Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature

It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of mind that states with underived representational content are ipso facto psychological states. This view—the Content View—underlies a number of interesting philosophical projects, such as the attempt to pick out a psychological level of explanation, to demarcate genuinely psychological from non-psychological states, and to limn the class of states with phenomenal character. The most detailed and influential theories of underived representation in philosophy are the tracking theories developed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan and others. Tracking theorists initially hoped to ‘naturalize’ underived representation by showing that although it is distinctively psychological it is not irreducibly so, yet they ended up developing theories of representation that by their own lights don’t pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon at all. Burge (Origins of objectivity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) sets out to develop a theory of underived representation that does pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon. His theory promises to vindicate the Content View and the various philosophical projects that depend on it. In this paper I argue that Burge’s theory dementalizes representation for the same reason tracking theories do: These theories hold that representations are states with underived accuracy conditions, yet such states are found in all sorts of mindless systems, like plants.     

A self-determination theory account of self-authorship: Implications for law and public policy

Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the principles of self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call “liberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life.     

How to Understand the Completion of Art

There are a number of recent discussions on the question of when an artwork is complete. While it has been observed that a work might be complete in one way and not in another, the impact of this observation has been minimal. Discussion has been continued as if there is only one real sense of completion that matters. I argue that this is a mistake. Even if there were only one (or one most important) kind of completion, extant theories of completion would be bad candidates for that one kind. The best explanation of the failure of extant theories is that there are many kinds of completion, many corresponding senses of “completion,” and no kind of artwork completion is objectively more important than any other. We have a good reason to think that this is the case given the disparate interests we have when we ask completion questions. Once we have realized that those concerns track properties that are often unrelated, the question for theorists to answer becomes, “In how many ways can an artwork be complete?”     

Theoretical Conundrum: The Politics and Science of Theorizing Authoritarian Cognition

The historical development of the four main theories which have attempted to explain the relationship between cognitive style and ideological content—i.e., authoritarianism, extremism theory, context theory, and value pluralism theory—is analyzed from a rhetorical perspective. The discussion focuses on the manner in which the tensions between theoretical universalism and political critique have been "resolved" by theorists working in different historico-political contexts. While both these scientific and political values have been of central concern in theorizing the link between cognitive style and content, they are deeply incompatible because it is not possible to establish a fixed relationship between a personality dimension and the changing beliefs associated with different ideologies across time and place. This has prompted theorists aiming for universalistic accounts to define ideological orientation in terms of psychological processes rather than content, which, in turn, has compromised the critical potential of their theory. The paper concludes that the historical development of the literature may be understood in terms of dilemmatic counter-themes which, under different political circumstances, have been resolved in novel ways.     

Reasonology and False Beliefs

Abstract

Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that ‘intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason’ and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation.     

基于期望值最大化的理论何时失效：风险决策中为自己-为所有人决策差异的眼动研究

主流的风险决策理论专家发展了一系列基于期望值最大化(expectation-maximization)的理论, 以期捕获所有人的风险决策行为。然而大量证据表明, 这些基于期望值最大化的理论并不能如同描述性理论那样理想地描述单一个体的决策行为。本研究采用眼动追踪技术, 系统考察了个体在为所有人决策与为自己决策时的风险决策行为及信息加工过程的差异。本研究发现, 基于期望值最大化的理论可捕获为所有人决策或为自己多次决策时的情况, 却不能很好捕获个体为自己进行单次决策时的情况。本研究结果有助于理解基于期望值最大化的理论与启发式/非基于期望值最大化的理论的边界, 为风险决策理论的划分和发展提供实证参考。     

The subjective intuition

Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists.     

The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events

It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view–which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)–has great trouble with.     

Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu

The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account.     

RELATIVISM AND NORMATIVE NONREALISM: BASING MORALITY ON RATIONALITY

Normative nonrealism denies (a) that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes of moral agents, and (b) that attitude-independent normative facts determine what is rational. An influential nonrealist approach to rationality comes from Richard Brandt's account of rationality in terms of “full information.” Using Brandt's account as illustrative, this paper identifies a serious problem for nonrealist normative theories based on theories of rationality. The paper argues that nonrealist accounts of rationality that oppose relativism cannot successfully handle the most serious threat from relativists: namely, a threat from a ‘Why care?’ open-question argument that stems from the question why one should care about being rational in a certain respect or sense. The paper identifies the bearing of ‘Why care?’ questions on the conflict between internalism and externalism regarding practical reasons. The main lesson is that ‘Why care?’ questions wreak havoc for nonrelativist nonrealist approaches to rationality and reason-based morality.     

Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.     

INSENSITIVITY

Ethical theories do not always focus sufficiently on the correct characterization of morally bad choices. Standard accounts include: acts that are unprincipled, low‐utility, badly directed, or in violation of contracts. These standard accounts of immorality are inadequate. The concept of vices – a key part of virtue theory – offers a better account of bad choice. Most virtue ethics focuses on the warm vices (greed, lust, pride, anger, acquisitiveness …), but the cool vices – the vices of insensitivity – may pose as many dangers to human life and happiness. I discuss a range of insensitivities and the ways in which they can infiltrate personality, often spreading so as to affect the entire character. I address the objection that insensitivity is a weak account of bad choice since insensitivity is often an involuntary characteristic. I borrow from Adam Smith the concept of ‘piacularity’ to explain how involuntary habits (and the acts they cause) can be bad despite the fact they are not culpable.     

