Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.     

Can there be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference?

There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make these terms referentially indirect under the second interpretation. This result is then generalized to proper names, by ascribing them a normative meaning as well.     

Can there be a feature-placing language?

The aim of this article is to argue against the real possibility of languages without subject-predicate structure, so-called feature-placing languages. They were first introduced by Strawson (1959/1990), later given formal expression through Quine's Predicate Functor Logic (Quine, 1960, Quine, 1971/Quine, 1976, Quine, 1992), and further elaboration in (Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995). I argue that, on the presumption that feature-placing languages are not mere notational variants on first-order languages, the idea of such languages is incoherent. The argument for this view rests on two highly plausible views about the conditions for the possibility of sentential meaning in natural languages. If accepted, these two views jointly imply that the sentences of feature-placing languages lack sufficient internal structure to meet the conditions for sentential meaning. Feature-placing languages cannot then count as genuine languages.     

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months (+/-3 months).     

Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?

In three experiments, children aged between 4 and 7 years viewed a circular disc oriented at a slant. The disc was made of luminous material and situated in a darkened chamber. Children of all ages exaggerated the circularity of the disc when they knew that the object was really a circle (the circle task), and the effect was greatest in the younger members of the sample. Crucially, however, a group of children in Experiment 3 who viewed an identical shape that they knew emanated from an actual ellipse did not exaggerate circularity. In the second experiment, children tackled three standard theory of mind tasks in addition to the circle task mentioned above. A significant correlation emerged (even with age partialed) between the extent of exaggeration made by those who knew that the shape was a circle and ability to pass the theory of mind tests. It seems knowledge of reality contaminates judgements of appearance in the circle task. This might be the same bias that features in realist errors in theory of mind tasks.     

Where sex was, there shall gender be? The dialectics of psychoanalytic gender theory

Psychoanalytic theories of gender identity have come a long way since Freud. The author reviews two dialectics that have shaped psychoanalytic gender theory thus far: first, the tension between theories that emphasize biological versus sociocultural influences on gender, and second, the dialectic between nomothetic (i.e., universalizing) and idiographic (i.e., focusing on individual variation) approaches. The author argues that psychoanalytic gender theory could be further enriched with more attention to two additional dialectics. One involves the so-called gender binary and the relative focus on cultural versus developmental aspects of the binary; a second involves the relationship between gender identity and desire. Attention to these dialectics can help better integrate theoretical and clinical perspectives on gender identity.     

Need there be a common currency for decision-making?

Abstract

According to various theorists and empirical scholars of behavior and decision, including economists, utility theorists, behavioral ecologists, behavioral economists and researchers in the new field of neuroeconomics the value (typically understood as utility) of competing choices must be represented on a common scale in order for them to count as competing at all, and in order for orderly comparison to lead to actual choices. For some neuroeconomists this means that expected (cardinal) utilities are neurally represented by firing rates of cells in specific brain regions. In this paper some important statements of the ‘common currency’ argument are reviewed and critically examined. A rational reconstruction of the key argument is then subject to criticism informed by a variety of empirical and theoretical considerations. In a strong form it does not survive the criticism, and this fact points the way to a re-examination of the sense in which complex living systems, including people, are agents in any straightforward sense.     

Should there be a duty to report crime?

A number of studies have examined why people do or do not respond when they observe criminal activities. Traditionally, the legal system has not punished the failure to report a crime. This study sought to ascertain whether a sample of college students and public citizens thought there should be legal punishments for the failure to report crimes. Respondents (N = 301) were presented a list of illegal acts and asked to select from a list (no punishment, fine, or prison sentences) what type of punishment should be enforced for failure to report that crime. Analysis indicated that the sample thought there should be punishments for most of the crimes, with a fine as the modal response. For more serious crimes, more serious punishments were selected, and there were some sex differences. It appeared that public support for such laws might be strong.     

Can Beck's theory of depression and the response style theory be integrated?

There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive theory and the response style theory (S. Nolen-Hoeksema & J. Morrow, 1991). Different propositions of J. A. Ciesla and J. E. Roberts (2007) and S. Lyubomirsky and S. Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, 1995) concerning associations of 2 response styles, brooding and reflection, with constructs of Beck's cognitive theory (schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, automatic thoughts) were tested. Model comparisons were based on a 4-week study in which 397 participants completed self-report instruments at 2 time points. A model allowing schemata to influence brooding and reflection that influence the other cognitive variables of Beck's cognitive theory fits the data better than the other integrated models. However, although schemata were significant predictors of both response styles, neither response style did significantly predict other cognitive variables. A comparison of the integrated model with Beck's original cognitive theory revealed that Beck's original theory fits the data better than the integrated model, whereas both models explain about the same amount of variance. Thus, an integration of Beck's theory and the response style theory are not supported.     

Who thinks inside of me? Some aspects of Merab Mamardašvili`s theory of consciousness

In this article I look at the methodology of one the most unique figures in Russian philosophy—Merab Mamarda?vili—who was known for his focus on consciousness. According to him, the application of the subject–object dualism to the analysis of consciousness leads to a series of complications. Within the phenomenological framework of intentionality there is an interwining of perspective and object to which this perspective is directed. As soon as we try to apply to consciousness subject–object schemes, then we immediately come across paradoxes. It is impossible to determine consciousness by means of subject–object, not only because it is neither an object nor a subject, but also because consciousness inevitably turns out to be “prior” to such distinctions.     

Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and “charges” one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express ∼2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of ∼15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention—augmented electromagnetism which can “tilt” chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.