False recognition in women reporting recovered memories of sexual abuse

False recognition—the mistaken belief that one has previously encountered a novel item—was examined in four groups of subjects: women reporting recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse, women who believe that they were sexually abused as children but who cannot recall this abuse (the "repressed" group), women who were sexually abused as children and always remembered the abuse, and women with no history of childhood sexual abuse. Subjects were administered a Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm. The results suggest that the recovered-memory group was more prone to false recognition than the other groups. In addition, women reporting recovered and repressed memories showed greater reduction in false recognition across study trials than did other subjects, perhaps reflecting strategic changes in performance.     

Recovering memories of trauma: A view from the laboratory

The controversy over the validity of repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been extraordinarily bitter. Yet data on cognitive functioning in people reporting repressed and recovered memories of trauma have been strikingly scarce. Recent laboratory studies have been designed to test hypotheses about cognitive mechanisms that ought to be operative if people can repress and recover memories of trauma or if they can form false memories of trauma. Contrary to clinical lore, these studies have shown that people reporting CSA histories are not characterized by a superior ability to forget trauma-related material. Other studies have shown that individuals reporting recovered memories of either CSA or abduction by space aliens are characterized by heightened proneness to form false memories in certain laboratory tasks. Although cognitive psychology methods cannot distinguish true memories from false ones, these methods can illuminate mechanisms for remembering and forgetting among people reporting histories of trauma.     

Fantasy proneness, but not self-reported trauma is related to DRM performance of women reporting recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse

Extending a strategy previously used by , we administered a neutral and a trauma-related version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm to a sample of women reporting recovered (n=23) or repressed memories (n=16) of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), women reporting having always remembered their abuse (n=55), and women reporting no history of abuse (n=20). We found that individuals reporting recovered memories of CSA are more prone than other participants to falsely recalling and recognizing neutral words that were never presented. Moreover, our study is the first to show that this finding even held when trauma-related material was involved. Correlational analyses revealed that fantasy proneness, but not self-reported traumatic experiences and dissociative symptoms were related to false recall and false recognition.     

Presentation modality affects false memory

Roediger and McDermott (1995) rejuvenated interest in Deese’s (1959) paradigm for producing reliable intrusions and false alarms. Using this paradigm in three experiments, we demonstrated that visual study presentation dramatically reduces the rate of false memories. Only auditory study presentation resulted in equal production of studied and critical items. Correct recall and recognition were unaffected. The suggestion that visual presentation provides a means for discriminating between false and true memories was supported by Experiment 3: Pleasantness rating of study items significantly reduced the creation of false memories regardless of modality.     

Creating false memories for brand names

Using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants are presented with lists of associated words (e.g., bed, awake, night etc). Subsequently, they reliably have false memories for related but non‐presented words (e.g. SLEEP). The present study investigated whether false memories could be created for brand names (e.g. Morrisons, Sainsbury's, Waitrose and TESCO) using the DRM paradigm and whether the effect was reduced if stimuli were presented in brand appropriate fonts compared with a plain font. Participants were presented with lists of brand names in plain or brand appropriate fonts, followed by a distractor task or free recall. Finally, they had a recognition task. Both false recall and false recognition of non‐presented brand names occurred. Brand specific fonts at study had no effect on recall but increased overall recognition. There was considerable variability in levels of false recall and false recognition amongst lists and across participants and reasons for this are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The corrective effects of warning on false memories in the DRM paradigm are limited to full attention conditions

Effects of attention control and forewarning on the activation and monitoring of experimentally induced false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm were investigated in a young adult sample (N=77). We found that reducing the degree of attention during encoding led to a decrease in veridical recall and an increase in non-presented critical lure intrusions. This effect could not be counteracted by a forewarning instruction. However, these findings did not emerge in a (retrieval supportive) recognition task. It seems that divided attention increases false recall when attention control and forewarning have to compete for limited cognitive resources in a generative free recall as opposed to a retrieval supportive recognition task. Forewarning instructions do not always protect young adults against experimentally induced false memories.     

Not lost in translation: writing auditorily presented words at study increases correct recognition “at no cost”

Previous studies have reported a translation effect in memory, whereby encoding tasks that involve translating between processing domains produce a memory advantage relative to tasks that involve a single domain. We investigated the effects of translation on true and false memories using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure [Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17–22; Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 21, 803–814]. Translation between modalities enhanced correct recognition but had no effect on false recognition. Results are consistent with previous research showing that correct memory can be enhanced “at no cost” in terms of accuracy. Findings are discussed in terms of understanding the relationship between true and false memories produced by the DRM procedure.     

