Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments

In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz. , the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism.     

Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an ill-defined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science.

     

Issues in the study and explanation of language behavior

A number of major issues raised in the study of language are examined from the standpoint of the requirements of an empirical science of language. In an effort to critically evaluate some of the basic assumptions and explanatory concepts of nativism in the study of language, the following five issues are examined: (1) What is nativism? (2) Can the creative aspect of language be explained in terms of nativism? (3) What is the explanatory status of nativist concepts? (4) What is the nature of nativist evidence? and (5) Do evaluative statements challenge alternative positions? The discussion points out various objections to and inconsistencies of nativism as well as the inadequacy of the explanatory status of nativist concepts.     

Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism

Prinz (Perceptual the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, MIT Press, 2002) presents a new species of concept empiricism, under which concepts are off-line long-term memory networks of representations that are ‘copies’ of perceptual representations – proxytypes. An apparent obstacle to any such empiricism is the prevailing nativism of generative linguistics. The paper critically assesses Prinz’s attempt to overcome this obstacle. The paper argues that, prima facie, proxytypes are as incapable of accounting for the structure of the linguistic mind as are the more traditional species of empiricism. This position is then confirmed by looking in detail at two suggestions (one derived from recent connectionist research) from Prinz of how certain aspects of syntactic structure might be accommodated by the proxytype theory. It is shown that the suggestions fail to come to terms with both the data and theory of contemporary linguistics.     

The nativist-empiricist controversy in the context of recent research on spatial and quantitative development

Demonstrations of cognitive competence in preschool children and infants played an important role in the waning influence of Piagetian theory and the rise of nativism. Arguments and data favoring modularity have further buttressed the case for nativism. This article reviews evidence concerning early competence and modularity in the spatial and quantitative domains, as well as the role of experience in development. This evidence provides little reason to support nativist claims in either domain.     

Development itself is the key to understanding developmental disorders

It is a truism that development involves contributions from both genes and environment, but theories differ with respect to the roles they attribute to each, which deeply affects the ways in which developmental disorders are researched. The strict nativist approach to abnormal phenotypes, inspired by adult neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology, seeks to identify impairments to domain-specific cognitive modules and studies the purported juxtaposition of impaired and intact abilities. The neuroconstructivist approach differs in several respects: (i) it seeks more indirect, lower-level causes of abnormality than impaired cognitive modules; (ii)modules are thought to emerge from a developmental process of modularization; (iii) unlike empiricism, neuroconstructivism accepts some form of innately specified starting points, but unlike nativism, these are considered to be initially `domain-relevant', only becoming domain-specific with the process of development and specific environmental interactions; and (iv) different cognitive disorders are considered to lie on a continuum rather than to be truly specific. These alternative theoretical positions are briefly considered as they apply to Specific Language Impairment, and followed by a more detailed case study of a well-defined neurodevelopmental disorder, Williams syndrome. It is argued that development itself plays a crucial role in phenotypical outcomes.     

Choosing the realist framework

There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework.     

Cowie on the Poverty of Stimulus

My paper defends the use of the poverty of stimulus argument (POSA) for linguistic nativism against Cowie's (1999) counter-claim that it leaves empiricism untouched. I first present the linguistic POSA as arising from a reflection on the generality of the child's initial state in comparison with the specific complexity of its final state. I then show that Cowie misconstrues the POSA as a direct argument about the character of the pld. In this light, I first argue that the data Cowie marshals about the pld does not begin to suggest that the POSA is unsound. Second, through a discussion of the so-called `auxiliary inversion rule', I show, by way of diagnosis, that Cowie misunderstands both the methodology of current linguistics and the complexity of the data it is obliged to explain.     

