The Effects of Truth–Lie Base Rate on Interactive Deception Detection Accuracy

Consistent with the Park and Levine's (PL) probability model of deception detection accuracy, previous research has shown that as the proportion of honest messages increases, there is a corresponding linear increase in correct truth–lie discrimination. Three experiments (N = 120, 205, and 243, respectively) varied the truth–lie base rate in an interactive deception detection task. Linear base‐rate effects were observed in all 3 experiments (average effect r#x02009;= .61) regardless of whether the judges were interactive participants or passive observers, previously acquainted or strangers, or previously exposed to truths or lies. The predictive power of the PL probability model appears robust and extends to interactive deception despite PL's logical incompatibility with interpersonal deception theory.     

Police officers' beliefs about,and use of,cues to deception

Meta‐analytic findings indicate that people, including police officers, are generally poor at detecting low‐stakes deception. Related to this, investigations of behaviours that people reportedly use to make truth or lie judgements tend to conclude that people rely on incorrect stereotypes. However, consistent findings suggest that police officers are able to detect high‐stakes deception; this implies that, at least in some contexts, police officers utilise reliable cues to deception. The research presented here was an investigation of cues to deception used by police officers (N  = 69), when making veracity decisions about real world, high‐stakes communications. Data were collected on both free report cues, and also prescribed cues that were known (from previous research), to discriminate between liars and truth‐tellers in the communications that the police officers observed. Officers free reported using cues related to verbal content, emotion, body language, eyes, vocal cues, and external cues. Most prescribed cues were self‐reportedly used correctly by large majorities of the officers, suggesting that they may not rely on inaccurate stereotypes. Self‐report use of categories of free report cues, and prescribed cues, was not related to accuracy in detecting deception. As people may not always be aware of the behaviours on which their judgements are based, the relationships between some of the behaviours actually displayed in the communications, and group accuracy in detecting deception in those communications, were also investigated. Group accuracy was related to the presence of subjective, emotion‐related cues in the communications.     

Interpersonal Deception

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) frames deception as a communication activity and examines deception within interactive contexts. One key element of the theory is the role of suspicion in prompting behavior changes. An experiment testing several suspicion-related hypotheses paired participants (half friends, half strangers) for interviews during which interviewees (EEs) lied or told the truth and interviewers (ERs) were induced to be (moderately or highly) suspicious (or not). Results confirmed that suspicion and deceit were perceived when present, suspicion was manifested through nonverbal behaviors but with different behavioral patterns for moderately versus highly suspicious ERs, and suspicion affected sender behavior. Relational familiarity moderated some behaviors. Results are discussed in terms of mutual influence processes and the dynamic nature of communication in interpersonal deception.     

Teenage Offenders' Ability to Detect Deception in Their Peers

This study investigated the deception detection abilities of teenage offenders and teenage non‐offenders who made veracity judgments about 12 videotaped interviewees and also explored the behavioural characteristics of teenage liars and truth tellers. The findings revealed that teenage offenders were significantly more accurate in their credibility judgments than teenage non‐offenders. However, the offenders' impressive accuracy rates were not as a consequence of using valid cues to deceit. The feedback hypothesis helps to explain why the offenders were more accurate in their decisions: Operating within a criminal environment may mean that teenage offenders frequently lie and are lied to. Consequently, they receive more feedback than non‐offenders regarding the effectiveness of their lies as well as how successful they are at detecting lies. As a result, their lie detection ability improves. The current study suggests moving away from individual deceptive cues as predictors of deceit towards a more intuitive and holistic approach to lie detection, such as the Brunswikian Lens Model.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Participation Affect Deception Success?

Communication episodes may range from highly interactive to noninteractive. The principle of interactivity refers to the constellation of structural and experiential features associated with interactivity that systematically affect communication processes and outcomes. One such feature is degree of participation. In deceptive interchanges, senders may engage in dialogic (high participation, two‐way) or monologic (low participation, one‐way) communication. According to the principle of interactivity, dialogue should advantage deceivers relative to monologue due to increased mutuality between sender and receiver and greater opportunities for deceivers to improve their performance over time. An experiment in which friends or strangers alternated between deceiving and telling the truth to a partner under dialogue or monologue conditions tested this principle. All hypotheses received some support. Relative to monologue, dialogue created more mutuality among strangers. Dialogue also enabled deceivers to better manage their informational content, speech fluency, nonverbal demeanor, and image, resulting in less accurate deception detection by partners. These results support the interactivity principle and interpersonal deception theory, from which the principle emanated.     

Collective interviewing of suspects

When people are interviewed about possible wrongdoing that has been committed in groups, they typically are interviewed separately. Yet, in several settings it would be more intuitive and convenient to interview suspects together. Importantly, such collective interviews could yield verbal cues to deception. This is the first deception experiment to investigate collective interviewing. Twenty-one pairs of truth tellers and 22 pairs of liars were interviewed pair-wise about having had lunch together in a restaurant. Given that truth tellers adopt a “tell it all” strategy in the interviews while, in contrast, liars prefer to keep their stories simple, we predicted that pairs of truth tellers would (i) interrupt and (ii) correct each other more, and would (iii) add more information to each other's answers than pairs of liars. The results supported these hypotheses. Theory-driven interventions to elicit more cues to deception through simultaneous interviewing are discussed.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

Observers' Language Proficiencies and the Detection of Non‐native Speakers' Deception

