Activity engagement is related to level, but not change in cognitive ability across adulthood

It is unclear whether the longitudinal relation between activity participation and cognitive ability is due to preserved differentiation (active individuals have higher initial levels of cognitive ability), or differential preservation (active individuals show less negative change across time). This distinction has never been evaluated after dividing time-varying activity into its two sources of variation: between-person and within-person variability. Further, few studies have investigated how the association between activity participation and cognitive ability may differ from early to older adulthood. Using the PATH Through Life Project, we evaluated whether between- and within-person variation in activity participation was associated with cognitive ability and change within cohorts aged 20-24 years, 40-44 years, and 60-64 years at baseline (n = 7,152) assessed on three occasions over an 8-year interval. Multilevel models indicated that between-person differences in activity significantly predicted baseline cognitive ability for all age cohorts and for each assessed cognitive domain (perceptual speed, short-term memory, working memory, episodic memory, and vocabulary), even after accounting for sex, education, occupational status, and physical and mental health. In each case, greater average participation was associated with higher baseline cognitive ability. However, the size of the relationship involving average activity participation and baseline cognitive ability did not differ across adulthood. Between-person activity and within-person variation in activity level were both not significantly associated with change in cognitive test performance. Results suggest that activity participation is indeed related to cognitive ability across adulthood, but only in relation to the starting value of cognitive ability, and not change over time.     

Does the direction and magnitude of cognitive change depend on initial level of ability?

Longitudinal change in five cognitive abilities was investigated to determine if the direction or magnitude of change was related to the individual's ability level. Adults between 18 and 97 years of age performed three versions of 16 cognitive tests on two occasions separated by an average of 2.7 years. In order to control for influences associated with regression toward the mean, level of ability was determined from scores on the first version of the cognitive tests on the first occasion, and across-occasion change was examined on the second and third versions. Change in every cognitive ability was significantly more negative with increased age. However, there was little indication of ability-dependent change in any of the five cognitive abilities, either in differences between composite scores, or in estimates of latent change. Although there are reasons to expect cognitive change to be less negative at either high or low levels of ability, these data suggest that neither the direction nor magnitude of change is related to initial ability when influences of regression toward the mean are controlled.     

Latent growth curve analyses of accelerating decline in cognitive abilities in late adulthood

Latent growth models were applied to data from the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging to discover if the rate of change in cognitive performance increased from middle age to later adulthood. The sample included 590 participants aged 44 to 88 years at first measurement. Data were gathered at 2 follow-up occasions at intervals of 3 years. Cognitive ability was assessed through 11 tests that tapped crystallized, fluid, memory, and spatial abilities and perceptual speed. Results indicated stability for measures of crystallized ability, linear age changes for many cognitive abilities, and a significant acceleration in linear decline after age 65 for measures with a large speed component. Gender differences were found only in mean level, not in rate of decline.     

On the confounds among retest gains and age-cohort differences in the estimation of within-person change in longitudinal studies: a simulation study

Although longitudinal designs are the only way in which age changes can be directly observed, a recurrent criticism involves to what extent retest effects may downwardly bias estimates of true age-related cognitive change. Considerable attention has been given to the problem of retest effects within mixed effects models that include separate parameters for longitudinal change over time (usually specified as a function of age) and for the impact of retest (specified as a function of number of exposures). Because time (i.e., intervals between assessment) and number of exposures are highly correlated (and are perfectly correlated in equal interval designs) in most longitudinal studies, the separation of effects of within-person change from effects of retest gains is only possible given certain assumptions (e.g., age convergence). To the extent that cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of age differ, obtained estimates of aging and retest may not be informative. The current simulation study investigated the recovery of within-person change (i.e., aging) and retest effects from repeated cognitive testing as a function of number of waves, age range at baseline, and size and direction of age-cohort differences on the intercept and age slope in age-based models of change. Significant bias and Type I error rates in the estimated effects of retest were observed when these convergence assumptions were not met. These simulation results suggest that retest effects may not be distinguishable from effects of aging-related change and age-cohort differences in typical long-term traditional longitudinal designs.     