False memories in children and adults: age,distinctiveness, and subjective experience

This study investigated developmental trends associated with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott false-memory effect, the role of distinctive information in false-memory formation, and participants' subjective experience of true and false memories. Children (5- and 7-year-olds) and adults studied lists of semantically associated words. Half of the participants studied words alone, and half studied words accompanied by pictures. There were significant age differences in recall (5-year-olds evinced more false memories than did adults) but not in recognition of critical lures. Distinctive information reduced false memory for all age groups. Younger children provided with distinctive information, and older children and adults regardless of whether they viewed distinctive information, expressed higher levels of confidence in true than in false memories. Source attributions did not significantly differ between true and false memories. Implications for theories of false memory and memory development are discussed.     

The distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition and false recall

The effects of generative processing on false recognition and recall were examined in four experiments using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In each experiment, a Generate condition in which subjects generated studied words from audio anagrams was compared to a Control condition in which subjects simply listened to studied words presented normally. Rates of false recognition and false recall were lower for critical lures associated with generated lists, than for critical lures associated with control lists, but only in between-subjects designs. False recall and recognition did not differ when generate and control conditions were manipulated within-subjects. This pattern of results is consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999), a metamemorial decision-based strategy whereby global changes in decision criteria lead to reductions of false memories. This retrieval-based monitoring mechanism appears to operate in a similar fashion in reducing false recognition and false recall.     

Can false memories spontaneously recover?

Can false memories that were suppressed at one time spontaneously recover at a later time? Fuzzy trace theory and activation-monitoring theory predict that false memories in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure become substantially reduced as list learning progresses because participants employ a memory-editing process. It follows that if the editing process is rendered less effective, false memories should spontaneously recover. We found that after DRM lists were well learned and false recognition to critical words was substantially reduced by multiple study-test trials, those false memories spontaneously recovered when participants were either rushed or delayed on a retest. We attributed the reduction in false recognition over trials to a memory-editing process that suppresses false recognition as participants gradually learn which words were in the lists and which words, though similar, were not. Rushing or delaying the participants on a retest made it more difficult for them to edit their memory, and false memories spontaneously returned.     

Mood,dissociation and false memories using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott procedure

Who is likely to have a false memory? Does being in a certain transient state, such as a negative mood, mean that a person is more like to have a false memory? These important questions are examined using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott (DRM) procedure. The amount of false memories was compared with people's score on a dissociation measure and by mood. Unlike past research, which has used different procedures to explore false memories, we found that dissociation was not associated with false memories. We argue that this is because the DRM procedure requires two processes for a false memory (the generation of the critical lure and mistaking its source), while most false memory procedures only require one process (source monitoring error) because the errant information is suggested to the participant. This pattern of results suggests that only errors with the source monitoring process are associated with dissociation. We found that mood was related to false memories, but it was dependent on the specific task demands. If participants were told to recall as many words as they could, then people in a negative mood had more false memories. However, if they were told to recall as many words as they felt like recalling, then there were more false memories for people in a positive mood. This can be explained by the mood‐as‐input hypothesis. Results are discussed in relation to both theories and applications of memory.     

Can false memories spontaneously recover?

Can false memories that were suppressed at one time spontaneously recover at a later time? Fuzzy trace theory and activation-monitoring theory predict that false memories in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure become substantially reduced as list learning progresses because participants employ a memory-editing process. It follows that if the editing process is rendered less effective, false memories should spontaneously recover. We found that after DRM lists were well learned and false recognition to critical words was substantially reduced by multiple study–test trials, those false memories spontaneously recovered when participants were either rushed or delayed on a retest. We attributed the reduction in false recognition over trials to a memory-editing process that suppresses false recognition as participants gradually learn which words were in the lists and which words, though similar, were not. Rushing or delaying the participants on a retest made it more difficult for them to edit their memory, and false memories spontaneously returned.     

Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Recovered-Memory Experiences of Childhood Sexual Abuse

ABSTRACT— People sometimes report recovering long-forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse. The memory mechanisms that lead to such reports are not well understood, and the authenticity of recovered memories has often been challenged. We identified two subgroups of people reporting recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. These subgroups differed dramatically in their cognitive profiles: People who recovered memories of abuse through suggestive therapy exhibited a heightened susceptibility to the construction of false memories, but showed no tendency to underestimate their prior remembering. Conversely, people who recovered memories of abuse spontaneously showed a heightened proneness to forget prior incidences of remembering, but exhibited no increased susceptibility to false memories. This double dissociation points to mechanisms that underlie recovered-memory experiences and indicates that recovered memories may at times be fictitious and may at other times be authentic.     

