Are Decisions Made by Group Representatives More Risk Averse? The Effect of Sense of Responsibility

We tested the hypothesis that a sense of responsibility drives group representatives' decisions to be more risk averse compared with decisions made by individuals. The hypothesis was supported when the monetary considerations (i.e., payoff inequality and the magnitude effect) were controlled for in the potential gain domain as well as in the potential loss domain. Evidence showed that this is because the group representatives were concerned about how they would view themselves (e.g., guilt and self‐blame) and also how they would be viewed by others (i.e., to avoid being blamed and looked down upon by others). This study provided new insights into understanding group representatives' decision making under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Risk Taking in Decision Making for Others Versus the Self1

In two studies, we examined people's level of risk taking when making monetary decisions for other people rather than for themselves. Experiment 1 examined the role of regret in these situations; results show that regret concerns led to increased risk avoidance both when participants made decisions for other people as well as when making decisions for themselves. Experiment 2 tested whether skill tasks would lead to greater risk avoidance when the decision was for another person versus for oneself. This hypothesis was not supported, although men were more risk seeking than were women in both situations. Taken together, these studies suggest that many of the findings from risk research on individual decision making regarding financial situations generalize to decision making for others.     

Studies in group decision I: Social space,patterns of communication and group concensus

The discovery of the effects of risky shift focusses the interest on the study of decision processes. Nevertheless the researches carried on until now have always shown confusion between the theoretical and experimental analysis of these processes and the risk-related behavior. In the first part of the article the authors try to clear this confusion as well as to define the conditions of a systematic study of the mechanisms of decision leading either to an averaging or to a polarization of individual views. The authors insist on the necessity to compare groups rather than individuals to groups. To start with, one hypothesis concerning the effects of group organization on the degree of polarization of views is proposed. The experiment described in the second part of the article confirms the hypothesis: A group in which individuals have the possibility to communicate with each other and to interact directly take more extreme decisions than a group deprived of this possibility. It is presumptuous and inexact to state that groups take more extreme risk than individuals whereas it is right to say that certain groups take risks when circumstances are favorable.     

Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well Has the Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?

Even after a quarter of a century, the groupthink hypothesis remains an influential framework for understanding the origins of group decision making fiascoes. Much of the original empirical evidence for this hypothesis was derived from a series of incisive qualitative studies of major policy fiascoes, including the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and U.S. military escalation of the Vietnam War. In the 25 years since the groupthink hypothesis was first formulated, new evidence, including recently declassified documents, rich oral histories, and informative memoirs by key participants in these decisions have become available to scholars, casting new light on the decision making process behind both the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. Much of this new evidence does not support Janis's original characterization of these processes. In particular, it suggests that dysfunctional group dynamics stemming from group members' strivings to maintain group cohesiveness were not as prominent a causal factor in the deliberation process as Janis argued. Instead, the evidence suggests that the decision making process was heavily influenced by how Presidents Kennedy and Johnson construed their options. Both Kennedy and Johnson tended to evaluate their alternatives primarily in terms of their political consequences, especially the desire to avoid what they construed as unacceptable political losses and potential damage to their reputations. Viewed in aggregate, this new evidence suggests that the groupthink hypothesis overstates the influence of small group dynamics, while understating the role political considerations played in these decisions. Thus, although both decisions may have been seriously flawed, the logic of this failure should be attributed to political psychological rather than social psychological processes.     

I felt low and my purse feels light: depleting mood regulation attempts affect risk decision making

We propose that negative affect can induce people to engage in risky decisions. We test two alternative hypotheses as to how this effect may emerge. The mood repair hypothesis states that risky choices in risk decision making serve as a means to repair one's negative affect. The depletion hypothesis, in contrast, states that risky choices in risk decision making are the mere consequence of a state of depletion resulting from engagement in active mood regulation attempts. The results of a first laboratory study establish a link between risky choices in risk decision making and negative affect. Subsequent experiments provide evidence that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts, rather than mood repair, is the underlying process for this link. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Decision Outcome Dispersion Upon Organizational Decision Making

The effects of varying decision outcome dispersion on organizational decision making were investigated under individual and group decision making conditions. Thirty-six female and pg]36 male subjects made decisions for organizational decision scenarios in which outcomes affected primarily the decision maker, people other than the decision maker, or a group of which the decision maker was a member. Subjects rated their levels of perceived risk and confidence in their decisions and made decisions within a simulated context of either a small or a large organization. Results indicated that subjects perceived significantly less risk and more confidence in their decisions when outcomes affected primarily themselves rather than others regardless of whether the decisions were made individually or by a group. Males perceived their decisions as significantly more risky than females. Induced organizational size did not significantly influence decision making.

