Psychoanalysis and homosexuality: do we need a new theory?

No need exists, it is argued, for a new psychoanalytic theory of homosexuality. Certainly psychoanalysis should not be expected to generate such a theory using its own methodology alone. The preoccupation with producing such a theory avoids more important questions about psychoanalytic theory building raised by an examination of the long relationship between psychoanalysis and homosexuality. These questions concern the problems related to using psychoanalytic methodology (1) to construct categories (including the categories normal and abnormal), (2) to construct causal theory (the problems include the limitations of psychoanalytic developmental theory and a long-standing confusion between psychoanalytic developmental theory, psychoanalytic genetic reconstruction, and psychodynamics), and (3) to identify "bedrock." Finally, the question is addressed of what might be needed that is new in the psychoanalytic approach to homosexuality.     

Do we need a concept of disease?

The terms “health”, “disease” and “illness” are frequently used in clinical medicine. This has misled philosophers into believing that these concepts are important for clinical thinking and decision making. For instance, it is held that decisions about whether or not to treat someone or whether to relieve someone of moral responsibility depend on whether the person has a disease. In this paper it is argued that the crucial role of the ‘disease’ concept is illusory. The health/disease distinction is irrelevant for most decisions and represents a conceptual straightjacket. Sophisticated and mature clinical decision making requires that we free ourselves from the concept of disease.     

Honestly, do we need a policy on truth?

Physicians are taught that the foundation of the physician-patient relationship is trust, and trust is based in part on truthfulness. While drawing important "lines in the sand" regarding whether and why to tell the truth, ethics codes promulgating honesty fail to provide clinicians with guidance regarding what is the truth, as well as when and how to disclose it. These issues may be at the core of why an adverse event is left undisclosed. Consistently being truthful in the setting of an error is particularly difficult and requires overcoming a number of institutional and personal barriers. The article concludes that if delivering "the truth" is important, then articulation of criteria for determining what should be told, by whom, and when is essential. A policy that considers the practical issues and provides guidance may be useful.     

Psychotherapy with transsexuals—do we need a new approach?

This paper details a 63-session therapy with a female-to-male trans-sexual. It illustrates the sexual conflict that lies behind the apparently conflict-free assertion that the patient is a man in a woman's body, as well as exploring the meanings of femaleness and maleness. It highlights the difference in our (the helping professions) reactions to transsexuals as opposed to other patients seen in psychotherapy, and suggests that reform is needed in the way that we conceptualize our role with these clients.     

Do we need an existential philosophy of the railway? Why then a philosophy of sport?

A lively debate has arisen about the need and the character of phenomenology—of phenomenology in general and of sports phenomenology in particular. This paper responds to Irena Martínková and Jim Parry who ‘defended’ philosophical phenomenology against my critique of their book about phenomenological approaches to sport. Where the defense maintains the existence of one single and correct phenomenology, understood as a sort of existential philosophy, this paper argues for a diversity of different types of phenomenology and more concretely for a phenomenological method that goes ‘back to phenomena.’     

Can we have a distinctive theory of memory?

The current status of the concept of distinctiveness an applied to memory research is discussed. In spite of the fact that distinctiveness is difficult to define, an increasing number of memory phenomena have been explained in terms of distinctiveness. These phenomena are grouped into four classes, which vary in how distinctiveness is operationalized. Distinctiveness has different effects on memory performance, depending on how it is defined, suggesting that the concept of distinctiveness has been overapplied. In addition, current theoretical explanations of the effects of distinctiveness on memory fail to specify what the different definitions of distinctiveness have in common, and fail to encompass adequately the broad range of phenomena to be explained. A limited theory of distinctiveness is proposed, in order to explain why conceptually incongruent material is remembered well.     

Lateral inhibition and echoic memory: Some comments on Crowder’s (1978) theory

Crowder (1978) has proposed a theory of the suffix effect based on lateral inhibition among echoic representations of the list and suffix items. The theory was prompted by, and derives its principal support from, the counterintuitive finding that the effect is smaller with multiple suffixes than with a conventional single suffix. In this paper, we describe four experiments, each of which fails to replicate this finding. In addition, we note a prediction of the theory and show that it is contrary to available evidence. It is argued that the details of the suffix effect are too complex to be captured by a theory of peripheral mechanism, even one as ingenious as Crowder’s.     

Are gods really moral monitors? Some comments on Ara Norenzayan's Big Gods by a historian of religions

The assumption that moral monitoring is a widespread function of gods is not well supported by historical documentation. The further thesis, that ideas about monitoring gods increase prosocial behavior and thereby the capacity of societies for survival, is implausible in view of the historical evidence about successful societies.     

