The Flexibility of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Gua</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Yao</Emphasis>—Based on an interpretation of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Yizhuan</Emphasis>

In Yizhuan’s interpretation of The Book of Changes, the book’s fundamental concepts, xiang 象 (images) and ci 辞 (words), play different roles. Concepts, including yin and yang, firmness and gentleness, sancai 三才 (three fundamentals), and the wuxing 五行 (five active elements), are used to interpret The Book of Changes through the interpretation of images, while the core Confucian values, such as benevolence and righteousness, are used to interpret The Book of Changes because of their connection with words of gua and yao. In order to expand the meaning of the words of gua and yao, Yizhuan sometimes connects words with images; in other occasions, however, it simply takes these words as independent guides. The Confucian scholars who wrote Yizhuan, therefore, not only revered the classic, but also used it to send their own message. Out of reverence, they “shu 述 (recited)”; in using it, they “zuo 作 (created)”. The combination of recitation and creation made the words of gua and yao very flexible in the process of interpretation, while the interpretation changed the meaning of the classic to a great extent.     

How is the Other Approached and Conceptualized in Terms of Schutz's Constitutive Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude?<Superscript>1</Superscript>

The problem of the other was one of the central problems for the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He investigated the other as the alter ego intensively in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which he introduced the conceptions of “analogical apperception' and “pairing' as fundamental forms of “passive synthesis.' Although it is no doubt Husserl who investigated the other most seriously and intensively, there is anaporiain his theory of the other. If the other is an object of ego's intentional consciousness, the other turns out to be no more than a modification of the ego. In the face of such anaporia, some phenomenologists embarked upon inquiry into the other. This paper focuses primarily on Alfred Schutz's discussion of the “other' in general and about the “stranger' in particular.     

Patients’ Views of Treatment-Focused Genetic Testing (TFGT): Some Lessons for the Mainstreaming of <Emphasis Type="Italic">BRCA1</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">BRCA2</Emphasis> Testing

This paper explores patients’ views and experiences of undergoing treatment-focused BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing (TFGT), either offered following triaging to clinical genetics (breast cancer) or as part of a mainstreamed care pathway in oncology (ovarian cancer). Drawing on 26 in-depth interviews with patients with breast or ovarian cancer who had undergone TFGT, this retrospective study examines patients’ views of genetic testing at this point in their care pathway, focusing on issues, such as initial response to the offer of testing, motivations for undergoing testing, and views on care pathways. Patients were amenable to the incorporation of TFGT at an early stage in their cancer care irrespective of (any) prior anticipation of having a genetic test or family history. While patients were glad to have been offered TFGT as part of their care, some questioned the logic of the test’s timing in relation to their cancer treatment. Crucially, patients appeared unable to disentangle the treatment role of TFGT from its preventative function for self and other family members, suggesting that some may undergo TFGT to obtain information for others rather than for self.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics I — The Method of Normal Models

The admissibility of Ackermann’s rule γ is one of the most important problems in relevant logic. While the γ-admissibility of normal modal logics based on the relevant logic R has been previously discussed, the case for weaker relevant modal logics has not yet been considered. The method of normal models has often been used to prove the γ-admissibility. This paper discusses which relevant modal logics admit γ from the viewpoint of the method of normal models.     

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Slaves of the Passions</Emphasis>

In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis?? problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart??s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122?C127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart??s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is presentism. This gives us prima facie reason to be presentists. But there is a strategy Craig does not consider-indexing, or relativizing, the copula. In this paper, I show that to the degree that indexing the copula solves the problem of temporary intrinsics, it also shows the invalidity of McTaggart??s argument. The upshot: the copula-indexer needn??t affirm the unreality of time, nor need she embrace presentism.     

