Presupposition and Accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian Picture

This paper offers a critical analysis ofStalnaker's work on presupposition (Stalnaker1973, 1974, 1979, 1999, 2002). The paperexamines two definitions of speakerpresupposition offered by Stalnaker – the familiar common ground view, and the earlier,less familiar, dispositional account – and howStalnaker relates this notion to the linguisticphenomenon of presupposition. Special attentionis paid to Stalnaker's view of accommodation. Iargue that given Stalnakers views,accommodation is not rightly seen as driven bythe presuppositional requirements ofutterances, but only by the interests ofspeakers in eliminating perceived differencesamong presuppositions. I also consider therevisions which are needed either to thedefinition of speaker presupposition or to thedefinition of sentence presupposition in lightof the possibility of informativepresupposition. In the concluding section, Idiscuss the ways in which some recent accountsof context and speaker presupposition departfrom their Stalnakerian foundations.     

Accommodating Presuppositions

In this paper I elaborate on previous criticisms of the influential Stalnakerian account of presuppositions, pointing out that the well-known practice of informative presupposition puts heavy strain on Stalnaker’s pragmatic characterization of the phenomenon of presupposition, in particular of the triggering of presuppositions. Stalnaker has replied to previous criticisms by relying on the well-taken point that we should take into account the time at which presupposition-requirements are to be computed. In defense of a different, ‘semantic’ (in a sense) account of the phenomenon of presupposition, I argue that that point does not suffice to rescue the Stalnakerian proposal, and I portray Lewisian ‘accommodation’ as one way in which speakers adjust themselves to one another in the course of conversation.     

Presupposition Failure and the Assertive Enterprise

I outline a discourse-based account of presuppositions that relies on insights from the writings of Peter Strawson, as well as on insights from more recent work by Robert Stalnaker and Barbara Abbott. One of the key elements of my account is the idea that presuppositions are “assertorically inert”, in the sense that they are background propositions, rather than being part of the “at issue” or asserted content. Strawson is often assumed to have defended the view that the falsity of a presupposition leads to catastrophe, in the sense that a false presupposition “wrecks the assertive enterprise”. I argue that the discourse-based account in terms of assertoric inertia can explain how cases of presupposition failure can sometimes be non-catastrophic; there are cases in which the assertive enterprise operates smoothly, despite presupposition failure. The chief problem facing this line of argument is to account for cases in which presupposition failure is catastrophic. If presuppositions are assertorically inert, then how can their falsity ever wreck the assertive enterprise? I offer a principled account that delineates the circumstances in which false presuppositions are, and those in which they are not, catastrophic.     

The Processing Costs of Presupposition Accommodation

The present study investigates the processing of presupposition accommodation. In particular, it concerns the processing costs and the time-course of accommodation as compared to presupposition satisfaction. Data collected in a self-paced word-by-word reading times experiment support three results. First, independently on the presupposition trigger in use, accommodation is costlier than satisfaction. Second, presupposition accommodation takes places immediately just as the trigger becomes available and proceeds incrementally during the sentence processing. Third, accommodated information is harder to be recalled. The results offer evidence for the on-line processing of presuppositions and, consistently with the traditional semantic framework, support the idea that, presuppositions are semantic properties encoded in the lexical meaning of the presupposition triggers.     

Local contexts and local meanings

Stalnaker (1978) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’. Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within ‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms. But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise ‘triggering algorithm’ has remained somewhat elusive. We discuss possible extensions of both claims. First, we offer a reconstruction of ‘local contexts’ which circumvents some of the difficulties faced by Stalnaker’s original analysis. We preserve the idea that local contexts are computed by a pragmatic mechanism that aggregates the information that follows from an incomplete sentence given the global context; but we crucially rely on a modified notion of entailment (‘R-entailment’), whose plausibility should be assessed on independent grounds. Second, we speculate that local contexts might prove necessary (though by no means sufficient) to understand how some presuppositions are triggered. In a nutshell, we suggest that a presupposition is triggered when the semantic contribution of an expression to its local context is in some sense ‘heterogeneous’. Without giving an analysis of the latter notion, we note that this architecture implies that presuppositions should be triggered on the basis of the meaning that an expression has relative to its local context (what we call its ‘local meaning’); we sketch some possible consequences of this analysis.     

