Linguistically guided anticipatory eye movements in scene viewing

The present study replicated the well-known demonstration by Altmann and Kamide (1999) that listeners make linguistically guided anticipatory eye movements, but used photographs of scenes rather than clip-art arrays as the visual stimuli. When listeners heard a verb for which a particular object in a visual scene was the likely theme, they made earlier looks to this object (e.g., looks to a cake upon hearing The boy will eat …) than when they heard a control verb (The boy will move …). New data analyses assessed whether these anticipatory effects are due to a linguistic effect on the targeting of saccades (i.e., the where parameter of eye movement control), the duration of fixations (i.e., the when parameter), or both. Participants made fewer fixations before reaching the target object when the verb was selectionally restricting (e.g., will eat). However, verb type had no effect on the duration of individual eye fixations. These results suggest an important constraint on the linkage between spoken language processing and eye movement control: Linguistic input may influence only the decision of where to move the eyes, not the decision of when to move them.     

The role of context in object recognition

In the real world, objects never occur in isolation; they co-vary with other objects and particular environments, providing a rich source of contextual associations to be exploited by the visual system. A natural way of representing the context of an object is in terms of its relationship to other objects. Alternately, recent work has shown that a statistical summary of the scene provides a complementary and effective source of information for contextual inference, which enables humans to quickly guide their attention and eyes to regions of interest in natural scenes. A better understanding of how humans build such scene representations, and of the mechanisms of contextual analysis, will lead to a new generation of computer vision systems.     

Visual arguments

Three experiments investigated the use of verb argument structure by tracking participants' eye movements across a set of related pictures as they listened to sentences. The assumption was that listeners would naturally look at relevant pictures as they were mentioned or implied. The primary hypothesis was that a verb would implicitly introduce relevant entities (linguistic arguments) that had not yet been mentioned, and thus a picture corresponding to such an entity would draw anticipatory looks. For example, upon hearing ...mother suggested..., participants would look at a potential recipient of the suggestion. The only explicit task was responding to comprehension questions. Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated both the argument structure of the verb and the typicality/co-occurrence frequency of the target argument/adjunct, in order to distinguish between anticipatory looks to arguments specifically and anticipatory looks to pictures that were strongly associated with the verb, but did not have the linguistic status of argument. Experiment 3 manipulated argument status alone. In Experiments 1 and 3, there were more anticipatory looks to potential arguments than to potential adjuncts, beginning about 500 ms after the acoustic onset of the verb. Experiment 2 revealed a main effect of typicality. These findings indicate that both real world knowledge and argument structure guide visual attention within this paradigm, but that argument structure has a privileged status in focusing listener attention on relevant aspects of a visual scene.     

Core geometry in perspective

Research on animals, infants, children, and adults provides evidence that distinct cognitive systems underlie navigation and object recognition. Here we examine whether and how these systems interact when children interpret 2D edge‐based perspectival line drawings of scenes and objects. Such drawings serve as symbols early in development, and they preserve scene and object geometry from canonical points of view. Young children show limits when using geometry both in non‐symbolic tasks and in symbolic map tasks that present 3D contexts from unusual, unfamiliar points of view. When presented with the familiar viewpoints in perspectival line drawings, however, do children engage more integrated geometric representations? In three experiments, children successfully interpreted line drawings with respect to their depicted scene or object. Nevertheless, children recruited distinct processes when navigating based on the information in these drawings, and these processes depended on the context in which the drawings were presented. These results suggest that children are flexible but limited in using geometric information to form integrated representations of scenes and objects, even when interpreting spatial symbols that are highly familiar and faithful renditions of the visual world.     

Selective attention during scene perception: Evidence from negative priming

In two experiments, we examined the role of semantic scene content in guiding attention during scene viewing. In each experiment, performance on a lexical decision task was measured following the brief presentation of a scene. The lexical decision stimulus named an object that was either present or not present in the scene. The results of Experiment 1 revealed no priming from inconsistent objects (whose identities conflicted with the scene in which they appeared), but negative priming from consistent objects. The results of Experiment 2 indicated that negative priming from consistent objects occurs only when inconsistent objects are present in the scenes. Together, the results suggest that observers are likely to attend to inconsistent objects, and that representations of consistent objects are suppressed in the presence of an inconsistent object. Furthermore, the data suggest that inconsistent objects draw attention because they are relatively difficult to identify in an inappropriate context.     