The Role of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Umwelt</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Aufbau</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Abbau</Emphasis> of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Natur/Geist</Emphasis> Distinction

In this essay I argue that Husserl’s development of the nineteenth century Natur/Geist distinction is grounded in the intentional correlate between the pre-theoretical natural attitude and environing world (Umwelt). By reconsidering the Natur/Geist distinction through its historical context in the nineteenth century debate between Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians from the Baden or Southwest school, it is possible to understand more clearly Husserl’s appropriations and novel contributions. One of Husserl’s contributions lies in his rigorous thematization and clarification of the constitutive features proper to the natural and human sciences as they arise from the pre-theoretical experience of an environing world. This ordinary lived experience between the lived body and environing world is presupposed by and forms a unity with both Natur and Geist, thereby acting as the unified ground that is inclusive of naturalized Geist and a geistig nature. This unbuilding (Abbau) of the Natur/Geist distinction is necessary, according to Husserl, for the radical clarification of the respective methodologies of the natural and human sciences.     

Von Wright’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">“The Logic of Preference”</Emphasis> revisited

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Special Topic:</Emphasis> Filial Piety: The Root of Morality or the Source of Corruption?

Confucianism advocates the lofty moral ideal of “humane love” (ren ai 仁愛) and condemns immoral actions. Strangely enough, however, Mencius, a “paradigmatic Confucian intellectual” who believed that “a true man cannot be corrupted by wealth, subdued by power, or affected by poverty” (Tu 1989a: 15), highly commended such typically corrupt actions as bending the law for the benefit of relatives or appointing people by mere nepotism when he talked about Shun 舜 in the text of the Mencius. In the first four sections of this article, I will address the issue of how Confucianism encourages a special kind of corruption through its fundamentally consanguineous affection. Then, in the remaining sections, I will try to respond to some criticisms of my views by a few Chinese scholars.     

Modeling Unicorns and Dead Cats: Applying Bressan’s ML<Superscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">ν</Emphasis></Superscript> to the Necessary Properties of Non-existent Objects

Should objects count as necessarily having certain properties, despite their not having those properties when they do not exist? For example, should a cat that passes out of existence, and so no longer is a cat, nonetheless count as necessarily being a cat? In this essay I examine different ways of adapting Aldo Bressan’s ML ^ν so that it can accommodate an affirmative answer to these questions. Anil Gupta, in The Logic of Common Nouns, creates a number of languages that have a kinship with Bressan’s ML ^ν , three of which are also tailored to affirmatively answering these questions. After comparing their languages, I argue that metaphysicians and philosophers of language should prefer ML ^ν to Gupta’s languages in most applications because it can accommodate essential properties, like being a cat, while being more uniform and less cumbersome.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">W</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">ang</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">Fuzhi’s Criticism of Buddhism and Its Limitations</Emphasis>

Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 remarks on Buddhism have not been given sufficient attention despite increasing research on him. The few works on this topic either focus on just one aspect of his view of Buddhism or fail to disclose the purpose and uniqueness of his attack of it. This essay analyzes his view of Buddhism comprehensively, in particular his insight into the paradox of Buddhist universal love and his rejection of Buddhist retribution and reincarnation from Confucian righteousness and qi 氣-monism. In addition, it also explores the reason, context, and limitations of his criticism, that is, his reaction to the popular approach of “understanding Confucian classics through learning Buddhism” in the late Ming 明, his response to Zongmi’s 宗密 criticism of Confucian cosmology and human nature, and his misunderstanding of some Buddhist concepts. Yet his criticism is still illuminating to our understanding of the interaction of Confucianism with Buddhism and other religions.     

Don’t Ever Do That! Long-term Duties in <Emphasis Type="Italic">PD</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">e</Emphasis></Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis>

This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer’s Propositional Deontic Logic (PD _e L), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or “Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PD _e L so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without <Emphasis Type="Italic">σ</Emphasis>-Additivity

In this paper a theory of finitistic and frequentistic approximations — in short: f-approximations — of probability measures P over a countably infinite outcome space N is developed. The family of subsets of N for which f-approximations converge to a frequency limit forms a pre-Dynkin system . The limiting probability measure over D can always be extended to a probability measure over , but this measure is not always σ-additive. We conclude that probability measures can be regarded as idealizations of limiting frequencies if and only if σ-additivity is not assumed as a necessary axiom for probabilities. We prove that σ-additive probability measures can be characterized in terms of so-called canonical and in terms of so-called full f-approximations. We also show that every non-σ-additive probability measure is f-approximable, though neither canonically nor fully f-approximable. Finally, we transfer our results to probability measures on open or closed formulas of first-order languages.