Autonomy,Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person

Abstract

Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint converges with Emmanuel Levinas’s concern about the role of the second‐person relationship in ethics. This paper contrasts their methodologies (regressive analysis of presuppositions versus phenomenology) to explain Darwall’s narrower view of ethical experience in terms of expressed reactive attitudes. It delineates Darwall’s overall justificatory strategy and the centrality of autonomy and reciprocity within it, in contrast to Levinas’s emphasis on the experience of responsibility. Asymmetrical responsibility plays a more foundational role as a critical counterpoint to ‘mean‐spirited’ reciprocity than Darwall’s laudable distinction between accountability and revenge, and responsibility even founds this distinction. The experience of being summoned to asymmetrical responsibility amplifies the meaning of ‘authority’, which is a presupposition for Darwall. Finally, asymmetrical responsibility helps develop decentred reasoning, invites risk beyond the boundaries of reciprocity at moments when autonomy appears endangered, reconciles respect and care at the experiential level, and presses to extend the scope of moral obligation.     

Presuppositions and Quantifier Domains

In this paper, I will argue for a new account of presuppositions which is based on double indexing as well as minimal representational contexts providing antecedent material for anaphoric presuppositions, rather than notions of context defined in terms of the interlocutors’ pragmatic presuppositions or the information accumulated from the preceding discourse. This account applies in particular to new phenomena concerning the presupposition of quantifier domains. But it is also intended to be an account of presuppositions in general. The account differs from the Satisfaction Theory and the Binding Theory of presuppositions in that it can be viewed as a conservative extension of traditional static semantics and in that it does not involve the notion of pragmatic presupposition.     

语言理解中的预设加工

预设是指以交际双方的共同背景（共享的知识或信念）为前提的、听话者根据特定语言标记（触发标记）及其限定的对象（计算内容）而推理出的非外显意义。例如,“张明又_触发标记发表了论文_计算内容”引发了“张明之前发表过论文”的预设推论。理解者依赖触发标记通达交际双方的共同背景,并在计算内容上生成完整的预设;随后,理解者连接生成的预设和共同背景,更新两者之间的关系。这些认知过程可能会受到语言中语序灵活性的调节;虽然语序的灵活性并不能改变触发标记在预设生成中的核心地位,但会影响预设加工的难度。研究者将预设理解视为一种得体性加工,并根据生成的预设和共同背景是否一致,将得体性分为预设满足和预设违反两类。前者是指理解者生成的预设与共同背景一致,后者是指理解者生成的预设与共同背景不一致。根据理解者是否能够合理化违反预设的语句,研究者进一步将预设违反加工分为预设失败和预设调补。预设失败指的是,理解者无法将不一致的预设内容合理化,更不能将之整合至已有的心理表征中。预设调补是指,不一致的预设内容可以重新合理化,或通过更新原来的心理表征来建构新的意义模型。 研究发现,共同背景能即时影响触发标记和计算内容加工。基于以前的实验证据,我们提出了语境影响预设理解的两阶段认知过程假说。具体而言,理解者在触发标记上,将共同背景与触发标记的语义信息进行整合,而在计算内容上,将具体的预设内容与共同背景进行整合。理解者在触发标记和计算内容加工上的认知过程可能有所不同。预设加工的不同阶段可能会受到触发标记范畴、共同背景与预设的关联程度、共同背景类型、以及理解者参与动机的影响。理解者在整合共同背景和预设内容时,并不是对两者是否匹配作简单判断,而是根据两者之间的关联程度来进行精细的加工。因此,理解者整合两者的难度可能会受到具体匹配程度的影响。理解者可以通过语言共现（即给理解者呈现的语言材料）、视觉共现（即给理解者呈现的视觉场景）、一般性的世界知识/社群关系（即通过社群形成的共识）等三种方式,来建立交际双方的共同背景。在不同的实验范式下,例如阅读范式和人际互动范式,理解者的参与动机可能有所不同,影响预设推理的结果或预设加工的深度。 我们提出,未来研究可以从三个角度进一步探讨预设加工的认知基础：（1）采用计算建模的方法,量化交际互动中听话者理解预设的过程、以及其他过程的影响（如听话者的观点采择）;（2）采用脑成像技术,揭示预设加工过程的神经基础;（3）以特殊人群为研究对象,检验和修正预设加工的认知模型。     

Characterizing the Linguistic Chameleon: Personal and Social Correlates of Linguistic Style Accommodation

Linguistic style accommodation between conversationalists is associated with positive social outcomes. We examine social power and personality as factors driving the occurrence of linguistic style accommodation, and the social outcomes of accommodation. Social power was manipulated to create 144 face‐to‐face dyadic interactions between individuals of high versus low power and 64 neutral power interactions. Particular configurations of personality traits (high self‐monitoring, Machiavellianism and leadership, and low self‐consciousness, impression management and agreeableness), combined with a low‐power role, led to an increased likelihood of linguistic style accommodation. Further, greater accommodation by low‐power individuals positively influenced perceptions of subjective rapport and attractiveness. We propose individual differences interact with social context to influence the conditions under which nonconscious communication accommodation occurs.     

