Freedom Reconsidered: Heteronomy,Open Subjectivity,and the ‘Gift of Teaching’

This paper analyzes the entanglement of the modern concepts of freedom, autonomy, and the modern notion of the subject and how a passion for and insistence on freedom has undermined the reconstruction of human subjectivity in Heidegger and Foucault, and how such passion has also limited the educational effort at addressing the problems brought to education by the modern notion of the subject. Drawing on Levinas, it suggests that a new understanding of freedom as heteronomy will allow us to envision an open subjectivity that is essential for education. Particularly, it looks at Gert Biesta’s recent campaigns for “subjectification” and “the gift of teaching” to analyze the underlying contradictions caused by the entanglement of freedom and subjectivity.     

From ‘Intersex’ to ‘DSD’: a case of epistemic injustice

Synthese - The 2005 International Consensus Conference on Intersex resulted in a substantive revision of the lexicon and guidelines for treating intersex conditions. The speed with which the new...     

‘Learning From’ the Concept and Concepts of a Religious Tradition: Jainism in the RE curriculum

Against a background of recent developments in religious education in England, this article argues for the inclusion of Jainism in the RE curriculum. Questions of the representation of religion in general and Jainism in particular are examined. It is claimed that when it comes to the ‘personal development’ side of religious education ('learning from'), pupils may best be served by drawing on a wider range of traditions than is customary in English RE, and that pupils need to engage with the ideas in a religious tradition as well as gain an authentic picture of the lives of practitioners. It is argued that much of personal and spiritual value can be gained from even an imperfect construction of a religious tradition, and this is illustrated from some of the teachings of Jainism and the author's experience of approaching a less familiar tradition.     

The European ‘We’: From Citizenship Policy to the Role of Education

This article sheds light on the European Union’s policy on citizenship; on the collective dimension of this policy, its ‘we’. It is argued that the inclusive, identity-constituting forces prominent in EU policy on European citizenship serve as a basis for the exclusion of people, which is illustrated by the recent expulsion of Romani from France. Based on a reading of Derrida, the twofold aim of this article is to reformulate the concept of a European citizenship ‘we’ and secondly, to outline some implications of this reframing as concerns the role of education in the formation of citizens.     

From ‘slumdog’ to humanitarian: educating orphans to save the world

The purpose of education should not only be to build content knowledge and literacy but to awaken the inherent human values within each child and encourage the translation of those values into social transformation. At the Hariharananda Balashram, we see one example of how destitute children are being provided with a moral and academic education that fits both Paulo Freire’s model of empowering the oppressed and Joseph and Efron’s emphasis on the seven worlds of moral education. The result is a group of children who not only are determined to succeed, but to use that academic and moral foundation to give back to their communities and become agents of social change.     

From biography to theory: the role of Anna Freud in the emergence of the ‘adolescent process’

Some aspects of Anna Freud’s life reveal the existence of specifically adolescent conflicts, which can be tied to some of her theoretical and clinical discoveries in the field of adolescent psychoanalysis. Her historical input in the gradual construction of a theoretical corpus on adolescence has often been ignored. These links between biography and theory gave rise to a movement of conceptualisation, making it possible to develop a psychoanalytic metapsychology of adolescence: indeed, emerged such notions as asceticism, intellectualisation in relationship with anorexia and the struggle against the genitalisation of the adolescent body. Today, the Annafreudian school of thought has remained the main source of investigation and theoretical transmission of what is now called the adolescent process.     

Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’

In science and everyday life, we often infer that something is true because it would explain some set of facts better than any other hypothesis we can think of. But what if we have reason to believe that there is a better way to explain these facts that we just haven’t thought of? Wouldn’t that undermine our warrant for believing the best available explanation? Many philosophers have assumed that we can solve such underconsideration problems by stipulating that a hypothesis should not only be ‘the best’ explanation available; rather, it should also be ‘good enough’. Unfortunately, however, the only current suggestion for what it might mean to say that an explanation is ‘good enough’ is, well, not good enough. This paper aims to provide a better account of what is required for an explanatory hypothesis to be considered ‘good enough’. In brief, the account holds that a ‘good enough’ hypothesis is one that has gone through a process that I call explanatory consolidation, in which accumulating evidence and failed attempts to formulate better alternatives gradually make it more plausible that the explanation we currently have is better than any other that could be formulated.     

Kierkegaard and Gift: The Problem with ‘Kenotic Love’ in Light of Kierkegaard's ‘Gift Theory’

In recent theology, kenosis has become a popular focal point around which to organize a concept of love. I locate one reason for such popularity in a response to the problematizing of love within postmodern theory. I then explore how Kierkegaard anticipates postmodern debates surrounding love and gift-theory while addressing significant questions differently, and within the context of a theology of creation. I argue that when his ‘gift theory’ and account of love are read in connection, far from defining love with a singular emphasis on kenotic ‘self-gift,’ Kierkegaard is seen to delineate a much broader vision of love which might inform our current context.     

