Base Rates,Deception Detection,and Deception Theory: A Reply to Burgoon (2015)

This essay continues a debate about the relative scientific merits of the Park‐Levine Model (PLM) and Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) with regard to accuracy in deception detection. Key points of disagreement include (a) the degree to which message recipients are sensitive to sender veracity and (b) the extent to which interactivity moderates the veracity and base‐rate effects specified by PLM. According to PLM, people are truth‐biased, truth‐bias makes people insensitive to deception, and as a consequence, base rates affect accuracy regardless of interactivity. IDT, in direct contrast, holds that people are sensitive to the veracity of other's communication and that interactivity is a key moderator. Consistent with PLM, data repeatedly show that people are insensitive to other's veracity and that this insensitivity is general across media affordances including interactivity. This rejoinder uses Burgoon's (2015) own interactive data to demonstrate the empirical superiority of PLM over IDT.     

Interpersonal Deception

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) frames deception as a communication activity and examines deception within interactive contexts. One key element of the theory is the role of suspicion in prompting behavior changes. An experiment testing several suspicion-related hypotheses paired participants (half friends, half strangers) for interviews during which interviewees (EEs) lied or told the truth and interviewers (ERs) were induced to be (moderately or highly) suspicious (or not). Results confirmed that suspicion and deceit were perceived when present, suspicion was manifested through nonverbal behaviors but with different behavioral patterns for moderately versus highly suspicious ERs, and suspicion affected sender behavior. Relational familiarity moderated some behaviors. Results are discussed in terms of mutual influence processes and the dynamic nature of communication in interpersonal deception.     

The Effects of Truth–Lie Base Rate on Interactive Deception Detection Accuracy

Consistent with the Park and Levine's (PL) probability model of deception detection accuracy, previous research has shown that as the proportion of honest messages increases, there is a corresponding linear increase in correct truth–lie discrimination. Three experiments (N = 120, 205, and 243, respectively) varied the truth–lie base rate in an interactive deception detection task. Linear base‐rate effects were observed in all 3 experiments (average effect r#x02009;= .61) regardless of whether the judges were interactive participants or passive observers, previously acquainted or strangers, or previously exposed to truths or lies. The predictive power of the PL probability model appears robust and extends to interactive deception despite PL's logical incompatibility with interpersonal deception theory.     

Deception and subtypes of aggression during early childhood

A multi-informant study investigated the association between deception capacities and subtypes of aggression in a young early childhood sample (M = 44.65 months of age, SD = 13.39, N = 64). A newly developed teacher report of deception had appropriate psychometric properties (reliability, concurrent validity, and construct validity). Recently introduced observational methods of physical and relational aggression were reliable and valid with this sample. Findings indicated that both physical and relational aggression were associated with concurrent deception. For boys only, physical aggression uniquely predicted deception, controlling for the variance associated with relational aggression. In addition, relational aggression predicted deception above and beyond the role of physical aggression for the entire sample.     

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward developing a cognitive theory of cyber deception. While widely studied, the psychology of deception has largely focused on physical cues of deception. Given that present-day communication among humans is largely electronic, we focus on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable and for which there is less psychological research. To improve cyber defense, researchers have used signaling theory to extended algorithms developed for the optimal allocation of limited defense resources by using deceptive signals to trick the human mind. However, the algorithms are designed to protect against adversaries that make perfectly rational decisions. In behavioral experiments using an abstract cybersecurity game (i.e., Insider Attack Game), we examined human decision-making when paired against the defense algorithm. We developed an instance-based learning (IBL) model of an attacker using the Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture to investigate how humans make decisions under deception in cyber-attack scenarios. Our results show that the defense algorithm is more effective at reducing the probability of attack and protecting assets when using deceptive signaling, compared to no signaling, but is less effective than predicted against a perfectly rational adversary. Also, the IBL model replicates human attack decisions accurately. The IBL model shows how human decisions arise from experience, and how memory retrieval dynamics can give rise to cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias. The implications of these findings are discussed in the perspective of informing theories of deception and designing more effective signaling schemes that consider human bounded rationality.     

