Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Traditional difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed

Studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning have relied on three traditional difference score measures: the logic index, belief index, and interaction index. Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010, 2011) argued that the interaction index incorrectly assumes a linear receiver operating characteristic (ROC). Here, all three measures are addressed. Simulations indicated that traditional analyses of reasoning experiments are likely to lead to incorrect conclusions. Two new experiments examined the role of instructional manipulations on the belief bias effect. The form of the ROCs violated assumptions of traditional measures. In comparison, signal detection theory (SDT) model-based analyses were a better match for the form of the ROCs, and implied that belief bias and instructional manipulations are predominantly response bias effects. Finally, reanalyses of previous studies of conditional reasoning also showed non-linear ROCs, violating assumptions of traditional analyses. Overall, reasoning research using traditional measures is at risk of drawing incorrect conclusions.     

Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

The extent to which belief revision is affected by systematic variability and direct experience of a conditional (if A then B) relation was examined in two studies. The first used a computer generated apparatus. This presented two rows of 5 objects. Pressing one of the top objects resulted in one of the bottom objects being lit up. The 139 adult participants were given one of two levels of experience (5 or 15 trials) and one of two types of apparatus. One of these was completely uniform, while the other had an element that randomly alternated in its result. Following the testing of the apparatus, participants were asked to rate their certainty of the action of the middle element, which was always uniform (the AB belief). Then they were told of an observation inconsistent with this belief. Participants were then asked whether they considered the AB belief or the anecdotal observation to be more believable. Results showed that increased experience decreased the tendency to reject the AB belief, when the apparatus did not have any randomness. However, the presence of a single element showing random variation in the system strongly increased rejection of this belief. A second study looked at the effect of a single random element on a mechanical system as well as an electronic system using graphical representations. This confirmed the generality of the effect of randomness on belief revision, and provided support for the effects of embedding a belief into a system of relations. These results provide some insight into the complex factors that determine belief revision.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

Temporal distinctiveness and repetition benefits in task switching: Disentangling stimulus-related and response-related contributions

Despite the popularity of the Wason selection task in the psychology of reasoning, doubt remains as to whether card choices actually reflect a process of reasoning. One view is that while participants reason about the cards and their hidden sides—as indicated by protocol analysis—this reasoning merely confabulates explanations for cards that were preconsciously cued. This hypothesis has apparently been supported by studies that show that participants predominantly inspect cards which they end up selecting. In this paper, we reanalyse the data of one such study, which used eye-movement tracking to record card inspection times (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). We show that while cards favoured by matching bias are inspected for roughly equal lengths of times, their selection rates are strongly affected by their logical status. These findings strongly support a two-stage account in which attention is necessary but not sufficient for card selections. Hence, reasoning does indeed affect participants' choices on this task.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

Highly reflective reasoners show no signs of belief inhibition

The processes underlying individual differences in reasoning performance are not entirely understood. What do people who do well on reasoning tasks where beliefs and logic conflict do differently from other people? Because abundant evidence shows that even poorer reasoners detect these conflicts, it has been suggested that individual differences in reasoning performance arise from inhibition failures later in the reasoning process. The present paper argues that a minority of highly skilled reasoners may deviate from this general reasoning process from an early stage. Two studies investigated signs of belief inhibition using a lexical access paradigm (Study 1) and a negative priming paradigm (Study 2). Study 1 showed that while other people exhibited signs of belief inhibition following a belief–logic conflict, people with the highest disposition for cognitive reflection did not. In Study 2, this finding was replicated and similar results were also obtained when comparing groups with higher and lower general cognitive ability. Two possible explanations are discussed.