From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences

How distinct is European philosophy of science? The first step is to characterize what is or might be considered as ‘European philosophy of science’. The second is to analyse philosophy of the social sciences as a relevant case in the European contribution to philosophy of science. (1) ‘European perspective’ requires some clarification, which can be done from two main angles: the historical approach and the thematic view. Thus, there are several structural and dynamic things to be considered in European philosophy of science and compare with other conceptions: (i) the topics discussed; (ii) the contents proposed; and (iii) the style of thought used. (2) The case of philosophy of the social sciences is relevant for the historical approach and for the thematic view. Historically, the Erklären–Verstehen methodological controversy arose in this continent, where the main authors and most of the influential approaches are located. Thematically, we can consider the contributions made by these European approaches to philosophy of the social sciences. They give us some distinctive features of European philosophy of science.     

Being ‘Spiritual’ and Being ‘Religious’ in Europe: Diverging Life Orientations

The present study shows that being ‘spiritual’ and being ‘religious’ are becoming different life orientations for a large part of the population. As far as we know, for the first time, a sample from an European country shows that these orientations are reflected in two coherent clusters of beliefs, experiences, and practices of what we call ‘new spirituality’ on the one hand and ‘traditional, church-related religion’ on the other hand. In addition, it appears that ‘only spiritual’ (and not ‘religious’) people and ‘only religious’ (and not ‘spiritual’) people have less ‘intensive’ spiritual/religious lives than people who describe themselves as ‘both spiritual and religious’. The ‘both’ category is not homogenous, probably as a result of the different associations which its members have of the conceptions of ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious’. The people in this category can be sub-divided in two sub-groups which show different profiles.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ in Moral Epistemology

Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine. Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in believing the conjunction of its premises without depending on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus, arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited.     

Lifelong Learning: A Pacification of ‘Know How’

A tendency of previous studies of lifelong learning to focus on learning and learning subjectivities may have led to an underestimation of potential effects in terms of a system of knowledge constitutive processes that operates powerfully to shape our societies. In this paper we explore lifelong learning and practices in the construction of knowledge at the point where a new relationship is being attempted between university courses and workplaces through programmes for learning. Drawing from Foucault and others we argue a strategic relation between discourses of lifelong learning and knowledge practices in such locations. Discourses of lifelong learning appear to support the reaching out of disciplinary practices into the workplace where theoretical knowledge is combined with knowledge derived from work experience, as a new form of knowledge that has use value. Discipline as a modality of power appears reconfigured and multiplied in new power-knowledge constellations which aim to subdue the desire and power of know how. Rather than lifelong learning as learning apparatus and strategy in the promotion of a will to learn as has been suggested elsewhere, we offer an alternative account. Here the promotion of a will to learn articulates with the will to knowledge in part through discourses of lifelong learning. Practices of knowledge constitution support the pacification of know how through its reconfiguration as knowledge that can be codified and mobilized for economic innovation.     

The concept of the ‘Other’ in modern Arab thought: From Muhammad cAbdu to Abdallah Laroui

The primary condition for the progress, or indeed the survival, of human societies is their effective coalescence into one human society’ (Zurayk 1994, 96).     

Welcome to the ‘Paradigm War’: the case of antidepressant medication

Mindfulness-based therapies are a recent development within the cognitive-behavioural tradition and an important element of the third wave cognitive behavioural therapy models. A number of these therapies could be considered to have mindfulness as a major component of the therapy. There has been a considerable growth of interest in these therapies with an accompanying increase in their evidence base. While a number of reviews have been conducted, these therapies were not comprehensively appraised. The most prominent of these therapies, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, was developed to reduce relapse in recurrent depression. We conducted a meta-analysis which looked at therapies considered to have mindfulness as a major component. We investigated whether this group of therapies was effective in reducing current depressive symptomatology as measured by the Beck depression inventory (BDI). A total of 11 studies were included in the analysis. We found a significant mean reduction score in current depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI, of 8.73 points (95% confidence interval?=?6.61, 10.86). We found evidence for the effectiveness of these major-component therapies in reducing levels of active depression. The robustness of these findings is discussed alongside the implications for research and practice within the context of the current literature.     

Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: ‘Because’, ‘In Virtue of’, and ‘Made True By…’

Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail.     

Learning to think in a ‘war zone’

This paper describes an experimental investigation of Winnicott's set situation as described by him in 1941. Three groups of South African infants, 7 to 9 months old, selected from white, black and institutionalized samples were tested three times in the set situation to validate Winnicott's findings and explore new ways of extending the usefulness of the set situation. The study also attempts to explore phantasy in infancy. The results show no significant differences between the black and white infants in the standard presentation, validating Winnicott's observations across different ethnic groups. However, significant differences in the institutionalized group were found, revealing considerable deviations and disturbances. In the second testing, where frustration was introduced, there were, however, significant differences in response to frustration between the black and white infants. Individual examples reveal the uniqueness of the responses to the situation. The situation provides a semi-structured infant observation which can be used as a diagnostic thermometer by professionals in the field of mental health.