We are made,not born: Empiricism is existentially useful

The perennial “nativist-empiricist” debate in developmental science has far-reaching relevance in our existence. Two studies conducted under the terror management framework tested whether the empiricist developmental conception serves distal defensive purposes. Experiment 1 highlights the palliative existential effect of the empiricist conception since participants who read an empiricist essay exhibited less death thoughts than participants who read a nativist essay or a control essay. Experiment 2 gives support to the distal defensive function of the empiricist conception by showing that, unlike with the nativist or the control essay, people under mortality salience exhibited a higher need to rely on empiricism than participants in the control pain condition. The existential advantage of empiricism is explained by the fact that human development is shaped by a meaningful cultural blueprint. Our results are discussed in terms of the ontological and existential benefits of contemplating human intrinsic identity, ranging from its biology to its social behaviors as primarily influenced by the cultural environment.     

Theoretical influences on research on language development and intervention in individuals with mental retardation

In this article, we consider the theoretical debates and frameworks that have shaped research on language development and intervention in persons with mental retardation over the past four decades. Our starting point is the nativist theory, which has been espoused most forcefully by Chomsky. We also consider more recent alternatives to the nativist approach, including the social-interactionist and emergentist approaches, which have been developed largely within the field of child language research. We also consider the implications for language development and intervention of the genetic syndrome-based approach to behavioral research advocated by Dykens and others. We briefly review the impact and status of the debates spurred by the nativist approach in research on the course of language development in individuals with mental retardation. In addition, we characterize some of the achievements in language intervention that have been made possible by the debates spurred by nativism and the various alternatives to it. The evidence we consider provides support for all three alternatives to the nativist approach. Moreover, successful interventions appear to embody elements of several of these approaches as well as other theoretical approaches (e.g., behaviorism). We conclude that language intervention must be theoretically eclectic in its approach, with different strategies appropriate for teaching different features of language, at different points in development, and for children displaying different characteristics or learning histories.     

The Innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical Concepts

In historical claims for nativism, mathematics is a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge. Claims by contemporary developmental psychologists of elementary mathematical skills in human infants are a legacy of this. However, the connection between these skills and more formal mathematical concepts and methods remains unclear. This paper assesses the current debates surrounding nativism and mathematical knowledge by teasing them apart into two distinct claims. First, in what way does the experimental evidence from infants, nonhuman animals and neuropsychology support the nativist hypothesis? Second, granting that infants have some elementary mathematical skills, does this mean that such skills play an important role in the development of mathematical knowledge?     

Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through language: a case study for colour

This article proposes a number of models to examine through which mechanisms a population of autonomous agents could arrive at a repertoire of perceptually grounded categories that is sufficiently shared to allow successful communication. The models are inspired by the main approaches to human categorisation being discussed in the literature: nativism, empiricism, and culturalism. Colour is taken as a case study. Although we take no stance on which position is to be accepted as final truth with respect to human categorisation and naming, we do point to theoretical constraints that make each position more or less likely and we make clear suggestions on what the best engineering solution would be. Specifically, we argue that the collective choice of a shared repertoire must integrate multiple constraints, including constraints coming from communication.     

EMPIRICISM FOR CYBORGS

One important debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists concerns whether we observe things using instruments. This paper offers a new perspective on the debate over instruments by looking to recent discussion in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Realists often speak of instruments as ‘extensions’ to our senses. I ask whether the realist may strengthen her view by drawing on the extended mind thesis. Proponents of the extended mind thesis claim that cognitive processes can sometimes extend beyond our brains and bodies into the environment. I suggest that the extended mind thesis offers a way to make sense of realists’ talk of instruments as extensions to the senses and that it provides the realist with a new argument against the constructive empiricist view of instruments.     

OTHER FOLKS' THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR

Our everyday, basic understanding of people's mental stales and behaviors has recently been a lively topic of debate m the social science. This article addresses whether some aspects of our. European-American theory of mind are universal, by examining ethnographic and experimental reports of cultural variation. Implications of the variation for nativist theories of development are discussed and research strategies to augment our understanding are proposed.     

A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content

This paper provides a novel argument against conceptualism, the claim that the content of human experience, including perceptual experience, is entirely conceptual. Conceptualism entails that the content of experience is limited by the concepts that we possess and deploy. I present an argument to show that such a view is exceedingly costly—if the nature of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning: all perceptual concepts must be innate. The version of nativism that results is incompatible with naturalistic accounts of concept learning. This cost can be avoided, and concept learning accounted for if nonconceptual content of experience is admitted.     

Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos

Wittgenstein sought to uphold ‘realism without empiricism’. This paper identifies in Wittgestein's and in Kant's philosophies a common line of argument that provides a genuinely transcendental argument for (not from) mental content externalism. This line of argument has not been previously recognized in either thinker's work. The common thesis defended by both Wittgenstein and Kant alike is that, if we human beings did not inhabit a natural world structured by a recognizable degree of similarity and variety among the objects or events we perceive, we could not so much as think, so we could not so much as be self‐conscious. (This line of argument is independent of Kant's idealism, and ultimately shows that Kant's transcendental idealism is false and unsupportable.)     

Anti‐Metaphysicalism,Necessity, and Temporal Ontology

This paper argues for a certain kind of anti‐metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti‐metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non‐factualism, physical‐empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non‐factualism or physical‐empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non‐factualism or physical‐empiricism. An initial reason is provided for thinking that non‐factualism might be true, but in the end, the paper leaves this question open. The paper also argues against a certain kind of necessitarianism about the temporal ontology debate; but this isn't an extra job—the falsity of this necessitarian view falls out of the other arguments as a sort of corollary.     

Shadworth Hodgson and William James's formulation of space perception: Phenomenology and perceptual realism

This paper has two related goals. First, it seeks to show that the theory of perception found in William James's Principles of Psychology is thoroughly consistent if it is approached through the framework of perceptual realism versus constructionism rather than the nativism versus empiricism debate. As such, this paper offers an alternative to Nicholas Pastore's claim that there are two contradictory theories of perception in the Principles. James's commitment to perceptual realism is articulated within the contexts of his (1) critique of constructionist perception theories, (2) notion of the spatial quale, and (3) formulation of the role of knowledge in adult perception. The second goal of this paper deals with the historical development of James's perceptual realism. Here it is argued that Shadworth Hodgson's method of reflection–an anticipation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction–served as the basis of James's commitment to perceptual realism.     

Agnostic empiricism versus scientific realism: Belief in truth matters

This paper aims to defend scientific realism against two versions of agnostic empiricism: a naive agnostic position, which suggests that the only rational option is to remain agnostic as to the truth of theoretical assertions, and van Fraassen's more sophisticated agnostic empiricism - which may be called "Hypercritical Empiricism". It first argues that given semantic realism, naive agnostic empiricism cannot be maintained: there is no relevant epistemic difference between theoretical assertions and observational ones. It then focuses on van Fraassen's more sophisticated alternative to scientific realism and suggests that an attitude towards science which involves less than aiming at theoretical truth and believing in theories would be, in some concrete respect that empiricists should recognize, worse off than the recommended realist attitude. To this end, the paper develops the so-called conjunction argument into a diachronic argument for scientific realism.     

Theoretical perspectives on language and communication problems in mental retardation and developmental disabilities

We argue that researchers interested in language and communication problems in mental retardation or any other developmental disorder should view such problems as emerging within the broader context of the behavioral profile, or phenotype, associated with a particular genetic condition. This will require understanding the direct and indirect effects of genes on the development of language and communication and thereby an understanding of the complex relations that exist between language and other dimensions of psychological and behavioral functioning as well as an understanding of the environments in which the developing person acts and is acted upon. We believe that the dominant model for understanding language and communication problems--the nativist approach, which emphasizes the child's innate capacity for acquiring language and characterizes language as consisting of a set of context-free deterministic rules that operate on abstract representations--is inconsistent with an emphasis on indirect genetic effects. We review recent evidence that undermines the nativist approach--evidence concerning the initial state of the language-learning child, the role of environmental input, the competence-performance distinction, and modularity. In place of nativism, we argue for Emergentism, which is a model in which language is seen to emerge from the interaction between the child's biological abilities to map statistical properties of the language input into a distributed representation and the characteristics of the language learning environment and for the purpose of engaging in real-time, meaningful language use.