Effects of age and ability on components of cognitive change

Prior experience with a cognitive task is often associated with higher performance on a second assessment, and these experience effects can complicate the interpretation of cognitive change. The current study was designed to investigate experience effects by obtaining measures of cognitive performance separated by days and by years. The analyses were based on data from 2017 adults with two longitudinal occasions, of whom 948 had also completed a third occasion, with each occasion consisting of three parallel versions of the tests on separate sessions. Change across short intervals was typically positive, and greater among older adults and adults with low levels of cognitive ability, whereas change over intervals of approximately three years was often negative, particularly at older ages. In contrast to the expectation that change over short intervals might be informative about change over longer intervals, relations between short-term change and long-term change were negative, as the individuals who gained the most with assessments separated by days tended to experience the greatest losses across assessments separated by years.     

Task practice differentially modulates task-switching performance across the adult lifespan

Cued-trials task-switching paradigms have been used extensively to examine ageing-related changes in cognitive control. Many studies report an increase in mixing cost (i.e., cost of repeating the same task in a single-task vs. a mixed-task block) and a less reliable increase in switch cost (i.e., cost of switching vs. repeating tasks in a mixed-task block) in old as compared to young adults. However, there is substantial variability between studies in the emergence and size of age effects on mixing and/or switch cost. In this study, we examined variation in mixing cost and switch cost as a function of task practice and preparation interval across the adult lifespan (18-79 years) using a paradigm that promotes advance preparation and reduces cue encoding differences between switch and repeat trials. Both preparation interval and task practice modulated mixing cost and switch cost-but task practice mediated the effects of preparation interval and age differentially for mixing cost and switch cost. Mixing cost was consistently larger in older participants, reduced with preparation and varied little with task practice. In contrast, the effect of preparation interval on switch cost varied with task practice. Reduction in switch cost with preparation interval emerged in younger participants by the second practice session and even later in older participants. When fully practiced, older participants showed greater mixing cost but less switch cost than younger participants. Age effects on both mixing cost and switch cost were mediated by changes in processing of repeat trials, indicative of reduced differentiation between switch and repeat trials in mixed-task blocks. This is consistent with reduced cognitive flexibility with increasing age.     

Establishing normative data for repeated cognitive assessment: A comparison of different statistical methods

Serial cognitive assessment is conducted to monitor changes in the cognitive abilities of patients over time. At present, mainly the regression-based change and the ANCOVA approaches are used to establish normative data for serial cognitive assessment. These methods are straightforward, but they have some severe drawbacks. For example, they can only consider the data of two measurement occasions. In this article, we propose three alternative normative methods that are not hampered by these problems—that is, multivariate regression, the standard linear mixed model (LMM), and the linear mixed model combined with multiple imputation (LMM with MI) approaches. The multivariate regression method is primarily useful when a small number of repeated measurements are taken at fixed time points. When the data are more unbalanced, the standard LMM and the LMM with MI methods are more appropriate because they allow for a more adequate modeling of the covariance structure. The standard LMM has the advantage that it is easier to conduct and that it does not require a Monte Carlo component. The LMM with MI, on the other hand, has the advantage that it can flexibly deal with missing responses and missing covariate values at the same time. The different normative methods are illustrated on the basis of the data of a large longitudinal study in which a cognitive test (the Stroop Color Word Test) was administered at four measurement occasions (i.e., at baseline and 3, 6, and 12 years later). The results are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided.     

Cognitive decline in old age: separating retest effects from the effects of growing older

Repeated administration of cognitive tests improves test performance, making it difficult for researchers to gauge the true extent of age-related cognitive decline. The authors examined this issue using data from the Rush Religious Orders Study and linear mixed-effects models. At annual intervals for up to 8 years, more than 800 older Catholic clergy members completed the same set of 19 cognitive tests from which previously established composite measures of cognitive domains were derived. Retest effects on some measures were substantial and continued to accumulate even after 8 annual test readministrations, but effects on other measures were minimal. Across cognitive measures, retest effects were not related to age, sex, or education. Individual differences in retest effects were substantial but not consistent across cognitive measures. The results suggest that retest-based improvement in cognitive test performance can be substantial and persistent.     