High Stakes Instrumentalism

In this paper, I aim to establish that, according to almost all democratic theories, instrumentalist considerations often dominate intrinsic proceduralist considerations in our decisions about whether to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. The reason for this is that almost all democratic theorists, including philosophers commonly thought to be intrinsic proceduralists, accept ‘High Stakes Instrumentalism’ (HSI). According to HSI, we ought to use undemocratic procedures in order to prevent high stakes errors - very substantively bad or unjust outcomes. However, democratically produced severe substantive injustice is much more common than many proponents of HSI have realised. Proponents of HSI must accept that if undemocratic procedures are the only way to avoid these high stakes errors, then we ought to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. Consequently, according to almost all democratic theorists, democratic theory ought, for practical purposes, to be reoriented towards difficult moral and empirical questions about the instrumental quality of procedures. Moreover, this is potentially very practically important because if there are available instrumentally superior undemocratic procedures, then wholesale institutional reform is required. This is one of the most potentially practically important findings of normative democratic theory. In spite of this, no-one has yet explicitly recognised it.     

The psychological implications of believing that everything is one

ABSTRACT

A variety of philosophical, religious, spiritual, and scientific perspectives converge on the notion that everything that exists is part of some fundamental entity, substance, or process. People differ in the degree to which they believe that everything is one, but we know little about the psychological or social implications of holding this belief. In two studies, believing in oneness was associated with having an identity that includes distal people and the natural world, feeling connected to humanity and nature, and having values that focus on other people’s welfare. However, the belief was not associated with a lower focus on oneself or one’s concerns. Participants who believed in oneness tended to view themselves as spiritual but not necessarily religious, and reported experiences in which they directly perceived everything as one. The belief in oneness is a meaningful existential belief that has numerous implications for people’s self-views, experiences, values, relationships, and behavior.     

Surviving without a Brain: A response to McMahan on Personal Identity

Abstract

In his Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, Jeff McMahan defends what he calls the embodied mind view of identity, and then puts forward several arguments in support of the view that physical continuity of the brain is crucial to our survival. He ultimately denies that psychological continuity is of any importance. His strategy is to recommend, by means of thought experiments, intuitions that support the importance of physical continuity of the brain and then argue against the plausibility of the notion of psychological continuity to which psychological theorists appeal. This paper is specifically concerned with the alleged importance of physical continuity to our survival. It responds to the positive and negative aspects of McMahan’s case by arguing that thought experiments that recommend the psychological view are far more compelling than he allows them to be and that psychological theorists can make do with a notion of psychological continuity that is immune to his criticisms.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

Successful intelligence: finding a balance

Human intelligence has long been on the borderline between a scientific and a quasi-scientific field within the scope of psychological science. This is partially because its study and measurement have been particularly susceptible to socio-political agendas, but also because empirical tests of theories of intelligence have too often ranged from inadequate to nonexistent. In this article it is argued that two extremes have prevailed in the study of intelligence. At one extreme are general-ability (g) theorists, who have collected large amounts of data to test the theory of general intelligence, but often using restricted ranges of participants, materials or situational contexts. They also show a tendency to limit their methods of data analysis (e.g. to exploratory factor analysis). At another extreme are theorists arguing for new, multiple intelligences, whose theories have been subjected to few or no empirical tests. I argue that a middle ground is needed that recognizes the multifarious nature of intelligence and of people’s conceptions of it, but that also is subjected to rigorous empirical tests.     

Closure and context

The aim of this paper is to explain why imaginativeness is valuable. Recent discussions of imaginativeness or creativity (which I regard as the same property) have paid relatively little attention to this important question. My discussion has three parts. First, I elucidate the concept of imaginativeness by providing three conditions a product or act must satisfy in order to be imaginative. This account enables us to explain, among other things, why imaginativeness is associated with inspiration, why it is associated with the faculty of imagination, and why it is relative to persons and to contexts. Second, in the light of this account, I say what the imaginativeness of persons is. Philosophical discussions of the imaginativeness of persons usually treat it as a capacity. In fact, it is a tendency or disposition of a certain kind. Third, I give reasons why the imaginativeness of persons has the value it does. I begin by saying what the basic facts about its value are. When a person's imaginativeness is valuable, it is either (i) a good thing about a person, (ii) good for the person, or (iii) good for others. I provide explanations of each of these facts. I conclude by addressing the difficult question of whether a person's imaginativeness is non-instrumentally good for her. On Romantic and Romantic-inspired views, imaginativeness is non-instrumentally good for a person because of its connection with self-realization. I reject this claim. However, I argue that, often, imaginativeness is indeed non-instrumentally good for the imaginative person.     

The Missing‐Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well‐Being

Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well‐being: a theory that incorporates both an objective‐value constraint and a pro‐attitude constraint. Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike desire theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires. This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective‐value constraint on well‐being. Second, unlike objectivist theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating. This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro‐attitude constraint on well‐being. However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing‐desires cases. For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well‐being. This, objectivists say, is implausible. It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone's life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and, hence, that health is a component of her welfare. This paper focuses on the missing‐desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well‐being. My argument is that the missing‐desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well‐being. My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well‐being to become hybrid theorists.