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald‐faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is ‘an unhappy divorce’ because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald‐faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.     

The deception faucet: A metaphor to conceptualize deception and its detection

Why are there few reliable deception cues and why is deception detection a challenge? These questions are related and have puzzled social scientists, leading to few universal truths about the relationship between deception and communication behavior. This article reviews existing theories to suggest how deceptive discourse production actually occurs, which can lead to a better understanding of deception production and detection processes. Crucial components of a deception — lie-truth base-rates, deception expectations, and goals — are largely overlooked in most theories and primary studies, but are integrated in this paper through a deception faucet metaphor. The metaphor describes deceptive discourse production as violations of conversational maxims (Quantity, Quality, Manner, Relation) and reflected by characteristics that change across deceptions. Considerations for theory and application are suggested.     

Increasing Deception Detection Accuracy with Strategic Questioning

One explanation for the finding of slightly above‐chance accuracy in detecting deception experiments is limited variance in sender transparency. The current study sought to increase accuracy by increasing variance in sender transparency with strategic interrogative questioning. Participants (total N = 128) observed cheaters and noncheaters who were questioned with either indirect background questions or strategic questioning. Accuracy was significantly below chance (44%) in the background questions condition and substantially above chance (68%) in the strategic interrogative questioning condition. The results suggest that transparency can be increased by strategic question asking and that accuracy rates well above chance are possible even for untrained judges exposed to only brief communications.     

Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive.     

Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

欺骗识别的准确率：影响因素与提高途径

欺骗是一种常见的社会现象,通过观察他人的行为表现识别欺骗则是人们的一项重要能力。研究表明,人们的欺骗识别能力仅仅略微高于随机水平。本文关注基于行为线索的欺骗识别研究。首先,介绍欺骗识别的准确率;然后,结合Brunswik的透镜模型从欺骗线索的有效性和欺骗线索的利用两方面分析识别准确率的影响因素;并在此基础上探讨了提高识别准确率的途径。最后,对未来可能的研究方向进行展望。     

Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception

Purpose  The purpose of this study was to test a new cognitive lie detection method, time restricted integrity confirmation (Tri-Con), which uses response time and inconsistencies across answers as cues to deception. Design/methodology/approach   Data were obtained from two samples of students enrolled in psychology classes (n = 96 for Experiment 1, n = 99 for Experiment 2). The experimental task required students to lie or tell the truth to questions probing biodata under time restriction. The foci of questions (such as Academics or Employment History) were chosen because of their relevance to participants’ lives. Findings  Tri-Con was able to distinguish between truth tellers and liars after controlling for individual differences. In one experiment, liar-truth teller classification accuracies reached 89%. Mean response times and answer consistency can be used to distinguish those who lie from those who tell the truth. Implications  Research on cognitive-based lie detectors, such as Tri-Con, hold the potential for developing reliable and valid methods of screening out employees likely to engage in misconduct and providing deceptive answers to screening questions. A cognitive lie detector would constitute a paradigm shift away from the polygraph, and could be used in tandem with integrity tests. Originality/value   This study was a preliminary test of a cognitive lie detection method based on a model of cognitive events (the Activation-Decision-Construction model) when people answer questions deceptively. It constitutes a step in translating laboratory-based cognitive research into applied technologies for the real world detection of lying, including lying that occurs during pre-employment screening. Received and reviewed by former editor, George Neuman.     

Sender Demeanor: Individual Differences in Sender Believability Have a Powerful Impact on Deception Detection Judgments

Sender demeanor is an individual difference in the believability of message senders that is conceptually independent of actual honesty. Recent research suggests that sender demeanor may be the most influential source of variation in deception detection judgments. Sender demeanor was varied in five experiments (N = 30, 113, 182, 30, and 35) to create demeanor–veracity matched and demeanor–veracity mismatched conditions. The sender demeanor induction explained as much as 98% of the variance in detection accuracy. Three additional studies (N = 30, 113, and 104) investigated the behavioral profiles of more and less believable senders. The results document the strong impact of sender effects in deception detection and provide an explanation of the low‐accuracy ceiling in the previous findings.     

New perspectives in assessing deception: The evolution of the truth machine

In recent years a growing interest has arisen in the development of tools for the detection of deception. Since William M. Marston's first publication (1917) on the use of the polygraph as a lie detector, the application of this tool, commonly known as the truth machine, has evolved. Modern technologies are now trying to push the issue further, investigating brain activity during deception using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The aim of this paper is to summarise the evolution of research from the original use of the polygraph to the use of new technologies in detecting deception, in order to provide an overview of the recent developments on the use of measurements of deception, and promote new research in this highly important domain of applied cognitive psychology.     

Deception Meets Enlightenment: From a Viable Theory of Deception to a Quirk About Humanity's Potential

This article seeks to further suggestions made by C. West Churchman (1979) Churchman, C. W. 1979. The systems approach and its enemies, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar] that a full inquiry into human systems requires a viable theory of deception. It argues that such a theory of deception requires an understanding of deception, a recognition of errors in perception, and an ability to see simultaneously from competing points of view. The intent here is to provide some insights that are useful in our understanding of deception, and thereby contributing to a viable theory of deception. Insights are used from what Huxley (1944) Huxley, A. 1944. The perennial philosophy, New York: Harper and Row.  [Google Scholar] calls the “perennial tradition,” found particularly within the esoteric traditions of the Buddhist, Sufi, and Taoist esoteric teachings, as well as many other spiritual traditions of the world. The perennial tradition emphasizes the role and continual presence of deception, alongside enlightenment, within human experience. In accord with C. West Churchman's view, this tradition suggests that, by a simultaneous recognition of both our enlightenment and our deception in any given situation, we have the proper perspective to meet the problems we face. A thought experiment, using insights from the perennial tradition, is offered as a challenge to all involved in human systems inquiry.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Subjective Cues to Deception/Honesty in a High Stakes Situation: An Exploratory Approach

ABSTRACT. The low ecological validity of much of the research on deception detection is a limitation recognized by researchers in the field. Consequently, the present studies investigated subjective cues to deception using the real life, high stakes situation of people making public appeals for help with missing or murdered relatives. It was expected that cues related to affect would be particularly salient in this context. Study 1 was a qualitative investigation identifying cues to deception reportedly used by people accurate at detecting deception. Studies 2 and 3 were then empirical investigations that mainly employed the cues reported in Study 1. A number of subjective cues were found to discriminate between honest and deceptive appeals, including some previously unidentified cues, and cues likely to be context-specific. Most could be categorized under the themes of authenticity of emotion, and negative and positive affective reactions to the appealer. It is concluded that some cues to deception may emerge only in real life, high stakes situations; however, it is argued that some of these may be influenced by observers’ perceptions of the characteristics of offenders, rather than acts of deception per se.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

When deception influences memory: the implication of theory of mind

When deceiving, one should remember to whom a falsified story was previously told; otherwise he or she may include inconsistencies, and the deception will probably be discovered. Bearing this in mind, we investigated the potential relationship between deception and the ability to remember to whom a piece of information was previously told (i.e., destination memory). Forty-one adults were given a destination memory task in which they had to decide to whom proverbs had previously been told. They were also given a questionnaire about deception (e.g., “I sometimes tell lies if I have to) and a cognitive theory of mind task in which they had to predict the behaviour of protagonists who hold a mistaken belief about the state of the world. Results showed a positive correlation between deception and destination memory (p <?.001), a relationship that was further mediated by cognitive theory of mind ability (p?<?.01). Deception requires monitoring and inferring what targets know, suspect, and believe. This monitoring ability (i.e., cognitive theory of mind) results in better processing of the target and consequently better destination memory. By showing the involvement of deception and theory of mind in destination memory, our findings emphasize the memory variations in social and interpersonal interactions.     

Deception and truth detection when analyzing nonverbal and verbal cues

In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.