Visual search for arbitrary objects in real scenes

How efficient is visual search in real scenes? In searches for targets among arrays of randomly placed distractors, efficiency is often indexed by the slope of the reaction time (RT) × Set Size function. However, it may be impossible to define set size for real scenes. As an approximation, we hand-labeled 100 indoor scenes and used the number of labeled regions as a surrogate for set size. In Experiment 1, observers searched for named objects (a chair, bowl, etc.). With set size defined as the number of labeled regions, search was very efficient (~5 ms/item). When we controlled for a possible guessing strategy in Experiment 2, slopes increased somewhat (~15 ms/item), but they were much shallower than search for a random object among other distinctive objects outside of a scene setting (Exp. 3: ~40 ms/item). In Experiments 4–6, observers searched repeatedly through the same scene for different objects. Increased familiarity with scenes had modest effects on RTs, while repetition of target items had large effects (>500 ms). We propose that visual search in scenes is efficient because scene-specific forms of attentional guidance can eliminate most regions from the “functional set size” of items that could possibly be the target.     

Constraints on spatial extrapolation in the mental representation of scenes: View-boundaries vs. object-boundaries

Viewers remember seeing information from outside the boundaries of a scene (boundary extension; BE). To determine if view-boundaries have a special status in scene perception, we sought to determine if object-boundaries would yield the same effect. In Experiment 1 eight “bird's-eye view” photographs containing single object clusters (a smaller object on top of a larger one) were presented. After the presentation, participants reconstructed four scenes by selecting among five different-sized cutouts of each object. BE occurred between the view-boundaries and the object cluster, but not between the smaller object and the larger object's boundaries. There was no consistent effect of the larger object's boundaries. Experiment 2 replicated these results using a drawing task. BE does not occur whenever a border surrounds an object, it occurs when the border signifies the edge of the view. We propose the BE reflects anticipatory representation of scene structure that supports scene comprehension and view integration.     

The time course of anticipatory constraint integration

Several studies have demonstrated that as listeners hear sentences describing events in a scene, their eye movements anticipate upcoming linguistic items predicted by the unfolding relationship between scene and sentence. While this may reflect active prediction based on structural or contextual expectations, the influence of local thematic priming between words has not been fully examined. In Experiment 1, we presented verbs (e.g., arrest) in active (Subject–Verb–Object) sentences with displays containing verb-related patients (e.g., crook) and agents (e.g., policeman). We examined patient and agent fixations following the verb, after the agent role had been filled by another entity, but prior to bottom-up specification of the object. Participants were nearly as likely to fixate agents “anticipatorily” as patients, even though the agent role was already filled. However, the patient advantage suggested simultaneous influences of both local priming and active prediction. In Experiment 2, using passive sentences (Object–Verb–Subject), we found stronger, but still graded influences of role prediction when more time elapsed between verb and target, and more syntactic cues were available. We interpret anticipatory fixations as emerging from constraint-based processes that involve both non-predictive thematic priming and active prediction.     

Scene and position specificity in visual memory for objects

This study investigated whether and how visual representations of individual objects are bound in memory to scene context. Participants viewed a series of naturalistic scenes, and memory for the visual form of a target object in each scene was examined in a 2-alternative forced-choice test, with the distractor object either a different object token or the target object rotated in depth. In Experiments 1 and 2, object memory performance was more accurate when the test object alternatives were displayed within the original scene than when they were displayed in isolation, demonstrating object-to-scene binding. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that episodic scene representations are formed through the binding of object representations to scene locations. Consistent with this hypothesis, memory performance was more accurate when the test alternatives were displayed within the scene at the same position originally occupied by the target than when they were displayed at a different position.     