     

Group Size Effects on Risk Perception: A Test of Several Hypotheses

Yamaguchi (1998) found that people perceived a lower level of risk in a group than when they were alone, despite the fact that being in a group did not reduce the objective level of risk. Three experiments were conducted to examine several potential explanations for this effect. Experiment 1 replicated the group size effect in self-perception as well as the perception of the risk level of others. Results did not support the interdependence hypothesis and the affiliation hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 tested a hypothesis based on the availability heuristic. The group size effect was reduced or nullified when the target of risk judgment was associated with risk-seeking behavior or when an accident, in which many people died, was made salient.     

Framing effects in group investment decision making: role of group polarization

Prospect theory proposes that framing effects result in a preference for risk-averse choices in gain situations and risk-seeking choices in loss situations. However, in group polarization situations, groups show a pronounced tendency to shift toward more extreme positions than those they initially held. Whether framing effects in group decision making are more prominent as a result of the group-polarization effect was examined. Purposive sampling of 120 college students (57 men, 63 women; M age = 20.1 yr., SD = 0.9) allowed assessment of relative preference between cautious and risky choices in individual and group decisions. Findings indicated that both group polarization and framing effects occur in investment decisions. More importantly, group decisions in a gain situation appear to be more cautious, i.e., risk averse, than individual decisions, whereas group decisions in the loss situation appear to be more risky than individual decisions. Thus, group decision making may expand framing effects when it comes to investment choices through group polarization.     

Evidence for Implicit Risk: Delay Facilitates the Processing of Uncertainty

Humans and other animals discount the value of rewards over time. One explanation for this is that delayed rewards may be less certain than immediate rewards, what has been referred to as the implicit risk hypothesis. Although this explanation is widely accepted, little research has directly assessed the validity of the implicit risk hypothesis. In the current study, we present two experiments in which participants made decisions about rewards involving both delay and uncertainty. By manipulating the order in which information was presented, we were able to investigate whether delay information facilitates beliefs about uncertainty and vice versa. It was found that participants were more likely to prefer larger, delayed rewards when information about delay was presented before information about uncertainty than when the information was presented in the opposite order. Additionally, we describe a process model that implements the implicit risk hypothesis and show that it is consistent with the observed patterns of data. These results support the implicit risk hypothesis and suggest that information about delay facilitates the processing of information about uncertainty. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loss aversion in the eye and in the heart: The autonomic nervous system's responses to losses

The common view in psychology and neuroscience is that losses loom larger than gains, leading to a negativity bias in behavioral responses and Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) activation. However, evidence has accumulated that in decisions under risk and uncertainty individuals often impart similar weights to negative and positive outcomes. We examine the role of the ANS in decisions under uncertainty, and its consistency with the behavioral responses. In three studies, we show that losses lead to heightened autonomic responses, compared to equivalent gains (as indicated by pupil dilation and increased heart rate) even in situations where the average decision maker exhibits no loss aversion. Moreover, in the studied tasks autonomic responses were not associated with risk taking propensities. These results are interpreted by the hypothesis that losses signal the subjective importance of global outcome patterns. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sharing Dilemma: Joining Cooperative Groups and Sharing Resources as a Means of Coping with Environmental Risk

The “social insurance” hypothesis posits that individuals join cooperative groups and share resources in order to reduce environmental risk. Despite its significance for explaining cooperative groups' formation, in small‐scale and in developing societies, the hypothesis has been subjected to little experimental testing. The present research is designed to examine the relative weight of the motivation for social insurance compared with other psychological motivations for sharing risk. We conducted two studies to test the tendency to share risk under different risk conditions and for groups of different sizes. A third experiment extends the risk‐sharing research to situations involving losses instead of gains. The findings of the first two studies lend strong support to the risk‐sharing hypothesis in the gain domain. For the loss domain, the results of the third experiment demonstrate an intriguing shift from strong reluctance to join groups under lower risk, to ubiquitous readiness to join groups under higher risk. We discuss these results in light of prospect theory and decisions from experience. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power1

Recent research in risk perception has examined the role of affect and worldviews as orienting dispositions that guide people's decisions about complex and risky topics such as nuclear energy. This study tests and supports the hypothesis that worldviews and affect-laden imagery are highly predictive of perceptions of risk from nuclear power and support for that technology. Furthermore, affect and worldviews each contribute independently to the prediction of nuclear support. We find also that a person's affective imagery associated with nuclear power is systematically related to their worldviews. We conclude that affect and worldviews appear to play similar roles as orienting mechanisms, helping people navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world. The implication of this view for the practice of risk communication is briefly discussed.     