We examined whether observers' language proficiencies affected their abilities to detect native and non‐native speakers' deception. Native and non‐native English speakers were videotaped as they either lied or told the truth about having cheated on a test. A total of 284 laypersons—who were either native or non‐native English speakers themselves—viewed these videos and indicated whether they believed that the speakers were being truthful or deceptive. Observers were more accurate when judging native speakers than when judging non‐native speakers, suggesting that perceptual fluency aided deception detection. Although there was no effect of observers' language proficiencies on discrimination, their belief that interviewees were telling the truth increased with proficiency. On the whole, these findings suggest that non‐native speakers may be at greater risk of being incorrectly classified in forensic contexts.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Content in Context Improves Deception Detection Accuracy

Past research has shown that people are only slightly better than chance at distinguishing truths from lies. Higher accuracy rates, however, are possible when contextual knowledge is used to judge the veracity of situated message content. The utility of content in context was shown in a series of experiments with students (N = 26, 45, 51, 25, 127) and experts (N = 66). Across studies, average accuracy was 75% in the content in context groups compared with 57% in the controls. These results demonstrate the importance of situating judges within a meaningful context and have important implications for deception theory.     

Sender Demeanor: Individual Differences in Sender Believability Have a Powerful Impact on Deception Detection Judgments

Sender demeanor is an individual difference in the believability of message senders that is conceptually independent of actual honesty. Recent research suggests that sender demeanor may be the most influential source of variation in deception detection judgments. Sender demeanor was varied in five experiments (N = 30, 113, 182, 30, and 35) to create demeanor–veracity matched and demeanor–veracity mismatched conditions. The sender demeanor induction explained as much as 98% of the variance in detection accuracy. Three additional studies (N = 30, 113, and 104) investigated the behavioral profiles of more and less believable senders. The results document the strong impact of sender effects in deception detection and provide an explanation of the low‐accuracy ceiling in the previous findings.     

Deception detection: interrogators' and observers' decoding of consecutive statements

This study is an examination of two forensically important but previously neglected issues in interpersonal deception. First, which cues do lie catchers-who have access to repeated interrogations-pay attention to in order to detect deception? Second, do face-to-face interacting interrogators differ from noninteracting observers in terms of how they perceive a suspect? After watching a staged event, 24 suspects (12 liars and 12 truth tellers) were interrogated three times over a period of 11 days. After the final interrogation, the veracity of each suspect was assessed by his or her interrogator and by 6 observers who had watched the interrogations on video only. The results of the experiment showed that consistency over time was by far the most commonly used cue for justifying veracity judgments. Critically, the predictive accuracy for this cue was alarmingly low. As opposed to results from previous research, the interrogators used verbal cues to a significantly greater extent than did the observers. Furthermore, a probing effect was shown (i.e., probed suspects were perceived as significantly more honest than nonprobed suspects). Finally, limited support for a previously reported honesty effect was obtained (i.e., that interrogators perceive suspects to be more honest than do observers).     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.     

First Impressions After Various Types of Deception: Less Favorable Following Expectancy Violation

This experiment involving 96 undergraduates tested whether the expectancy-violation model could explain how different types of discovered verbal deception influence first impressions. A female confederate responded to a participant's question about her weight with a lie, true, secretive, or technically true (i.e., equivocal) statement. The confederate who lied or kept her weight a secret was less well liked, was seen as less moral, was less likely to be recommended as a dating partner, and made a worse overall impression than one who told the truth or equivocated. Violation of expectations for an honest answer mediated the relation between type of deception and both liking and recommendation as a dating partner. Thus, violating people's expectations for an honest answer can cause one to be seen in a less favorable light.     

欺骗识别的准确率：影响因素与提高途径

欺骗是一种常见的社会现象,通过观察他人的行为表现识别欺骗则是人们的一项重要能力。研究表明,人们的欺骗识别能力仅仅略微高于随机水平。本文关注基于行为线索的欺骗识别研究。首先,介绍欺骗识别的准确率;然后,结合Brunswik的透镜模型从欺骗线索的有效性和欺骗线索的利用两方面分析识别准确率的影响因素;并在此基础上探讨了提高识别准确率的途径。最后,对未来可能的研究方向进行展望。     

Honest or Deceitful? A Study of Persons' Mental Models for Judging Veracity

This study focused on understanding the detailed and dynamic mental models that people develop for judging veracity. It was hypothesized that individual differences in such mental models, assessed by using Thagard's (1989) ECHO computer simulation program, would predict participants' attributions and confidence in making attributions. After watching videotapes of targets, 120 participants rated targets' veracity and their own confidence in making attributions. Half of these participants also provided “on-line” information that, in turn, was entered into ECHO. The two groups did not differ in their judgments of veracity, but the on-line group was significantly more confident. Results from ECHO and network analysis indicated not only that participants' mental models for detecting deception are detailed, changing, and idiosyncratic, varying in their structure and degree of coherence, but also that a number of previously unidentified cognitive structures are used for detecting deception. Results that confirm the hypotheses are also presented.     

Accuracy and bias in newlywed spouses' perceptions of each other's personalities

This study investigated moderators of newlywed spouses' accuracy in judging each other's personality. Spouses in 154 predominantly Hispanic newlywed couples rated their own and their partners' personality traits. Full‐sample results showed significant associations between perceivers' and targets' personality ratings (“truth force”/“tracking accuracy”). Positive directional bias (perceivers' mean trait ratings of targets exceeding targets' self‐ratings) also was evident. Positive directional bias occurred when perceivers had little familiarity with their spouse prior to dating and when perceivers had high self‐esteem. Truth force/tracking accuracy increased with less time spent cohabiting and higher perceiver self‐esteem. Positive associations between perceivers' self‐esteem and ratings of partners on positively valenced traits were reduced when partners had had greater opportunities to observe one another's behaviors.