Object-position binding in visual memory for natural scenes and object arrays

Nine experiments examined the means by which visual memory for individual objects is structured into a larger representation of a scene. Participants viewed images of natural scenes or object arrays in a change detection task requiring memory for the visual form of a single target object. In the test image, 2 properties of the stimulus were independently manipulated: the position of the target object and the spatial properties of the larger scene or array context. Memory performance was higher when the target object position remained the same from study to test. This same-position advantage was reduced or eliminated following contextual changes that disrupted the relative spatial relationships among contextual objects (context deletion, scrambling, and binding change) but was preserved following contextual change that did not disrupt relative spatial relationships (translation). Thus, episodic scene representations are formed through the binding of objects to scene locations, and object position is defined relative to a larger spatial representation coding the relative locations of contextual objects.     

The role of color in visual search in real-world scenes: evidence from contextual cuing

Because the importance of color in visual tasks such as object identification and scene memory has been debated, we sought to determine whether color is used to guide visual search in contextual cuing with real-world scenes. In Experiment 1, participants searched for targets in repeated scenes that were shown in one of three conditions: natural colors, unnatural colors that remained consistent across repetitions, and unnatural colors that changed on every repetition. We found that the pattern of learning was the same in all three conditions. In Experiment 2, we did a transfer test in which the repeating scenes were shown in consistent colors that suddenly changed on the last block of the experiment. The color change had no effect on search times, relative to a condition in which the colors did not change. In Experiments 3 and 4, we replicated Experiments 1 and 2, using scenes from a color-diagnostic category of scenes, and obtained similar results. We conclude that color is not used to guide visual search in real-world contextual cuing, a finding that constrains the role of color in scene identification and recognition processes.     

The role of context on boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a memory error in which observers remember more of a scene than they actually viewed. This error reflects one’s prediction that a scene naturally continues and is driven by scene schema and contextual knowledge. In two separate experiments we investigated the necessity of context and scene schema in BE. In Experiment 1, observers viewed scenes that either contained semantically consistent or inconsistent objects as well as objects on white backgrounds. In both types of scenes and in the no-background condition there was a BE effect; critically, semantic inconsistency in scenes reduced the magnitude of BE. In Experiment 2 when we used abstract shapes instead of meaningful objects, there was no BE effect. We suggest that although scene schema is necessary to elicit BE, contextual consistency is not required.     

Consistency effects between objects in scenes

How does context influence the perception of objects in scenes? Objects appear in a given setting with surrounding objects. Do objects in scenes exert contextual influences on each other? Do these influences interact with background consistency? In three experiments, we investigated the role of object-to-object context on object and scene perception. Objects (Experiments 1 and 3) and backgrounds (Experiment 2) were reported more accurately when the objects and their settings were consistent than when they were inconsistent, regardless of the number of foreground objects. In Experiment 3, related objects (from the same setting) were reported more accurately than were unrelated objects (from different settings), independently of consistency with the background. Consistent with an interactive model of scene processing, both object-to-object context and object-background context affect object perception.     

Infants detect changes in everyday scenes: The role of scene gist

When watching physical events, infants bring to bear prior knowledge about objects and readily detect changes that contradict physical rules. Here we investigate the possibility that scene gist may affect infants, as it affects adults, when detecting changes in everyday scenes. In Experiment 1, 15-month-old infants missed a perceptually salient change that preserved the gist of a generic outdoor scene; the same change was readily detected if infants had insufficient time to process the display and had to rely on perceptual information for change detection. In Experiment 2, 15-month-olds detected a perceptually subtle change that preserved the scene gist but violated the rule of object continuity, suggesting that physical rules may overpower scene gist in infants’ change detection. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 provided converging evidence for the effects of scene gist, showing that 15-month-olds missed a perceptually salient change that preserved the gist and detected a perceptually subtle change that disrupted the gist. Together, these results suggest that prior knowledge, including scene knowledge and physical knowledge, affects the process by which infants maintain their representations of everyday scenes.     

Representational momentum in aviation

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of expertise on motion anticipation. We conducted 2 experiments in which novices and expert pilots viewed simulated aircraft landing scenes. The scenes were interrupted by the display of a black screen and then started again after a forward or backward shift. The participant's task was to determine whether the moving scene had been shifted forward or backward. A forward misjudgment of the final position of the moving scene was interpreted as a representational momentum (RM) effect. Experiment 1 showed that an RM effect was detected only for experts. The lack of motion anticipation on the part of novices is a surprising result for the RM literature. It could be related to scene unfamiliarity, encoding time, or shift size. Experiment 2 was run with novices only. It was aimed at testing the potential impact of 2 factors on the RM effect: scene encoding time and shift size. As a whole, the results showed that encoding time and shift size are important factors in anticipation processes in realistic dynamic situations.     

