Primitive representation and misrepresentation

This paper develops a statistical approach to the problem of primitive representation. Representation of the kind commonly attributed to litmus paper, fuel gauges and tree rings occurs when, so to speak, there is a sufficiently good correlation between two variables. The fundamental distinction between misrepresentation and non-representation is explained in terms of the notion of an informationally useful correlation. The paper further argues that the statistical approach satisfactorily resolves well known puzzles such as Fodor's disjunction problem.     

Medieval theories of mental representation

Throughout most of the Middle ages, it was generally held that stored mental representations of perceived objects or events preserved the forms or species of such objects. This belief was consistent with a metaphor used by Plato. It was also consistent with the medieval belief that a number of cognitive processes took place in the ventricles of the brain and with the phenomenology of afterimages and imagination itself. In the 14th century, William of Ockham challenged this belief by claiming that mental representations are not stored but instead constructed in the basis of past learned experiences.     

Resurrecting the tracking theories

Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.     

Reasoning and mental representation

Four experiments exploring the effects of the coherence of a mental representation of material on reasoning performance are presented. Each employs a simple task that allows most subjects at some stage to solve the problem. We postulate that the crucial factor influencing performance is a unified representation of the material. In Experiment 1 we use an authorization of a kind familiar in daily life, and in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 we use sentences describing simple objects in different ways. In each case performance was enhanced when the material could be given a unified representation.     

Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation

Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation, and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that, as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults' knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries' locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults’ knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries’ locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

Surface construal and the mental representation of scenes

What distinguishes scenes from nonscenes? Photographs of objects on both naturalistic and blank backgrounds yielded boundary extension (BE: memory for unseen spatial expanse outside the picture's boundaries). However, line-drawn objects on blank backgrounds did not (Experiment 1). Perhaps the blank background was construed as depicting a real-world surface in the photograph condition but was construed as depicting nothing in the line-drawn condition. To change background construal, the authors used objects cut out of photographs; these were placed on blank backgrounds while viewers watched (Experiments 2 and 3). BE was eliminated. The authors propose that amodal continuation is a fundamental aspect of scene perception. However, not all pictures are scenes--only pictures construed as depicting a truncated view of a continuous world.     

Visuospatial working memory and mental representation of spatial descriptions

The purpose of the present research is to investigate whether different components of working memory (WM) are involved in processing spatial and nonspatial texts. The interference effects of two concurrent tasks on comprehension and recall of two kinds of text were investigated in two experiments. Each participant listened to a spatial and a nonspatial text, with one of two concurrent tasks: articulatory suppression or spatial tapping. The dependent variables in Experiment 1 were accuracy of recall and verification of information inferred from the texts. In Experiment 2 response times in the verification task were also considered. Results support the hypothesis that verbal and spatial components of working memory are differentially involved in the comprehension and memory of spatial and nonspatial texts, with a selective interference effect of the spatial concurrent task on the spatial text and an interference effect of the verbal concurrent task on both the spatial and nonspatial texts. These effects emerged for recall, sentence verification, and response times. Our findings confirm previous results showing that the verbal component of working memory is involved in the process of text comprehension and memory. In addition, they show that visuospatial working memory is involved, in so far as the text conveys visuospatial information.     

Gaze orientation interferes with mental numerical representation

Number comparison tasks are characterized by distance and size effects. The distance effect reveals that the higher the distance is between two numbers, the easier their magnitude comparison is. Accordingly, people are thought to represent numbers on a spatial dimension, the mental number line, on which any given number corresponds to a location on the line. The size effect, instead, states that at any given distance, comparing two small numbers is easier than comparing two large numbers, thus suggesting that larger numbers are more vaguely represented than smaller ones. In the present work we first tested whether the participants were adopting a spatial strategy to solve a very simple numbers comparison task, by assessing the presence of the distance and the magnitude effect. Secondarily, we focused on the influence of gaze position on their performance. The present results provide evidence that gaze direction interferes with number comparisons, worsening the vague representation of larger numbers and further supporting the hypothesis of the overlapping between physical and mental spaces.     

The mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps

Recognition priming and distance estimation were used to investigate the mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps. In Experiment 1, recognition priming showed that cities close in route distance primed each other more than cities far in route distance, even when Euclidean distance was equated. Experiment 2 showed that this finding was robust and not an artifact of the way subjects learned the maps. Distance estimations in Experiment 1 supported the priming results. These results indicated that psychological distance in cognitive maps is primarily dependent on route distance rather than Euclidean distance.     

Improved mental representation of space in beginner orienteers

The purpose of the present study was to monitor any improvement in orienteering skills attributable to acquiring a better mental representation of space. Two groups were examined: the experimental group, who attended 6 mo. of orienteering lessons, versus the control group, who did jogging training instead. Each group, consisting of 20 children, was tested on the Corsi Block-tapping Test, run Forward and Backward, and the Star-Butterfly Test. Pre- and post-tests were administered. In the experimental group, scores increased in mean complexity from pre- to post-test on the Forward and the Backward Corsi tests, while on the Star-Butterfly Test both time and mistakes had decreased after the training. In the control group, mean complexity and Star-Butterfly Test scores were unchanged from pre- to post-test. These results showed that after continual training in orienteering techniques, the orienteering group was able to remember and repeat sequences of events with greater precision than before the training, while these skills were unchanged in the control group after training in jogging.