Presupposition Projection and Conditionalization

I explain what exactly constrains presupposition projection in compound sentences and argue that the presuppositions that do not project are conditionalized, giving rise to inferable conditional presuppositions. I combine elements of (Gazdar in Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logical form. Academic Press, New York 1979) and (van der Sandt in Context and presupposition. Croom Helm, London 1988) which, together with an additional, independently motivated assumption, make it possible to construct an analysis that makes correct predictions. The core of my proposal is as follows: When a speaker felicitously utters a compound sentence whose constituent clauses (considered in isolation) require presuppositions, the hearer will infer that the speaker presupposes those propositions, unless the sentence contains some element that makes the hearer realize that, if the speaker actually presupposed them, she would be either uninformative or inconsistent in her beliefs. In these cases, the propositions that would have been presupposed, had the clauses been uttered in isolation, will not be presupposed, i.e. the clausal presuppositions will not project.     

Existence,presupposition and anaphoric space

The following paper deals with the notion of existence, especially as concerns natural languages. In Section 1, starting from some quite obvious examples drawn from logic, I sketch the problem of the existential presupposition usually ascribed to noun phrases. My opinion is that the point of view frequently adopted in this case is unduly restrictive, for the existence which is believed to be presupposed here is actual existence. Accordingly, I emphasize the need for having a weaker notion of existential presupposition, such that the existence (if this word can still be used) here referred to is relevant only to linguistic goals. Section 2 sketches this notion, by assimilating existence (in the weak sense) to identification in a linguistic space. (I deal here only with intuitive considerations: a more formal account will be given, I hope, in another paper.) Finally, in Section 3, the notion of actual existence is examined by contrast with the linguistic (or weak) notion of existence: and this is a question which of course can't be tackled in terms of a purely linguistic analysis, for it needs a general, epistemo-logical approach.     

The Metasyntactic Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism

Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions have there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic interpretation, while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available, the metasyntactic interpretation, which grants that names have their bearers essentially and yields some account of a priori knowledge.     

Understanding Frege’s notion of presupposition

Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to names.

     

Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems

Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to their being “a literally true story of what the world is like”. The third presupposition is that there are methods for justifying a belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory which do not also suffice to justify beliefs in its literal truth. Each of these presuppositions raises a number of problems, some of which are quite old and others rather newer. In each case, I briefly review some of the old problems and then elaborate the newer problems.     

Comparing Journal of Consumer Psychology and Journal of Consumer Research

The Journal of Consumer Psychology (JCP) was created in 1992 partly in response to what was interpreted by some as a shift in the methodological focus of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR). JCR began to increase its accommodation of postmodern approaches, compared to more positivistic approaches. JCP's mission was thus perceived by some to be more methodologically homogeneous, with a greater focus on traditional experimental psychology in the domain of consumer behavior. Is JCR really more methodologically diverse than JCP? In what other ways are the two journals similar or different? This article attempts to answer these questions with an in‐depth analysis of the articles published in both journals from 1992 to 1998. The articles are reviewed in terms of overall output, authorship, content, research design, and data analysis. Conclusions and implications are included.     

Silencing,Psychological Conflict,and the Distinction Between Virtue and Self-Control

According to many virtue ethicists, one of Aristotle’s important achievements was drawing a clear, qualitative distinction between the character traits of temperance (sophrosyne) and self-control (enkrateia). In an influential series of papers, John McDowell has argued that a clear distinction between temperance (or virtue, in general) and self-control can be maintained only if one claims that, for the virtuous individual (but not for the self-controlled), considerations in favor of actions that are contrary to virtue are “silenced.” Some virtue ethicists reject McDowell’s silencing view as offering an implausible or inappropriate picture of human virtue, but they argue that (contra McDowell) virtue can still be clearly distinguished from self-control by the absence of motivational conflict alone. In this paper, I argue that this criticism of McDowell is at most half right. If the silencing view is false, so that virtue can have a cost and the virtuous person can justifiably feel negative emotions in response to that cost, there is no principled reason why the virtuous person cannot also have motivational conflict. So, if one rejects the silencing view, then one must allow that the distinction between virtue and self-control is at most a matter of degree.

     

Naming,Saying, and Structure

It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world's structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law‐hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint‐carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow Lewis and Sider to properly impose constraints on grammar.     

Temporal Externalism

Abstract

Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions.     

Wittgenstein,Theories of Meaning,and Linguistic Disjunctivism

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non‐circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.     

Ricoeur's Account of Tradition and the Gadamer–Habermas Debate

While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur's account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate's importance and describe Ricoeur's reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur's middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition.