Self-relevance and wishful thinking: Facilitation and distortion in source monitoring

When making source attributions, people tend to attribute desirable statements to reliable sources and undesirable statements to unreliable sources, a phenomenon known as the wishful thinking effect (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005). In the present study, we examined the influence of wishful thinking on source monitoring for self-relevant information. On one hand, wishful thinking is expected, because self-relevant desires are presumably strong. However, self-relevance is known to confer a memory advantage and may thus provide protection from desire-based biases. In Experiment 1, source memory for self-relevant information was contrasted against source memory for information relevant to others and for neutral information. Results indicated that self-relevant information was affected by wishful thinking and was remembered more accurately than was other information. Experiment 2 showed that the magnitude of the self-relevant wishful thinking effect did not increase with a delay.     

Illusory correlation and attitude-based vested interest

The present studies test whether having a ‘vested interest’ in a particular outcome affects perceived covariation. Vested interest was defined as a function of whether Dutch university students were in favour or against the implementation of a threatening policy (receiving lectures in English as opposed to the native Dutch). In both studies subjects were told that this policy would be tried out at either their own or another comparable university, and that the university chosen would be the one with the greatest proportion of support for the plan. In Study 1 subjects (n = 151) were presented with statements expressing pro or contra attitudes and arguments to the policy. These were ostensibly derived from students at both universities but university affiliation was not indicated. In Study 2 (n = 114) similar information was provided but the statements were attributed to students from the two universities, such that there was an equal proportion of opposition/support for the plan at both universities. We hypothesized that illusory correlations would reflect the vested interest of attitude such that students opposing the policy would overestimate the proportion of opponents to supporters at their own university compared to those in favour of the policy. The results of both studies supported our hypothesis and they also revealed attitude to be a more important predictor of illusory correlation than perceived personal consequences for themselves. The prediction that illusory correlations would be weaker in Study 2 than in Study 1, because it provides less scope for bias, was not supported. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Inference of one's attitude from behavior recalled under linguistically manipulated cognitive sets

To test Bem's (1972) hypothesis that individuals infer their attitudes from information about their behavior in a given context, subjects were asked their attitudes about a course after reporting their behaviors for the course and receiving a linguistic manipulation intended to produce an intrinsic or extrinsic cognitive context (set). Intrinsic set was manipulated by having subjects complete statements of the form “I generally do X because I …”. Extrinsic set was manipulated by having subjects complete statements of the form “I generally do X in order to …”. A pretest found that the intrinsic form resulted in a class perceived as more interesting than useful while the extrinsic form resulted in a class perceived as more useful than interesting. The present experiment found that subjects' attitudes are derived from information about different behaviors under the two cognitive sets. The attitudes of extrinsic set subjects were correlated with behaviors relevant to obtaining course out-comes like grades (contingent behaviors) and uncorrelated with behaviors relevant to personal interest (noncontingent behaviors); the opposite was found for intrinsic set subjects.     

On some sources of metacomprehension

Metacomprehension is defined as readers' evaluations of their performance on a task, involving inferences derived from a text. In two studies metacomprehension was related to characteristics of the inferences required, in terms of 1) amount of information to be kept in long-term memory (Study 1), 2) amount of information to be kept in short-term memory (Study 2) and 3) existence of negatives (Study 2). In the first study, 41 psychology students read a text and afterwards judged 1) the correctness of a set of pragmatic inference statements, and 2) their confidence in being correct or the difficulty of judging each statement. In the second study, 81 high-school students read a text and simultaneously judged 1) the correctness of a set of logical inference statements and 2) their confidence in being correct and the difficulty of judging each statement. In both studies, metacomprehension was not significantly correlated with actual performance. The results indicate that one important source of metacomprehension consists in information processing load. In Study 1, long-term memory requirements represent this load, in Study 2, the existence of negatives.     

Questions versus statements: Challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Questions versus statements: challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Accuracy and confidence in detecting truths andlies in elaborations and denials:Truth bias, lie bias and individual differences

Accuracy in the ability to detect truths and lies isimportant in a legal setting. It might be used as atool in police investigations to eliminate potentialsuspects, to check the truthfulness of informants orto examine contradictory statements of witnesses andsuspects in the same case. A consistent finding in thedetection of deception literature is the truthbias: People's accuracy at detecting truths isusually higher than their accuracy at detecting lies.The present article examines whether the existence ofa truth bias depends on the type of lie. It is arguedthat a truth bias may occur when people judgeextensive statements (e.g. elaborations), but that alie bias may occur when people judge statements whichdo not provide much verbal information (e.g. denials).Fifty participants (college students) were exposed to20 video fragments of 20 people telling elaborations(10) or denials (10). Half of the elaborations anddenials were truthful, the other half were deceptive.After each fragment, the participants were asked toindicate whether the person was lying or telling thetruth and how confident they were in their decisionmaking. As predicted, with regard to elaborations atruth bias was found and with regard to denials a liebias was found. In other words, people have difficultyin accurately judging deceptive elaborations andtruthful denials. The study further revealedindividual differences in participants' confidence atdetecting deceit. The more socially anxious/shy theparticipants reported themselves to be, the lessconfident they were in their ability to detect deceit.Also, the more extraverted they themselves reported tobe, the more confident they were in their ability todetect deceit. The importance of confidence onimproving people's ability to detect deceit will bediscussed.     

Trauma and memory: effects of post-event misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval

The present study concerned effects of misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval on eyewitness memory for a traumatic event (a vivid murder). Relations between misinformation acceptance and compliance were also examined. The classic three-stage misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1979) was employed, with a multi-component recognition test added. Either immediately or 2 weeks after viewing a distressing film, 232 adults read a narrative (misleading or control) about the murder and then took a recognition test that tapped memory for central and peripheral details. Test-item order either matched the chronology of the film or was randomly determined. Significant misinformation effects were obtained. Moreover, control participants were more accurate in response to questions about central than peripheral information; however, this was not so for misinformed participants. Sequential but not random retrieval order resulted in a higher proportion of correct responses for central as opposed to peripheral misinformation questions. Compliance was significantly related to misinformation effects. Delay increased participants' suggestibility, impaired memory accuracy, and produced higher confidence ratings for misinformed participants compared to controls. Findings indicate that even for a highly negative event, adults' memory is not immune to inaccuracies and suggestive influences.     

Some effort for some: further evidence that scalar implicatures are effortful

Under the assumption of the principle of cooperation (Grice, 1989), a statement such as "some eels are fish" is thought to be false since it contains less information than is considered sufficient. However, the statement is logically sound since the meaning of "some" is compatible with "all". Currently, the primary interpretation of such underinformative statements remains subject to debate. According to Levinson (2000), the pragmatic "some but not all" interpretation is the default interpretation, while others (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) argue that this pragmatic interpretation only comes to the fore when relevant within the context and is thus considered secondary to the logical "some and perhaps all" interpretation. In this study, three factors that may influence the answer pattern are studied: task load, working memory capacity, and repetition of the statements. In Experiment 1, we used a secondary task paradigm to manipulate the cognitive load under which a number of underinformative statements had to be judged. We observed that for participants with a rather limited working memory span it is harder to reach a pragmatic interpretation under cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition of the statements. We observed that with a higher number of filler statements, participants produced fewer consistent answer patterns. This study provides further evidence against the automaticity of the pragmatic interpretation: It shows that the pragmatic interpretation requires more cognitive effort than the logical interpretation and that increasing the number of filler statements inhibits the development of a response strategy.     

Remembering makes evidence compelling: retrieval from memory can give rise to the illusion of truth

The illusion of truth is traditionally described as the increase in perceived validity of statements when they are repeated (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). However, subsequent work has demonstrated that the effect can arise due to the increased familiarity or fluency afforded by repetition and not necessarily to repetition per se. We examine the case of information retrieved from memory. Recently experienced information is expected to be subsequently reexperienced as more fluent and familiar than novel information (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Therefore, the possibility exists that information retrieved from memory, because it is subjectively re-experienced at retrieval, would be more fluent or familiar than when it was first learned and would thus lead to an increase in perceived validity. Using a method to indirectly poll the perceived truth of factual statements, our experiment demonstrated that information retrieved from memory does indeed give rise to an illusion of truth. The effect was larger than when statements were explicitly repeated twice and was of comparable size to when statements were repeated 4 times. We conclude that memory retrieval is a powerful method for increasing the perceived validity of statements (and subsequent illusion of truth) and that the illusion of truth is a robust effect that can be observed even without directly polling the factual statements in question.     

THE "RANGE OF CONVENIENCE" OF PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS AND CONFIDENCE IN EVALUATING SELF

In two independent experiments, participants evaluated themselves dichotomously on bipolar constructs, and also indicated on a scale of 1 to 10 their degree of confidence in the validity of each of their own self-evaluations. They also rank-ordered the constructs in terms of their relative "usefulness for understanding people." The same 12 constructs were supplied to all 40 participants in the first experiment (e.g., generous-stingy), whereas 10 constructs were elicited individually from each of 53 participants in the second one. A significant correlation was found between construct rankings and participants' degree of confidence in their own self-evaluations across both elicited (r = 0.76) and supplied (r = 0.80) constructs. Participants using elicited constructs expressed significantly more confidence in their self-evaluations than did participants using supplied constructs. These findings were interpreted within the framework of Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory.     

The cognitive interview: is its benefit affected by the level of witness emotion?