Response–reinforcer dependency and resistance to change

The effects of the response–reinforcer dependency on resistance to change were studied in three experiments with rats. In Experiment 1, lever pressing produced reinforcers at similar rates after variable interreinforcer intervals in each component of a two‐component multiple schedule. Across conditions, in the fixed component, all reinforcers were response‐dependent; in the alternative component, the percentage of response‐dependent reinforcers was 100, 50 (i.e., 50% response‐dependent and 50% response‐independent) or 10% (i.e., 10% response‐dependent and 90% response‐independent). Resistance to extinction was greater in the alternative than in the fixed component when the dependency in the former was 10%, but was similar between components when this dependency was 100 or 50%. In Experiment 2, a three‐component multiple schedule was used. The dependency was 100% in one component and 10% in the other two. The 10% components differed on how reinforcers were programmed. In one component, as in Experiment 1, a reinforcer had to be collected before the scheduling of other response‐dependent or independent reinforcers. In the other component, response‐dependent and ‐independent reinforcers were programmed by superimposing a variable‐time schedule on an independent variable‐interval schedule. Regardless of the procedure used to program the dependency, resistance to extinction was greater in the 10% components than in the 100% component. These results were replicated in Experiment 3 in which, instead of extinction, VT schedules replaced the baseline schedules in each multiple‐schedule component during the test. We argue that the relative change in dependency from Baseline to Test, which is greater when baseline dependencies are high rather than low, could account for the differential resistance to change in the present experiments. The inconsistencies in results across the present and previous experiments suggest that the effects of dependency on resistance to change are not well understood. Additional systematic analyses are important to further understand the effects of the response–reinforcer relation on resistance to change and to the development of a more comprehensive theory of behavioral persistence.     

Making Reading More Difficult: A Degraded Text Microworld for Teaching Reading Comprehension Strategies

We present an empirical study that investigated seventh-, ninth-, and eleventh-grade students’ understanding of the infinity of numbers in an interval. The participants (n = 549) were asked how many (i.e., a finite or infinite number of numbers) and what type of numbers (i.e., decimals, fractions, or any type) lie between two rational numbers. The results showed that the idea of discreteness (i.e., that fractions and decimals had “successors” like natural numbers) was robust in all age groups; that students tended to believe that the intermediate numbers must be of the same type as the interval endpoints (i.e., only decimals between decimals and fractions between fractions); and that the type of interval endpoints (natural numbers, decimals, or fractions) influenced students’ judgments of the number of intermediate numbers in those intervals. We interpret these findings within the framework theory approach to conceptual change.     

Children's memory for the times of events from the past years

This study tested 8–12‐year‐olds' ability to localize in time parent‐reported events from four time intervals ranging from 6 months to 4 years ago. Memory for content was very accurate, and children's time estimates showed substantial agreement with the times provided by their parents. Accuracy of year judgments declined with retention interval, with the greatest change occurring between the 1–2‐year and 2–3‐year intervals. Season, month and time of day accuracy were much more stable over time. There were significant improvements with age in performance on measures of conventional time knowledge, and this performance was correlated with the accuracy of time estimates on the long time scales, controlling for age and general cognitive ability. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive,not physical,engagement in video gaming influences executive functioning

Physically active video games (i.e., exergames), which are a prevalent and popular childhood activity, may have benefits to executive-functioning (EF) skills, as they incorporate both cognitive engagement and physical activity. Acute EF change in 147 7- to 12-year-olds was assessed after participation in a 20-min activity. The between-subjects design had 4 conditions: exergame, sedentary video game, exercise, and nonplaying control. The varied level of physical and cognitive engagement examined whether the nature of the activity, such as physical movement or cognitive engagement in an enjoyable activity, differentially related to changes in different aspects of EF. Participants in the cognitively engaging conditions (i.e., the 2 video game conditions) improved their accuracy on the most complex EF test and their reaction time on the standard EF test more than participants in the other conditions. These findings suggest that the kind of cognitive engagement involved in video game play is the mechanism of acute effects on EF.     