Forgiveness results from integrating information about relationship value and exploitation risk

Exploitation is a fact of life for social organisms, and natural selection gives rise to revenge mechanisms that are designed to deter such exploitations. However, humans may also possess cognitive forgiveness mechanisms designed to promote the restoration of valuable social relationships following exploitation. In the current article, the authors test the hypothesis that decisions about forgiveness result from a computational system that combines information about relationship value and exploitation risk to produce decisions about whom to forgive following interpersonal offenses. The authors examined the independent and interactive effects of relationship value and exploitation risk across two studies. In Study 1, controlling for other constructs related to forgiveness, the authors assessed relationship value and exploitation risk. In Study 2, participants experienced experimental manipulations of relationship value and exploitation risk. Across studies, using hypothetical and actual offenses and varied forgiveness measures, the combination of low exploitation risk and high relationship value predicted the greatest forgiveness.     

心理距离与后果严重性对人身安全决策的影响

已有研究发现决策者在为自己与不同他人决策时,其风险偏好存在差异。但是当对后果严重性不同的事件进行决策时,上述结果也并不总是如此。为了探究在人身安全情境中决策者面对后果严重程度不同的任务时,为自己和为他人决策时风险偏好的差异,实验一采用人际亲密度和决策所带来消极结果的严重程度分别操纵心理距离与后果严重性,结果发现决策者在后果严重任务中的决策比后果不严重任务更保守,为自己和为陌生人决策均比为最好朋友决策更冒险。这可能是由于决策者知觉到的决策责任不同所致。因此在实验一的基础上实验二引入决策责任这一变量,考察其在心理距离对风险决策影响中的作用,研究结果证明了我们的假设。     

Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceived susceptibility and self-protective behavior: a field experiment to encourage home radon testing

Tested in a field experiment (N = 647) the hypothesis that perceptions of personal susceptibility are important in decisions to test one's home for radioactive radon gas. Experimental group subjects received a personal telephone call to tell them they lived in a high-risk area and a personal letter to reinforce the telephone message. After the intervention, experimental subjects were significantly more likely than minimal-treatment subjects to acknowledge the possibility of high radon levels in their homes. Perceptions of susceptibility and illness severity were significantly correlated with orders of radon test kits and with testing intentions. Nevertheless, there were no differences between groups in test orders or intentions. Results are discussed in terms of the difficulty of getting people to acknowledge susceptibility and the factors other than risk perceptions that influence self-protective behavior.     

Decision making under time pressure: An independent test of sequential sampling models

Choice probability and choice response time data from a risk-taking decision-making task were compared with predictions made by a sequential sampling model. The behavioral data, consistent with the model, showed that participants were less likely to take an action as risk levels increased, and that time pressure did not have a uniform effect on choice probability. Under time pressure, participants were more conservative at the lower risk levels but were more prone to take risks at the higher levels of risk. This crossover interaction reflected a reduction of the threshold within a single decision strategy rather than a switching of decision strategies. Response time data, as predicted by the model, showed that participants took more time to make decisions at the moderate risk levels and that time pressure reduced response time across all risk levels, but particularly at the those risk levels that took longer time with no pressure. Finally, response time data were used to rule out the hypothesis that time pressure effects could be explained by a fast-guess strategy.     

Comparing Risky Decision Making Under Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences

In a series of three experiments, subjects made risky decisions under conditions of hypothetical or real consequences. Task variations across experiments included: (1) type of risk (monetary gambles or investments of time and effort), (2) within-subject and between-subjects manipulations of consequence condition, and (3) single or multiple decisions. The hypothesis of no difference between choices in real and hypothetical consequence conditions was retained in each experiment. Supplemental analyses ruled out various “artifactual” interpretations of the null results. Discussion focused on conditions in which researchers can and cannot infer decision makers’ actual risk preferences from their responses in laboratory tasks.