This research investigated whether a witness's emotion could influence the accuracy of statements obtained by the use of a cognitive interview. A total of 70 first-year university students viewed a video depicting a road accident. Electrodes were attached to their arms in order to send fictitious electric shocks during the video (high-arousal condition) or to measure physiological signs (low-arousal condition). One week later, they were interviewed using either a cognitive interview (CI) or a structured interview (SI). It was hypothesised that the beneficial effect of the cognitive interview would be amplified by a high level of arousal, particularly concerning central aspects of the video. Results indicated that a CI elicited more correct central and peripheral details recalled, whatever the level of arousal inducted during the encoding of the to-be remembered event. Furthermore, high-arousal participants produced more accurate testimonies concerning peripheral details than participants exposed to a low level of arousal. No interaction between interview and emotion was found. The theoretical and practical implications for interviewing witnesses are described.     

Electrophysiological differences in the processing of affective information in words and pictures

It is generally assumed that affective picture viewing is related to higher levels of physiological arousal than is the reading of emotional words. However, this assertion is based mainly on studies in which the processing of either words or pictures has been investigated under heterogenic conditions. Positive, negative, relaxing, neutral, and background (stimulus fragments) words and pictures were presented to subjects in two experiments under equivalent experimental conditions. In Experiment 1, neutral words elicited an enhanced late positive component (LPC) that was associated with an increased difficulty in discriminating neutral from background stimuli. In Experiment 2, high-arousing pictures elicited an enhanced early negativity and LPC that were related to a facilitated processing for these stimuli. Thus, it seems that under some circumstances, the processing of affective information captures attention only with more biologically relevant stimuli. Also, these data might be better interpreted on the basis of those models that postulate a different access to affective information for words and pictures.     

Does the type of prompt affect the accuracy of information provided by alleged victims of abuse in forensic interviews?

Forty‐three victims of sexual abuse averaging 9.78 years of age and 52 youths who admitted abusing them were interviewed about the abusive incidents. Forensically relevant details provided by the victims were categorised as confirmed, contradicted or ignored by the perpetrators. Most (66.6%) of the details were ignored, but details were more likely to be confirmed when they were elicited using invitations (open‐ended free‐recall prompts) rather than focused prompts. However, similar effects were not evident with respect to contradictions. The results support predictions that information elicited using free‐recall prompts is more likely to be accurate than information elicited using focused prompts. Published in 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.     

Recall,recognition, and confidence patterns in eyewitness testimony

The diversity of methods, contents and tests used in the study of eyewitness memory may have contributed to discrepancies in results in this field. In this experiment, using incidental or intentional learning, we examine the recall and recognition of actions and details concerning the central and peripheral information of a kidnapping. A similar pattern emerges in free recall, hits and recognition confidence: scores are much higher in actions than in central details and there are almost no differences between peripheral actions and details, showing that the distribution of attentional resources is different for actions and details in central than in peripheral information. Although in recall the degree of error was low, in recognition false alarms, especially those in central actions, reduced the level of accuracy to even lower than chance performance in both incidental and intentional groups, also showing that subjects accept false but plausible contents with a high level of confidence. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attitude importance and the accumulation of attitude-relevant knowledge in memory

People who attach personal importance to an attitude are especially knowledgeable about the attitude object. This article tests an explanation for this relation: that importance causes the accumulation of knowledge by inspiring selective exposure to and selective elaboration of relevant information. Nine studies showed that (a) after watching televised debates between presidential candidates, viewers were better able to remember the statements made on policy issues on which they had more personally important attitudes; (b) importance motivated selective exposure and selective elaboration: Greater personal importance was associated with better memory for relevant information encountered under controlled laboratory conditions, and manipulations eliminating opportunities for selective exposure and selective elaboration eliminated the importance-memory accuracy relation; and (c) people do not use perceptions of their knowledge volume to infer how important an attitude is to them, but importance does cause knowledge accumulation.     

Judgment and Response Processes across Two Knowledge Domains

Wallsten and Gonzalez-Vallejo (1994) developed the Stochastic Judgment Model to account for true-false judgment and response processes in a single well-defined knowledge domain. This paper generalizes the model to a four-category rating task that encompasses two knowledge domains simultaneously. It then applies the model to an experiment in which Ph.D. students in history and English literature rated confidence in the truth of statements in both domains, and also decided which statement within a pair consisting of one from each domain was more likely true. Constrained versions of the general model fit the rating data very well and accurately predicted the pair-comparison (PC) choices. The results suggest that (a) the mean distance between the true and false statement distributions of confidence was greater in the better known domain; (b) judged confidence variability is greater in the domain of greater knowledge; while simultaneously (c) criterion variability is constant across domains; (d) the extreme response criteria are located symmetrically around the central one; which (e) is located to yield the usual bias to call statements true. Finally, cross-domain PC choices were very well predicted by assuming that respondents judged only the statement in the single domain they knew better and not well predicted by the more common assumption that they compare their levels of confidence in the two statements. Implications for the underlying cognitive processes are discussed including the effects of expertise.