Influence of tonal and temporal expectations on chord processing and on completion judgments of chord sequences

Pitch and time are two principal form-bearing dimensions in Western tonal music. Research on melody perception has shown that listeners develop expectations about "What" note is coming next and "When" in time it will occur. Our study used sequences of chords (i.e., simultaneously sounding notes) to investigate the influence of these expectations on chord processing (Experiments 1 and 4) and subjective judgments of completion (Experiments 2 and 3). Both tasks showed an influence of tonal relations and temporal regularities: expected events occurring at the expected moment were processed faster and led to higher completion judgments. However, pitch and time dimensions interacted only for completion judgments. The present outcome suggests that for chord perception the influence of pitch and time might depend on the required processing: with a more global judgment favoring interactive influences in contrast to a task focusing on local chord processing.     

When thoughts don’t feel like they used to: Changing feelings of subjective ease in judgments of the past

Thinking about the past is critical to everyday experiences, but people are not unbiased when doing so. Feelings of subjective ease that accompany generating reasons for known or alternative outcomes influence hindsight bias. But people do not always make decisions immediately after thinking about issues. Three experiments demonstrated that generating versus reading earlier generated reasons has markedly different effects on judgments, with theoretical and practical implications. Inevitability judgments were consistent with feelings of ease when generating reasons, but with numbers of reasons (content) when later reading those reasons. Experiments 2 and 3 also found that feelings of ease can be reconstructed if people reconsider their feelings when initially generating reasons. Discussion centers on the operation of subjective ease and its role in understanding judgment and decision making.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

Bayes and blickets: effects of knowledge on causal induction in children and adults

People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in which participants learned about the causal properties of a set of objects. The studies varied the two factors that our Bayesian approach predicted should be relevant to causal induction: the prior probability with which causal relations exist, and the assumption of a deterministic or a probabilistic relation between cause and effect. Adults' judgments (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) were in close correspondence with the quantitative predictions of the model, and children's judgments (Experiments 3 and 5) agreed qualitatively with this account.     

Gauging possibilities for action based on friction underfoot

Standing and walking generate information about friction underfoot. Five experiments examined whether walkers use such perceptual information for prospective control of locomotion. In particular, do walkers integrate information about friction underfoot with visual cues for sloping ground ahead to make adaptive locomotor decisions? Participants stood on low-, medium-, and high-friction surfaces on a flat platform and made perceptual judgments for possibilities for locomotion over upcoming slopes. Perceptual judgments did not match locomotor abilities: Participants tended to overestimate their abilities on low-friction slopes and underestimate on high-friction slopes (Experiments 1-4). Accuracy improved only for judgments made while participants were in direct contact with the slope (Experiment 5), highlighting the difficulty of incorporating information about friction underfoot into a plan for future actions.     

Strategy selection in causal reasoning: when beliefs and covariation collide.

The present study investigated how people combine covariation information (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) with pre-existing beliefs (White, 1989) when evaluating causal hypotheses. Three experiments, using both within- and between-subjects designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Experiment 2, this interaction was observed when participants made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in participants' metacognitive judgments: Participants indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based cues. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. The findings were most consistent with White's (1989) causal power theory, which suggests that covariation information is more likely to be considered relevant to believable than unbelievable causes.     

Judgments about forces in described interactions between objects

In 4 experiments, participants made judgments about forces exerted and resistances put up by objects involved in described interactions. Two competing hypotheses were tested: (1) that judgments are derived from the same knowledge base that is thought to be the source of perceptual impressions of forces that occur with visual stimuli, and (2) that judgments are generated using simple models or heuristics for deriving force judgments from kinematic information. The results show some similarities with perceptual impression research, particularly that an active object is judged to exert more force on an inactive object than the latter exerts on the former. However, most of the available kinematic information had little or no effect on judgment, supporting the hypothesis that force judgments are generated according to simple rules. Presentation of information about damage to the objects resulted in use of all available kinds of information; this could reflect greater imageability of damage information than kinematic information.     

We are, therefore they aren’t: Ingroup construal as a standard of comparison for outgroup judgments

Five studies tested the assumptions: (a) that ingroups are habitually used as a standard of comparison for outgroup judgments, and (b) that outgroup judgments are generally contrasted away from a momentary construal of the ingroup. Results generally support these assumptions. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated increased activation levels of ingroup knowledge as a result of corresponding outgroup judgments. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that outgroup judgments depend not only on cognitively accessible outgroup exemplars, but also on accessible ingroup exemplars. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the impact of accessible ingroup exemplars on outgroup judgments is mediated by changes in the construal of the ingroup, such that: (a) outgroups were judged lower with regard to a given trait the higher participants perceived their ingroup with regard to that trait, and (b) controlling for the effect of ingroup construal attenuated the obtained effects on outgroup judgments.     

Feeling like you know who you are: perceived true self-knowledge and meaning in life

The essence of who a person really is has been labeled the "true self," and an emerging area of research suggests that this self-concept plays an important role in the creation of a fulfilling existence. Three studies investigate the role of the subjective feeling that one possesses knowledge of one's true self in meaning in life judgments. Consistently, the perception of availability of true self-knowledge (operationalized as the metacognitive experience of ease in describing one's true self) predicted meaning in life judgments over and above other potentially related constructs such as mood and self-esteem. Conversely, the subjective availability of knowledge of how one actually behaves (i.e., one's actual self) was unrelated to meaning in life judgments. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

On the subjective quality of social justice: the role of affect as information in the psychology of justice judgments

This article argues that it is not uncommon for people forming justice judgments to lack information that is most relevant in the particular situation. In information-uncertain conditions, people may therefore construct justice judgments by relying on how they feel about the events they have encountered, and justice judgments may hence be strongly influenced by affect information. Findings show that in information-uncertain conditions, the affective states that people had been in prior and unrelated to the justice event indeed strongly influenced their justice judgments. These findings thus reveal that in situations of information uncertainty, people's judgments of justice can be very subjective, susceptible to affective states that have no logical relationship with the justice judgments they are constructing. Implications for the social psychology of justice and the literature on social cognition and affect are discussed.     