Categorical implicit learning in real-world scenes: evidence from contextual cueing

The present study examined the extent to which learning mechanisms are deployed on semantic-categorical regularities during a visual searching within real-world scenes. The contextual cueing paradigm was used with photographs of indoor scenes in which the semantic category did or did not predict the target position on the screen. No evidence of a facilitation effect was observed in the predictive condition compared to the nonpredictive condition when participants were merely instructed to search for a target T or L (Experiment 1). However, a rapid contextual cueing effect occurred when each display containing the search target was preceded by a preview of the scene on which participants had to make a decision regarding the scene's category (Experiment 2). A follow-up explicit memory task indicated that this benefit resulted from implicit learning. Similar implicit contextual cueing effects were also obtained when the scene to categorize was different from the subsequent search scene (Experiment 3) and when a mere preview of the search scene preceded the visual searching (Experiment 4). These results suggested that if enhancing the processing of the scene was required with the present material, such implicit semantic learning can nevertheless take place when the category is task irrelevant.     

Testing a conceptual locus

Changes to objects that are inconsistent with the scene in which they appear are detected more accurately than changes to consistent objects. In three experiments, we tested whether this inconsistent object advantage derives from the differential retention of conceptual codes generated from a brief view of a real-world scene in accordance with a conceptual short-term memory (CSTM) hypothesis. A scene was presented for 250 msec, followed by a brief mask and a test scene in which a target object was either changed or not changed. In Experiment 1, changes that altered conceptual content (object deletion) were contrasted with visual changes (left-right orientation changes). In Experiment 2, the duration of the mask was manipulated to vary the amount of time available for conceptual consolidation of the initial scene. In Experiment 3, the type of mask was manipulated: Either a meaningless pattern mask or a meaningful, and thus conceptually disruptive, scene was shown. The inconsistent object advantage was obtained in each experiment, yet in none was it modulated in the direction predicted by the CSTM hypothesis. Instead, the inconsistent object advantage is likely to be caused by contextual influence on memory for visual object representations.     

Implicit scene learning is viewpoint dependent

When novel scenes are encoded, the representations of scene layout are generally viewpoint specific. Past studies of scene recognition have typically required subjects to explicitly study and encode novel scenes, but in everyday visual experience, it is possible that much scene learning occurs incidentally. Here, we examine whether implicitly encoded scene layouts are also viewpoint dependent. We used the contextual cuing paradigm, in which search for a target is facilitated by implicitly learned associations between target locations and novel spatial contexts (Chun & Jiang, 1998). This task was extended to naturalistic search arrays with apparent depth. To test viewpoint dependence, the viewpoint of the scenes was varied from training to testing. Contextual cuing and, hence, scene context learning decreased as the angular rotation from training viewpoint increased. This finding suggests that implicitly acquired representations of scene layout are viewpoint dependent.     

Factors influencing the use of transparency in children's drawing

When young children draw a scene in which one object partially occludes another, they often depict hidden features of the occluded object by rendering the nearer object transparent. This may signify a motive to produce drawings that are informative. Three experiments are reported in which a simple paradigm is employed to consider this possible basis of transparency drawing. Experiment 1 established a gradual decrease in the use of this device across the 5–7-year age range. Its occurrence could not be ascribed to a simple lack of graphic skill and it was not readily inhibited by stronger perceptual marking of scene boundaries. The extent to which children were purposefully producing informative drawings was evaluated in Expts 2 and 3. Because an increase in occluded information actually served to inhibit transparencies, it is argued that they need not reflect such a communicative attitude. An alternative account is proposed whereby drawing decisions are guided, sometimes inappropriately, by the structure of cognitive representations children form of scenes. Transparencies signify a failure to anticipate certain graphic ambiguities thereby generated. However, they may be inhibited if the geometry of a particular scene forces the child to confront such ambiguity at the outset of drawing.