“The General's Abduction by Aliens from a UFO: Levels of Meaning of Alien Abduction Reports”

A case study is presented of a patient who claims to have been abducted by aliens from a distant planet. Four related levels of meaning for the patient's belief that he—and other contactees—were deducted is provided. These explanations can be categorized as: historical, moral, metaphorical, and psychological. A rationale is offered for the treatment of patients with alien abduction beliefs.     

How are false memories distinguishable from true memories in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm? A review of the findings

This article reviewed the literature comparing true and false memories. Although false memory experience is typically characterized as compellingly similar to true memory experience, research also indicates many distinctions between these two types of memory. The primary focus of this article was on comparing these two types of memory in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm on a number of independent and dependent measures. Studies that compared true and false memories in recall and recognition rates over retention intervals, as a function of list word presentation duration, list presentation repetition, in recall and recognition latencies, output serial position, phenomenological experiences (conscious and unconscious discrimination between these two types of memories), and neurophysiological processes were reviewed. The conclusion is that the degree to which false memory is experienced and observed as similar to or the same as true memory is a function of a number of variables in the process of acquiring and measuring the memory.     

A New Solution to the Recovered Memory Debate

ABSTRACT— The controversy regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been characterized by two perspectives. According to one perspective, some people repress their memories of abuse because these experiences have been so emotionally traumatic, and they become capable of recalling the CSA only when it is psychologically safe to do so many years later. According to the other perspective, many reports of recovered memories of sexual abuse are false memories, often inadvertently fostered by therapists. In this article, we provide evidence for a third interpretation that applies to a subset of people reporting recollections of CSA; it does not require the concepts of repression, trauma, or false memory. These people did not experience their CSA as traumatic; they either failed to think about their abuse for years or forgot their previous recollections, and they recalled their CSA spontaneously after encountering reminders outside of psychotherapy. Their recovered memories are corroborated at the same rate as those of people who never forgot their abuse. Hence, recalling CSA after many years is not the same thing as having recalled a previously repressed memory of trauma.     

Does test-induced priming play a role in the creation of false memories?

We investigated the role of test-induced priming in creating false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which subjects study lists of related words (bed, rest, awake) and then falsely recall or recognise a related word (sleep) on a later test. However, in experiments using three different procedures, we found that the number of related words tested prior to the critical word had surprisingly little impact on false recall and recognition. We manipulated the location of the critical item in tests of yes/no recognition, word-stem cued recall, and part-set cued recall. We consistently obtained high probabilities of false recall and recognition, but the probability was unaffected by the number of related items presented prior to the test of the critical item. Surprisingly, test-induced priming of the critical item does not seem to play a large role in this memory illusion.     

Inhibiting retrieval of trauma cues in adults reporting histories of childhood sexual abuse

Are people who report having forgotten their childhood sexual abuse (CSA) characterised by superior ability to inhibit retrieval of disturbing material? To test this hypothesis, we asked adults reporting either repressed, recovered, or continuous memories of CSA or no history of CSA to participate in a directed forgetting experiment (list method). They rated the emotionality of two consecutive lists of trauma‐related and positive words. After the first list, the experimenter instructed participants to forget these words, and to continue rating the remaining words. A surprise recall task revealed robust directed forgetting and valence effects: All groups recalled more words from the second list than from the first list, and recalled more trauma words than positive ones. Participants reporting either repressed or recovered memories of CSA did not exhibit superior forgetting of trauma versus positive words relative to the other two groups. Finally, a subsidiary analysis revealed that participants exhibiting a “repressor” coping style (low self‐reported anxiety plus high defensiveness) did not exhibit superior directed forgetting of trauma words.     

Explorations in the social contagion of memory

Four experiments examined social influence on the development of false memories. We employed the social contagion paradigm: A subject and a confederate see scenes and then later take turns recalling items from the scenes, with the confederate erroneously reporting some items that were not present in the scenes; on a final test, the subject reports these suggested items when instructed to recall only items from the scenes. The first two experiments showed that the social contagion effect persisted when subjects were explicitly warned about the possibility that confederates' responses might induce false memories and when they were tested via source-monitoring tests that explicitly gave the choice of attributing suggested items to the other person. Levels of false recall and recognition increased with the number of times the misleading information was suggested (Experiment 3), and subjects were more likely to incorporate the erroneous responses of an actual confederate on a recognition/source test as compared with those of a simulated confederate (Experiment 4). Collectively, the data support the claim that false memories may be transmitted between people and reveal critical factors that modulate the social contagion of memories.