Schematic knowledge changes what judgments of learning predict in a source memory task

Source monitoring can be influenced by information that is external to the study context, such as beliefs and general knowledge (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). We investigated the extent to which metamnemonic judgments predict memory for items and sources when schematic information about the sources is or is not provided at encoding. Participants made judgments of learning (JOLs) to statements presented by two speakers and were informed of the occupation of each speaker either before or after the encoding session. Replicating earlier work, prior knowledge decreased participants’ tendency to erroneously attribute statements to schematically consistent but episodically incorrect speakers. The origin of this effect can be understood by examining the relationship between JOLs and performance: JOLs were equally predictive of item and source memory in the absence of prior knowledge, but were exclusively predictive of source memory when participants knew of the relationship between speakers and statements during study. Background knowledge determines the information that people solicit in service of metamnemonic judgments, suggesting that these judgments reflect control processes during encoding that reduce schematic errors.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: The role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Effects of salience and time pressure on ratings of social causality

A model is proposed to account for the effects of a target person's salience on judgments of that target. It is argued that salience leads to more extreme inferences in the direction implied by prior knowledge that is relevant to the judgment. This knowledge may include both specific information about the target being rated and general information about the class of stimuli to which the target belongs. Two experiments supported these hypotheses. When subjects were under time pressure to make judgments of a target person's influence in a social situation, their judgments increased with the salience of the target when they had prior knowledge that the target was generally high in social influence. However, their judgments decreased with the target's salience when subjects had prior knowledge that the target was generally low in social influence. When subjects were given ample time to make their judgments, however, the effects of target salience were attenuated. Possible implications of these findings for prior research on salience effects are discussed.     

Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

Does evaluative learning rely on the perception of contingency?: manipulating contingency and US density during evaluative conditioning

An experiment is reported studying the impact of objective contingency and contingency judgments on cross-modal evaluative conditioning (EC). Both contingency judgments and evaluative responses were measured after a contingency learning task in which previously neutral sounds served as either weak or strong predictors of affective pictures. Experimental manipulations of contingency and US density were shown to affect contingency judgments. Stronger contingencies were perceived with high contingency and with low US density. The contingency learning task also produced a reliable EC effect. The magnitude of this effect was influenced by an interaction of statistical contingency and US density. Furthermore, the magnitude of EC was correlated with the subjective contingency judgments. Taken together, the results imply that propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship, as reflected in contingency judgments, moderates evaluative learning. The data are discussed with respect to different accounts of EC.     

Persistence during extinction: Are judgments of persistence affected by contingency information?

The partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE), defined as increased behavioral persistence following intermittent reward, is considered an important outcome of instrumental learning contingencies, both inside and outside the laboratory. Since adults have a rich experience with situations in which desired outcomes depend on instrumental responding, we asked whether that experience affects judgments of persistence when relevant contingency information is manipulated. Subjects read simple scenarios with information about behaviors generated by high vs. low reward rate, and then judged the resultant persistence of these behaviors under no-reward conditions. Studies 1 and 2 found no evidence that persistence judgments were affected by contingency information in naive subjects. Studies 3 and 4 compared groups with and without explicit knowledge about behavioral psychology and thus tested possible effects of that knowledge for persistence more directly. Judgments in naive subjects were not reliably influenced by reward rate information, but subjects possessing expert knowledge demonstrated judgments that were reliably affected by contingency information. The results indicate that people do not generate generalized knowledge from normal experience with occasional vs. regular reward. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed.     

Learning geographical information from hypothetical maps

People show biases or distortions in their geographical judgments, such as mistakenly judging Rome to be south of Chicago (the Chicago-Rome illusion). These errors may derive from either perceptual heuristics or categorical organization. However, previous work on geographic knowledge has generally examined people's judgments of real-world locations for which learning history is unknown. This article reports experiments on the learning of hypothetical geographical spaces, in which participants acquired information in a fashion designed to control real-world factors, such as variable travel experiences or stereotypes about other countries, as well as to mimic initial encounters with locations through reading or conventional school-based geography education. Five experiments combine to suggest that biases in judgment based on learning of this kind are different in key regards from those seen with real-world geography and may be based more on the use of perceptual heuristics than on categorical organization.     

Eyeheight-scaled information about affordances: a study of sitting and stair climbing

Previous work has shown that both the perceived and actual critical (maximum) heights of surfaces that afford "sitting on " and "climbing on" can be expressed as constant proportions of each actor's leg length. The current study provides evidence that these judgments of critical action boundaries are based on an existing source of size and distance information that is already scaled with reference to the actor's eyeheight. In Experiment 1 changes in judgments of "perceived eyeheight" (an index of the intrinsic scalar) as a function of viewing distance were shown to be highly correlated with changes in the maximum height that was perceived to afford sitting on or climbing on. In Experiments 2 and 3 observers wore 10-cm blocks and made judgments about whether the heights of various surfaces afforded sitting or climbing. The use of eyeheight-scaled information as the basis for their estimates predicted the obtained pattern of errors in these judgments. With a modicum of experience wearing the blocks, however, observers were able to retune accurately their critical action boundary to a degree that would not have been predicted from their consistent overestimation of the height of the block on which they were standing. These results have implications for understanding how observers obtain information about their specific action boundary.