Developmental differences in children’s interpersonal emotion regulation

Previous research on interpersonal emotion regulation (ER) in childhood has been rather unsystematic, focusing mainly on children’s prosocial behaviour, and has been conducted in the absence of an integrative emotion theoretical framework. The present research relied on the interpersonal affect classification proposed by Niven et al. (Emotion, 9:498–509, 2009) to investigate children’s use of different interpersonal ER strategies. The study drew on two samples: 180 parents of children aged between 3 and 8 years reported about a situation where their child was able to change what another person was feeling in order to make them feel better. In addition, 126 children between 3- and 8-years old answered two questions about how they could improve others’ mood. Results from both samples showed age differences in children’s use of interpersonal ER strategies. As expected, ‘affective engagement’ (i.e., focusing on the person or the problem) and ‘cognitive engagement’ (i.e., appraising the situation from a different perspective) were mainly used by 7–8 years-old, whereas ‘attention’ (i.e., distracting and valuing) was most used by 3–4 and 5–6 years-old. ‘Humor’ (i.e., laughing with the target) remained stable across the different age groups. The present research provides more information about the developmental patterns for each specific interpersonal emotion regulation strategy.     

Further analyses of the effects of practice,dropout, sex,socio-economic advantage,and recruitment cohort differences during the University of Manchester longitudinal study of cognitive change in old age

A sample of 4,314 volunteers who, when first recruited, were aged from 41 to 93 years were quadrennially tested from 2 to 4 occasions during the next 4 to 20 years on the Cattell Culture Fair intelligence test, 2 tests of information-processing speed, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) vocabulary test, and 3 memory tests. After significant effects of practice, sex, demographics, socio-economic advantage, and recruitment cohort had been identified and considered, performance on all tests declined with age. These age-related declines accelerated for the Cattell and WAIS, 2 tests of information speed, and 2 of the memory tests. For all tests individuals' trajectories of age-related change diverged with increasing age but, unexpectedly, were not affected by demographic factors. Practice gains from an initial experience of the cognitive tests remained undiminished as the interval before the second experience increased from 4 to 8 + years.     

认知诊断属性分类一致性信度区间估计三种方法

摘要：引入了三种可以估计认知诊断属性分类一致性信度置信区间的方法：Bootstrap法、平行测验法和平行测验配对法。用模拟研究验证和比较了这三种方法的表现,结果发现,平行测验法和Bootstrap法在被试量比较少、题目数量比较少的情况下,估计的标准误和置信区间较接近,但是随着被试量的增加,Bootstrap法的估计精度提高较快,在被试量大和题目数量较多时基本接近平行测验配对法的结果。Bootstrap法的所需时间最少,平行测验配对法计算过程复杂且用时较长,推荐用Bootstrap法估计认知诊断属性分类一致性信度的置信区间。     

Resistance to change of forgetting functions and response rates

This experiment examined the effects of reinforcement probability on resistance to change of remembering and response rate. Pigeons responded on a two-component multiple schedule in which completion of a variable-interval 20-s schedule produced delayed matching-to-sample trials in both components. Each session included four delays (0.1 s, 2 s, 4 s, and 8 s) between sample termination and presentation of comparison stimuli in both components. The two components differed in the probability of reinforcement arranged for correct matches (i.e., rich, p = .9; lean, p = .1). Response rates during the variable-interval portion of the procedure were higher in the rich component during baseline and more resistant to the disruptive effects of intercomponent food and extinction. Forgetting functions were constructed by examining matching accuracy as a function of delay duration. Baseline accuracy was higher in the rich component than in the lean component as measured by differences in the gamma-intercept of the forgetting functions (i.e., initial discrimination), rather than from differences in the slope of the forgetting function (i.e., rate of forgetting). Intercomponent food increased the rate of forgetting relatively more in the lean component than in the rich component, but initial discrimination was not systematically affected. Extinction reduced initial discrimination relatively more in the lean component than in the rich component, but did not systematically affect rate of forgetting. These results are consistent with our previous data suggesting that, as for response rate, accuracy and resistance to change of discriminating are positively related to rate of reinforcement. These data also suggest that the disruptability of remembering depends on the conditions of reinforcement, but the way in which remembering is disrupted depends on the nature of the disruptor.     

