalism’. This doctrine at once explains the characteristic ‘opacity’ of psychological predicables and helps to show the way around difficulties opacity is felt to create, and it also frees our thinking from the tyranny of the distinction between necessity and contingency, too often misapplied to facts rather than to things said or thought. An important challenge to conceptual epiphenomenalism is to account for the facts of introspective certainty and privileged testimony. This challenge can be met by identifying the nature of and displaying the behavioral conditions for the various grades of self‐consciousness or reflective knowledge. The methodology of conceptual epiphenomenalism is schematically applied to elucidate first the general conception of animal action and then a variety of phenomena plausibly thought to be exponible by reference to the conception of action, specifically the broader category of animal behavior, intention, and hoping and wishing.     

Teachers’ Perceptions of Creativity in the Classroom

Teachers’ implicit understandings of creativity may not align with current research-based understanding of creativity and characteristics associated with creative students. Even teachers who say they value creativity may actually find creative characteristics undesirable. Participating teachers (n = 371) rated student characteristics on a scale of very undesirable to very desirable. Participants also completed a brief self-assessment of personal creativity and rank-ordered a set of educational objectives based on what they perceived as most important. Results indicated that teachers found student characteristics associated with creativity less desirable than those characteristics contraindicative to creativity (d = 2.70). No effects were found based on the grade level (d = 0.07) and small effects were found for subjects taught (η² = 0.023). Similarly, no effects were found for the teachers’ level of experience (η² = 0.004) or age (η² = 0.002). Teachers’ level of personal creativity was related (r = .248) to how desirable they rated student characteristics associated with creativity, but the importance with which teachers ranked creative thinking had small effects (η² = 0.04) on how desirable they found characteristics associated with creativity. These results generally confirm previous studies and suggest that teachers’ grade level, subject, experience, and age have no effect on their perception of creative characteristics. However, some evidence suggests that teachers who are more creative find student characteristics associated with creativity more desirable in class.     

Al-Ghazali’s Position on the ‘Second Proof’ of the ‘Philosophers’ for the Eternity of the World,in the First Discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ (represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position (and thus, the second proof) is incoherent.