Does a theory of language need a grammar? Evidence from Hebrew root structure

Hebrew constrains the occurrence of identical consonants in its roots: Identical consonants are acceptable root finally (e.g., skk), but not root initially (e.g., kks). Speakers' ability to freely generalize this constraint to novel phonemes (Berent, Marcus, Shimron, & Gafos, 2002) suggests that they represent segment identity-a relation among mental variables. An alternative account attributes the restriction on identical phonemes to their feature similarity, captured by either the number of shared features or their statistical frequency. The similarity account predicts that roots with partially similar consonants (e.g., sgk) should be at least as acceptable as roots with fully identical consonants (e.g., skk), and each of these roots should be less acceptable than dissimilar controls (e.g., gdn). Contrary to these predictions, three lexical decision experiments demonstrate that full identity is more acceptable than partial similarity and (in some cases) controls. Speakers' sensitivity to consonant identity suggests that linguistic competence, in general, and phonology, in particular, encompass a computational mechanism that operates over variables. This conclusion is consistent with linguistic accounts that postulate a symbolic grammatical component that is irreducible to the statistical properties of the lexicon.     

Do we perceive a flattened world on the monitor screen?

The current model of three-dimensional perception hypothesizes that the brain integrates the depth cues in a statistically optimal fashion through a weighted linear combination with weights proportional to the reliabilities obtained for each cue in isolation (Landy, Maloney, Johnston, & Young, 1995). Even though many investigations support such theoretical framework, some recent empirical findings are at odds with this view (e.g., Domini, Caudek, & Tassinari, 2006). Failures of linear cue integration have been attributed to cue-conflict and to unmodelled cues to flatness present in computer-generated displays. We describe two cue-combination experiments designed to test the integration of stereo and motion cues, in the presence of consistent or conflicting blur and accommodation information (i.e., when flatness cues are either absent, with physical stimuli, or present, with computer-generated displays). In both conditions, we replicated the results of Domini et al. (2006): The amount of perceived depth increased as more cues were available, also producing an over-estimation of depth in some conditions. These results can be explained by the Intrinsic Constraint model, but not by linear cue combination.     

Towards a multidisciplinary guideline religiousness,spirituality, and psychiatry: what do we need?

ABSTRACT

A multidisciplinary guideline on religion, spirituality (R/S), and psychiatry aims to address: (1) organising R/S consultation in mental health care, (2) categorising research findings, and (3) professionalism and education with respect to R/S. Contents are derived from brainstorm sessions with key participants in the field of R/S and psychiatry in the Netherlands, and from the position statements on R/S and psychiatry in the UK and by the World Psychiatric Association. The following chapters are proposed: (1) ethical and existential themes and R/S, (2) R/S in stages of mental health care practice, (3) R/S counselling, (4) collaboration, and (5) relationship to other guidelines. The core themes need verification by specialists in the field, nurses, therapists, counsellors, patient-practitioners, and psychiatrists. The author recommends to approach R/S in an easy way, to listen to matters of personal meaning, and to leave the task to others in case of a lack of affinity.     

Do we need positive illusions to carry out plans? Illusion: and instrumental coping

This study tested the theory that positive illusions and instrumental (problem-focused) coping behaviours are related (Brown, J. D. (1993). Coping with stress: The beneficial role of positive illusions. In A. P. Turnbull, J. M. Patterson, S. K. Behr, D. L. Murphy, J. G. Marquis, & M. J. Blue-Banning (Eds.), Cognitive coping, families, and disability, Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes.). Positive illusion was assessed as a discrepancy between positive bias towards the self in trait ratings and positive bias towards average others, where ratings were self-favouring. Problem-focused coping was assessed through recall of coping with a recent stressful situation. The results showed that positive illusion scores were unrelated to problem-focused coping scores. It was suggested that although individuals need to be positive to cope well they do not need positive illusions. Tests for gender differences showed that males held more positive illusions than females. No gender differences were found for problem-focused coping but females used emotion-focused coping more than males to cope with a recent stressful situation.     

What must a psychological theory of reasoning explain? Comment on Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008)

In this comment, it is argued that the modification of mental models theory of conditional inference proposed by P. Barrouillet, C. Gauffroy, and J.-F. Lecas to deal with truth value gaps merely patches up a problem in the theory, rather than accomplishing the fundamental and systematic revision that is necessary. It is argued that P. Barrouillet et al.'s modified mental model theory fails to meet the criteria of good theory of reasoning by invoking an algorithmic-level distinction to resolve a failing in the computational-level theory of the task.