Did the popsicle melt? Preschoolers’ performance in an episodic-like memory task

Episodic memory has been tested in non-human animals using depletion paradigms that assess recollection for the “what”, “where” and “when” (i.e., how long ago). This paradigm has not been used with human children, yet doing so would provide another means to explore their episodic memory development. Using a depletion paradigm, preschool-aged children were presented in two trials with a preferred food that was only edible after a short interval and a less-preferred food that was edible after the short and long intervals. Younger (mean?=?40 months) and older (mean?=?65 months) children tended to choose their preferred food after the short intervals, but did not switch to selecting their less-preferred food after the long intervals. Importantly, their choices did not differ with age. Although older children better remembered “what”, “where”, and “what is where” than did younger children, neither age group successfully estimated “how long ago” an event occurred. Finally, both age groups spontaneously recalled information about Trial 1. We also analysed the relation between the different measures used in the study but no clear patterns emerged. Results are discussed with respect to the cognitive mechanisms necessary to succeed in depletion paradigms and the measurement of episodic memory more broadly.     

The perception of empty and filled time intervals by pigeons

Pigeons were trained in a within-subjects design to discriminate durations of a filled interval (2 s and 8 s of light) and durations of an empty interval (2 s and 8 s bound by two 500-ms light markers). Filled intervals required a response to one set of comparisons (e.g., blue vs. yellow), whereas empty intervals required a response to a different set of comparisons (e.g., red vs. green). Psychophysical testing indicated that empty intervals were judged to be longer than equivalent durations of a filled interval. This finding was replicated when the anchor durations used during training were changed to 1 s and 4 s, or 4 s and 16 s. The difference between the point of subjective equality (PSE) for the empty intervals and the PSE for filled intervals increased as the magnitude of the anchor duration pairs increased. In addition, the difference limens (DL) for empty intervals were smaller than those for filled intervals, and they also increased as the magnitude of anchor duration pairs increased. An analysis of the Weber fractions (WF; i.e., DL/PSE) provided evidence for superimposition of the empty and filled timing functions across the different sets of anchor durations. These results suggest that the accumulation of subjective time was greater for empty intervals than for filled intervals. Within the framework of scalar timing theory, this difference in timing appeared to be the result of a clock rate difference rather than a switch latency difference.     

Exploring the within-person coupling of sleep and cognition in older African Americans

This study examined the within-person relationship between sleep and cognitive functioning. Fifty community-dwelling African Americans (age range = 50-80 years) were asked to report their sleep duration and quality the previous evening and to complete cognitive measures over 8 occasions within a 2-3 week period. A within-person daily change in sleep duration was significantly associated with worse global cognitive performance. The greater an individual deviated away from his or her average sleep duration on a particular day, the more likely his or her performance would decline. These results demonstrate that the sleep-cognition relationship can be observed at a within-person level of analysis.     

Further investigation of harmonic priming in long contexts using musical timbre as surface marker to control for temporal effects

Harmonic priming studies have reported facilitated processing for chords that are harmonically related to the prime context. Responses to the target (the last chord of an 8-chord sequence) were faster and more accurate when the target was strongly related, i.e., a tonic chord, to the preceding prime context than when it was less related, i.e., a subdominant chord. Results have been interpreted in terms of musical expectations and processing speed: the prime allows listeners to develop expectations for future events which lead to facilitated processing of the most strongly expected event. The present experiment investigated an alternative hypothesis suggesting that the harmonic structure of the prime context might create an ambiguity about "when" to respond that is stronger in contexts ending on less related targets than in contexts ending on strongly related targets. A change of musical timbre was used as surface marker indicating without ambiguity the temporal occurrence of the target. Participants made speeded intonation judgments of the target, i.e., judging whether targets are acoustically consonant or dissonant. The findings replicate the previously reported priming effect and rule out that processing differences are solely due to ambiguities about when in time the target will occur.